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Summary 
This is an analysis of the nature and political significance 
of Russian messianism: the idea that the Russian people or 
the Russian State is the "chosen people" or the "chosen 
instrument". I outline the genesis of the theory of Moscow, 
the Third Rome and discuss the ideas and activites of the 
nineteenth-century Slavophils, the pan-Slavists, Dostoevsky 
and Vladimir Solovyov. I examine the influence of 
messianism on Russian Communism, considering Berdiaev's 
views. The main part of the work investigates the rebirth 
of interest in Russian messianism in the Brezhnev period. I 
try to investigate the links between this cultural movement 
and the Russian nationalist elements within the political 
elite. My main sources for this are samizdat journals and 
articles, in particular the journal Veche, cultural journals 
such as Noyyi mir, Molodaia gvardiia and Nash sovremennik, 
Party documents and emlZre journals. I find that Russian 
messianism has been especially important at times when the 
country is in crisis: Russia is in Golgotha, but where there 
is suffering there is also redemption, not only for Russia 
but for humanity. It has by no means been always dominant 
in intellectual thought. It has had little influence (under 
either tsars or Communists) on the fields of nationality 
policy, policy towards religion or foreign policy. Today, 
as in the nineteenth century, its adherents can be opponents 
or supporters of the existing State structure. The growth 
of non-Russian nationalism under Gorbachov, combined with 
glasnost', has fuelled Russian nationalism. This is 
unlikely to be co-opted into the official ideology, because 
it would increase the dissatisfaction of the non-Russians. 
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organizations, Pre-revolutionary titles are 
transliterated according to Soviet orthography. For 
personal names, I have compromised between the Library of 
Congress system and normal British usage. Tsars are 
referred to by their English names. "yi" and "ii" are 
normally rendered as "y" (Dostoevsky); "e" as 6# YO $I or it 0 is 
(Soiovyov, Gorbachov, but Khrushchev as it is the most 
widely used version); hard and soft signs in personal names 
are omitted (Leontev, but Zinoviev as the most widely used 
version). 
Dates toilow the Russian calendar and its change. 
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rntroduction 
In 1971 the former Soviet political prisoner Vladimir 
N. Osipov began publishing within the USSR a samizdat 
journal, Veche (People's Assembly). What distinguished 
this journal from a number of others published by human 
rights activists, social reformers and members of national 
minorities and religious groups was that it was of the 
Russian nationalist tendency. The idea that the Russians 
were the principal victims of the Soviet experience had 
begun to circulate in samizdat, evoking suspicion and 
ridicule from the mainstream human rights movement. Leonid 
1. Pliushch, for example, has said that two such 
nationalist articles "sounded like a voice from the Stone 
Age". 1 At a time when other samizdat journals were being 
forced to suspend publication, Osipov was able to circulate 
nine issues of Veche, in spite of the fact that he made no 
attempt to hide his identity from the authorities. 
It seemed that unofficial Russian nationalism enjoyed 
greater freedom than other forms of political dissent. 
Circles within the regime were apparently extending 
protection to Veche. This was not surprising, since the 
late 1960s had seen the appearance of Russian nationalist 
ideas within the official Soviet media. Part of the Soviet 
establishment was promoting Russian nationalist and 
messianist ideas as an alternative to official Marxism- 
Leninism, an ideology which was proving less and less 
attractive to the young, and as an alternative to the ideas 
of human rights and democratization which were invading 
1 
trom Eastern Europe, the Eurocommunists and the West in 
general. 
Veche sought to continue the line of the Slavophils of 
the nineteenth century and of the writer Fyodor M. 
Dostoevsky. These figures represent links in a chain of 
ideas, going back at least to the twelfth century, which 
can together be termed "Russian messianism". This is a 
concept more specific than Russian nationalism; it 
represents the idea that the Russian people is in some 
sense the "chosen people". In the period of L. I. 
Brezhnev's leadership (19b4-i962), Russian messianism 
broadly defined was not contined to samizdat but appeared 
in "official" literary and political journals as well. 
It might appear strange that Russian nationalism should 
find it necessary to create its own samizdat in the Soviet 
Union. It has long been accepted that at least from the 
time of Stalin, Russian nationalism has been a component 
part of the official Soviet ideoiogy. 2 In terms of Soviet 
behaviour in international politics, it has been argued 
that the Marxist components of the ideology are much less 
significant than the pursuit of "national" or "State" 
interests, however much the original revolutionary goals 
are re-stated. Alec Nove has referred to this possibility: 
a tightly controlled and nominally monolithic 
political system may devote itself to the pursuit of 
nationalist great-power causes, while continuing to adhere 
to 'Marxism7Leninism'. 113 More outspokenly, the former 
2 
National Security Adviser to US President Jimmy Carter, 
Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, declared in 1964: "The Soviet Union 
is the political expression of Russian nationalism. "4 
Other specialists, seeing the growth of Soviet military 
power in the Brezhnev period, have suggested that the 
legacies of Plarx and Lenin may still play a role in the 
Soviet world-view, even it the promotion of world 
revolution is relegated hopelessly low in the priorities of 
the Politburo. As Jonathan Steele put it just after 
Brezhnev's death: 
Soviet leaders believe that the struggle between two 
social systems is the basic international reality of 
today's world. The enlargement of the world socialist 
system from being simply "socialism in one country" 
under Stalin to a "socialist commonwealth" of some 
dozen nations is considered a truly revolutionary 
development. 5 
Major studies of contemporary Russian nationalism began 
appearing in the West in the mid-i970s. The person who has 
done most to bring Russian nationalism to the attention of 
the English-speaking reader is John B. Dunlop. Before him 
much useful work was done by Dimitry V. Pospielovsky. 
Dunlop and Pospielovsky are both sympathetic to Russian 
nationalism. They see the tens of millions of Orthodox 
Russians (and perhaps Ukrainians and Belorussians) as 
providing a mass base for a nationalist movement which 
would emphasize Russia's traditional Orthodox culture. In 
the absence of a strong democratic tradition in Russia, 
they see nationalism as the most viable alternative to 
communism. Dunlop's book The New Russian-Revolutionaries 
(197(b)b portrayed Russian nationalism as a real threat to 
the regime. In his 1983 volume, The Faces of ContemporarY 
3 
Russian-Nationalism, Dunlop wrote that "Russian nationalism 
could become the ruling ideology of state once the various 
stages of the Brezhnev succession have come to an end. "7 
The expectation that Russian nationalism would become 
more important in the USSR was shared by a former Soviet 
journalist who had emigrated to the USA, Aleksandr L. 
: anov (. Yanov). He is of Jewish nationality and, unlike 
Dunlop and Pospielovsky, he is appalled by Russian 
nationalism. In his books Detente after Brezhnev (1977), 
The-New Russian Right (1978) and The Russian Challenýre and 
the Year 2000 (1987) he predicted the convergence of 
dissident Russian nationalism with official Russian 
nationalism in a diabolical anti-Semitic chauvinism which 
would be powerful enough to displace traditional Marxism- 
Leninism as the ideology of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU). 8 He claimed that there was a pattern 
in Russian history whereby Russian nationalist trends, 
however liberal in origin, always tended towards 
cooperation with the State. 
The IIIanov thesis" has already been subjected to some 
justified criticism in Engiish-language periodicals. 9 I 
shall argue below that Ianov's historical analogy is 
invalid, at least as far as the nineteenth century (his own 
example) is concerned. Furthermore, empirically, Russian 
nationalism over the period since the 1960s has not tended 
to merge with the State. On the contrary, some of it 
evolved towards the human rights movement. I shall also 
4 
argue that Ianov, Dunlop and Pospielovsky all overestimated 
the possible attraction of Russian nationalism, either as a 
focus of mass discontent and opposition to the regime, or 
as a possible direction in which the regime itself might 
evolve. 
Unfortunately, most of the major studies of 
contemporary Russian nationalism published until now have 
lacked a detailed historical perspective. If one is to 
evaluate and explain the ideas of people who claim to be 
influenced by the Slavophils and Dostoevsky, it is 
necessary to have a clear understanding of the political 
views and the political and cultural activity of the 
antecedents. I begin by considering the origin and nature 
of messianism, in a comparative perspective, with 
particular reference to Jewish messianism. In the bulk of 
this thesis, I have sought to explain the nature and 
political role of Russian messianism, the thread that links 
such ideas as "Moscow, the Third Rome", Slavophilism, pan- 
Slavism, Popuiism (narodnichestvo) and much of contemporary 
Russian nationalism, as well as influencing even Bolshevism 
and Staiinism. In the analysis of Russian messianism, I 
find it helpful to distinguish between two poles: one which 
emphasizes the State, and one which emphasizes the land and 
the people. These two poles can be politically totally 
opposed to each other, although both remain within the 
messianist framework. The State-oriented messianism is 
linked with the idea of Moscow's domination of other 
peoples (nationalist messianism), whereas the people- 
oriented messianism is linked with the idea of the Russian 
5 
people as being a model for other nations to follow 
(universalist messianism). Both poles, although 
historically dependent on Orthodoxy, find their reflection 
in the official Soviet media of the 1980s. These ideas of 
a unique role for Russia often appear as a reaction against 
attempts to import Western models, whether they be 
introduced by tsars like Peter I, Marxists like Georgy V. 
Plekhanov or liberals like Andrei D. Sakharov. 
In the historical part of the thesis, my main primary 
sources have been the writings of the Slavophils, 
Dostoevsky, Vladimir S. Solovyov, Nikolai A. Berdiaev and 
Lenin. I have also considered, where appropriate, Soviet 
analyses of the thinkers and movements under discussion. 
In dealing with what I consider the contemporary period, 
from i9b4 onwards, I have used samizdat materials, the 
official Soviet media and emigre literature. A central 
feature here is my discussion of the nine issues of 
Osipov's Veche, the most influential Russian nationalist 
samizdat journal. There is so far no adequate treatment in 
English of the contents of Veche and the relations between 
the main contributors. I have attempted to fill that gap. 
I hope to show that Russian messianism is a major and 
durable trend of Russian thought, although its influence on 
policy-makers has not been great. Here I pay particular 
attention to nationality and religious policy, and some to 
foreign policy. I have concentrated on developments up to 
the end of the Brezhnev era, but I have found it worthwhile 
to include some limited discussion of trends since then, 
6 
particular in view of the revival of political and cultural 
life under M. S. Gorbachov. I conclude by assessing the 
prospects for Russian nationalism in the future. 
7 
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Chapter Une 
The Origins of Russian Messianism 
Messianism has a place in many religions, including 
Persian Zoroastrianism and the "nativistic" religions of 
primitive tribes (such as the cargo cults of Melanesia), 
There are elements of it in Hinduism and Buddhism. It has 
nowhere been of greater social importance 
and from there in Christianity. Islam is 
messianic religion, but even there messia 
developed, such as the Mahdist movements. 
central to the ideas of the Shi'ites, but 
rejected by the Sunnite Muslims. 1 
than in Judaism, 
not essentially a 
nic sects have 
Mahdism is 
is generally 
The word "Messiah" is I rom the Hebrew mashiah, meaning 
"the anointed one,, 2. What seems to be the characteristic 
feature of all movements or ideas described as forms of 
I'messianism" is the concept of the "anointed" or "chosen" 
individual, people or group. This is as true for the 
contemporary cults around individual "Messiahs" such as 
Charles Manson and the Rev. Jim Jones in the United States 
as for the older forms of messianism. 
3 The elasticity of 
the term is recognized by R. J. Zwi Werblowsky: 
The term messianism ... denoting the 
Jewish religious 
concept of a person with a speciai mission from God, is 
used in a broad and at times very loose sense to refer 
to beliefs or theories regarding an eschatological 
(concerning the last times) improvement of the state of 
man or the world, and a final consummation of history. 
4 
Hans Kohn defined messianism as 
... primarily the religious belief in 
the coming of a 
redeemer who will end the present order of things, 
either universally or for a single group, and institute 
a new order of justice and happiness. 
5 
9 
This is a good description of Jewish messianism, but the 
restriction ot I messianism to "religious" belief is too 
narrow for present purposes. Messianism will be understood 
here to embrace secular as well as religious beliefs, and 
will concern a "redeemer" or "Messiah" which may be an 
entity such as a particular nation, Class or party, or an 
individual person. 
Messianism is closely related to "miilenarianism" or 
lichiliasm", but it is not identical with them. These 
terms, derived from the word for "thousand" in Latin and 
Greek respectively, referred originaily to the thousand- 
year Kingdom of God on Earth expected after the Second 
Coming of Christ. Yonina Talmon defines millenarian 
movements as "religious movements that expect imminent, 
total, ultimate, this-worldly collective salvation". 6 The 
majority of millenarian movements are messianic in that it 
is expected that salvation will be brought about by a 
divine (as in Christianity) or divinely-chosen redeemer, 
but this is not always the case. Conversely, the 
expectation of a Messiah does not always involve 
the expectation of total redemption which characterizes 
millenarianism. 7 Nor should messianism or millenarianism 
be confused with utopianism, which might be defined as the 
description of ideal societies without the specification of 
the means (still less any "chosen" means) to attain them. 
It would be wrong to expect the Russian word messianizm 
to have precisely the same nuances as the English. It is 
10 
worth quoting a description of messianizm given by the 
Russian Christian philosopher, Vladimir S. Solovyov 0853- 
1900). 
Outside the theological sphere, although in connection 
with religious ideas, in all peo=ies who have played an 
important role in history, on the awakening of their 
national consciousness there has arisen the conviction 
of the special advantage of the given people, as the 
chosen bearer and perpetrator ýsoyershitei') of the 
historical fate of mankind. 8 
While messianizm has the same wide range of attributes as 
the English word, in Russian it seems to be particularly 
associated with the concept of the chosen people, as 
Solovyov's description suggests. 
Father Superior Gennady Eikalovich, a present-day 
"I "I Russian emiFre, offers an alternative definition. 
Messianism is an ideological philosophy of history 
(istoriosofskaia ideologiia), according to which the 
life at the people in all its aspects must depend as 
far as possible on the principles at Christian ethics. 9 
He has not justified his definition, which effectively 
reduces messianism to Christianity. Although his 
definition does not coincide with that used here, it shouid 
be remembered that "messianism" sometimes conveys 
Eikalovich's definition. 
Eikalovich considers Solovyov's definition to be too 
wide, embracing missionizm as well as messianizm. 10 It is 
true that these two notions are related and sometimes 
confused. The difference between them was explained by 
the Russian Orthodox existentialist philosopher, Nikolai A. 
Berdiaev (1874-1948), who was himself influenced by 
Solovyov. Berdiaev wrote, in a passage which is cited with 
11 
approvai in a contemporary samizdat =-ssay: 
Messianizm derives from Messiah, missionizm from 
mission. Messianizm is much more exacting than 
missIgn-LZM. It is easy to assume that each nation has 
its particular mission, its cai-t_ng in the world, 
corresponding to the uniqueness :: ± its individuality. 
But the messianic consciousness claims an exclusive 
calling, a calling which is relizious and universal in 
its significance, and sees in the given people the 
bearer of the messianic spirit. The given people is 
God's chosen people, and in it --as the Messiah. 
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Jewish messianism 
Judaism told the Jewish people 7--at they were the 
"chosen" people, and that the Messia-- would be born among 
them. The understanding of the tunc----ons of the chosen 
people and the Messiah changed as tf=e passed. The 
development of Jewish messianism brought out the tension 
between universalist messianism and nationalist messianism 
which has been common to later messianisms. The 
universalist interpretation of Jewish messianism was that 
Israel was divinely chosen to enligh-t: en the Gentiles about 
the one true God and carry His salvation to the end of the 
earth. The nationalist interpretaticn, on the other hand, 
focussed on a national warrior hero. This Messiah would 
fulfil God's promise to His people and gather them 
together, reinstate them in Palestine in prosperity and 
destroy the enemies of Israel. These two interpretations 
have coexisted throughout Jewish history, although with 
differing degrees of emphasis on each. 12 
The tirst "chosen person" in the Old Testament is Noah, 
but it was his descendant Abraham who made the "Covenant" 
with God. Abraham was promised the land ot Canaan, and his 
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descendants were promised greatness, --n condition of their 
being true to God and circumcising t--eir maies. i3 The 
despair, born of the unhappy fortunes of the "chosen 
people" in the 4000 years since the supposed Covenant, 
contributed to the development of ex-ýýectations of a Messiah 
and to the support for successive movements, led by people 
claiming to be the Messiah, which formed an almost 
permanent part of Jewish history. 14 Even in its 
secularized version, the messianic idea exercises "unbroken 
and vital power" among Jews today. 1b 
For the ancient prophets of the Old Testament, such as 
Hosea, Amos and Isaiah, the Messiah was a national, 
political figure of this world, within history, who would 
restore the national independence of Israel, re-establish 
the House of David and rule as King Israel. The country 
would be glorious and there would be everlasting peace. 
Sometimes there appears the idea of the other nations 
coming under Israel's political influence. 16 The 
universalist dimension appears, for example, in Isaiah ii, 
2-4, written c. 740-700 B. C. Here it is prophesied that 
in the last days ... all nations" will turn to the God 
of Israel who will judge them and inaugurate peace: 
... out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of 
the LORD from Jerusalem. 
Spiritual bliss and material prosperity are pr(: )mised. 1'7 
Sigmund Mowinckel argues that this universalism is limited 
by Jewish nationalism, since the God of all nations is 
firstly the God of Israel. According to Mowinckel, this is 
true of even "Deutero-Isaiah" (the unknown author of Isaiah 
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xl-lv), who prophesies the coming of -ýhe Servant of the 
Lord, interpreted by Judaism as the Jewish people and by 
Christianity as Christ. The "future hope" of this period 
was for "God's kingly rule on earth through the world- 
hegemony of Israel and her Davidic ruler". 18 
Later in the development of Judaism, the wider cosmic 
background was added into the messianic idea, with 
expectations of the apocalyptic struggle between Israel and 
the heathens. Conceptions of the Resurrection of the Dead, 
the Last Judgement, Paradise and Hell were introduced in 
order to meet the need for an expectation of personal (as 
opposed to national) reward and punishment. These ideas 
are to be found in writings such as the Book of Daniel (c. 
Ibb B. C. ) and the two Books of Enoch. 19 The Book of Daniel 
has been described by Norman Cohn as nationalist propaganda 
for the lower strata of Jewish society, intended to counter 
the attempts of their foreign rulers to destroy the Jewish 
religion. In Daniel's dream (ch. vii), God rewards His 
people for their loyalty. 
And the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the 
kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the 
people of the saints of the most High, whose kingdom is 
an everiastin kingdom, and all dominions shall serve 
and obey him. 
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Cohn calls this vision of the everlasting dominion of 
Israel over all peoples "collective megalomania". 21 
This later Judaism promoted a dualistic view of the 
world, with a sharp transition expected between "this age" 
and the "age to come". "This age" was seen as under the 
dominion of Satan, represented by the heathen powers ruling 
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the Jewish people. The sufferings o--,; the Jews would climax 
in the coming of the Messiah. There were two strands to 
the character of the Messiah in later Judaism: the first is 
national and this-worldly, as in the ancient prophets, and 
the second is universalistic and other-worldly. These two 
strands were never completely reconciled, and the masses 
clung to the national Messiah. The fact that frequently a 
real person was regarded (for a while) by the people as 
the Messiah demonstrates that the Messiah was seen as a 
political figure of this world. The spiritual elements 
never replaced the political basis of messianism. The 
Messiah would be a warrior, God's active instrument who 
would destroy the heathen powers. He would allow only 
those who converted to Judaism and submitted to Israel to 
survive. They would become tributary vassals to the 
Messiah and no longer be allowed to live in Israel's land. 
In this "age to come", Israel would have Paradise in 
Palestine while the heathen would be in Hell. Further on 
in the development of Judaism, there was an increasing 
tendency to distinguish the Kingdom of the Messiah from the 
Kingdom of God. The messianic kingdom became a 
transitional, earthly kingdom, of limited duration (500 or 
1000 years) after which the Messiah and all living people 
would die. Then would come the Resurrection of the Dead 
and the eternal universalist Kingdom of God. 22 
Jewish messianism is essentially linked with 
catastrophe. The sufferings of the Jews promoted the 
messianic ideology, and later, the occurrence of 
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particuiarly cruel persecution was =-=-t-n as heralding 
redemption. 23 This was the case -Irc= b3 B. C. to 72 A. D. 
when the increasing repression under -. he Roman occupation 
promoted expectations of the imminen-: coming of the Messiah 
and the appearance of numerous lalse Y[essiahs. 24 Judaism 
refused to accept Jesus Christ as the Messiah, since Christ 
was not the national, political hero who was expected. 
Christ's reported interpretation of --hLe messianic 
prophesies of the Old Testament to refer to inward 
spiritual salvation, rather than to -!: hLe historical world, 
was not regarded as legitimate. 25 
After the sacking of Jerusalem and the dispersal of the 
Jews, their religion held them toget-l-Ler and the messianic 
idea continued to evolve. Moses Maimonides (died 1204) 
taught that the Messiah would restore the Jews to Palestine 
but would not create Paradise or enable Israel to dominate 
other nations. The world would continue as before, within 
the laws of nature. 26 But Maimonides' views did not leave 
a lasting impression on the Jewish consciousness. The 
sufferings associated with the expulsion of the Jews from 
Spain in 1492 were again seen as the birthpangs of the 
messianic era. 27 In the sixteenth-century doctrine known 
as the Cabbala, it is posited that T srael will redeem the 
whole world through fulfilling the commandments of the 
Torah. Thus the Messiah becomes the entire Jewish people, 
rather than an individual redeemer, and the messianism is 
universalist rather than nationalist. 28 The most 
significant Jewish messianic movement after Christianity, 
however, was that around the individual "Messiah" Sabbatai 
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Zevi ýib2o-ib7b) in Smyrna. Rejecte-- by the rabbinic 
authorities, he nevertheless attract=-d followers in every 
part of the Diaspora, including the '-, -emen, Russia and 
Britain. Like other false Messiahs, ýie failed to restore 
the Jews, and he himself was forced 7o convert to Islam. 29 
Some universalist religious Jews in nineteenth-century 
Europe came to regard the Diaspora -. =ý; as a tragedy but as 
part of God's strategy to bring enligý: Ltenment to the 
nations through the Jewish people. 30 Other Jews, 
influenced by European concepts of namionalism, looked 
towards the gathering of Jews in Palestine. Rabbi Jehuda 
Alkalay (1798-1878) and Z. H. Kalisher (1795-1874) combined 
Jewish nationalism with the belief that the messianic age 
was imminent. Moses Hess (1812-1875), more through the 
influence of Hegel than that of traditional religion, came 
like them to conclude that Jews shouid go to Palestine. 31 
Pogroms and persecution of Jews in the Russian Empire in 
the late nineteenth century and the growing insecurity of 
Jews throughout Europe added weight to the movement for a 
return to the land of Zion. 
Jacob Katz describes Zionism, the belief in the need 
for a Jewish home in Palestine, as Jewish messianism, 
purged of its miraculous elements but deriving much 
ideological and emotional appeal from the original 
doctrine. 32 David Ben-Gurion, who became the first Prime 
Minister of the State of Israel in 1948, was himself an 
atheist. He considered that a person of Jewish origin 
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rema: Lned a Jew so long as he or she -; --d not adopt another 
religion. 33 Gershom G. Scholem acce=--s that Zionism is a 
secular movement, but one linked wit-- religion and likely 
to be transitional to a rebirth of J--idaism. Similarly, but 
from an unsympathetic viewpoint, Nat-nan Weinstock considers 
Zionism to be a secularization of traditional Jewish 
messianism, retaining the latter's "mythical" and 
"irrational" character. 34 The fact -7: hLat the establishment 
of the State of Israel followed the ýss destruction of 
Jews in the Nazi Holocaust seemed to conform to the 
messianic idea of catastrophe being a prelude to 
redemption. 35 
A fundamental problem remains, however, in reconciling 
traditional Jewish messianism with modern Zionism. If the 
establishment of the Jewish State is to be understood as 
the beginning of the fulfilment of the Old Testament 
prophecies, then there should be an identifiable Messiah 
leading the restoration. Mowinckel, aware of this, calls 
Zionism 
... a kind of politico-religious 'Messianism' without a 
Messiah, thought out in terms of immanent political 
forces but coloured by a romantic, religious 
nationalism. 3(5 
Some orthodox messianist Jews have considered the attempt 
to create Israel without a Messiah to be blasphemous. 
These include the Neturei Karta group in Mea Shearim, 
Jerusalem, who decorate their homes with the slogan 
"Zionism is a rebellion against God". 37 Although linked 
with messianism in its origins, political Zionism today is 
best considered a nationalist movement, even though the 
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criterion for acceptance into the namion (in the "Law of 
Return") is religious. 
Christian messianism 
The Christianity of Jesus was pure messianism. The 
Greek christos (the anointed one) was a translation of the 
Hebrew mashiah, and the Gospels tracet Jesus's ancestry 
back to David, apparently trying to -egitimate His 
messianic status. 38 It has, indeed, ---een argued that the 
account of Jesus's activity given in -te Gospels was 
distorted in order to make Christiar=_7 less unacceptable 
to the Roman Empire. Samuel G. F. Braadon suggests that 
Jesus's disciples believed that He was their national 
Messiah, and were close in their out--zok to the Jewish 
anti-Roman group, the Zealots. Hyam Y-accoby claims that 
"Jesus was a Jewish Resistance leader. " Brandon sees 
Jesus's triumphal entry into Jerusalem on an ass in the 
week of the Crucifixion as a politica- demonstration in 
which He assumed the "Messiahship". -17he Roman Procurator 
of Judaea, Pontius Pilate, sentenced --esus to death because 
he was convinced that He was politica-ly dangerous. 39 
Whether or not this is true, as early as the first 
century A. D. the word christos was adopted by Christians to 
remove the national political connota---Lons of the Jewish 
Messiah, and spiritualize and universalize the concept of 
salvation. 40 The "chosen people" were now considered to be 
not the Jews but the followers of Christ, Jew or Gentile. 
The Book of Revelations, also known as the Apocalypse (c. 
93 A. D. ) prophesies the events of the "last days", the 
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struggles between the forces of ligr--- anci the Torces of 
darkness, and the Resurrection of the Dead. It is an 
expression of Jewish apocalyptic thought, combining Judaist 
and Christian elements. Revelations xix and xx contain the 
Jewish visions of a messianic figure with a sharp sword, 
and of a messianic kingdom lasting a thousand years. The 
Messiah is not a Jewish national hero, however, but an 
altruistic warrior, exalting the poor and smiting the rich, 
and rewarding the just of all nations. This is in the more 
universalistic spirit of the Old Testament prophets of 
early Judaism, rather than the nationalism of Daniel. 41 
Just as the Jews still waited for their Messiah, so 
Christ's Apostles looked forward to their Master's Second 
Coming, when Christ would rule the earth and fulfil the 
promises of the sermon on the mount. He had promised to 
return within the lifetime of some of those living then. 42 
The sufferings of the Christians under the Roman 
persecution strengthened their belief that the Second 
Coming was imminent, just as Jewish messianic expectations 
were strengthened by catastrophe. But Christ failed to 
return and the churches moved towards an accommodation with 
the earthly powers. In the Eastern Church, millenarianism, 
with its promise of imminent salvation for the poor and 
punishment for the powerful, was discredited by the middle 
of the second century. The Book of Revelations was removed 
from scriptural canon. Millenarianism was the accepted 
orthodoxy in the Western Church for much longer, but after 
Christianity became the official religion of the Roman 
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Empire in the fourth century, Church --octrine was modified 
to sanction the political rulers. X---lenarianism was 
denounced as a Jewish heresy at the ý---uncil of Ephesus in 
431, The belief in the imminent mess--anic age, with the 
struggle of Christ and Antichrist preticted in the 
Apocalypse, was confined to millenar--an sects. These were 
composed mainly of the poor, and they fought Church and 
State. 43 
Messianism in the West 
A series of revolutionary messian: c and millenarian 
movements, based on Christianity, a±--=-cted parts of north- 
western Europe from the end of the eleventh century to the 
middle of the sixteenth. People who -acked a secure place 
in the rapidly-changing society turned towards individuals 
and movements which promised to lead --hem to a new society, 
often based on common ownership. The enemy was sometimes 
the Saracens, and usually the rich and the Jews. Unusual 
suffering again strengthened messianic expectations. 44 
Later, the victories of the British, American and French 
revolutions led to the spread of universalist messianism, 
which frequently became nationalistic and was used to 
justify expansionism by military means. In 1648 a Member 
of Parliament named Hugh Peter expressed his belief that 
England was God's "elect nation", des-ýýined to use her 
military power to root out monarchism throughout Europe. 4t 
These sentiments were reinforced in the nineteenth century, 
after Britain had acquired an empire. Rudyard Kipling 
wrote "The White Man's Burden" (1898) and Cecil Rhodes 
21 
proclaimed his countr7 to be the "ch--sen instrument" to 
bring societies based on "peace, liberty and justice" into 
existence around the world. 4b 
In the nineteenth century, many Americans became 
convinced of the "Manifest Destiny" c., - the United States to 
carry the torch of liberty throughoum the world. Theodore 
Poesche and Charles Goepp, in a book entitled The New-Rome, 
or the United States of the World (18t3), said that all 
peoples, as they overthrew their tyrants, should demand 
admission to the USA. "A people cannot forego its mission, 
and the mission of the American people is not bounded by 
oceans. " As a first step they suggested that the United 
States should annex the Caribbean, Central America as far 
as Panama, Hawaii and the whole British Empire. 47 
It is impossible to divorce these ideologies of 
nationalist messianism from the nationalist movements that 
appeared in Europe after the French Revolution of 1789. 
Students of nationalism have long associated it with 
industrialization and urbanization. Nationalist ideologies 
as a rule came from the intellectual strata of the 
population. Professional groups such as teachers, lawyers, 
doctors and clergy staffed the movements, while gentry, 
peasants, industrialists seeking protected national 
markets, and urban workers provided support. The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs study group on 
nationalism led by Edward Hallett Carr presented a classic 
statement in 1939. 
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As far as it is humanly possible --o judge, the national 
movements would not have arisen, Dr would not have 
merited the title of 'national', if it had not been for 
the growth of the capitalist syszýem and the Industrial 
Revolution. 48 
A prominent nineteenth-century advocate of the view 
that revolutionary France was "chosen to lead and enlighten 
the world" was Jules Michelet. 49 He considered that 
France, when poised to invade Belgium in 1792, had 
represented "Justice" and "eternal reason". Sacrificing 
herself for humanity, France was "the interpreter between 
God and man". 50 The link between revolution and 
nationalist messianism is highlighted by Regis Debray, a 
French socialist and adviser to President Francois 
Mitterrand. 
... all the revolutionaries I have known personally were 
ardent patriots whose 'internationalism' was generally 
a national messianism... in Cuba and Vietnam being a 
revolutionary - not only now that a workers' state 
exists, before as well - means being a nationalist. 
He includes himself in this category. 
... let me confess frankly to a personal inclination for 
Jacobin messianism: I have always really believed that 
France will again bear the torch of revolution to the 
rest of Europe. 5i 
The stateless nations in the nineteenth century were no 
more immune to nationalist messianism than the nations 
already possessing states. Giuseppe Mazzini, for example, 
saw the Messiah in the Italian people. 52 In the 
nationalist and messianist movements of the Slav peoples, 
German ideas were influential. Johann G. Herder, a German 
romantic, proclaimed in 1784 that the Slavs were to be the 
leaders of Europe. This was because of their rural 
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occupation, their unspoilt backwardness, their peace-loving 
disposition and lack of ambition to rule, which at that 
time meant that many of them were living under a foreign 
yoke. He looked forward to their future emancipation. 
Another German, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) 
claimed that God had given each people a particular 
mission. 53 These ideas were taken up by the 
Russian Slavophils, but before them by thinkers from 
those Slav peoples that were more culturally oriented to 
the West. When Tsar Nicholas I crushed the 1831 Polish 
rising, the Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz depicted Poland as 
the "Christ of the nations". 54 
And they martyred the Polish people and laid it in the 
grave, and its soul descended into darkness. 
But on the third day the soul shall return to the body 
and the nation shall rise from the dead and free all 
the peoples of Europe from slavery. 55 
In conclusion, it seems true to say that almost every 
national group in nineteenth-century Europe, as well as the 
Americans, found their "prophets" who informed the group 
that it had been chosen for a particular missicDn. 
5b It is 
worth remembering this before beginning the discussion of 
Russian messianism. 
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Russian messianism 
This thesis is mainly concerned with Russian 
messianism, that is, with the idea T---at the Russian people 
(or other Russian entity) is uniquelT "chosen" in the sense 
described earlier. Contemporary Russian messianism owes a 
large debt, which is frequently ackncwledged, to earlier 
Russian messianist doctrines. It is therefore justifiable 
to devote considerable attention here to these doctrines, 
including the concept of "Moscow, the Third Rome", the 
theories of Slavophilism and pan-Slavism, and the writings 
of Dostoevsky, Solovyov and Berdiaev. These doctrines of 
Russian messianism, as of other messianisms, have included 
both nationalistic and universalistic elements. 
At present, we are handicapped not only by the lack of 
work on Russian messianism, considered as a recurring 
phenomenon with a history lasting several centuries, but 
also by the lack of a comprehensive study of the 
development of either Russian nationalism or Russian 
national consciousness. Instead we have several studies 
dealing with particular aspects of Russian nationalism and 
a monograph dealing with national consciousness in the 
eighteenth century. 57 
The many histories of Russian philosophy, published in 
Russian and in Western languages, devote considerable 
attention to philosophies of Russian messianism in the 
context of the overall development of Russian philosophy. 
Similarly, James H. Billington's mammoth study of Russian 
culture considers many examples of messianism. 58 No 
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student of Russian messianism can ignore the work of Hans 
Kohn, the author of many books and armicles on Russian 
thought and on nationalism in general. Kohn is 
particularly noteworthy for having considered Russian 
messianism in a comparative context. The nature of his 
comparisons have, however, been criticized for their pro- 
Western bias. Louis L. Snyder sees a dichotomy in Kohn 
between "good" West European nationalism and "bad" East 
European nationalism, and Ken Wolf has supported Snyder's 
view. 59 
The monographs of Hildegard Schaeder and Nicolas Zernov 
have discussed "Moscow, the Third Rome". 60 A considerable 
number of books have appeared on Slavophilism and pan- 
Slavism, and even more on the work of Dostoevsky. Michael 
Cherniavsky's Tsar and People deals with the evolution of 
two central myths of Russian messianism up to 1917: the 
myth of the Tsar as the "saintly ruler", which is linked 
with the "Third Rome" idea; and the myth of "Holy Russia", 
which expresses the idea of the chosen people. 61 Berdiaev 
considered messianism to be one of the most important 
components of the "Russian idea", and he discussed it 
frequently in the book of that name and in his other 
books. 52 Three works by Westerners specifically address 
themselves to the theme of Russian messianism: ETnmAnuel 
Sarkisyanz's Russiand und der Messianismus des Orients, 
Gugliemo Guariglia's Il Messianismo russo and Vatro 
Murvar's long article "Messianism in Russia: Religious and 
Revolutionary". 63 These three share with Berdiaev a 
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concern with relating the messianism ci pre-revoiutionary 
Russia to Boishevism and the Soviet S-late. They have tried 
to find an explanation for existing Ecviet reality in the 
history of Russian thought. Guarigi--a and Sarkisyanz ýin 
the first half of his book) provide ý-seful surveys of 
Russian messianism. (The second hai-t of Sarkisyanz's book 
concerns the relationship between Russian messianism and 
messianisms in a number of Asian rei-, Sions. ) Murvar's 
article is devoted to enumerating the common 
characteristics shared by religious messianisms and 
revolutionary messianisms in Russia. Unfortunately, he 
fails to provide a working definiti= of "messianism" and 
this enables him to exaggerate the -; =-. Dortance of messianism 
in Russian revolutionary thought. Furthermore, he fails to 
consider the importance of messianism in other countries. 
As a result he overstates his conclusion that revolutionary 
messianisms in Russia, including Bolshevism, had an 
especially "religious" character. b4 
Perhaps not surprisingly, many of those in the West who 
write on themes associated with Russian messianism are ot 
Russian origin, This does not mean that they are all 
sympathetic to Russian messianism. Berdiaev, for example, 
described messianism as "always a rejudaization of 
Christianity". b5 Writers of Jewish origin or of other 
nationalities which suffered from Russian imperialism, on 
the other hand, have been hostile to Russian messianism. 
For example, one Ukrainian nationalist wrote in a London 
emig. re i. ournal: "... Russian Messianism is the Messianism of 
a barbarous horde and is furthered by the Russian people.,, bb 
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It will not be possible to proviae a complete outline 
of all the doctrines of Russian mess--anism that have 
appeared in the last five centuries. Only the most 
influential theories will be considered. I shall be 
particularly concerned with the att4----jde taken by these 
doctrines to the Jews, the proponents of a messianism 
totally incompatible with Russian messianism; the attitude 
to the other non-Russian nationalities which came under 
Russian political control; and the im-, Diications of these 
doctrines for Russian foreign policy. Further, the 
political consequences of the doctrines will be considered. 
Did they remain the theories of inte-, I-ectuals, ignored 
or rejected by rulers? Or were thev ideologies which 
justified existing circumstances, to which rulers paid only 
lip service? Did they sometimes af±ect the policy-making 
process'? 
Moscow. the Third Rome 
In the second half of the fitteen-zýh century and the 
early sixteenth century, the idea developed that Moscow had 
a unique religious and political mission as the successor 
to Rome and Byzantium. The earliest surviving formulation 
of this idea is probably that in a le-i: ter by the monk 
Filofei (Philotheus), the elder (starets) of Eleazarov 
monastery in Pskov, written in 1511. Filofei addressed his 
Tsar, Vasily III, with these words. 
The Church of old Rome fell because of the impiety of 
the Apollinarian heresy; the Church of the Second Rome, 
Constantinople, was smitten under the battle-axes of 
the Agarenes; but this present Church of the Third, New 
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Rome, of Thy sovereign empire: the Holy Catholic 
Apostolic Church ... shines in the whole universe more 
resplendent than the sun. And let it be known to Thy 
Lordship, 0 pious Czar, that all the empires of the 
Orthodox Christian Faith have converged into Thine one 
empire. Thou art the sole Emperor of all the 
Christians in the whole universe ... For two Romes have 
fallen, and the Third stands, and a fourth shall never 
be, for Th 
others... 
ý Christian Empire shall never devolve upon 
The supposedly unique merits of the Church of Moscow are 
used here to justify the claim of the Muscovite ruler to 
lead a universal Christian Empire. Moscow is the chosen 
city, and its prince is the chosen Emperor. 
I shall outline how the "Third Rome" idea was rooted in 
Muscovite culture and how it emerged under the impact of 
the events of the fifteenth century. The link made in 
Muscovy between a state and a supposedly universal church 
had a direct antecedent in Byzantium. As the Byzantine 
Empire declined, the Eastern Church increasingly took on 
the aspects of a Greek national church rather than a 
universal church. t8 At the same time, Byzantine messianism 
presented Constantinople as both the "New Rome" and the 
"New Jerusalem". tg Muscovy could also look back to old- 
Russian elements in its heritage: Metropolitan Ilarion of 
Kiev, in a sermon of 1049 entitled "On Law and Grace", 
spoke of a great temple within the "city of glory, Kiev", 
evoking the image of the Holy City, Jerusalem. 
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Sixteenth-century Moscow appropriated this. The Soviet 
scholars Iu. M. Lotman and B. A. Uspensky commented: 
It is characteristic that the idea of Moscow, the Third 
Rome, could quite soon be transformed into the idea of 
Moscow, the New Jerusalem, which did not contradict the 
first idea but could be taken as its concretization. 71 
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While Rus' was breaking up into : ý-uding principalities, 
from the eleventh to the thirteentEL 7: anturies, the Orthodox 
Church became the symbol of national --nity. Then, in the 
period of Mongol occupation, the ChurchL was a rallying 
point for national feeling, The tramster of the seat of 
the Russian Metropolitan from Vladimir to Moscow in 132b 
was vital to Moscow's assumption of national leadership. 
Muscovy considered itself a communit7 of faith, and 
nationality was determined by religi2n; a Tatar baptised in 
the Orthodox Church was considered a -7:;, ussian. 
Thus there 
was a tendency to regard Orthodoxy ýand therefore 
Christianity) as synonymous with Russ--anness. 
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From the late fourteenth century, the monasteries 
developed the ideological claim that 2ýuscovy and her Grand 
Dukes were chosen to represent the c-ý-max of Christian 
history. The belief was reinforced b7 the fall of other 
Orthodox states to the advance of the Muslim Turks, and the 
success of the Muscovite rulers in drawing other Russian 
cities around themselves in battle against the Mongols. 
The Russian monks began to see Moscow as holier than 
Byzantium herself. In 14-119, at the -ouncil of Florence, 
the Byzantine Church accepted union with the Roman Catholic 
Church, ending (temporarily) the Schism which had divided 
the churches of West and East. Host--'e to the Latins and 
feeling threatened by Catholic neight--urs, the Musc-; ovite 
Grand Duke Vasily II repudiated the union. He ousted 
Metropolitan Isidore, the Russian re-presentative at 
Florence, who was Greek by birth, in -, 441. A Church 
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ý-, ouncil in 1446 replaced Isidore wit-- -a native Russian, 
without the approval of the Constant: aopie Patriarch, and 
proclaimed the autonomy of the Russiarý Church. The fall of 
Constantinople to the Turks in 1453 was later considered by 
the Russian ideologists to be a punis--ment from God for the 
treachery at Florence, and justificai: -an for Muscovy's 
stance. 73 
The way was now clear for Muscovy to claim the mantle 
of Byzantium. She was the only Orthodox country apart from 
Georgia not under Muslim rule. 74 By 14bi the Russian 
Church was describing Vasily 11 as "t"ne man Chosen by God 
... only supporter of the true OrthodrCxy ... Tsar of all 
7 Rus,,. 75 In 1470 his son, Grand Duke Van III, declared the 
Russian Church independent of the Patriarch of 
Constantinople. Ivan's marriage in 1472 to Sophia 
Paleologina, the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor, 
provided the occasion for the Grand Duke to adopt the 
titles of Tsar (probably derived from Caesar, but 
previously applied in Russia to the Tatar khans) and 
samoderzhets, equivalent to the Byzantine autokrator. In 
1480 Ivan ended the last vestiges of the Islamic Mongol 
tutelage, and adopted the Byzantine eagle as an emblem. 
Millennial expectations abounded: the Church predicted that 
the world would end in 1492, and similar apocalyptic 
premonitions came in 1500. When the world failed to end in 
1492, the Metropolitan of Moscow marked the event by 
proclaiming Ivan III to be the "new Emperor Constantine of 
the new Constantinople - Moscow". Another prophecy of the 
time, which recurred frequently in Russian messianist 
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thought, was that the Third Rome wou--4 liberate the Second: 
Moscow would capture Constantinople. 
- -: ý 
Church and State in Muscovy and eighteenth-century Russia 
Filofei's letter to Vasily III, ---, en, represented the 
culmination of a long chain of ideas. The theory of the 
Third Rome was intended to justify ttne autocratic position 
of the Muscovite rulers by portraying them as 
representatives of God on earth, going rather further than 
the Western concept of the "Divine R_JFht of Kings". 
Further, it gave them a messianic du--y to expand the 
jurisdiction of the Orthodox State, -: m free their co- 
religionists living under infidel powers and to reconquer 
Constantinople for Christendom. This did not mean that the 
actions of the Tsars were dictated soiely, or even mainly, 
by religious motives. Most historians agree that, on the 
contrary, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries 
the Russian Orthodox Church was progressively reduced to 
being a department of the State. 
The raising of the Metropolitan ot Muscovy to the 
status of Patriarch in 1589 removed the last token of 
Muscovy's subordination to Constantinople. Coinciding with 
a time of relatively weak tsarist leadership, this 
inaugurated a brief period of ecclesiastical supremacy. In 
the "Time of Troubles" (lb04-1b13), when the Catholic Poles 
held sway in Muscovy, the Orthodox Church led the Russian 
resistance, centred on the St. Sergei Monastery of the Holy 
Trinity, fifty miles from Moscow at what is now Zagorsk. 
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After the expulsion of the Poles, the Zemskii Sobor 
(Assembly of the Land) chose Michael Romanov to be Tsar. 
Real power, however, was in the hanas of the Tsar's father, 
Patriarch Filaret, who received from his son the title of 
"Great Sovereign". Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich ýi645-ib76) 
bestowed the same title on Patriarch Nikon. The latter had 
accepted the Patriarchate on condition that the Tsar and 
the nobles would obey him. With the isar away fighting, 
Nikon was able to establish something approaching a 
- changes in the long- theocracy. He introduced a number of 
established Russian practices of religious ritual, 
attempting to return to what he believed to be the original 
Greek models. But the Tsar, with the support of the 
nobles, thwarted the Church's political ambitions. The 
Church Council of lbbb-1667 gave approval to Nikon's 
changes in worship but dismissed him Irom the Patriarchate, 
The Council declared: " ... the tsar has power to rule the 
patriarch and ail other priests. " This marked the end of 
the attempts to create a theocracy and represented the 
subordination of the Church to the State. 77 
Nikon's changes provoked within the Russian Orthodox 
Church much opposition, led by Archpriest Avvakum. Nikon's 
credo, "I am a Russian but my taith is Greek", was a 
"terrible blow to the idea of Moscow the Third Rome". 78 
The defenders of the traditional Russian methods believed 
that Nikon was Antichrist and expected apocalyptic events. 
The Church Council of ibOb-ib(57 exco=unicated the 
traditionalists, finalizing the Great Schism that has, at 
least until very recently, split the Old Believers 
33 
ýstarovery, raskollniki) from the Sta--e Church. The State 
and Church launched repressive attac--s on the Schismatics, 
who came to see the year ib66 as the teginning of the rule 
of Antichrist. They continued to be--eve that Moscow was 
the "Third Rome", and unlike the Ort-=dox Church they 
canonized Filofei. 79 
The reign of Peter 1, "the Great" (1t)96-1725), brought 
a decisive change in relations between Church and State. 
Since most ol those within the Churca who had opposed the 
extension of State control were in t--e ranks of the 
expelled Old Believers, it was easier for Peter to carry 
even further the subordination of the Church to the State. 
Breaking completely with Byzantine tradition, he abolished 
the position of Moscow Patriarch in 1700. He replaced it 
with a Holy Synod, responsible directly to himself. This 
followed the Lutheran model and was in line with his policy 
of modernizing Russia through the selective imitation of 
Western methods. 80 I'his poiicy was a direct denial of 
Russian messianism. The idea of "Moscow, the Third Rome" 
received another devastating shock in Peter's construction 
of the new capital, St. Petersburg, symbolizing the 
abandonment of the Moscow traditions. Peter also showed 
his rejection ol Orthodox messianism by rejecting the title 
of "Christian Emperor of the East", proposed for him by the 
Senate in 1721.81 The imperial aspects of the "Third 
Rome", however, were attractive to the tsars of the 
eighteenth century. The expansion of Russian power and the 
quest for empire invited comparison with ancient Rome, and 
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Peter adopted the Latin title "Impera7or". 32 
Lotman and Uspensky suggest that : he concept of the 
"Holy City" was transferred from Mosc--lw to St. Petersburg. 
The German name of the city, Sankt Petersburg, might 
be translated as the "Holy City oi Fe--er" (sviatoi gorod 
Petra), referring to the Emperor rat--er than the saint. 
The holiness of Petersburg, however, lay in its 
Egsudarstvennost', its dedication to --he State. In this 
sense Petersburg was the "New Rome". F--ý 
For succeeding generations, the attitude to the 
personality and activity of Peter served as a touchstone of 
opinion as to the future direction of Russia. Supporters 
and opponents of tsarism disagreed among themselves as to 
whether Russia needed more Westernization, or should rely 
on her own traditions and resources. In the Soviet period, 
the negative view of Peter held by the Bolshevik historian 
Mikhail N. Pokrovsky gave way under Stalin to a more 
balanced position. Although Peter was the ruler of an 
unjust society, and the people suffered under him, his 
military, naval and foreign policies were progressive. The 
epithet "the Great" was not restored to normal use. This 
line continued into the Brezhnev period and beyond, as 
represented by the biography by Nikolai I. Pavlenko, 
published in 1975 by the Moiodaia gvardiia house. 84 
Even at the height of the official acceptance of 
"Moscow, the Third Rome", it seems that no religious 
motivation in foreign policy ever prevailed over the 
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political interests ol the Muscovite State. The ideology 
may well have been significant intern-ally, as a 
justification for a strong centralized State. 
85 The Church 
constantly encouraged the expansion =' Muscovy, from the 
time when the Metropolitan moved there and desired to bring 
his jurisdiction of Rus' into a sing-, e State. Religious 
messianism justified Ivan III's annexation of the north- 
eastern provinces. In foreign polic7, the "Third Rome" 
theory exerted considerable influence as a rationalization, 
injecting a sense of religious mission into the expansion 
against the Catholic Poles and Lithu--nians in the West and 
the Muslims in the East. 8ý5 Ivan III used the treatment of 
Orthodox subjects in Lithuania as an excuse to launch a war 
against that country (1500-1503), for which the real reason 
was his desire to expand his territory. 
B7 Sarkisyanz 
suggests that religious enthusiasm may have had a decisive 
influence on expansion as late as 1552, when Ivan IV 
conquered Kazan. But he concurs that Muscovite expansion 
thenceforth was pragmatically motivated, and suggests that 
the "Third Rome" had even less influence on Russian 
imperialism than the "Holy Roman Empire" concept had on 
German imperialism. Dmitry Obolensky, similarly, laments 
that what he sees as the Christian universalism of the 
Byzantine Empire was distorted in the narrow framework of 
Muscovite interests. 88 
An example of this is Muscovy's attitude to the 
Orthodox subjects of the Islamic Ottoman Empire. 
Fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Muscovy was more concerned 
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with maintaining trade and good rela7--ons with the Sultan 
than with protecting or liberating -tLe Christians of 
Constantinople and the Balkans-89 -In 1597 Pope Clement 
VIII sent a Croat clergyman, Alexana; -=-- Komuiovic, to 
Muscovy with a plan for the Slavs of -ýussia, Poland and 
the 
Balkans to unite in a "holy war" for --he common defence of 
Christendom against the Ottomans. Ne--ther the plan to 
liberate the South Slavs nor the ba-J-- of Constantinople 
enticed the Muscovite ruiers. 
90 No =re success was gained 
by Juraj Krizanic (IbiB-lb83), another Croat Catholic 
priest who wanted Russia to advocate -ýhe unity ot the Slav 
peoples under the political aegis oi 7he Russian Tsar and 
the religious leadership ot Rome (see below, p. 59). 
91 
According to Pokrovsky, on only one occasion throughout 
the whole Muscovite era was a plan drawn up for the 
conquest of Constantinople from the Turks, and this was 
during the Polish domination. It was only in the 
Petersburg period that ConstantinopLe became seriously 
coveted, with both Peter I and C_atherý. ne II going to war 
against Turkey. 92 The Russian call for the liberation of 
the Orthodox and the Turkish wars of --hat time were, it is 
considered, motivated by State interests, such as the 
desire for control of the Bosphorus. Under the treaty of 
Kuchuk-Kainarji (1774), Russia gained extra-territorial 
rights in the Ottoman Empire: she was made guardian of 
the religious rights of the Porte's Orthodox subjects, a 
situation which iasted until IB53-93 
The "Third Rome" may have had some impact on the 
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relations between the nationalities :a Russia. Any ruling 
group which seeks to impose a unifor-- ideology on society 
is likely to face a problem with the jews. As Ronald I. 
Rubin says, "the Jew has always : tarec badly in politically 
messianic societies". He attributes -, his to Jewish 
religious values, minority status, refusal to parrot 
political orthodoxies, ties to foreign co-religionists and 
sensitivity to injustice. 94 Perhaps -. he most important is 
the inability or unwillingness of religious Jews to accept 
ideologies incompatible with Judaism. Outbreaks of 
apocaiypticism and messianism in XuscDvy, no less than in 
the West, were accompanied by anti-Jewish feeling. This was 
demonstrated at the beginning of the sixteenth and in the 
middle of the seventeenth century. 95 
Muscovy took over from Kiev an anti-Jewish sentiment. 
This derived partly from the New Testament, as for example 
in Ilarion's sermon "On Law and Grace'". 96 It was also 
influenced by Kiev's hostile contact with the Khazar 
Empire, stretching from the Lower Volga to the Crimea, 
whose rulers had adopted Judaism. Vladimir Monomakh, 
Prince of Kiev (1113-1125), decreed the total expulsion of 
the adherents of Judaism from Rus'. The byliny, the epic 
folk poems of Rus', always presented the Jews in odious 
forms-97 Anti-Semitism was incorporated into Muscovy's 
ideology. James Billington mentions the antipathy of the 
peasants to the urban non-manual occupations of the Jews. 
He is probably right to add that "A newly proclaimed chosen 
people felt hostility toward an older pretender to this 
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title. '198 
In fact there were few Jews in Muscovy or the other 
Russian towns. Salo W. Baron attributes this to the 
"xenophobia of both the Russian masses and their rulers". 
99 
Desiring a homogeneous Orthodox population, the State tried 
to exclude the Jews. The sect known as the "Judaizers" do 
not appear to have been directly linked with Judaism, 
although this is a matter of dispute. 100 But the spread of 
the sect led to the repression of the Jews. At the Church 
Council of lbbb-lb67, the Old Believers and the reformers 
accused each other of being corrupted by the Jews, or even 
of being Jewish. Expectations of the end of the world were 
shared at this time by the Old Believers and the Jewish 
followers of Sabbatai Zevi, indicating how apocalyptic 
feelings spread across religious barriers-101 
Expansion into Poland and Lithuania from the mid- 
seventeenth century led to the incorporation of the Jews 
living there. Jews were ordered to be expelled from the 
Empire in 1727 and 1742, "unless they be willing to adopt 
Christianity of the Greek persuasion". The partitions 
of Poland (1772-1795) added numbers of Jews who could not 
be forced to accept Orthodoxy en masse. Pressure from 
Moscow merchants and a desire to avoid religious conflict 
influenced Catherine II's decision to prevent Jews from 
moving outside the Jewish "Pale" in the West of the 
Empire. 102 
Did the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century tsars try 
39 
to impose Russian Orthodoxy or the R, -, ssian language on the 
other non-Russians of the Empire? I-- was generally 
accepted that apart from the Ukrainians, who were 
traditionally Orthodox, the other grcups, such as the 
Muslims, Lithuanians, Poles and the Lutheran Baltic Germans 
could not be forced in a body to accept Orthodoxy. As far 
as the Islamic peoples were concerned, Ivan IV had preached 
a policy of religious freedom for the Tatars following his 
capture of Kazan, 103 and this policy was generally adhered 
to. An exception was under Empress Elizabeth, whose 
intolerance of Islam provoked an unsu: ýcessful revolt of 
the Bashkirs in 1754-1755. Catherine II reversed 
Elizabeth's policy; she sought to strengthen Russian 
control by coming to an accommodation with Islam. She 
encouraged the education of the Kirghiz in both Kirghiz and 
Russian, and had mullahs employed to teach them. 104 
There does not seem to have been any attempt to impose 
the Russian language on the Ukrainians in this period. In 
1596, when the Ukraine was under Polish occupation, 
some Ukrainian Orthodox Christians were absorbed into the 
Ukrainian Catholic or "Uniate" Church, which recognized 
papal supremacy. The Ukraine later won its political 
autonomy, and in 1654 the Cossack Council (the Ukrainian 
assembly) asked for the protection of Muscovy against 
Poland. Under the Treaty of Pereiaslavl the same year, the 
Ukraine was united (or reunited) with Muscovy. In ib86 the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church was incorporated into the Moscow 
Patriarchate. 105 
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Tsars from Peter I onwards began :o integrate the 
Ukraine into the Russian Empire. In -710 he appointed a 
Russian official to watch over the U---ainian leader, the 
hetman, and proceeded to erode Ukrain-"an autonomy with the 
help of the Russian Army. In 17t4 Ca-, herine II abolished 
the hetmanate and enunciatek- the pr----ciple of the unified 
'tic provinces and administration of the Ukraine, the Baý 
Finland in the Russian Empire. "Thes-e provinces ... " wrote 
Catherine, "should be easily reduced -. o a condition where 
they can be Russified... 11 This desire to Russify was not 
at all motivated by religious messianism; indeed, in George 
Vernadsky's words, "The church was ccasidered essential 
only for the moral education of the lower classes. " 
Rather, Russification was associated with Catherine's 
desire for administrative rationality and her style of 
"enlightened despotism". The privileges of self-government 
were removed in turn, ultimately, from all the territories 
mentioned, and the principle of unified administration was 
extended to the lands taken in the partition of Poland. 
Michael T. Florinsky comments that, except in Finland and 
Poland, "her successors on the throne (with the exception 
of Emperors Paul and Alexander 1) remained on the whole 
faithful to the program inaugurated in 1764", right up to 
1917.1()t 
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Holy Russia 
It has been suggested above that : he doctrine ol 
"Moscow, the Third Rome" was not taken very seriously by 
the Muscovite tsars as a guide to po--ý-cy formulation, and 
the concept was significantly moditiet or abandoned with 
the move to Petersburg. But the masses of the population 
sometimes behaved as if they took aszects of the doctrine 
very seriously. The peasant version -ni Russian messianism. 
emphasized the holiness and uniqueness of the Russian land 
and peopie rather than the holiness the Tsar. It should 
be admitted at once that there is di----icuity in 
ascertaining what exactly the beiieia of the peasants were 
at any time in Russian history, since they were largely 
illiterate and their masters when wri-: ing about them may 
well have distorted their position. iO7 Nevertheless, the 
demands of the various peasant revolts make it possible to 
fit together a plausible peasant ideciogy, based on the 
myths of "Holy Russia" and the "saint-y ruler". 
The first known use of the term "Holy Russian" 
(sviatorusskii) in political iiteramure occurs in the works 
of Prince Andrei M. Kurbsky in the sixteenth century. 108 
This is in the context of his attacks on Ivan IV for 
allegedly betraying the divine mission of Russia and the 
trust put in him by God. Kurbsky began a tradition which 
has continued to this day among opponents of Russian 
regimes: rather than challenge directy the ideology of the 
leader or leadership, he accused the leader of failing to 
act in accordance with his ideology. Thus, Soviet 
dissidents of the Brezhnev era holding widely differing 
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views - Marxists, constitutionalist=- and nationalists - 
argued that the regime deviated irom Y-arxism, its own 
Constitution and patriotism, all of walch the leadership 
claimed to abide by. 
Wherefore, 0 tsar [Kurbsky wrote --o Ivan] have you 
destroyed the strong in Israel [--. e., Russia] and 
subjected to various forms of dea--h the voevodas 
[military commanders] given to ycu by God? 
15ýý 
The Tsar is portrayed as the antithesis of Holy Russia, 
dishonouring the "Holy Russian lands". 110 
The concept of "Hoi7 Russia" was --ard17 ever deployed 
in writings exalting the Tsar, and was used officially cnl7 
on ver7 rare occasions of national emergenc7. This laiiure 
to use the epithet suggests that there is a considerable 
portion of truth in Michael Cherniavsk7's belief that the 
concept had a subversive connotation. It is true that a 
seventeenth-centur7 song which praises Tsar Michael Romanov 
uses the phrase "Ho17 Russian land"; but since this was 
written soon after the Zemskii Sobor "nad determined the 
succession by election, it is likely 7hat Michael was seen 
as a genuinely popular choice. The ýDenetration of Russian 
messianism among the simple people is illustrated by a folk 
story. Christ is alleged to have den, -ed that He was Jewish 
and to have asserted: "I am pure Russian". 111 For official 
Muscovy, the focus of holiness was the Tsar, and the 
uniqueness of Russia as in the "Third Rome" theory depended 
on the uniqueness of the Tsar. For the peasantry, Holy 
Russia was the Orthodox Russian people and land, whose 
holiness was independent of the existence of the Tsar and 
the Muscovite State. Illustrative of this is that the Don 
43 
ossacks, as adherents ol Russian Ur-=doxy, would die for 
Holy Russia and even the Orthodox Tsar, but until the union 
of Ib54 they owed no political allegý-ance to the Muscovite 
State. 112 
When the peasants felt that the ;: zilicies emanating Irom 
Moscow or Petersburg were not appropr:. ate for "Holy 
Russia", they, like Kurbsky, t7Picai-, 7 articulated their 
dissent in pro-tsarist form. In the popular revolts from 
the seventeenth century on, the insurgents sometimes 
claimed that the Tsar was good but had bad advisors. 
Peasants desiring the abolition of serfdom, for example, 
might assert that the "Tsar wishes it but the boyars 
resist. "ii3 At other times the rebei leaders themselves 
claimed to be the true holy Tsar. Pckrovsky wrote that the 
myth of the Tsar was the "peasantry's revolutionary 
ideology". 114 It is true that the peasants manipulated 
their belief in the Tsar to justify their rebellion; but as 
Daniel Field points out, this does not necessarily mean 
that their belief was not sincere. 115 These rebeiiions 
were essentially conservative, not only in that they sought 
the return of the "true Tsar" or the implementation of his 
wishes, but also in that they sought a return to the "true 
Russian path" which was being abandoned by Westernizing 
tsars. Billington remarks that "in social composition and 
messianic utoplanism" they resembled the sixteenth-century 
rebellions of German peasants. i16 Zernov suggests that the 
great majority of peasants were unaffected by the 
Westernizing reformss and genuinely believed the Tsars to be 
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truly Orthodox. It seems that, even among part of the 
Petersburg proletariat, only the shootings of Bloody 
Sunday, 190b, could undermine the people's faith in the 
Tsar. The shattering of the myth undermined the legitimacy 
of the Empire-il7 
The views of the revolutionary peasants paralleled in 
many ways those oi the Old Believers; in some cases, the 
two currents merged. Both believed that the holy Muscovite 
traditions were being destroyed by the tsars; but whereas 
the peasants sought to return to the traditions by the use 
of violence, the Old Believers generally stood aside from 
political struggle and awaited salvation from above. The 
Cossack revolt led by Stenka Razin began in ibb7, close to 
the time of the Church Council which dismissed Nikon and 
excommunicated the Old Believers. The Cossacks admittedly 
rose in the name of Nikon rather than Avvakum; but the two 
priests were united in the belief that the Church should 
not be subordinated to the State. Beyond this, even the 
Old Believers themselves became ridden by schism and 
strife. Some Old Believers, from lbb7, were preparing for 
the end of world, believing Antichrist had begun his reign, 
while others merely expected his imminent arrival. Some 
burned themselves to death, while others fled and created 
their own communities. Usually the belief in the 
chosenness of Russia was combined with a withdrawal from 
the Russian State. 118 
The reign of Peter I provided a boost to the strength 
of the Old Believers. Peter's enthusiastic adoption of 
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Western methods and his promotion o-. : oreigners 
ýparticularly Germans) into high pia--=-s alienated many 
Russians. Again the Isar was seen as Antichrist. 
Merchants who had lost their privileges through Peter's 
reforms tound that the ideology of tte Old Believers was 
supportive of their interests; many = them broke from the 
Westernized urban environment and joi-med the Old Believer 
communities, spearheading the conquesý- of Siberia. Old 
Believer life was industrious and ascetic. Messianic 
groups with their own prophets constantly emerged and split 
off, keeping alive the intense religious tradition. They 
intermingled with the many Protestant sectarian communities 
which appeared in Russia from the seventeenth century 
onwards, and were influenced by them. Both the Old 
Believers and the sectarians expected the imminent end of 
the natural order, but while the former expected only the 
Last Judgement, the latter generally expected the 
millenniai Kingdom of God on Earth. Sects such as the 
khlysty (flagellants), who called themselves "God's 
People", the moiokane (milk drinkers) and, more 
eccentrically, the skoptsy ýcastrated ones) showed great 
vitality, producing numbers of "Christs" and "angels". 119 
According to Billington, the sectarians differed from 
the Old Believers in that they did not look back to a past 
Russian Orthodoxy but propagated a new set of beliets. 120 
Vatro Murvar seems not to make a sharp distinction between 
the two. He writes: 
All sectarian religious structures in pre-Revolutionary 
Russia were messianic... the dissidents' most 
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tundamentai question was whether or not, under steadily 
increasing toreign intluences, --: hLe Russian peolDle were 
still pertorming their tasks, or at least marching 
towards the basic messianic goai, and whether their 
motherland was still Holy Russia... There was no 
dissent structure in the Russian context which did not 
share these messianic dogmas. 121 
Despite the categorical nature of this statement, Murvar 
does not seem to establish satisfactcrily that the 
sectarians, as opposed to the Oid Beiievers, really were 
concerned with "Holy Russia". Rather, he places the 
sectarians within the framework of Russian messianism by 
arguing that the sectarians shared certain messianic 
doctrines with the Old Believers. Murvar's main aim is to 
show the essential similarity of the religious messianisms 
and the revolutionary messianisms in Russia. He argues 
that all religious and revolutionary messianisms shared 
these common doctrines. He claims further that these 
doctrines "seem to have been most successfully internalized 
into the durable and vital value-system of both Tsarist and 
Soviet Russia". 122 
The common doctrines identified by Murvar are 
"millennialism", "twain cosmogony" and "monism" or 
"collectivism". All the sects expected that the Millennium 
would come after a cosmic struggle between Christ and 
Antichrist. This gave rise to the "twain cosmogony": all 
humanity was divided into the "children of darkness" and 
the "children of light", respectively the followers ot 
Antichrist and Christ (the latter being members of the 
sect). The "chosen" group, the "children of light", 
sometimes sought to hasten the millennium by rejecting the 
evil world through suicide, euthanasia and castration. The 
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leaders of the chosen grouý) were beiý-eved to be endowed 
with mysticai powers, if not actually divine. By "monism" 
is meant the rejection of any distinction between the 
religious, political and economic spheres of activity; one 
absolute religious idea dominates all'. aspects of life. 
Applied to the economy, it was held that land and other 
property belonged to God and were intended to be used for 
the benefit of the people. The concept of private property 
was therefore considered evil; Nikon and Peter were 
sometimes accused of inventing it. Hence property in the 
sectarian communities was held collectively. Murvar states: 
The sectarians were not dissenters ýin the contemporary 
Western sense) who fought for their right to dissent; 
quite to the contrary, they wished to replace Tsarist 
monism with their own because the former was corrupted 
by Western influences. 123 
The State against the Nation 
It is clear that the sectarians and the Old Believers 
were in fundamental opposition to the tsarist State. In 
this context, the position of Tibor Szamuely is unduly one- 
sided. Szamuely, in his volume The Russian Tradition, 
claimed that throughout history the Russian people were 
devoted not only to their country but also to their State. 
He attributed this to their supposed consciousness that 
only a powerful, centralized State could ensure national 
survival, in the face of enemies from all sides; and to 
their isolation from Europe. Russians of all classes, he 
said, looked at the State with "ecstatic rapture" and 
"exultation bordering on idolatry". People believed in 
Russia, as a society based on equality and justice, because 
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it was a society of universal bondage, in which the 
autocracy prevented the emergence of -zhe type of oppressor 
class which ruled in Western Europe. -24 
All this neglects the importance --: )I the Schism, the 
sectarians and the Cossack traditions of freedom. It is 
more accurate to taik about a "dual -ýussia" - the Russia of 
St. Petersburg and the Russia of the religious dissenters. 
More generally, the religious Schism symbolized the split 
between the State and those who soug-tt alternatives. 
Berdiaev said that the Russians were Schismatics; he 
included the religious Schismatics, -7-he Cossacks and the 
nineteenth-century intelligentsia as -roups who, in 3 
different ways, tried to escape tsar, -st oppression. 
12b 
Robert C. Tucker sees the division perhaps even more 
starkly: the State, at any rate from mhe time of Peter's 
reforms, stood against the nation. The vlast', the 
Eosudarstvo - the central autocratic State power - stood 
against obshchestvo, the society, and narod, the people or 
nation. 126 Aleksandr i. Herzen, a Russian socialist 
writing in the nineteenth century, and Pavel N. Miliukov, a 
Russian liberal writing in the twentieth, agreed on this. 
Herzen spoke of the "Russia of the dark people, poor, 
agricultural, communal, democratic ... conquered, as it 
were", by the official Russia. 127 Miliukov wrote that for 
centuries "the country continued to feel and live 
independent of the state authorities.,, 128 
National consciousness 
The discussion of the State as standing against the 
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nation and the discussion of the por---'ar belief in "Ho17 
Russia" presuppose the existence of some form of national 
consciousness. A common Russian cons--iousness dated back 
to the eleventh centur7 and persistea while Russian land 
was occupied b7 the Lithuanians, Poies and Mongols. S. O. 
Yakobson suggests that it was the presence of Polish troops 
in Muscov7 in 1blO which made "the national idea ... the 
common possession of the vast masses : )f the populace" of 
Russia. The reforms of Nikon and then Peter provoked an 
upsurge of national feeling, which Yakobson calls 
"nationalism", in defence of the old -ý: raditions. 129 Hans 
Rogger prefers to call this feeling "national 
consciousness" when applied to the eighteenth century or 
earlier. He refers particularly to the attempt by educated 
Russians to develop a distinct Russian identity, character 
and culture, in reaction to Peter's Westernization. 
National consciousness, paradoxically, was the product 
of the most Westernized stratum of society. 130 Charles 
Ruud emphasizes the "general sense o--,; lagging behind the 
to "nationalism in the viest" as the "principal stimulus" 
late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries". 131 It should be 
added that the bearers of national consciousness and 
nationalism were divided about the extent to which they 
wanted Russia to catch up with the West or maintain her own 
identity. 
Catherine II, Imperatrix of the Enlightenment, tried to 
use the developing national consciousness for the benefit 
of the State. She presented the government as serving 
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national aspirations. She emphasizea native Russian 
virtues and sponsored the developmen-- Of Russian culture, 
This was partly to pre-empt Russian criticism of the 
"foreign" monarchy (Western both in -ts practice and in the 
ethnic Origin of the monarch) . Russian native pride was 
encouraged as a sub-division of loyalty to the Empress. In 
turn people who wished to end serfdom and improve the 
living conditions of the masses took advantage of this 
official Russian orientation to put -.. orward their own view 
of national priorities, For Nikolai ýT . Novikov (1744-1818) 
and Aleksandr N. Radishchev (1749-1802), the Russian 
peasant, "unspoiled" by Western influence, was the fount of 
true morality. But Rogger denies that their view was 
nationalist; neither indulged in "uncritical exaitation" of 
the people or nation. i32 Similarly, Radishchev and other 
late-eighteenth-century writers used the official idea of 
Russia as a successor to ancient Rome as a justification 
for demanding that the liberties of Rome be extended to 
Russia. 133 
Thus the Russian nationai consciousness ot the 
eighteenth century, which was founded on opposition to 
Westernization, gave rise to the official Russian 
orientation of Catherine. Sometimes this overlapped with 
the unofficial national consciousness. The beginning of 
the nineteenth century saw a shift from the defence of 
Russian models against Westernization to an "uncritical 
worship of all things Russian". 134 This sowed the seeds of 
"official narodnost'" under Nicholas I and of Slavophilism. 
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Messianism under Alexander I 
The reign of Alexander 1 (1801-1-; 'ý25) began with society 
and the new Tsar apparently united in enthusiasm for the 
ideas ot Enlightenment. The failure --o carry through 
social and political reforms in this spirit led to the 
disillusionment which culminated in -r---Le Decembrist rising 
of 1825. It would be wrong to see Alexander as moving in a 
straight line from reform to reactl=, but the general 
tendency of the period is symbolized by the replacement as 
Alexander's chief adviser of the refcrmer Mikhail M. 
Speransky by the reactionary General Aleksei A. Arakcheev, 
halfway through the reign. Alexander's change in direction 
reflected not only his interest in mysticism but also the 
pressure of the nobility. 
A major intellectual influence in this period was 
Nikolai M. Karamzin (1766-1826). In his Memorandum on 
Ancient and Modern_Russia, offered to Alexander in 1811, he 
opposed any constitutional reforms and advocated the 
maintenance of national traditions, including autocracy. 135 
In his criticisms of Peter I for disrupting national 
traditions, he proved to be a precursor of the Slavophils, 
although his attitude to tradition was pragmatic rather 
than ideological. 
In the reigns of Michael and of his son, our ancestors, 
while assimilating many advantages which were to be 
found in foreign customs, never lost the conviction 
that an Orthodox Russian was the most perfect citizen 
and Hol Rus' the foremost state in the world. Let 
this be called a delusion. Yet how much it did to 
strengthen patriotism and the moral fibre of the 
country! 13b 
As Alexander's o±ticial Iiistorian, Karam-zin produced a 12 
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volume history of the Russian State 
rossiiSkoF, o), the publication of whica began in 1818 and 
was completed only after his death. --his history was 
republished many times and the early 61avophils were 
familiar with it. 137 
In view of Karamzin's influence za Slavophilism, it is 
worth pointing out that despite his =ajor role in Russian 
historiography ýPushkin called him "zur first historian") 
this major work was not republished --n the Soviet Union 
before the Gorbachov period. His description of travel in 
Western Europe was published in Moscc-4 in 1980, and in 1983 
a volume about him, intended for a mass audience, was 
published with a print run of 200,000.138 In ig8b, 
during his visit to New Delhi, Gorbachov referred to "our 
famous historian and writer Nikoiai Karamzin". 139 
Napoleon's attack on Russia in 1812 created the danger 
that he would appeal to the Russian peasants by promising 
to end serfdom. Count Fyodor V. Roszopchin (later the 
Governor of Moscow) sought to unite the peasants with the 
government by promoting the idea of "Holy Russia". This 
concept had previously had subversive connotations (see 
above, p. 42), but Rostopchin's "Holy Russia" referred to 
the Russian people led by the "Russian God" through the 
Tsar. After the defeat of Napoleon, the concept was 
modified: Russia was "Holy" not so much because of her 
unique relationship with God as because she was ruled by 
the Tsar. 140 
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Whatever Rostopchin's intentions, a tremendous boost 
was given to Russian national feeling by the defeat of 
Napoleon and the subsequent entry of Russian troops into 
Paris in l814. While this was not the first time that 
Russian troops had served in Western Europe, they had not 
previously occupied Paris, the cradle of the French 
Revolution. Purely in terms of the westward projection of 
military power, Russia advanced furthLer in 1814 than at the 
end of World War II. The Austrian diplomat Friedrich von 
Gentz observed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 that 
Russia faced "no further real danger" from her neighbours, 
but would find it "easy" to conquer them. For most 
Russians, the deieat of Napoleon represented Russia's 
victory over Europe. 141 
Alexander, however, desired neither to conquer Europe 
nor to impose the Orthodox religion on her. In France he 
imposed constitutional limitations on the power of the 
restored Louis XVIII. Eisewhere he acted as chiet deiender 
of the status_auo in Europe. In 1815 he persuaded the 
Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia to join him in 
the so-called "Holy Alliance". He believed he had a holy 
mission from God to defend Europe from liberals and 
revolutionaries, whom he considered anti-Christian. One 
could describe his messianism as personal rather than 
national. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, 
dismissed the Alliance as "mysticism and nonsense", 
The members of the Alliance were supposed to conduct their 
relations on the basis of Ohristian morality, but while the 
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maintenance of peace was an importan": aim, so too was the 
maintenance of the existing monarchies, allegedly ruling by 
"Divine Rightll. i42 The defence of "-egitimacyll governed 
Alexander's foreign policy, and Pierre Kovalevsky is among 
those who argue that it was pursued a7 the expense of 
Russia's national interests. Alexan----r's messianism, 
together with the victory over Napoleon, had an important 
consequence. They allowed the idea 7-at Russia had a 
mission in Europe to appear among the educated classes. 143 
How did Alexander's mesEianism a---ýect the minorities of 
the Russian Empire'? A decree ol: 1804 generally reduced the 
discrimination against religious minorities. In l8iO, 
however, Prince Aleksandr N. Golitsyn, the Oberprokurator 
of the Holy Synod of the Russian Ort. I-Lodox Church, was put 
in charge of the minority religions as well, and this 
adversely affected them, particularly the Jews. Golitsyn's 
Bible Society evoked much interest from a section of 
society (religious mysticism not being confined to the 
monarch). After the incorporation of Finland into the 
Russian Empire in 1808, she was allowed to retain most of 
her own laws and customs. Even in 1615 the Kingdom of 
Poland was granted her own constitution, guaranteeing the 
position of the Polish language, freedom of worship and 
wide autonomy in domestic affairs. 144 
Disappointment among army officers and other educated 
strata at the slow pace of reform and at Arakcheev's 
despotism led to the formation of secret societies. 145 
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These later became known collective-,, -,, as the Decembrist 
movement, following the attempted cc, --, D of December 1825, 
after the death of Alexander. Vatro Hurvar has tried to 
argue that the Decembrists illustrate his claim that all 
dissident movements in pre-revoiutionary Russia shared 
"messianic dogmas" and believed in "'Holy Russia" (see 
above, pp. 4b-47). He quotes Marc Raeff in his support. 
[The Decembrists] craved to intrcduce into public life 
what they felt were Russia's own historical 
institutions and national tradit--ons ... Peter the 
Great, they believed, had imposed institutions too 
closely imitative of foreign models; it was time to 
return to genuinely Russian forTr-. 14b 
Murvar stops here, but Raelf goes on. 
However, the Decembrists never rejected the spirit of 
modernity and reliance on Western culture and political 
liberalism. On the contrary, they felt that the 
successors of Peter I in the eighteenth century and 
particularly Alexander I, had be--rayed what was good 
and genuinely useful in the Western models and imitated 
only the harmful externais. 147 
Murvar is right to say that the Decembrists believed that 
the Tsars had betrayed Russia's traditions, but wrong to 
play down the importance of Western liberalism as an 
influence on them. They may have been xenophobic, and this 
was in part brought on by Alexander's lack of esteem for 
the Russian nation. 146 But they wanted to do something 
about serfdom and they wanted at the very least what 
Alexander had given to France and Poland but denied to 
Russia -a constitution. 
Nikita M. Muravyov ot the Decembrists' "Northern 
Society" proposed a liberal and +-ederal constitution tor 
Russia. The most important programme ot the Decembrist 
movement, however, was the Russka, -a Pravda (Russian Law or 
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Russian Justice), formulated by Coic:: Lý-i Pavel I. Pestei of 
the Decembrists' "Southern Society", :: )ased in the 
Ukraine. 149 Pestei called for the atolition of serfdom and 
the introduction of economic libera-l--sm; and for the 
replacement of autocracy by a repub-zan system of 
representative government, based on ezual rights. While 
Pestel argued for Russification of 7--e non-Russians and the 
promotion of Orthodoxy, this was tar t-rom the spirit of 
"Moscow, the Third Rome". Indeed he said that Russia's 
capital should be moved not back to ":: scow but to Nizhny 
Novgorod. Nations already in the Em-:: re which were 
politically unviable should remain w7---hin Russia: Pestel 
mentioned "Finland, Estonia, Livland, Courland, White 
Russia, the Ukraine, New Russia [Nov--rossiial, Bessarabia, 
the Crimea, Georgia, the entire Caucasus, the lands of the 
Kirghiz, all the Siberian peoples and other tribes". He 
further advocated the annexation of Holdavia, Turkestan and 
Mongolia in the interests of Russian security, but rejected 
any further expansion. For Pestel, -Foland was a 
different 
matter. She had shown her politicai viability in the past, 
and Russia should grant her independleence, subject to her CD 
adopting the same political system as Russia. 
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Pestel advocated a strongly centralizing policy tor the 
territories remaining inside Russia. An7 form of 
federalism, he feared, would lead to the borderlands 
falling away. 15l He discussed at some length the non- 
Russian races and argued that the Russian language should 
be introduced for them. Orthodoxy was to remain the 
"ruling faith", and, in the spirit of Peter, the clerg7 
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were to be regarded as "part oi the ;:, --, vernment ... a divsi(: )n 
of the bureaucracy". lt2 fhe purpose zýt all this was 
clearly the fusion of the races; the government should 
aim at making them into one single nation and at 
dissolving all differences into zne common mass, so 
that the inhabitants throughout -e entire territory of 
the Russian state be all Russiang 153 
Perhaps one reason why Pestel was prepared to give 
Poland conditional independence was --hLat he feared that the 
Poles might not easily be assimilatee-d into the Russians, 
especially given their Catholicism. 'Dverall it seems fair 
to categorize Pestel as a pragmatist, not an ideologist of 
Russian messianism, despite Murvar's etforts. 154 
One of the groups absorbed by PesT-el's "Southern 
Society" was the Ukraine-based Society of the United Slavs 
(1812-1825). Like Pestel, this group favoured the 
overthrow of autocracy and serfdom. What distinguished 
them was their desire for a federal Smate uniting all the 
Slav peoples ol: Europe, including the Poles, and also the 
Hungarians, whom they mistakenly believed to be Slavs. 
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At this point it is necessary to pause and rehearse the 
origins of pan-Slavism and the relation between pan-Slavism 
and Russian messianism. 
Pan-Slavism 
Pan-Slavism was a movement and an ideology which 
promoted the cultural and in some cases the political unity 
oi the Slav peoples. It was conceptually quite different 
from Slavophilism, the iatter being a movement and an 
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ideology which emphasized Russian Or-7ý-odoxy and the unique 
features of the Russian people. Admittedly, some leaders 
of the Slavophil movement later evolved towards pan- 
Slavism. Whereas the Slavophils were Russians, the pan- 
Slavists included Russians and non-Russian Slavs. It would 
be wrong to portray Slavophilism as "progressive" and pan- 
Slavism as "reactionary", or vice versa; both movements 
contained pro-tsarist and anti-tsarist elements. 
Two of the earliest pan-Slavists, the Croat clergymen 
Alexander Komuiovic and Juraj KrizanJc, have already been 
V . 11 mentioned (see p. 37). Krizanic, like some later pan- 
Slavists, saw a special role for Russia in leading the Slav 
"o 
alliance. Vladimir Solovyov declared that Kri'zIanic's pan- 
Slavism served his desire for Christian unity. 
15b E. 
Shmurlo agrees that Krizanic sought religious unity of the 
Slavs under Rome, but argues that this was secondary to his 
main desire for the cultural and political unity of the 
Slavs against the Turks and Germans. 157 This sort o: t pan- 
Slavism clearly had little to do with traditional Russian 
messianism in that it was based on the first Rome rather 
than the Third. Pan-Slavism was given a boost among the 
South Slavs (the "Illyrian" movement) a century later, in 
17B3, when Russia annexed the Crimea. From the 1820s the 
Western Slavs became important in the pan-Slav movement, 
led by the Lutheran Slovaks Jan Kollar and Pavel Safarik. 
Their version of pan-Slavism was more liberal than 
others. 158 
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By now some Russians were promoT: ng pan-Slavist 
policies. In 1804 Vasily N. Karazin ýi773-i842), a lormer 
education oiticiai, called on the tsarist government to 
help the Serbs, who were rebelling against the Turks, and 
to establish a Kingdom o± the Slavs --: i the Balkans. This 
kingdom would be linked with the Russian Empire and be a 
pole of attraction to all Slavs. Karazin made the 
messianic claim that Russia's role was "celui de defendre 
la cause du genre humain". He declared that the Tsar could 
not turn his back on the Slavs, as the supreme head of 
their Church. Karazin was a reformer who advocated some 
limitations on the autocracy; his advi-ce on foreign policy 
was ignored. 159 
Nevertheless, pan-Slavism played some role in Russian 
foreign policy up to 1812. The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, a Pole, Prince Adam Czartorysky, proposed in 1804 
that, after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the Isar 
should proclaim himself the Emperor of the Eastern Slavs, 
pacifying Austria with some South Slav lands. fhe most 
important targets lor Russia were Constantinople and the 
Dardanelles. In 1806, when Russia went, to war with lurkey, 
she expressed support for her enemy's Slav subjects; but 
when war broke out with France in 1812, Russia made peace 
with Turkey and abandoned the Slavs to the Ottomans. Pan- 
Slavism was not a consistent basis of foreign policy, but 
rather an instrument to be used when convenient, like 
the "Third Rome" ideology earlier. i6O The idea of pan- 
Slavism largely went underground in 1812, with the Society 
of the United Slavs. Later came the Brotherhood of St. 
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Cyril and St. Methodius, also based --n the Ukraine and 
centred around Nikoiai I. Kostomarov, and later still the 
followers of Bakunin. When the Holy Alliance became the 
lynchpin of tsarist foreign policy, there was little chance 
of 01ficial support for general Slav uprisings. 
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Chapter Two 
The Slavophils-and Russian Messianisin under Nicholas-I 
(1825-1855) 
It was in the reign of Nicholas 1 (1825-1855) that the 
Slavophils formulated their ideas. While the extent to 
which each of them embraced Russian messianism differed, 
they shared a belief in Russia's uniqueness. This chapter 
will investigate their ideas, the influences on them and 
the political consequences of their views. It will 
consider their relationship to other Russian messianists, 
and to the State and tsarist ideologists. 
Two-ideologies 
In 1969 the Soviet journalist Aleksandr L. Ianov 
launched a discussion on Slavophilism in the Soviet 
specialist press. His article "The Riddle of Slavophil 
Criticism" was the first of 12 contributions to appear in 
Voprosy-literatury that year-I In this article, and in 
another entitled "The Slavophils and Konstantin Leontev" in 
V012n2aX filosofii, 2 Ianov posed the problem: why was it 
that the conservative ideologist Leontev "proved to be the 
direct-heir of the classical Slavophils who devoted their 
lives to a struggle for freedom"-? 3 In Ianov's book The 
Russian New RjZh: L, published in the USA after his 
emigration there, he explains his purpose in starting the 
discussion. In the 1960s, Russian national consciousness 
and nationalist feeling in the USSR had grown, reflected 
for example in the journal Molodaia--gvardiia. (See chapter 
6, below. ) Ianov sought to show, within the confines of 
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censorship, that this nationaiism wouid inevitably end in 
an accommodation with the Soviet State, whether or not it 
originated in opposition to the regime. 
How did it happen that, having begun a noble 
conirontation with the despotic tsarist regime, the 
ideologists of Russian nationalism ultimately worked 
out a formula for collaboration with that regime; ' How 
was Slavophilism transformed from a mighty protest 
against despotism into an equally mighty apoiogia for 
it, suitable for practical use in the struggle against 
democracy? Is there not an objective logic in this 
tragic evolution of Russian nationalism, leading to 
such a terrible outcome; 4 
For lanov, a clear demonstration of this evolution was the 
fate of Ivan Aksakov, who as a Slavophil was opposed to the 
ruling elite and its "anti-national" character, and 
believed in freedom of the Press, but towards the end of 
his life was forced by his nationalism to side with the 
conservatives rather than the "nihilists and liberals"5 
(whom he identified as the representatives of an even 
greater danger). 
In "The Riddle of Slavophil Criticism", lanov 
emphasised the differences between early Slavophiiism and 
the ideology ot Niclaoias i. "... Russian social 
consciousness in the i8ý30s and i84Os created not one but 
two competing nationalist ideologies. Two systems o± 
views, each claiming the role o± this ideology, but in 
everything else completeiy dilierent. "6 These ideologies, 
ianov argued, "suitered ±rom one and the same detect: they 
had a religious nature. " The otticiai ideology idolized 
authoritarian government. (As will be shown below, it is 
inaccurate to describe the cilicial ideoiogy as 
nationalist, although it had what has been termed a 
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nationalist wing. ) On the other hand, Slavophilism 
idolized the "simple people". But this idolization of the 
simple people led to hostility on the part of the 
Slavophils to the oppositionist intelligentsia, bringing 
the Slavophils into alliance with reaction and even, as far 
as the epigones of Slavophilism were concerned, into 
support for the Black Hundreds. 7 This was about as far as 
Ianov thought he could go in discussing the "danger" of 
anti-Soviet Russian nationalism in the Soviet Press, but 
his writings as an emigre are more explicit. He is not 
repeating the views of Vladimir Solovyov, Miliukov and 
others about the decomposition of Slavophil ideology (which 
will be discussed later). Rather he is saying that there 
is a "duality in Russian nationalism - 'dissident' versus 
'establishmentarian' - which, through a series of stages, 
completes a complex and tortuous Journey from mutual 
confrontation to convergence... "8 
Ianov's writings and the tone in which they are phrased 
make it clear that he regards this process of "convergence" 
of nationalist ideologies as inevitable. 9 Such a claim 
requires careful scrutiny. Undoubtedly, there is a 
methodological problem in Ianov's approach in that even if 
it can be shown that Slavophilism evolved directly into 
Leontev's ideas, it does not follow from this that Ianov's 
"assertion" or "prediction"10 about contemporary Russian 
nationalism is necessarily valid. For this one would have 
to assume the factors operating on Russian nationalism in 
the nineteenth century were the same as those operating 
today. One would also have to have a highly deterministic 
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attitude to the evolution of ideas and movements, 
comparable to the view that Stalinism was the inevitable 
consequence of Marxism. Nonetheless it is likely that some 
light can be cast on the relationship between the Russian 
nationalist ideologies in the USSR today by an 
investigation of the relationship between official and 
unofficial nationalist ideologies of the nineteenth 
century. 
It should perhaps be pointed out that there was no 
necessary link in nineteenth-century Russia between anti- 
Westernizing thought and either the 'left' or the 'right'. 
If 'left' implies a preference for freedom and equality and 
'right' suggests an emphasis on order, privilege and 
conservatism, then both left and right included 
Westernizing and anti-Westernizing wings. 11 Under 
Nicholas, independent public opinion was generally more 
sympathetic to Westernizing than to Slavophil ideas. In 
what follows, I use the terms "Slavophil" and"Slavophilism" 
to refer to the "classical" or "early" Slavophils: Aleksei 
Stepanovich Khomiakov (1804-60), the brothers Ivan 
Vasilevich and Pyotr Vasilevich Kireevsky (1506-1856 and 
1808-1856), the brothers Konstantin Sergeevich and Ivan 
Sergeevich Aksakov (1817-1860 and 1823-1886), Iury 
Fyodorovich Samarin (1819-1876) and Aleksandr Ivanovich 
Koshelyov (1806-1883). 
On the surface, there are several similarities between 
the ideology of Nicholas I and Slavophilism, Nicholas's 
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ideology has been referred to since the late nineteenth 
century (following Aleksandr N. Pypin) as official 
(ofitsiallnaia) narodnost', usually rendered in English as 
"Official Nationality". The ideology was expressed in 1833 
by Nicholas's Minister of People's Enlightenment, Sergei S. 
Uvarov: "Our common obligation consists in this, that the 
education of the people be conducted, according to the 
Supreme intention of our August Monarch, in the joint 
spirit of Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality. "12 The 
three elements of Uvarov's triad - Orthodoxy, autocracy and 
narodnost' - were all believed in by the Slavophils, 
although their interpretation of these concepts usually 
differed from the official view. The Soviet scholar 
Viacheslav A. Koshelyov suggests that the outward 
similarity of Slavophilism. to Uvarov's formula was 
conscious, with the aim of making it easier for the 
Slavophils to spread their ideas. 13 Both the official 
ideology and Slavophilism were hostile to the Western ideas 
of liberalism and socialism, and they both postulated that 
Russia was in a certain sense different from the West. The 
Slavophils nevertheless fundamentally opposed the path of 
development pursued by Russian officialdom. While there 
were differences among the Slavophils, they generally 
rejected the Westernizing reforms of Peter I, the life- 
style of the elite, and sometimes idealized the Muscovite 
past. In this there was a continuity going back to the 
concept of "Moscow, the Third Rome" and the ideas of the 
Raskol'niki. (Herzen called the latter "Slavophils". 14) 
Furthermore, the Slavophils idolized the Russian people, 
. especially 
the peasants, rather than the State, and 
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protested at the lack of freedom in Nicholas's Russia. 
Nicholas Riasanovsky has divided the proponents of 
official narodnost'_ into the "dynastic" and "nationalist" 
wings. The dynastic wing included the Tsar, most of his 
government and the journal Severnoe-pchelo (Northern Bee, 
St. Petersburg, 1825-1864), edited by Nikolai I. Grech and 
Fyodor V. Bulgarin. This wing was strongest in St. 
Petersburg. To the right of the government was the 
obscurantist journal Maiak (The Lighthouse, St. Petersburg, 
1840-1845), edited by S. Burachek and P. Korsakov, which 
carried anti-Western feeling to an extreme. The 
nationalist wing was headed by Mikhail Petrovich Pogodin 
(1800-1875) and Stepan Petrovich Shevyryov (1806-1874), 
respectively professors of history and literature at the 
University of Moscow. Pogodin was the publisher and first 
editor of the journal Moskvitianin (The Muscovite, Moscow, 
1841-1856), which was patronized by Uvarov. Many of its 
contributors, together with the poet Fyodor Ivanovich 
Tiutchev (lB03-1875), belonged to the nationalist wing. 
The nationalists gained much wider support than the 
dynastic wing among young educated Russians, and they were 
strongest in Moscow. The emphasis of the nationalist wing 
on the world mission of the Russian people brought them 
closer to the Slavophils and, lacking a journal of their 
own, the Slavophils contributed to Moskvitianin. 15 The 
chronicler of Pogodin's work, Nikolai P. Barsukov, records 
however that of all the Slavophils, only Khomiakov had 
consistently friendly relations with Pogodin. 16 
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Despite the similarities between the nationalist wing 
of official narodnost' and the Slavophils, both Riasanovsky 
and Andrzej Walicki, two leading scholars of Slavophilism, 
are insistent on the fundamental divisions between them. 
Pogodin and the Slavophils emphasised their mutual 
differences; neither Pogodin himself nor the Slavophils 
used the word "Slavophil" to describe him, and this 
distinction was respected in much of pre-revolutionary 
Russian scholarly literature. Hans Kohn, however, did 
describe Pogodin as a "Slavophil". Paul Debreczeny 
restricts "official nationality" to the dynastic wing, and 
describes Shevyryov as occupying "a place midway between 
Slavophilism and official nationality". To complicate 
matters further, Tiutchev considered himself a Slavophil, 
despite his enthusiasm for Peter. Richard A. Gregg holds 
that Tiutchev was a Slavophil because of his professed 
belief that the Orthodox Russian peasantry represented a 
uniquely Slav way of life which official Russia had 
abandoned. He claims that other Slavophils considered 
Tiutchev to be one of them, but cites no evidence. Ivan 
Aksakov's long biographical essay nowhere calls him a 
Slavophil, but emphasises his proximity to Slavophil ideas. 
Some of the Russian Westernizers, such as Vissarion G. 
Belinsky and Nikolai G. Chernyshevsky, lumped the two major 
doctrines together. Plekhanov wrote an article intended to 
show the essential unity of Slavophilism and official 
17 
Soviet scholars have generally accepted that 
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differences exist between the ideologies, while minimizing 
their importance, and have argued that these differences 
reflect the different social bases of the ideologies. Thus 
N. L. Rubinstein argued in 1927 that Slavophilism reflected 
the interests of the middle strata of the gentry, whereas 
Nicholas's government drew its support mainly from the top 
strata. Aleksandr G. Dementev in 1951 had a similar 
position. 18 
It should be emphasized here that Soviet scholars 
before the Brezhnev era seriously neglected the study of 
Slavophilism. It was safer and more profitable for them to 
concentrate on those Westernizers; and socialists who were 
the acknowledged precursers of Plekhanov and Lenin. 
Academician N. Derzhavin wrote in 1939 in the journal 
Istorik-marksist that he knew of no post-revolutionary work 
specifically on Slavophilism, although he thought that it 
deserved "very serious attention". 19 (He presumably 
overlooked Rubinstein's work. ) The Moscow University 
professor Sergei S. Dmitriev published an article dedicated 
to Slavophilism in the same journal two years later, 
linking the ideology with liberal bourgeois aspirations. 
This article was the subject of a discussion in the same 
issue. 20 After this, however, nobody seems to have 
produced any books or major articles concentrating on 
Slavophilism until the late Khrushchev period, although 
works dealing with relations between the Slavophils and 
other thinkers did appear. (Books were published, on the 
other hand, on the pan-Slavist movement which coalesced 
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after the Crimean War. ) When analysis of Slavophilism 
became legitimized, it was usually smuggled in under the 
guise of discussing the poetry or the "literary criticism" 
of the Slavophils, using the same subterfuge as the writers 
of the nineteenth century. 21 The collected poems of Ivan 
Aksakov were published in 1960, under Khrushchev, and of 
Khomiakov in 1969, under Brezhnev. 22 The 1969 discussion 
in Voprosy_literatury can be identified as the first major 
scholarly symposium on Slavophilism in the USSR since 1941. 
Encyclopaedia entries on Slavophilism in the 1970s and 
1980s refer to the Slavophils' opposition to serfdom, to 
West European political forms and to the revolutionary 
movement. In the third edition of the Bol'shaia-sovetskaia 
entsiklopediia (Large Soviet Encyclopaedia, 1976), Dmitriev 
identified what the Slavophils saw as the uniqueness of 
Russia. It was "in the absence, as it seemed to them, of 
class struggle, in the Russian land obshchina and artels, 
and in Orthodoxy, which the Slavophils considered the only 
true Christianity". 23 B. F. Egorov, the author of the 
article in the Kratkaia. literaturnaia-entSiklo-Dediia (Short 
Literary Encyclopaedia, 1971), also supplied a short 
version for the Literaturnvi entsiklo-Dedicheskii-slovar' 
(Literary Encyclopaedia-Dictionary, 1987). In the latter, 
but not the former, he noted that the Slavophils had posed 
the question of the historical and national sources of 
Russian culture. 24 
More significant is the appearance of books devoted 
solely to Slavophilism. The 1972 monograph by Iu. Z. 
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Iankovsky may have been the earliest, although the mention 
of Slavophilism or any Slavophils was cautiously omitted 
from the title. 25 In 1976, the first book to include 
"Slavophils" in its title appeared, a monograph by the 
philologist Vasily I. Kuleshov in a print of 10,000.26 A 
collective work under the imprint of the Gorky Institute of 
World Literature appeared in 1978, with a print of only 
3650.27 Editions of the collected works of Ivan Kireevsky 
were published in 1979 and 1984, both with a print of 
20,000, and of the literary criticism of Konstantin and 
Ivan Aksakov in 1981 with a relatively large print of 
100,000. Ivan Aksakov's letters began to appear in 1988.28 
Two more monographs came, by Vischeslav A. Koshelyov in 
1984, under the auspices of the Institute of Russian 
Literature (Pushkin House), with a print of only 4,500, and 
a monograph by Nikolai I. Tsimbaev in 1986 with a print run 
of 5,260.29 Kuleshov's 1976 volume repeated Derzhavin's 
complaint of 1939.11 ... Slavophilism as a phenomenon of 
Russian public life of the 1840s-50s has still been studied 
insufficiently.,, 30 As Koshelyov notes in his review of 
Soviet studies of Slavophilism, some commentators such as 
Kuleshov claim that the Slavophils' literary creations were 
"extremely weak", while others, including himself, consider 
that their work was artistically interesting and went 
beyond the confines of Slavophil doctrine. 31 
Influences-on-official-. naroduost' and Slavophilis 
Similarities between official narodnost' and 
Slavophilism are partly attributable to the fact that they 
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were both influenced by similar sources, especially German 
romanticism and the nationalist treatment of Russian 
history. Further, Pogodin directly affected the Slavophils 
through his lectures; Samarin described Pogodin as the 
professor who influenced him most. Pogodin's view on the 
essential differences between Russia and the West were 
published in his Moskovskii vestnik (Moscow Herald) in 
1827, well before the emergence of Slavophilism. Pogodin 
and the Slavophils both studied in the climate of 
reactionary nationalism dominated by the works of Denis I. 
Fonvizin, S. N. Glinka, A. S. Shishkov and especially 
Karam--in. The theatre was dominated by themes from Russian 
history, from Aleksandr Pushkin's play qgnis Godunoy (1825) 
to Mikhail Glinka's opera A-Life-for-the Tsar (1836; 
renamed under Stalin, Ivan Susanin). But as Isaiah Berlin 
has expressed it, "Almost all the social and political 
ideas held by Russian thinkers had their origin in the 
West, " and the impact of European idealism, especially 
German romanticism, on Pogodin and on the Slavophils was 
very important. Walicki. states that F. W. J. Schelling's 
influence on Pogodin was evident in his lectures of the 
1820s. Riasanovsky attributes more weight to German 
thinkers such as Herder, F. Schiller, J. G. Fichte, 
Friedrich Schlegel and particularly Schelling than to other 
Russians as influences on the Slavophils. According to 
Riasanovsky, "romantic nationalism penetrated the official 
doctrine, contending for allegiance with the older dynastic 
interpretation"; but one could argue that Uvarov's 
formulation of 1833 already reflected to a degree Pogodin's 
romant ici sm. 32 
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An experience common to some of the young men who later 
became proponents of official narodnost' and Slavophilism 
was association with the Moscow secret society 'The Lovers 
of Wisdom' (liubomudry, 1823-1825 or 1825). This was 
formed to spread German idealistic philosophy (especially 
Schelling's thought) in Russia. Nevertheless its members 
were critical of the Russian tendency to imitate Western 
ideas and advocated, among other things, a genuinely 
national literature. The society included the Kireevsky 
brothers, Koshelyov, Pogodin and Shevyryov. A leading role 
was played by Prince Vladimir F. Odoevsky (1803-1869). In 
his "Russian Nights", begun in the 1820s, Odoevsky 
expressed his admiration for European culture, but rejected 
the self-interest of capitalist society. 33 He emphasised 
what he called Russia's samobytnost', her uniqueness or 
originality. Russia's national mission was to lead the 
West back to a state of love and unity. "There will come a 
conquest of Europe by Russia, but only a spiritual one, 
because the chaos of European learning can be brought into 
harmony only by the Russian mind. "34 
Neil Cornwell denies that Odoevsky was a precursor of 
the Slavophils. Odoevsky, he points out, supported Peter's 
reforms. In the 1840s, he stood between the Slavophils and 
the Westernizers. 35 Riasanovsky describes Odoevsky as "the 
first Russian to give a critical philosophical appraisal of 
Western culture and to formulate on this basis the doctrine 
of Russian Messiahship". 36 Walicki designates Odoevsky's 
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views as I'missionism" rather than "messianism", 37 but this 
seems mistaken. Odoevsky wrote: "the sixth part of the 
world designated by Providence for a great deed 
(podvig) ... will save not only the body but the soul of 
Europe as well. 38 This idea of Russia having been chosen 
to save Europe is central to Russian messianism and became 
important in Slavophil doctrine. 39 
Chaadaev 
A final influence on Slavophilism who cannot be 
neglected is Pyotr Iakovlevich Chaadaev (1793-1856). 40 
Walicki considers Slavophilism to be in a sense a "reply to 
Chaadaev". 41 Chaadaev's "Philosophical Letters", written 
in 1829, expressed his deep unhappiness with the past and 
present state of Russia, and his admiration for the papacy, 
which symbolized the past and (for him) forthcoming unity 
of Christendom, 42 He referred to the "disastrous condition 
which encroaches upon all hearts and minds in our 
country"43 and exhorted his reader to follow the customs of 
the Church. The Schism in Christianity had prevented 
Russia from participating in the cultural and intellectual 
movements of Western Europe, leaving her behind and 
belonging "neither to the West nor to the East". 44 Russian 
culture was purely imitative. 
Alone in the world, we have given nothing to the world, 
taken nothing from the world, bestowed not even a 
single idea upon the fund of human ideas, contributed 
nothing to the progress of the human spirit, and we 
have distorted all progressivity which has come to 
us. 45 
Here he praised Peter I for trying to unite Russia with 
civilization. But Chaadaev saw little hope for Russia in 
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the short term. 
We are one of those nations which does not seem to form 
an integral part of humanity, but which exists only to 
provide some great lesson for the world. The lesson 
which we are destined to provide will assuredly not be 
lost, but who knows when we shall find ourselves amid 
humanity and how much misery we shall experience before 
the fulfilment of our destiny? 46 
The publication of the first letter in 1836 shocked 
Russian society in its mood of national-self satisfaction. 
Nicholas had Chaadaev declared insane but did not deprive 
him of liberty. 47 The following year Chaadaev produced his 
"Apologia of a Madman", expressing rather different views. 
But this was not a sudden change, a forced recantation. 
The July revolution of 1830 in France had undermined his 
faith in Europe; the aristocratic structures which 
Chaadaev admired were crumbling. 48 In 1835 he wrote: 
"... it is Europe to whom we shall teach an infinity of 
things which she could not conceive without us ... great 
things have always come from the desert. "49 Norman G. O. 
Pereira has pointed out that self-doubt often produces 
self-affirmation and self-exaltation, and suggests that 
this process was evident in Chaadaev and other nineteenth- 
century Russian thinkers. 50 
In the "Apologia", 51 Chaadaev defended his right as a 
patriot to speak unpleasant truths; but now the theme 
which can be summed up in the phrase "the advantages of 
backwardness" came to dominate. The "Apologia" was a paean 
to Peter I for liberating Russia from her old traditions 
and teaching his successors and his people to learn from 
the West. From his time on, Russia took her whole culture 
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from the West. Chaadaev argued that Peter's success was 
possible only because Russia before him did not have a 
thriving culture and rich traditions; for otherwise, the 
nation would not have accepted Europeanization. Chaadaev's 
words became famous. "In his land Peter the Great found 
only a blank sheet of paper, and he wrote on it: Europe and 
[the] West; since then we belonged to Europe and to the 
West. " 52 
Chaaciaev was now in a position of appearing to ally 
himself with the government, who still venerated Peter, 
against the "fanatical Slavicists" who wished to "demolish 
the work of Peter the Great; they want to follow the road 
into the desert again. "53 At the same time Chaadaev 
doubtless was appealing to the government to stick to 
Peter's road, and not be seduced by the national 
exclusiveness which might be an interpretation of 
narodnost'. Following Peter's road, Chaadaev thought that 
Russia would do great things. 
I think that if we have come after the others, it is in 
order to do better than the others... To reduce us to 
repeating the long series of follies and calamities 
which nations less favoured than ours had to undergo 
would be, in my opinion, a strange misunderstanding of 
the role which has been allotted to us... There is 
more: I have the inner conviction that we are called 
upon to resolve most of the problems in the social 
order, to accomplish most of the ideas which arose in 
the old societies, to make a pronouncement about those 
very grave questions which occupy humanity. 54 
His view that Russia was divinely chosen for a special 
mission reflected his discussions with Ivan Kireevsky and 
others who later became Slavophils. 55 Joseph Frank has 
written that Chaadaev "provided Russian Messianism with a 
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; )hilosophical foundation, '56 with his theory of the 
advantages of backwardness. Chaadaev's sharp differences 
with the Slavophils were not related only to his pro- 
Catholic sympathies. While Chaadaev's unique version of 
Russian messianism was rooted in support for Peter, the 
Slavophil version looked to Russian traditions which Peter 
01 had disrupted; and whereas Chaadaev looked to the elite as 
the main agency of Russia's development, the Slavophils 
looked to the common people. 57 
Pravoslavie, samn3derzhavie, -nairadnost' 
It was neither Slavophilism nor the ideas of Chaadaev 
which dominated Journalism under Nicholas I, but the 
official ideology. I shall discuss this in the next two 
sections, and then consider Slavophil thought. Following 
that, I shall look at some of the issues of contention 
between the proponents of the two ideologies, and attempt 
to consider the relationship between ideology and the 
actual policies of the Tsar. 
Nicholas's reign had begun with the Decembrist revolt, 
and this served to reinforce the anti-Enlightenment feeling 
which had been held by the previous Tsar and his government 
and which characterized the latter part of Alexander's 
reign. The revolutions of 1830 in Western Europe made 
Nicholas afraid of the development of a Russian working 
class, and he refused to stimulate industry. His fears 
were to be strengthened by the revolutions of 1848.58 
Uvarov expressed his wish to defend Russia, even for only 
fifty years, "from the fate prepared for her by 
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theories". 59 The activities of the censorship and the 
Third Department, the political police, were stepped up. 
The name of Nicholas I became synonymous with reaction and 
the regimentation of society. 60 
Uvarov wrote in 1843 that the fall of institutions in 
Europe and the spread of revolutionary ideas had 
necessitated the search for the principles which were 
unique to Russia. Those were the principles enshrined in 
his triad. In a style typical of much that was written at 
the time, Uvarov claimed that the Russians were deeply 
attached to their faith and that an "innumerable majority" 
believed that "Autocracy constitutes the main condition of 
the political existence of Russia. " Shevyryov in 1841 
still more romantically spoke of Russia's unique political 
harmony. 
Only in our land do the tsar and the people comprise 
one unbreakable whole, not tolerating any obstacle 
between them: this connection is founded on the mutual 
feeling of love and faith and on the boundless devotion 
of the people to its tsar. 
The West, on the other hand, was dying from a contagious 
disease. Russians dealing with the West "fail to notice 
the poison concealed in the carefree intercourse, we do not 
scent in the Joy of the feast the future corpse which is 
already exuding an odor! "61 Tiutchev blamed the problems 
of the West on the Roman Catholic Church's split from 
Orthodoxy and its assumption of temporal power. This, he 
said in an article praised by Khomiakov, produced 
Protestantism and revolution. 62 
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Nicholas I seems to have sincerely believed in 
Orthodoxy. Recognizing that religion was important in 
maintaining order, he believed at the same time that order 
and the autocracy itself had to be maintained because it 
was God's will. The Church remained under the control of 
the State. Pogodin's arguments for Orthodoxy, like much of 
the writing of official narodnost', were crude and naive, 
especially in comparison with the Slavophils' work. 
Pogodin attacked atheists and materialists not only because 
they denied his Christianity, but also because he believed 
that the acceptance of their ideas would undermine the 
basis of morality and lead to chaos. Only Orthodoxy was 
the correct form of Christianity; Nicholas I, Fogodin, the 
poet Vasily A. Zhukovsky and other adherents of the 
official ideology went so far as to refer to the "Russian 
God". A handbook bearing Bulgarin's name claimed that the 
Russian State owed its foundation to Christianity, and that 
this explained the epithet "Holy Russia". 63 
Arguments for autocracy rested not only on the analogy 
between Tsar on Earth and God in Heaven but also on a 
pessimistic view of human nature. Pogodin seems to be 
typical of official ideologists in his ambiguous attitude 
to the Russian people. "The Russian people is marvellous, 
but marvellous so far only in potentiality. In actuality 
it is low, horrid and beastly.,, 64 Grech and Bulgarin spoke 
of the need for the Tsar to use harsh measures to preserve 
his autocracy. Bulgarin warned, "There is no beast fiercer 
than a raging mob! "65 
A historical justification for autocracy could be found 
90 
in the work of Peter 1, revered by Nicholas and the 
official ideologists. Pogodin attempted to catalogue the 
manifold achievements of Peter's reign in an article, aimed 
against the Slavophils, published in the first issue of 
Moskvitianin. Everywhere one looked, there were signs of 
Peter's influence: the calendar, clothing, the alphabet, 
the literary language, newspapers, certain items of food, 
sexually mixed social gatherings, secular universities, as 
well as the Table of Ranks and the complaints form, were 
introduced under him. These reforms were necessary for 
Russia's survival. It was not Peter's fault if Russians 
after him began to deify Europe and neglect Russian 
tradition. Pogodin was not by any means dismissive of the 
Muscovite, pre-Petrine traditions; and he clashed with 
representatives of the dynastic wing of official narodnost' 
when they compared Muscovite Russia to a corpse, with the 
intention of glorifying Peter the more. Nicholas banned 
the publication of Pogodin's hagiographic tragedy Peter I 
because he considered it almost blasphemous to portray his 
predecessor on the stage. Pogodin and Nicholas agreed, 
however, about the patriarchal nature of Russian autocracy. 
The Tsar saw himself as having a father-child relationship 
with his subjects, and instructed officials, educators, the 
police and even the manufacturers of Moscow to provide 
paternal care to the people whom they supervised. 66 
It is probably impossible to render satisfactorily in 
English the word narodnost'. It should not be translated 
as "nationalism"; tsarism was ambivalent towards this. 
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Riasanovsky acknowledges that "nationality", the usual 
translation, is "very inadequate". It had this meaning 
originally, in the sense of simply belonging to a national 
group, but under Nicholas it acquired the meaning of the 
spirit or character of a nation or people. Perhaps this 
does not go far enough; V. V. Zenkovsky states that the 
concept, deriving from German romanticism, meant "the 
individuality and 'mission' of each 'historical' nation". 
Part of the confusion over its meaning derives from the 
fact that different strands of opinion gave the word 
different connotations. The word narod itself is 
ambiguous, carrying the meaning of either the nation as a 
whole or the people, especially the common people. The 
meanings of "national" and "people's" are respectively 
carried today in the phrases "narodnoe khoziastvo SSSR'l and 
"sovet narodnykh deputatov". To follow Martin Malia's 
explanation, the government used narodnost'- to mean "that 
which is national", referring to the State, autocracy and 
serfdom; but it also intended the term to reflect the 
attempt to rely directly on the masses for support. The 
Slavophils borrowed the term to mean "that which is of the 
nation as a whole" and "that which is of the masses", 
referring particularly to the peasants, who had avoided the 
Westernization suffered by the elite. Belinsky too, in 
1841 associated narodnost' with the common people and used 
natsional'nost' for the whole people. The government used 
narodnost' for exclusively Great Russian (not Polish or 
Ukrainian) themes. Perhaps such phrases as "kinship with 
the people" and "closeness to the people", convey some of 
the meaning of narodnost'. 67 
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Even within the official ideology, there was tension 
between the "dynastic" and "nationalist" wings over the 
meaning of narodnost'. Both agreed, however, that devotion 
to Orthodoxy and the Tsar were particular characteristics 
of the Russian people. In 1837 the heir apparent was to 
visit Moscow, and Pogodin was commissioned to write a piece 
for him. This extract brings out not only his belief in 
the piety and loyalty of the people but also his respect 
for Muscovite traditions and his belief in the people as 
the bearers of national history. 
When the imperial standard in the Kremlin Palace 
announces His arrival, when the great bell of the 
Cathedral of the Assumption begins its solemn tolling, 
and the Tsarist square is covered by countless Orthodox 
people, when a unanimous hurrah! roars like thunder at 
the sight of the longed-for august first-born of 
Moscow, let Him look carefully into these faces; let 
Him listen attentively to these sounds: He will hear in 
them, He will read in them, more clearly than all the 
chronicles, our History. He will comprehend through 
them, more correctly than on the basis of all the 
statistical data, the secret of Russian power. He will 
learn, in this great moment of revelation, what is 
Moscow, what is the Russian man, what is Holy Russia. 68 
Fogodin claimed that the Western states were founded on 
conquest and were ridden by class divisions, whereas the 
Russian State was founded by popular invitation to Norman 
princes and avoided class struggle. This "Norman theory" 
of the origin of the Russian State is rejected by Soviet 
historians, such as Academician Boris A. Rybakov, who in 
1984 complained that it was still being taught in the 
West. 69 All the official ideologists postulated a 
dichotomy between "Russia" and "Europe", but the 
"nationalists" in particular emphasised it. For the 
93 
nationalists, the Russian people were not the mere 
instruments of autocracy but had a mission to unify the 
Slavs and even lead the world back to genuine Christianity. 
While the nationalists emphasized "Holy Russia", Bulgarin 
of the dynastic wing welcomed a suggestion that Russia 
should be renamed "Petrovia" or "Romanovia" after the demi- 
god. This was a fundamental problem with the official 
ideology: for all the talk of narodnost' , the regime 
continued to glorify the Tsar who had done most to break 
with national traditions. 70 
Fushkin, 
_aogol aad_, 
Lleksandr Iyanov 
Two writers of creative literature who made 
contributions to official narodnost' merit special 
attention: Aleksancir S. Pushkin (1799-1837) and Nikolai V. 
Gogol (1809-1852). Pushkin's love for freedom, Western 
orientation and the repression he suffered under 
Alexander I made him sympathetic to the Decembrists. When 
Nicholas made himself Pushkin's censor, the writer's 
position was made no easier. At the same time, one 
constant in Pushkin's views was a strong Russian 
nationalism. 71 In 1831, when the tsarist army crushed the 
Polish uprising, this was bitterly opposed by public 
opinion in Europe and by progressive thinkers in Russia; 
but Pushkin wrote "To the Slanderers of Russia", in which 
he told the West to mind its own business. Russia had 
spilt blood in defence of Europe, and the Polish revolt was 
"Just a quarrel of Slavs among ourselves". 72 Pushkin's 
contradictory feelings about Peter I were manifest in his 
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poem "The Bronze Horseman" (1833). On the one hand he 
sympathizes with the ordinary person who is a victim of a 
decision made by Peter. But on the other hand such 
autocrats seemed to be historically necessary; Peter had 
lifted Russia into the modern age. Although Nicholas 
censored the core of the poem, it can be read as a 
reconciliation with autocracy. 73 "The government is still 
the only European in Russia, " Pushkin declared in 1836.74 
It may seem odd to depict Gogol as a partisan of the 
official ideology. The first part of his uncompleted novel, 
Dead Souls (1842) was acclaimed, by Belinsky among others, 
as a satire on Russian society and an attack on serfdom; 
but other writers have seen it as part of his religious 
quest for national regeneration. The apparent 
contradictions in Gogol's work led Riasanovsky to conclude: 
"The great novelist himself did not know what he was 
doing. "75 The image of Russia as a troika travelling into 
an unknown future, at the end of Part One, has become 
f amous. 
Rus', do you not also gallop like the brisk troika 
which cannot be overtaken? 
They heard the familiar song from above, their bronze 
breasts strained together at once, and hardly touching 
the earth with their hooves, they were transformed into 
nothing but stretched lines, flying through the air, 
and rushing along, totally inspired by God! ... Rus', 
where are you dashing? Reply. She does not reply ... she flies past everything that there is on earth, and 
other peoples and states look askance, go to the side 
and yield way before her. 76 
Gogol's Selected-Passages-from-Correspondence-with 
Friends (1847) are animated not only by support for the 
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political and social systems existing in Russia, but also 
by a deep religious feeling (or desire for faith). 77 The 
Church can solve all the problems of the world; and by the 
Church Gogol means the Russian Orthodox Church, for he 
believed in the particular religious calling of the Russian 
people and the uniqueness of the "Russian soul". "In our 
land before any other, the bright resurrection of Christ 
will be celebrated. " Gogol believed that Russia was called 
upon to create a new Christian culture, which would be a 
prelude to the end of the world. 78 According to Zenkovsky, 
Gogol was the first to introduce eschatological motifs into 
Russian literature, and Berdiaev, who found his social 
prescriptions "horrible", agrees that messianism begins in 
Russian literature with Gogol. 79 As has been argued above, 
Russian religious messianism was much older than this; but 
in the context of the trend of ideas that saw Russia as a 
model for Europe which could avoid the evils of capitalist 
development and revolution, Gogol was one of the first to 
put Russia's religious calling at the centre of his thought. 
Why does Russia alone act as a prophet? Because she 
feels more keenly than others the hand of God in 
everything that comes to pass within her, and senses 
the approach of another kingdom. 80 
Gogol was at pains to distance himself from jingoism. "We 
are no better than anyone else, and our life is more 
unsettled and disorderly than all of theirs. "81 But 
nevertheless: "The great task which is impossible for any 
other peoples, is possible only for the Russian people.,, 82 
Prior to the publication of Selected-Passages, Gogol 
had been given a pension by the Tsar and had written to 
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Uvarov expressing his loyalty. Uvarov publicized this 
letter. To Gogol's great disappointment, this declaration 
of loyalty did not prevent the censorship from deleting 
sections of the Passages which appeared to offer advice to 
the government. 83 Most readers were disgusted by the 
book's servility; Belinsky's accusatory letter to Gogol, 
linking the book and the money, seems to have been a 
typical reaction. A personal attack on Fogodin alienated 
the supporters of the official ideology, while a statement 
in praise of Peter I alienated the Slavophils. 84 Thus 
Gogol's work attracted little immediate support and much 
opposition; but the author of The-Inspector-General and 
Dead-Soqls nevertheless has a significant place in the 
development of Russian messianism. 85 
The painter Aleksandr Ivanov (1806-1858), a friend of 
Gogol, probably merits mention here because of his 
eschatological perceptions concerning the person of the 
Tsar. In 1545 Nicholas visited Ivanov's studio in Rome, 
where he was working on his mag. 111L]E-opjj, ý, "The Appearance of 
Christ to the People". Ivanov then discovered that the 
Russian people was "the last of' the peoples of the 
planet ... The Messiah whom the Jews await and in whose 
second coming symbolic Christians [sic] believe is the 
Russian Tsar, the Tsar of the last people. " The Tsar would 
become "entirely equal to Christ in his high authority and 
belief in God". 86 He planned a temple in Moscow which 
would include a fresco of the Second Coming, with the 
Messiah presented in the form of Nicholas 1.87 Khomiakov 
highly regarded the art of both Gogol and Ivanov. 88 
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Slavophilisiix-and-the_ýSlavophils 
It is not possible to point to a body of doctrine and 
say that that was what the Slavophils believed. They did 
not form an organized, disciplined group; they had 
differences among themselves; and in some cases their views 
changed over time, with the result that people who had 
become known as Slavophils came to support ideas which were 
not shared by the original Slavophils. The very term 
Slavophil was subject to different meanings (see above, p. 
Peter K. Christoff, says that S: 31avophilism as- such did 
not exist, only a number of individual Slavophils. 89 Marc 
Raeff maintains that Slavophilism was not a coherent 
system, but a mood. 90 
The "golden age" of Slavophilism ran from the mid-1840s 
and through the 1850s. The leading Slavophils came from a 
common background: they were from old, traditional, gentry 
families; they were all well-educated, and most were 
related by blood and marriage. All spent at least some of 
their formative years in Moscow; and Khomiakov, the 
Kireevsky brothers and the Aksakov brothers all attended 
the University of Moscow. 91 It is often forgotten that 
around half the population of Moscow at this time were Old 
Believers, the traditional opponents of Westernization. 92 
It would be wrong to say that anti-Western feeling was 
basic to the original Slavophils; they were not even in 
agreement over their attitude to Peter I. Zenkovsky is 
right to note that the essential difference between the 
Slavophils and the Westernizers was the Slavophil view of 
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Orthodoxy as the foundation of Russian national originalit7 
(samobytnost'). 93 Indeed this was perhaps the central 
element of Slavophilism. The adherents of official 
narodnost' also claimed to proceed from this view, but 
their usually servile attitude to the regime marked them 
off from the Slavophils. 
Rather than creating an "ideal type" of Slavophilism 
that no real person actually believed in, it seems 
appropriate to outline the views of the most influential 
Slavophils in so far as they are relevant to the subject of 
this study. The problem as to who was the original 
Slavophil - Khomiakov or Ivan Kireevsky - can be dismissed 
briefly. It is clear that Khomiakov was the main creator 
of Slavophil religious ideas whereas Kireevsky was of 
central importance in philosophy. Berdiaev's view that 
Christianity is the centre of Slavophilism leads him to 
support Khomiakov's claim; while Khomiakov was true to 
Orthodoxy from his childhood onwards, Kireevsky (according 
to Berdiaev) did not become a Christian until the late 
1840s. 94 Riasanovsky describes Kireevsky's "Reply to 
Khomiakov" of 1839 as the first statement of his 
Slavophilism, and elsewhere says that Slavophilism can be 
dated from 1839.95 Riasanovsky agrees with Berdiaev on 
Khomiakov's central role, however, and describes him as the 
"recognized leader" of the Slavophils until his death. 96 
Khomiakov 
Khomiakov was steeped in Orthodoxy all his life. 
Beginning in 1829, his view of Russia's world mission and 
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her role as leader of the Slavs appeared in his poetry, and 
he developed Slavophilism from the late 1830s. Walicki 
considers that he was "far more of a nationalist" than Ivan 
Kireevsky or Konstantin Aksakov, and indeed a "chauvinist", 
enthusing about Russian military power (see below, pp. 131- 
33). He left unpublished his "Notes on Universal History" 
and his ecclesiastical study, now known as The-Church-is 
One (written 1344-1845). 97 
Nicolas Zernov has called Khomiakov "the first original 
theologian and authentic spokesman of the Russian 
Church". 98 His major theological contribution was the 
concept of sobornost'. This meant for Khomiakov the 
"togetherness" and "oneness" of Christian believers, the 
collectivity and unity which he held could be found only in 
the Orthodox Church. Freedom could be gained not by the 
individual alone but through the collective, in this 
sobornost'. The adjective sobornyi, he said, represented 
in Church Slavonic the Greek katholikos (catholic, 
universal); and he asserted that kgtholikos meant 
"according to all". The universal Church, then, was the 
Church "according to all" the believers; it represented the 
"free unanimity" of the beliefs of its members. 99 
In his essay "On Humboldt" (probably written in 1849 
but published posthumously) he attacked the Western 
Churches for leaving behind this "free unanimity". 
"Christianity... propounded the ideas of unity and freedom 
indissolubly combined in the moral-law=of mutual love. "100 
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But legalistic, rationalistic Roman Catholicism believed 
that freedom was antagonistic to unity, and sacrificed 
freedom in favour of an external unity. The "one- 
sidedness" of Rome eventually led to the emergence of 
Protestantism, which sacrificed the idea of unity to the 
idea of freedom. Protestantism, in its turn, by retreating 
from dogma degenerated into scepticism and rationalism; 
this produced a revolutionary ferment in Western politics. 
Alternative philosophies such as Hegelianism, socialism and 
communism were isolated from religion and therefore had 
collapsed or were about to collapse. The only alternative 
was Orthodoxy, whose standard-bearer was Russia, and here 
he drew attention to Russia's pre-Christian communalism. 
... man can no longer see the eternal truth of original 
Christianity except as a whole, that is in the identity 
of unity and freedom, manifested in the law of 
spiritual love. That is Orthodoxy. Any other concept 
of Christianity has henceforth been made impossible. 
The representative of this concept is the East, and 
mainly the Slav countries headed by our Rus', which 
accepted pure Christianity a long time ago, and with 
God's blessing also became a strong vessel of it, 
perhaps because of that communal principle by which it 
lived, lives and cannot live without. She has passed 
through great trials, has defended her social and 
cultural principle in long and bloody struggle ... and having first saved these principles for herself, she 
must now become their representative for the whole 
world. That is her vocation, her destiny in the 
future. 101 
Notwithstanding the divisions in the Church, Khomiakov 
claimed that in a real sense the Church was united. 
The Church is one. Her Unity follows of necessity from 
the unity of God; for the Church is not a multitude of 
persons in their separate individuality, but a unity of 
the grace of God, living in a multitude of rational 
creatures, submitting themselves willingly to grace. 102 
This emphasis on freedom and unity caused him to reject the 
Roman Catholic distinction between a teaching hierarchy and 
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an obedient laity; rather, all Christians were teachers. 
He approved enthusiastically an Encyclical of the Orthodox 
Patriarchs of 1848: "the guardianship of dogmas and of the 
purity of rites is entrusted not to the hierarchy alone, 
but to the whole people of the Church, which is the Body of 
Christ. 11103 The Roman Catholic bishops had violated the 
idea of sobornost' by independently and arbitrarily adding 
filioaue to the Creed, precipitating the split between the 
Western and Eastern parts of the Church. While the 
Catholics were guilty of subordinating the individual to 
the hierarchy, the Protestants were guilty of 
individualism. Thus, only the Orthodox were truly 
Christian. 
... only those communities can acknowledge one another 
as fully Christian which preserve their unity with the 
Eastern Patriarchates, or enter into this unity. For 
there is one God and one Church, and within her there 
is neither dissension nor disagreement. 104 
Khomiakov was not satisfied, however, with the actual 
situation of the Russian Orthodox Church. He believed that 
the task of the Church was to regenerate the whole of human 
life, including its social and economic aspects. He was 
unhappy at the close links between Church and State, 
although he claimed that the Church had retained its 
spiritual independence. He appealed to the West not to 
judge the Orthodox faith by the official acts of the 
Russian Church. Berdiaev comments on this that Khomiakov 
was counterposing an ideal Orthodoxy to real Catholicism, 
an inherently unfair exercise. Khomiakov's theological 
works could not be published in Russia in his lifetime 
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ýalthough some appeared abroad). Walicki points out that 
the Orthodox Church leaders were not enamoured with the 
idea of the supremacy of the body of believers, but they 
permitted Khomiakov's works to be published in 1679. In 
spite of the apparent practical difficulty of achieving 
unanimous opinion on matters of religion, Khomiakov's ideas 
have become part of the canon of Russian theology. 
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Khomiakov's view of the traditional peasant commune 
(obshchina) governed by the meeting of its members ýmir) 
was an extension into the social sphere of his concept of 
sobornost'. Customarily the decisions of the mir were 
unanimous and binding on their members, and were treely 
accepted. He saw in the obshchina the germs of a new 
society. The principle would not necessarily be destroyed 
by industrialization because of the tradition of co- 
operation among artisans in the small collective enterprise 
ýartel'). The alternative to the preservation ot 
collective customs was 11 ... the concentration of property 
in 
relatively iew hands", and the "consignment to the 
proletariat" ot most ol the popuiation. 
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Khomiakov travelled to Germany and Britain (where he 
visited Oxford and discovered a fondness for the "organic" 
Tory principles). He was a long way from the view that 
simply exalted Russia and denigrated Europe. At one point, 
rejecting the extreme nationalist viewpoint, he wrote: "We 
really place the Western world above us and recognize its 
unquestionable superiority. 11107 This may account for his 
103 
views on the Russian past and Peter I, which Walicki 
describes as "quite out of step with orthodox Slavophile 
doctrine". Khomiakov was more critical than other 
Slavophils of Muscovite Russia; in his polemic with 
Kireevsky in 1839 he rejected Kireevsky's claim that life 
in Muscovy represented the expression of Christian 
principles. 108 In particular, he disliked the exclusivity 
and xenophobia which appeared in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. It was inevitable, he asserted, that 
this xenophobia would lead to its opposite, and the 
instrument was Peter. As he said in "On Humboldt": 
However strictly future history will judge him (and it 
is undeniable that many serious accusations fall on his 
memory), it will recognize that the trend he 
represented was not completely wrong; it became wrong 
only in its triumph, and that triumph was full and 
complete. 
What the triumph meant was "spiritual enslavement to the 
Western world... bitter antagonism against the Russian 
land". 109 In 1851 Khomiakov wrote: "Not a small favour 
was rendered to us by Peter in acquainting us with the 
sciences and intellectual life of the West. "110 What 
Khomiakov objected to was not the fruits of enlightenment 
but the mistake made by the Russians of confusing 
enlightenment with the Western forms "clothing" it. 111 
Later, in the "Letter to the Serbs" (1860), he praised 
Peter for his "intelligent work" in importing Dutch naval 
technology, but deplored Peter's "awful foolishness" in 
retaining Western technical terminology. 112 
The statements above suggest that it is rather 
misieading tor Riasanovsky to assert baidly, "The 
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Slavophiles were opposed to Peter the Great and his 
reforms, to contemporary Russian government and 
society. "113 It is true that the Slavophils disliked the 
despotic methods and excesses of Peter, and his instituting 
the split between the Westernized 'elite and the masses; 
and his new capital represented the antithesis of what they 
believed in. Their romantic conception of history, 
however, persuaded them to assign to Peter some positive 
role in the evolution of Russia. Khomiakov even saw a use 
for St. Petersburg, since it separated the site of the 
State power from the site of the Russian spirit, Moscow. 
Riasanovsky himself states that the necessity for Peter's 
reforms was recognized even by Konstantin Aksakov. 114 It 
seems that Khomiakov was not as "out of step" as Walicki 
suggests. Christoff argues that Khomiakov objected not so 
much to Peter's reforms in themselves as to the Tsar's 
energetic interference in the organic process of Russian 
history, violating sobornost' and obshchinnost'. 
Surprisingly, Khomiakov paid little attention even to 
Peter's absorption of the Church into the State. 115 
Even though Khomiakov believed that the West had made a 
positive contribution to world culture, he was in no doubt 
that this was coming to an end. "The age has passed and 
the entire West is covered with the shroud of death. "116 
The path from Catholicism via Protestantism to rationalism 
and individualism could go no further except to collapse, 
so long as the West remained bound by its own "principles". 
But there was light ahead. Russians were now returning to 
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their native "principles", such as Orthodoxy and the 
obshchina, and Russia now had to save the West. 
History calls Russia to be at the forefront of 
universal enlightenment; it gives her this right 
because of the all-roundedness and fullness of her 
principles, and a right given by history to a people is 
a duty imposed on each of its members. li7 
It is not enough to say that Khomiakov believed in 
Orthodoxy; he ideaiized and believed in the Russian people 
too, and in the "Messiahship of Russia". 118 (He rejected 
the epithet "Moscow, the Third Rome", however, as insulting 
to Moscow, since he regarded ancient Rome as legalistic and 
self-interested. 119) He believed that nations, like 
persons, had their own spiritual principles and 
personalities; humanity's historical tasks were divided up 
according to nations. Thus the Western nations suffered 
from various neuroses, but the Russian people felt their 
Christian mission. 120 At the time of the Crimean War 
Khomiakov wrote: "The Russian people does not think of 
conquests at all - conquests have never seduced it ... It 
thinks of its duty, it thinks of a holy war [&Lerre 
sacrgel. "121 In a similar vein, he referred to "the interests 
of Moscow" as interests of "all humanity 
[obshchechelovecheskiel. "122 "The Russian question is 
undoubtedly the only universal issue of our time.,, 123 
Ivan Kireevskv 
Ivan Kireevsky, the philosopher of Slavophilism, 
differed from Khomiakov in that he reverted to Orthodoxy 
and became a Slavophil after a period of "Westernism". The 
editor of the 1979 Soviet edition of his works, Iu. V. Mann, 
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aptly reters to the "complexity and contradictiory nature', 
of Kireevsky's deveiopment. 124 Even in his first article, 
"On the Nature of Pushkin's Poetry" (1828), he spoke of the 
birth of a national literature truly depicting Russia and 
Russian character, in the "third phase" of Pushkin's 
development, supplanting the earlier domination of Western 
styles in his poetry. 125 In his "Review of Russian 
Literature for the Year 1829" he expressed his great 
admiration for European culture and the belief that Russia 
should continue to learn from it. At the same time he 
argued that Europe needed regenerating by a nation "that 
would rule over Cgospodstvovall the others thanks to her 
political and intellectual predominance". 126 Russia, he 
said, had been influenced by all the major European nations 
and was well placed to take on this role. Partly under 
Chaadaev's influence and after his visit to Germany in 1830 
(his only trip abroad), the "Western" elements in 
Kireevsky's thought then came to the fore. This was 
reflected in the title of his periodical, Evropeets (The 
European), which was banned after two issues. His article 
in the first issue, "The Nineteenth Century" ý1632) 
rejected the idea of Russia's samobytnost' and spoke of her 
role in helping to construct a new European 
civilization. 127 He defended Peter's reforms. "For our 
prosperity depends on our enlightenment, and for this we 
are obliged to Peter. " Political developments in Europe, 
however, were not to his liking; and this, together with 
the influence of his Orthodox wife, led him to abandon 
Westernism. The year 1838 marked the peak of his hostility 
to Peter, "the destroyer of the Russian and the introducer 
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of the German". The basic principles of his Slavophil 
philosophy of history appeared in his "Reply to Khomiakov" 
of that year. 128 
When Kireevsky took over the editorship of MoSkvitianin 
from Pogodin and Shevyryov in 1845, he dissociated himself 
from their dislike of the West. His "Survey of the Current 
State of Literature" reaifirmed his former ideas about 
Russia taking over the development of culture from the 
exhausted West. 
Were we to tear ourselves away from Europe, we would 
cease to be a universal nation... love for European 
enlightenment, as well as for our own, unite, in the 
final phase of their development into a single love and 
a single yearning for a living, and therefore universal 
and truly Christian, enlightenment. 129 
V. A. Kotelnikov, the editor of the 1984 Soviet edition of 
Kireevsky's articles, finds his combination of what 
Kotelnikov calls "European humanism" with concern for Rus' 
to be "especially instructive" for today. 130 
The clearest expression of his philosophy of history is 
his article "On the Nature of European Culture and Its 
Relation to the Culture of Russia" published in the 
Slavophils' Moskovskii_ýsbornik (Moscow Compendium) in 
1852.131 In this he articulated the central Slavophil 
concerns about the slavish copying of Western culture and 
the need to return to Russian spiritual traditions. His 
attitude to Peter was ambiguous. Kireevsky believed that 
in the mid-nineteenth century Europe was no longer the sole 
source of enlightenment; but he seems to have believed that 
Peter's reforms were necessary at the time. He went 
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zurther than Khomiakov towards the Imperator's view; 
Peter's desire for learning to pass from the West to 
Russia, said Kireevsky, "to a great extent justifies his 
extreme measures.,, 132 Now, however, there was a feeling of 
disappointment and dissatisfaction in the West; this was 
due to the unlimited trust that had been placed there on 
the omnipotence of reason, which had now been outgrown. 
Russian scholars who had previously been biased in Tavour 
of the West and against Russia now became more objective 
and re-examined Russian traditions. "The sources of 
Russian culture, " argued Kireevsky, "are totally different 
from the elements composing the culture of the European 
peoples.,, i33 He considered three elements of Western 
culture to be "entirely alien to old Russia. "134 The most 
important of these was the influence of Roman Catholicism, 
which had split from the universal Church. Russia, on the 
other hand, had remained constantly in touch with the 
universal Church. Secondly, the influence of ancient Roman 
civilization was reflected in the mentality of the West. 
The Roman mentality was dominated by law rather than 
justice, form rather than content, and reason rather than 
faith. This mentality led to the formation of separate 
political parties, pursuing their own interests and 
policies at the expense of the State, and thence to 
revolution. Thirdly, the European states arose from 
conquest and were divided along class lines. 135 
In contrast to Europe, pre-Petrine Russia had been a 
united community. Even when the country was politically 
divided, Orthodoxy (rather than a co=on language) made 
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Russia conscious of being "one living body". 136 Since 
Peter, the educated class had moved from Russian 
traditions; but, said Kireevsky, "this Russian life-style, 
created according to, and impregnated with, the ideas of 
our former upbringing, has still survived almost unchanged 
among the lower classes of the people. "137 This 
idealization of the peasantry, as contrasted with official 
society, sharply differentiates Kireevsky from the official 
ideologists. He drew an idealized picture of old Russia; 
she allegedly had "neither victors nor vanquished... nor 
class (soslovnoe) contempt, class hatred and class 
envy". 138 The Church influenced the State, but did not 
seek to rule; the epithet "Holy Russia" was orginally not a 
proud claim by the State (as the term was sometimes used in 
the nineteenth century) but reflected the abundance of holy 
places in the country. Berdiaev later described this view 
of Russian history as "fantastic" and accused the 
Slavophils of confusing the past with their utopia. 
Kireevsky praised the obshchina, but did not put the same 
emphasis on collective ownership that Khamiakov did; he 
said that the obshchina', s rights were "limited by the right 
of the landlord". 139 Kireevsky concluded his article by 
calling on the educated class to return "to the pure 
sources of the ancient Orthodox faith of its people.,, 140 
Kireevsky does not seem to have been as extreme in his 
claims for Russia as Khomiakov. For Kireevsky, Russia's 
mission was to create a new universal Christian philosophy 
and thereby initiate a new philosophical age. This 
110 
philosophy would essentially reject "autonomy" in favour of 
"wholeness" and "integralism" in all aspects of human life. 
Thus it would reject the autonomy of reason in favour of 
"spiritual wholeness", and reject the autonomy of the 
individual in the interests of society. Since rationalism 
had influenced Western Christianity, the new philosophy 
could be based only on Orthodoxy. 141 Whether this view of 
Russia's mission is truly a "messianic perspective", as 
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that messianism is "nowhere raised in his writings"143 and 
it is true that Kireevsky does not seem to regard the 
Russian people as uniquely chosen to redeem all the world's 
sins. Berdiaev went so far at one point as to deny that 
the Slavophils as a group, including even Khomiakov, could 
"be called in any exact sense 'messianic'"; I find his 
meaning unclear here, since he also talks of the 
contradictions of national messianisms in relation to 
Khomiakov. 144 Christoff is willing to use the term 
"messianism" to refer to Kireevsky's view that Russia's 
task was to lead Europe by sharing Orthodoxy with her. 145 
It appears, though, that Russian messianism is weaker in 
Kireevsky than in Khomiakov. 
Pyots-KireevskV 
Pyotr Kireevsky, Ivan's younger brother, did not write 
much but is always remembered as one of the founders of 
Slavophilism. He was a major influence on Ivan, retaining 
the Orthodox faith all his life, and he was the Slavophil 
folklorist. His study of Russian history gave him a more 
balanced view of pre-Petrine Russia than his brother had. 
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One significant article which he wrote for Moskvitianin in 
1845 was a polemic against Pogodin. He disputed Pogodin's 
claims about the Norman origin of the Russian State. 
Further, he accused Pogodin of seeing the Russian people as 
entirely passive in history and neglecting their resistance 
to foreign invasion. Pogodin's stubborn reply contributed 
to Ivan Kireevsky's resignation from Moskviti. anin. 146 
Konstantin Aksakov 
Much of the thought and activity of the Aksakov 
brothers, and of Samarin and Koshelyov, belongs 
chronologically to the next chapter. Konstantin Aksakov, 
whose major concern was with history, was the most extreme 
of the early Slavophils. His nationalist orientation began 
as aa child, when he would burn notes written in French, 
and lasted his whole life. It was only at the end of his 
life that he went abroad, and died on an Aegean island. 
Despite his early enthusiasm for Peter's attempts to bring 
European education to Russia, by the mid-1840s he was on 
the way to Slavophilism. 147 His poem "To Peter" (1845) 
accused the Emperor of despising and repressing the people 
"with a blooded axe". Peter's capital city was a threat to 
"Rus'", but the people would return to freedom "with their 
ancient Moscow,,. 148 
In 1847 he wrote: "Peter the Great brought in alien 
principles, but the national principles have been preserved 
to the present in the simple Russian people.,, 149 In the 
same vein, his article on the 700th anniversary of Moscow 
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in Moskovskie vedomosti, also published in 1845, declared 
that the old capital was still Russia's eternal national 
centre. It was "the true capital of Holy Rus'11,150 i. e. 
of the Orthodox peasant masses, in contrast to the 
Petersburg government and elite. Moscow's significance was 
not merely Russian, but universal; for the Russian people 
were characterized by their faith in universal principles. 
Elsewhere Aksakov developed this idea. 
The Russian people is not a people; it is humanity; it 
is a people only because it is surrounded by peoples 
with exclusively national essences, and its humanity is 
therefore represented as nationality. The Russian 
people is free, it has no state element in itself ... 
151 
This anticipates Dostoevsky's idea of the Russian as the 
"universal person". 
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Contentious issues: doinestic 
The differences between the views of the Slavophils and 
of the proponents of official narodnost' will now be 
outlined, and the relationship between these ideas and the 
actual policies of Nicholas I will be considered where 
appropriate. The attitude to Peter I and his reforms has 
often been seen as the crucial dividing line between 
official narodnost' and Siavophiiism. Having discussed the 
similarities between the two movements, Riasanovsky states: 
"Yet the difference is also very important. It centered on 
the figure and the activity of Peter the Great, and it came 
to include, as it expanded, divergent views ol the 
government, the people and the entire history of Russia. " 
But as I have tried to argue above (pp. 103-105,107), 
Riasanovsky is wrong to depict the Slavophils as uniformly 
against Peter's reforms. Nor were Pogodin and Shevyryov 
totally uncritical of the effects of the reforms. 
Shevyryov claimed to have criticisms of Peter, although his 
enthusiasm usually overcame them. 152 Pogodin, like some of 
the Siavophiis, disliked the uncritical adulation of the 
West that followed Peter but exculpated him from 
responsibility for this. 153 The distinction between the 
two groups is not as great as has been made out. 
Nor was the issue of serfdom one which neatly separated 
the Slavophils Irom official narodnost'. The Slavophils 
were land-owners and serf-owners, but generally in 
principle they were against serfdom. As a supporter of the 
obshchina and an opponent of landed property, Khomiakov 
strongly attacked serfdom as early as 1839, and even blamed 
114 
Peter for its introduction. Pyotr Kireevsky, Koshelyov and 
Samarin also opposed serfdom, with the former urging that 
the peasantry be given half the land, apparently without 
compensation for the landowners. In Khomiakov's opposition 
to serfdom there may have been an element of fear of 
peasant violence, which was present under Nicholas. 
Khomiakov showed his concern for the interests of the 
landlords by proposing a scheme whereby the State would 
compensate them for the loss of their serfs. Part of this 
money could be raised, he suggested, by privatizing State- 
owned assets to foreign capital. i54 This leads to the 
unavoidable question of what social interests, if any, 
Slavophilism expressed. Links between Slavophilism and the 
Moscow merchants do not seem to have developed until the 
Crimean War, although they became very important 
thereafter. Walicki suggests: 
Slavophilism was the ideology of the hereditary 
Russian nobility who were reluctant to stand up on 
their own behalf as a privileged group defending its 
own selfish interests, and therefore attempted to 
sublimate and universalize traditional values and to 
create an ideological platform that would unite ail 
classes and social strata representing 'ancient 
Russia,. 155 
Against this, it should be emphasized that there is little 
evidence that the Slavophils, in the period of Nicholas I, 
actually had the support of the nobility. 
The view that Slavophilism reflected the self-interest 
of the gentry is strengthened by the case of Ivan Kireevsky 
but weakened by that of Konstantin Aksakov, Kireevsky 
depended on the income produced by his serfs. He was, in 
principle, against serfdom, but in practice showed little 
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interest in emancipation. In 1847 he argued to his sister 
that this was not the time for it, and for the rest of his 
life he maintained an opposition to emancipation that seems 
to have been governed by self-interest. Koshelyov, who was 
more concerned with the problem, reproached Kireevsky for 
having no remorse about being a serf-owner, but (as 
Christoff points out) he himself did not free his serfs. 
Konstantin Aksakov, on the other hand, in his commitment to 
the abolition of serfdom was prepared to discount the 
interests of the gentry. Although he neglected the 
question until the last few years of his life, his writings 
of 1857 express the conviction that the peasants had a 
right not only to emancipation, but also to land. The 
benefits to the landlords would be in the moral sphere. 156 
The question of serfdom divided the upholders of the 
official ideology into the dynastic and nationalistic 
wings. Uvarov argued that serfdom was inextricably linked 
with autocracy, in the sense that it gave the gentry a 
stake in the political structures. Nicholas I spoke in 
1842 of serfdom as an "evil", but he feared the political 
consequences of abolition. Grech shared his fears. On the 
other hand Pogodin, who had serf origins, argued against 
Uvarov for abolition, apparently both because he thought it 
would promote political stability and because he believed 
Russia should be a classless society. He and Shevyryov 
were to welcome the Emancipation. 157 Thus the nationalist 
wing of official narodnostl- lined up with the majority of 
the Slavophils against the dynastic wing and Ivan 
11(5 
KireevskV, demonstrating how much the two ideologies 
overlapped on political issues. 
In religious matters, the Slavophils favoured the 
rebirth of parish communes and elected priests rather than 
the existing Church structure headed by Peter's Holy Synod. 
Ivan Aksakov in 1859 denied any "solidarity with the 
official spiritual world". 158 Although Ivan Kireevsky 
claimed that Peter had converted the majority of Russians 
into Old Believers, thereby apparently expressing some 
sympathy for them, the Slavophils favoured the return of 
the Raskol'niki to the Orthodox Church. Within the Russian 
Empire they advocated the propagation of Orthodoxy at the 
expense of other Christian denominations, but did not 
accept the use of force for this. Nicholas's religious 
policy distinguished between different religions on the 
basis of their loyalty to the State, and in the borderlands 
it cannot be separated from his general policy towards 
national minorities. With some exceptions, he increased 
the persecution of the ncDn-Orth(: )dox. i59 
On the question of autocracy, the Slavophils rejected 
the official idea that the Emperor ruled by divine right. 
They supported autocracy partly because it was the 
traditional Russian form of government, and partly because 
they saw political power as a burden, a necessary evil, and 
if a single person could accept the burden, so much the 
better. Riasanovsky probably goes too far when he says 
that the Slavophils advocated autocracy "without 
enthusiasm". 160 Berdiaev is right to say that Slavophilism 
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led to the conclusion that the government was "alien" 
(inorodnaia) to Russia, even if the Slavophils did not come 
out openly and say that; 161 but this refers to the German 
forms and practices of the State rather than the principle 
of autocracy itself. To the Slavophils, the purpose of the 
State was to defend the people, and interfere with them as 
little as possible. The Slavophil view was most clearly 
expressed in Konstantin Aksakov's Memorandum to Alexander 
II in 1855 (see below, pp. 150-53). Alongside unlimited 
autocracy, Aksakov posited the unlimited right of the 
people to advise the government on the correct course to 
take. 162 This was anathema to Nicholas; but the Slavophil 
views were to a great extent shared by the nationalist wing 
of the official ideologists. Pogodin, who himself suffered 
from censorship, wrote: "We think that every supreme 
authority, even the wisest, will become still wiser when 
assisted by the voice of the entire people. " Even the 
phrase voX. 2opuli., -vox-Dei 
is found in his writingsI63 - 
not an obvious argument for autocracy. 
The interpretation of narodnost' also brought Pogodin 
and Shevyryov closer to the Slavophils than to the dynastic 
wing of official ideology. As Nikolai L. Brodsky wrote, 
narodnost' meant serfdom to Uvarov and emancipation to the 
Slavophils164 (or to most of them), and he could have added 
Fogodin and Shevyryov to the latter side. For the 
Slavophils, narodnost' was associated with what they 
considered to be the traditions of the Russian peasantry, 
namely Orthodoxy and (especially for Khomiakov and 
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Konstantin Aksakov) collectivism. The regeneration of 
Russia on the basis of Orthodoxy, Khomiakov believed, would 
serve as a model for the rest of the world. Pogodin 
believed Russia was chosen to be the unifier and leader of 
the Slav world. Pogodin's pan-Slavism emphasised racial 
links more than religion, although it was linked with 
Orthodoxy. Khomiakov's form of messianism was universalist 
(originally, at least) whereas Pogodin's was nationalist. 
Any form of messianism was anathema to the government, 
which wanted to maintain the world as it was rather than 
transform it. 
I shall now consider what these messianisms 
meant for the non-Russians of the Empire and the Slavs 
outside it, and what policies the government pursued 
towards these peoples. The Slavophils failed to win 
support from the non-Russians for their ideas. This was 
because, even among the traditionally Orthodox Ukrainians, 
individuals who might have sympathized with some Slavophil 
views were federalist and rejected the Great Russian 
centralism which accompanied the Slavophil acceptance of 
autocracy. Even the most nationalist of the Slavophils, 
Konstantin Aksakov, did not favour forced Russification. 
Great Russia was the creative force in the Empire, the 
"head" of the Russian body. Great Russians protected 
themselves against "one-sidedness" by allowing other 
nations to develop in the State. 165 Samarin, however, 
advocated the Russification of the Baltic provinces as a 
means of destroying the influence of the German barons. In 
his "Letters from Riga" (1848), he opposed the Tsar's 
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policy of tolerating the privileges of the Germans and the 
exploitation of the Estonian and Latvian peasants. His 
manuscript was circulated privately, and it earned him 
twelve days in prison and a personal rebuke from 
Nicholas. 166 The Slavophils had a hostile attitude to the 
Poles; Khomiakov accused them of betraying the Slavs by 
accepting Catholicism and becoming imbued by it. 167 In 
1831 he wrote an "Ode" attacking the Polish revolt aiid 
referring to the "cursed battles" of Slav against Slav. 168 
The Tsar, Bulgarin, Grech and Shevyryov all shared the 
Slavophils' enthusiasm for the Russian language, and the 
Court had to abandon the use of French. The question of 
the Russification of the Baltic separated Pogodin, who 
supported Samarin, from the dynastic wing who valued the 
loyalty of the Germans. Pogodin ruled out independence for 
the national minorities of the Empire. Nicholas punished 
the Polish revolt of 1B30-1831 by annulling the Polish 
Constitution and giving dictatorial power to the Russian 
viceroy. No concessions were made to Ukrainian 
nationalism; the members of Kostomarov's Brotherhood of 
St. Cyril and St. Methodius, which favoured a pan-Slav 
federation of autonomous nations, including the Ukraine, 
were arrested in 1847.169 In the 1840s, the Orthodox 
Church made a number of conversions from the Lutheran 
Church among the Estonian and Latvian peasants. This 
alarmed the German nobility, who were themselves Lutheran. 
After the European revolutions of 1848 St. Petersburg began 
to depend more heavily on the Germans as a conservative 
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force, and the Orthodox Church was no longer allowed to 
proselytize among the peasantry. 170 
The Jewish question did not attract much attention from 
the early Slavophils. Khomiakov was not hostile towards 
the Jews, but Ivan Kireevsky did not like them. Ivan 
Aksakov, on the other hand, as early as 1848-1851 was 
expressing his hatred for every Jew for, in his view, 
continuing to crucify Christ. This was (after about 1860) 
to grow into a central component of later Slavophilism. As 
for the official attitude, even more than in the case of 
the Poles, Nicholas's ultimate aims were to assimilate the 
Jews into the Russian population. 171 
Contentious-issues: 
-pan-Slavism. 
beyond the. Einpire 
Khomiakov had volunteered and fought the Turks in 
Bulgaria in 1828. He, Konstantin Aksakov and Samarin 
supported the unsuccessful efforts of the Croat, Ljudevit 
Gaj, to secure Russian military aid to create a South Slav 
union in 1838-1840. But a concern for the Slavs outside 
the Empire was not an important part of Slavophilism until 
the Crimean War. Christoff, discussing the reasons for 
this, suggests that the problems of Russia herself were 
sufficiently daunting for the Slavophils to deal with. 
Perhaps more important is the fact that some of the Slavs 
were not Orthodox, and Orthodoxy was the basis of 
Slavophilism. Ivan Aksakov in 1849 explained that the 
Slavophils could not support pan-Slavism because of the 
Catholicism and liberalism of some of the other Slavs. 172 
The very name "Slavophil" is confusing here, applied as it 
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was to them initially by their opponents; their altinity 
was speciticaily tor Russian traditions, and they wished 
these traditions to penetrate all humanity, not just the 
Slavs. 
Pogodin's pan-Slavism changed in form several times. 
It varied from defending the rights of the Slavs in Austria 
and Turkey, through the idea of Slav federation, to the 
total unity of all Slavs under tsarism. Belief in Russia's 
messianic role was a constant theme. 173 The nationalist 
flavour of his speeches and writings is captured in his 
"Letter on Russian History" (1637). 
Russia, what country can compare with thee in 
magnitude? ... A population of sixty million people... Let 
us add to it thirty million more of our brothers and 
sisters, the Slavs... in whose veins flow the same 
blood as ours, who speak the same language as we do 
[sic! ], and who feel, therefore, according to the laws 
of nature, as we do... l ask: who can compare with us? 
Whom will we not force into submission? Is not the 
political fate of the world in our hands whenever we 
want to decide it one way or the other? 
... the future belongs altogether to the Slavs... 
But which of the Slav tribes occupies the first rank 
todaye Which tribe can by its number, its language, 
and the totality of its qualities be considered the 
representative of the entire Slav world'? Which offers 
the best pledge for the tuture goal? Which shows most 
clearly that it has the conditions for reaching that 
goal? Which indeed?... 
My heart trembles with Joy, Oh Russia, Oh my 
Fatherland! Is it not you? Oh, if it were only you! 
You, you are chosen to consummate, to crown the 
development of humanity, to embody all the various 
human achievements (which hitherto have been 
accomplished only separately) in one great synthesis, 
to bring to harmony the ancient and modern 
civilizations, to reconcile heart with reason, to 
establish true justice and peace. You alone can prove 
not only that science, liberty, art, knowledge, 
industry and wealth are the goal of mankind, but that 
there is something higher than scholarship, trade and 
education, freedom and riches - the true enlightenment 
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in the spirit of Christianity, the Divine Word, which 
alone can im art to Man earthly and heavenly 
happiness. 17ý 
Pogodin's letter was addressed to the future Alexander II, 
but the official to whom Pogodin sent it refused to forward 
it, since it contradicted the official policy against pan- 
Slavism. 175 
More lyrical than Pogodin in his support for pan- 
Slavism was the poet Tiutchev, In a poem of 1831, on the 
suppression of Poland, he wrote: "Not for the Koran of 
autocracy did Russian blood flow in a river... [but] to 
gather under a single Russian banner the kindred 
generations of Slavs. "176 His ambitions for Russia were 
made clear in his poem "Russian Geography" (1848): "From 
the Nile to the Neva, from the Elbe to China, from the 
Volga to the Euphrates, from the Ganges to the Danube, This 
is the Russian Kingdom.,, 177 This poem referred to three 
"sacred capitals" of Russia as Moscow, the City of Peter 
and the City of Constantine". George Florovsky correctly 
pointed out that Tiutchev's emphasis on Empire (despite the 
"Koran of autocracy") differentiated him from the early 
Slavophils. 178 Tiutchev's "Prophecy" (1850) envisaged the 
Russian Emperor setting up an altar in Byzantium; he would 
kneel before it and "rise up as the pan-Slavonic Tsar". 
"Dawn" (1850) spoke of the tide in the Bosphorus glowing 
red, and continued: "0, Rus', the approaching day is great 
- the universal and Orthodox day". The messianic theme is 
of Russian self-sacrifice for the Slavs. 179 In plainer 
language, Russia and-Germany (1844) called for Russia to 
expand into a "Graeco-Russian Orthodox Empire" which would 
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be capable of reforming the papacy and creating a universal 
church. 180. 
Tiutchev's major contribution to the development of 
Russian messianism was the view that Russia's mission was 
to prevent revolution in Europe. He put this forward in "La 
Russie et la Revolution" (April 1848). 
For a long time there have been in Europe only two real 
powers: the Revolution and Russia... the life of the 
one means the death of the other. 
Russia is above all the Christian Empire ... The Revolution is above all anti-Christian. 
The revolution represented the absolutism of the human ego, 
substituting itself for God. 
In this war to the death, in this ungodly crusade which 
the Revolution, already the mistress of three-fourths 
of Western Europe, prepares against Russia, the 
Christian East, the Slav Orthodox East, whose life is 
indissolubly bound up with ours, will by necessity 
enter the struggle on our side. 
Tiutchev thought it "impossible" that the Tsar would fail 
to intervene against the revolution. 181 
Nicholas I was committed to halting the revolutions in 
Europe. But by this very token he could not encourage the 
Slavs outside the Empire to overthrow their rulers and join 
Russia. As much as Alexander I, he equated autocracy at 
home with legitimism and opposition to nationalism and 
liberalism abroad. Sarkisyanz argues that Nicholas's 
foreign policy was ideologically motivated - not in support 
of Orthodoxy or pan-Slavism, but for the divine right of 
kings, Nicholas's Foreign Secretary, Count Karl 
Nesselrode, a Protestant from Germany, represented 
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everything that the Slavophils hated. Tiutchev, who worked 
for many years in Munich, was provoked into writing a poem 
attacking him for trying to subvert "Holy Russia". 182 
Under the 1833 Berlin Convention, the Holy Alliance was 
revived. Nicholas crushed a Polish revolt in Cracow in 
1846, but then handed the city over to Austria, showing 
that he was more interested in preserving order and keeping 
to treaties than in Russian expansionism. In 1847 (partly 
in response to the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood) the 
government denounced pan-Slavism. The Russian government 
banned Russians from attending the Slav Congress held in 
Prague in 1848. That year, the Russian army crushed the 
anti-Turkish revolt of the Orthodox Romanians on behalf of 
the Ottomans. The following year, in perhaps his most 
well-known counter-revolutionary act, Nicholas saved the 
Hapsburg Empire by destroying the Hungarian revolution. 183 
There is no space here to untangle all the factors 
involved in the formation of Russian policy towards Turkey 
in the period up to the Crimean War. It seems clear that 
the principles of legitimism played a role, but Russia's 
interest in controlling the Straits may not have been 
irrelevant. Nicholas's decision to abandon support for the 
Ottomans and propose the partition of Turkey between Russia 
and other legitimist empires seems to have been based on 
the belief that the Ottoman Empire could not survive. It 
was not until 1853 that the Tsar proposed to abandon the 
policy of discouraging Slav revolts against foreign 
oppressors. Even then, he dropped his plan for an Orthodox 
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rising against the Ottomans, when Nesselrode objected to it 
as contrary to legitimist principles. Riasanovsky suggests 
that Nicholas was genuinely concerned about the oppression 
of Christians in the Ottoman Empire, and that this led to 
his demand that the Sultan guarantee the rights of his 12 
million Orthodox subjects. Whether Nicholas finally went to 
war for the sake of the Orthodox or in the interest of the 
State must remain open to conjecture. As might be 
expected, he claimed that his motive was Christian. What 
is clear is that racial pan-Slavism was not a force in 
decision-making. Nicholas continued to oppose pan-Slavism. 
and as Florinsky points out, the censorship saw to it that 
pan-Slavism did not become a popular mood in Russia. 184 
The--81avophils-and__Moskvitianin 
Riasanovsky argues that the differences between the 
Slavophils on one side, and Pogodin and Shevyryov on the 
other, were much greater in the spirit than in the letter. 
For the generation of the i84Os, Peter I symbolized 
Nicholas I, and support for Peter blended with support for 
Nicholas. I have suggested that the Slavophils were not in 
total opposition to Peter. In philosophical matters, 
however, the difference was significant. Pogodin and 
Shevyryov were not interested in sobornost'. Pogodin wrote 
in 1854: "The New Testament is for the people, while the 
Old, with its dictum 'An eye for an eye, a tooth for a 
tooth' is for the state and its policies. " Zenkovsky 
accurately commented: "How radically different is this idea 
from all that the Slavophils thought and wrote. " Brodsky 
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affirms that the Slavophils "all had a negative attitude to 
the ideology of Moskvitianin" and used that journal only 
because of a lack of an alternative. Westernizers such as 
Timofei N. Granovsky also wrote for Moskvitianin. 
Christoff quotes a number of negative comments by the 
Slavophils on Fogodin's journal, although he claims that 
Khomiakov found Shevyryov's article describing the West as 
a future corpse (see above, p. 89) "glorious". Christoff 
states that on the questions of Church, government and 
people, Pogodin and Shevyryov were closer to the dynastic 
group than to the Slavophils, but he is reluctant to decide 
whether the Moscow professors "belonged to the same 
ideological camp" as the Slavophils. 185 
The Slavophils' failure to produce an ideological 
journal of their own in the 1840s seems to have had several 
causes. They were not sufficiently ideologically united; 
they lacked organizational ability and interest; and their 
chances of securing government permission were not hopeful. 
By 1844 Moskvitianin was losing subscribers; it had 
approximately 300-400, in comparison with the 3000 of the 
Westernizers' OtecheStvennve zaiDiski. After six months 
negotiations with the Slavophils, Pogodin allowed Ivan 
Kireevsky to become editor of Moskvitianin (obviating the 
need for the Slavophils to apply for a licence for their 
own journal). Kireevsky edited three issues in 1845 and 
then resigned. This was for several reasons: because he 
did not receive adequate support from the other Slavophils, 
because of the clash between his brother Pyotr and Pogodin 
(see above, p. 112) and because he himself could not get on 
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with Pogodin. 186 
Tolerance and_irepression 
The discussion of the issues of contention above 
suggests that the clear line drawn by Riasanovsky between 
the supporters of official narodnost' and the Slavophils, 
while of religious and philosophical significance, seems a 
less accurate frontier of political division than a line 
between the dynastic wing of official narodnost', on one 
side, and the nationalist wing of official narodnost' and 
the Slavophils on the other. The latter side can be 
referred to as the "Russian nationalists". Both sections 
of the Russian nationalists suffered from the attentions of 
the State. 
The Slavophils suffered more; they were denied the 
professorships awarded to Pogodin and Shevyryov, and their 
publications were more likely to be banned than not. 
Reference has been made to the banning of Pogodin's Peter. 
Nicholas was reluctant to permit the appearance of 
Moskvitianin, but because it opposed the Westernizers he 
agreed to it, on condition that it be strictly supervised. 
A report to Uvarov of 1842 drew attention to the dangers of 
the journal's talk about the liberation of the Slavs. 
Khomiakov had attracted the Tsar's displeasure as early as 
1839 with his sympathy for the Slavs, and was put under 
surveillance. Ivan Kireevsky was permitted to edit 
Moskvitianin in 1845, and the Slavophils published two 
editions of the annual Moskovskii_sbornik in 184b and 1847. 
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(This periodical earned the epithet "progressive" from the 
Soviet historian Nikolai I. Tsimbaev in 1978. ) After 
Uvarov's circular of 1847 against pan-Slavism, the 
Slavophils came under more pressure, and the Governor- 
General of Moscow, Count A. A. Zakrevsky, (according to 
Aleksandr Koshelyov) on occasion referred to them as "red" 
and "communists". 18'7 
In 1848, frightened by the revolutions, Nicholas 
tightened the censorship. Christotf claims that the 
material interests of the Slavophils led them to support 
the Tsar's anti-revolutionary policy, but things were more 
complex. Khomiakov seems to have hoped that the 
revolutions would facilitate the spread of Orthodoxy. He 
complained privately about the censorship. His fellow 
Slavophil Ivan Kireevsky not only refused to join Pogodin 
in a petition to loosen the controls on literature, but 
even argued that they were necessary to help the government 
fight revolution. Kireevsky's appearance on the side of 
the government was brought on by a fear which, according 
to Riasanovsky, "made him betray the most cherished beliefs 
of the Slavophils", in relation to both censorship and 
serfdom. 188 Konstantin Aksakov wrote to the Tsar in March 
1848 in support of his manifesto against revolution, but 
argued that in order to fight revolution, Nicholas should 
re-establish Russian traditions. Not surprisingly, this 
increased the Emperor's suspicion of the Slavophils. Sam- 
arin's arrest in March 1849 was discussed above (pp. 119- 
20). In the same month, Ivan Aksakov was briefly arrested 
for political criticism in his letters. In spite of the 
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latter's dissociation from pan-Slavism, Nicholas marked his 
file with the comment that pan-Slavists sought to encourage 
rebellion against Russia's allies, to the disadvantage of 
Russia. On top of this the Tsar forbade Konstantin Aksakov 
to wear his "Russian beard" because of the revolutionary 
connotations of beards in Western Europe. 189 
Even the dynastic wing of the supporters of official 
narodnost' suffered from the events of 1848-1949. Uvarov 
had been more favourably disposed towards pan-Slav feeling 
than the Emperor had. Furthermore, his emphasis on 
Orthodoxy and narodnoSt' may have been inconvenient at a 
time when the Orthodox Church was being prevented from 
expanding in the Baltic provinces. Increasingly dependent 
on what the Slavophils called the "German Party" at Court, 
Nicholas sacked Uvarov and replaced him with a still more 
reactionary bureaucrat, Prince Plato Shirinsky-Shikhmatov. 
Generally speaking, oppression and censorship were even 
worse from 1848 to 1855 than in Nicholas's earlier years. 
Nevertheless, the Slavophils received permission for 
another Moskovskii-sbornik volume, edited by Ivan Aksakov 
and financed by Koshelyov, which appeared in 1852. It 
included Kireevsky's "On the Nature of European Culture" 
(see above, pp. 108-110), with its attack on Western 
influences in the upper classes. The collection worried 
the government, who demanded to see in Petersburg the 
manuscripts for the next volume prior to publication. This 
included a reply to Kireevsky from Khomiakov, who 
contrasted Christianity with the institutions of the 
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Russian State. The government banned the volume and the 
rest of the series, deploring the over-emphasis on 
narodnost' (at the expense of autocracy). Five leading 
contributors - the Aksakov brothers, Khomiakov, Kireevsky 
and Prince V. A. Cherkassky - were put under surveillance 
and banned from publishing anything without special 
permission from Petersburg. In this atmosphere, Fogodin 
found himself condemning the regime for introducing "the 
quiet of a graveyard, rotting and stinking, both physically 
and morally". 190 
Russian messianism and__: the__jCrimean War 
The Crimean War was, for Fogodin, Tiutchev and 
Khomiakov, the time for the enactment of Russia's world- 
historical mission. Pogodin broke completely from the 
dynastic wing of the official ideology, demanding a total 
reversal of Russian foreign policy, the encouragement of 
Slav revolutions and the dismemberment of the Ottoman 
Empire. For both security and religious reasons, he 
argued, Russia should take Constantinople, which would 
become the capital of the Slav federation. The whole 
country should be mobilized for the war, with the Tsar 
consulting the people and cutting his own expenditure and 
that of the rich. Such views could not be published 
openly, but they received sufficient circulation to provoke 
a statement from Nesselrode. 191 Tiutchev also expected the 
capture of Constantinople, a united Slavdom and the 
realization of the Orthodox Kingdom. He was filled with 
messianic, eschatological expectations of the final, 
decisive struggle between Russia and the West. Russia was 
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at the "edge of the abyss", and it was "quite simply, the 
end of the world". 192 Konstantin Aksakov hoped for 
Constantinople and the creation of independent Slav states 
under Russian protection. 193 Ivan Kireevsky and Khomiakov 
saw the Crimean War as a "holy war" waged by Catholic 
France, allied with Britain and Turkey, against Russia. 194 
In his enthusiasm for the war, Khomiakov outdid the 
other Slavophils. His poem "Rossii" (To Russia), composed 
in 1854 on the eve of the outbreak of the war, remains 
controversial. The message of the poem is that in spite of 
her unworthiness, Russia has been chosen to be God's 
instrument in war. His earlier poem of the same title 
(written in 1839) had referred to Russia's mission to bring 
God's word to all peoples, but had warned Russia against 
pride. The 1854 poem thus seems to put forward a similar 
position, but the final verse is more aggressive, referring 
to "bloody battles" and ending "Smite with the sword - the 
sword of God. " The Slavophils, defending Khomiakov, 
emphasised his critical comments about Russia, and Brodsky 
writing in 1910 considered the final verse "out of place 
and superfluous". Other writers, including Walicki, cite 
the poem as an example of Khomiakov's chauvinism, and 
Walicki calls the Slavophil interpretation 
"superficiall'. 195 
Khomiakov tells Russia that God is calling her to fight 
for her brothers (the Slavs). He castigates the evils of 
Russia, including "the yoke of serfdom", and continues: "0, 
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unworthy of election, you were chosen! Wash yourself 
speedily with the water of repentance! " Official circles 
were horrif ied by the poem, and the government required him 
to give a guarantee not to distribute any of his verses 
without permission from St. Petersburg. Khomiakov wrote 
that he supposed it was "impossible even to imagine that 
such a canon of penitence could be published". 196 
What Walicki interprets as chauvinism is seen by 
Eikalovich (as by the Slavophils) as service; Russia was 
the nation chosen to save the world. Eikalovich quotes the 
emig e evitsky to the effect that Slavophil messianism 
was "national-culturai" rather than "State-imperialist". 
Both Khomiakov's poems "To Russia" warn against national 
pride, yet because of the emphasis on Russia's "chosenness" 
they provoke the accusation of chauvinism, especially the 
Crimean War poem with its almost bloodthirsty last verse. 
Khomiakov demonstrated how difficult it was to avoid 
crossing the line from universalist messianism. to 
nationalist messianism. The Slavophils had believed in the 
peaceful triumph of Orthodoxy on a world scale, but when 
war was imminent between Russia and the West, Khomiakov was 
prepared to live by the sword. In both this and his 
concern for the Slavs, Khomiakov provided a link between 
Slavophilism and the later pan-Slavism. of Ivan Aksakov. 197 
In the 1969 V92E2sy=literatury debate the Soviet 
scholars showed themselves deeply divided over their 
interpretation of Slavophil messianism. Egorov provided a 
defence of Khomiakov. 
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It should be noted that the unique messianism and 
confidence that precisely the Russian people was called 
upon to show to all other peoples the way to the ideal 
led the Slavophils not to national haughtiness but on 
the contrary to extreme exactingness towards themselves 
and their country. Chosenness (izbrannichestvo) 
inspired a great responsibility. i98 
Vadim V. Kozhinov (whose views will be discussed in chapter 
vi) also sought to rebut accusations of chauvinism. 
The Slavophils did not at all consider that the 
Russians were somehow superior to the Germans, English, 
French, etc. They spoke only of the decline of Western 
culture in their time, and expressed confidence in the 
approaching great flourishing of Russian culture. 199 
Kuleshov and S. I. Mashinsky took an anti-Slavophil 
stance. Kuleshov wrote: 
Khomiakov's self-accusation (criticism of Russia) was 
subordinated to his wider and more important idea: the 
messianic glorification of Russia, standing under 
'god's banner'. 
In the Slavophils the messianism of Russia is 
counterposed to everything European being regarded as 
corrupt. 200 
In the article which concluded the series, Xashinsky 
repeated the above quotation from Kozhinov and flatly 
rejected it. 
The nationalism of the Slavophils was expressed in the 
haughty attitude to other peoples, in their idea about 
the advantage of the 'Russian world' over the Western, 
of the Orthodox Church over the Catholic, and also in 
their messianic idea about the Russian nation as a 
whole as 'god-chosen' ('the god-bearing people') 
lboggizbrannoi. narod-bowonoSets]. and, which is 
especially important, in their insistent striving to 
cork up Russia and isolate her from all humanity. 201 
Before the end of the Crimean War, Nicholas was dead. 
Russian messianism had flourished in his reign, with the 
different versions reacting on one another. Neither 
messianism nor nationalism were encouraged by the 
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government; rather the official ideology promoted a 
chauvinistic attitude towards the State, devotion to the 
autocrat and the political passivity of the Russian people. 
Some of the Russian nationalists could accept some of these 
ideas. I have tried to show that the line drawn by Ianov 
and Riasanovsky between the adherents of the official 
ideology and the Slavophils was not as clear as they 
suggest, and at times disagreements cut across their camps. 
Perhaps the best example is Ivan Kireevsky's refusal to 
support Pogodin's petition against censorship. 
Nicholas's reign does not bear out Ianov's contention 
of a convergence of Russian nationalist dissent with the 
State. Pogodin, indeed, was going in the other direction. 
In subsequent years, admittedly, as will be seen, the 
Slavophils moved towards pan-Slavism. But already by the 
end of the 1840s, Khomiakov's views on the obshchina had 
formed the basis for Herzen's version of Russian 
messianism, which was to develop into the anti-tsarist 
narodnichestvo movement. 
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Chapter Three 
Pro-Tsarist Forms-c3f-Russian_Messianism, _1855---1917 
The-last_years of classical Slavo-Philis 
The death of Nicholas I, the accession of Alexander 
II and the easing of censorship gave rise in Russia to 
hopes of political and social improvements being introduced 
from above. Alexander's intention, expressed in 1856, of 
beginning the abolition of serfdom forced the advocates of 
change to make a choice faced also by later generations 
down to the present. Should they seek the overthrow of 
the regime, in spite of its apparent reserves of strength, 
or should they help to push the regime further in the 
direction of reform, in spite of the apparatus of coercion 
and bloody repression which it continued to deploy? I 
shall deal now with those tendencies of Russian messianism 
which sought to work within the existing political system, 
and consider in the next chapter the revolutionaries such 
as Herzen and the narodniks. 
The Slavophils had never been revolutionaries, and 
the more relaxed political environment enabled them to play 
a larger public role than hitherto. Before the end of 
1855, Konstantin Aksakov submitted to Alexander his 
memorandum "On the Internal Condition of Russia". 1 This 
important Slavophil document appealed for a "return" to the 
situation which, Aksakov alleged, existed before Peter I, 
with the government tolerating freedom of opinion. He 
began by claiming that the Russian people were not 
"political" (gosudarstvennyi)2 and continued by positing 
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the "impossibility of any revolution in the Russian 
people". 3 This was because the Russian people were 
concerned with moral, spiritual and social freedom, not 
political freedom. Leaving the kingdom of this world to 
the State, they sought the Kingdom of God. In Russia, the 
obshchina predated Christianity, but Christianity 
reinforced the obshchina, and the Russians were "perhaps 
the only Christian (in the true meaning of the word) people 
in the world". 4 The West, on the other hand, with its 
constitutions and republics, was ready to "give itself up, 
if not to the final collapse, then to terrible shocks". 5 
In Muscovite Russia, the government and the people had 
interfered with each other as little as possible, and the 
Tsars had called assemblies to advise them. "Action was 
the right of the sovereign, and opinion the right of the 
country". 6 
Peter had abandoned these principles. He invaded 
the lives of the people, forcibly changing their morals and 
customs, and causing a split in society. From then until 
now, Russia had been like an occupied country under the 
yoke of its own government. The danger was that, deprived 
of their inner, social freedom, Russians would seek 
external political freedom. They would be drawn away from 
the Russian I'soil" (pochva) into support for revolutionary 
ventures, which (despite his earlier statement on the 
impossibility of revolution) Aksakov feared could destroy 
Russia. The continuation of Peter's system would mean 
that Russia would cease to be Russia. 7 
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The point had been reached where each individual was 
afraid to express a sincere opinion. "All lie ILE! ýtl to 
each other, recognize this, but continue to lie... 118 
Aksakov claimed that the people wanted only freedom to 
live, freedom of the spirit and freedom of speech. In 
restoring these, the government would be returning to 
Russian principles, without sacrificing autocracy. 
"Freedom of speech is an inalienable human right". Over a 
century before Gorbachov, Konstantin Aksakov demanded 
glasnost' (openness): proper relations between the State 
and the land, and free public opinion, would heal Russia's 
evils, "especially bribery, for which the of 
public opinion is so frightening. "g 
This was a devastating attack on the Petersburg style 
of leadership. The Soviet historian Tsimbaev, in an 
article published in 1972, rejects the view that the 
memorandum testified to the reactionary position of early 
Slavophilism and shows that "to a very great extent it was 
directed against the policy of the existing autocracy". 10 
A. S. Kurilov, in his introduction to the 1981 
"Sovremennik" edition of the Aksakov brothers' literary 
criticism, justly comments that it required "outstanding 
courage" to address the Tsar in such a way, so soon after 
the final dark seven years of Nicholas. Kurilov quotes 
extracts from the memorandum, which has not been published 
in Russia in full since the October Revolution, but while 
he evaluates it positively, he describes it as an "exposure 
of the autocracy and serfdom". In reality, Aksakov hardly 
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mentioned serfdom and he supported autocracy, while his 
main demand for free speech is underplayed by Kurilov. 11 
Another Soviet critic, Kuleshov, in his 1976 monograph goes 
to the opposite extreme and claims that all Aksakov's 
proposals in the memorandum "were envisaged from the point 
of view of saving the existing system,,. 12 
It is now known that Alexander saw the memorandum. 13 
He may not have been influenced by it, but he made 
concessions to its spirit by liberalizing censorship, and 
the Slavophils benefited from this. Aleksandr Koshelyov 
was allowed to begin publishing the journal Russkaia-beseda 
(Russian Conversation) in February 1856, and in April 1857 
the more popular, propagandistic weekly newspaper, Molva 
(Talk, or Public Opinion), appeared. Both were based in 
Moscow. The latter was edited by Sergei M. Shpilevsky, 
but was dominated by Konstantin Aksakov, who contributed 22 
editorials. 14 In the Slavophil manner, they eulogized the 
11simple people" as the bearer of Russian traditionl5 but, 
as Kurilov points out, Aksakov did not take a narrow 
chauvinist viewpoint; he favoured the flourishing of all 
narodnosti, not only the Russian. "Narodnost' is the 
personality of the people... long live every narodnost'll. 16 
Aksakov found the limits of tolerance with an article which 
sharply contrasted the living conditions and morality of 
the Westernized "public" and the Russian "people". 17 The 
Tsar himself considered the article "wicked" and Molva was 
forced to close. 18 Russkaia beseda was allowed to 
continue, however, and from summer 1858 Ivan Aksakov was 
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effectively the editor. Unlike his brother, he did not 
idealize the Russian people, and Russkaia-beseda shifted 
from the traditional Slavophil emphasis on the spiritual to 
a concern with social, economic and political affairs. 
This did not prevent the journal from losing subscribers, 
and Ivan Aksakov closed it at the end of 1859. Two major 
issues of concern to the Slavophils at this time were the 
emancipation of the serfs and the question of the non- 
Russian Slavs. I shall now turn to these. 19 
There seems little reason to question Kuleshov's view 
that on the question of emancipation there was no 
difference between Slavophils such as Koshelyov and Samarin 
and the liberal Westernizers. Samarin circulated a 
manuscript memorandum advocating emancipation which was 
read and apparently approved by the Tsar. According to 
Ivan Aksakov, the proposal to free the peasants with land 
first appeared in print in Russkaia-beseda. 20 Samarin and 
Koshelyov were appointed by the government to provincial 
gentry committees, and Samarin and Cherkassky were 
appointed to the Editing Commissions established in 1859 to 
prepare the emancipation statute. Themselves landowners, 
they sided with the State in attacking the position of the 
more reactionary gentry, but they sought to make the reform 
acceptable to the gentry. 21 Kurilov emphasizes the 
contradictory position of the Slavophils, being landlords 
who were both "anti-serfdom" and "anti-bourgeois". 22 
Tsimbaev claims that Ivan kksakov's position on 
emancipation was that of a far-sighted representative of 
the landowners, who saw that concessions to the peasants 
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were necessary to avert revolt. 23 The Slavophils could 
justify their collaboration with the Petersburg autocracy 
on the grounds that, on this issue at least, the autocracy 
was moving in the direction traditionally desired by most 
Slavophils. 
Alexander's government was also more sympathetic than 
Nicholas's to the position of the Slavs in the Ottoman 
Empire. In 1858, the publication ban on Ivan Aksakov was 
lifted. Egor P. Kovalevsky, head of the Asian Department 
of the Foreign Ministry (which included the Balkans), 
thereupon encouraged him to produce a weekly newspaper, to 
be called Parus (The Sail). But Kovalevsky was cautious. 
As Aksakov wrote to Pogodin, 
I should tell you that in proposing that we publish a 
newspaper, EP Kovalevskii urgently requested that at 
first ... neither your name nor mine should appear - 
two 
names which St Petersburg stomachs find irritating and 
somewhat indigestible. 24 
Aksakov infuriated official circles by sending a circular 
on the establishment of a Slav Bureau, associated with 
Parus, to Czechs, Poles, Serbs and Bulgarians, and he was 
warned to limit his coverage of' the Slav question. Parus 
finally appeared in 1859, but was banned after two issues, 
both for Pogodin's pan-Slavist writing and for its domestic 
material. 25 Aksakov wrote: 
You cannot imagine how hateful and despicable Moscow is 
to Petersburg, what apprehension and fear is evoked 
there by a word: narodnost'. Not one Westernizer, not 
one Russian socialist is as frightening to the 
government as a Moscow Slavophil, nobody suffers such 
persecution. 25 
Kurilov comments that this was "somewhat exaggerated, but 
not unfounded". 27 
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Slavonic solidarity was not confined to Journalism. In 
1858 the Moscow Slav Benevolent Comm, -ttee was formed, 
initially as a charitable organization to help Christians 
in the Ottoman Empire. Khomiakov, Konstantin Aksakov, 
Samarin and Koshelyov were among the founder members, and 
Pogodin and Ivan Aksakov played leading roles. Gorchakov 
spoke of the "necessity" to aid the Orthodox. The Tsarina, 
the Heir Apparent (the future Alexander III) and the Church 
all helped the Committee or (after its formation in 1867) 
its Petersburg Section. The Asian Department's support, 
at least, was politically motivated: Kovalevsky said that 
assistance to the Orthodox Slavs would "undoubtedly yield a 
harvest in the future". 28 
A link between Ivan Aksakov and the Foreign Ministry 
was provided by Tiutchev, who was Aksakov's father-in-law. 
In 1858 Tiutchev was put in charge of the Foreign 
Censorship Committee. He continued to favour pan-Slavism. 
In the aftermath of the Crimean War he had become bitterly 
critical of the late Tsar, Nicholas, and, it seems, more 
sympatheic to the Slavophil emphasis on the Russian 
people. A poem for which he is particularly remembered 
today is as follows. 
One cannot understand Russia with the mind. 
One cannot measure her with a common yardstick. 
She has a special status. 
One can only believe in Russia. 29 
One of the last documents of classical Slavophilism 
before its leaders died or became mainly concerned with 
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pan-Slavism, was Khomiakov's "Letter to the Serbs", 
published abroad in 1860. This exhorted the newly 
independent nation to remain true to Orthodox tradition and 
reject Westernism. Khomiakov referred to Russia's racial 
as well as religious links to the Serbs, and criticized the 
Orthodox (but not Slav) Greeks for their alleged pride. 
In the Slavophil tradition, he attacked serfdom and Russian 
intimidation of other nations, and urged the Serbs to 
retain Orthodoxy, freedom of religion, the obshchina, 
freedom of speech and of the Press and social equality. 
He criticized Russia's slavish imitation of foreign models 
and Feter's reforms in particular. The letter was also 
signed by, among others, the Aksakov brothers, Samarin, 
Koshelyov and Pogodin. 30 The fact that Pogodin was 
prepared to put his signature to a document attacking the 
style of Peter's reforms is a further indication that the 
division between Slavophilism and official narodnost' over 
Peter was not a decisive one. 
Ivan_Aksakov_and__ýthe_transformation of Slavophilis 
lvan and Pyotr Kireevsky had died in 1855; Konstantin 
Aksakov and Khomiakov died in 18ý50, leaving Ivan Aksakov to 
become the leading Slavophil. He, like Samarin and 
Koshelyov, put less emphasis on religion and philosophy, 
and more on politics and economics, than the creators of 
Slavophilism had done. In 1861, despite police 
objections, the Tsar gave Ivan Aksakov permission to 
publish in Moscow a weekly newspaper, Den' (The Day), on 
conditon that it did not have a "political section". 31 
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The first issue proclaimed continuity with the "banner of 
Russian narodnost', understood and defined by the 
Kireevskys, Khomiakov, Konstantin Aksakov and all the so- 
called Slavophil school". 32 The lifetime of Den, from 
1851 to 1865, saw the victory of pan-Slavism over the old 
Slavophilism. 
Ivan Aksakov wrote in the first issue: "to-free-the 
Slav-peoples from-material-and spiritual-oppression and to 
give them the gift of independent spiritual and, very 
likely, political existence under the protection of the 
powerful wings of the Russian eagle - that is the 
historical vocation, the moral right and the obligation of 
Russia". It is notable that the words "under the 
protection of the powerful wings of the Russian eagle" are 
omitted in Tsimbaev's citation of the sentence. 
33 
Tsimbaev's book, which seeks to legitimize much of 
Aksakov's activity, was allowed a print run of only 2460. 
Aksakov saw the liberation of the Slavs as a national task, 
the accomplishment of which would overcome Peter's division 
of Russia. Undergoing sacrifice through war and death, 
the country would achieve redemption. Thus Aksakov 
maintained the messianist idea of redemption through 
suffering, but linked it to the goals of the Russian State, 
more openly than Khomiakov had in the Crimean War. Russia, 
moreover, was to be the Messiah not for all Europe, but 
only for the Slavs. His immediate aim was to transform 
Slavophilism into a popular movement, but in the process he 
revealed what Kuleshov calls "openly conservative 
tendencies, the degeneration of Slavophilism into 
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reactionary pan-Slavism". 34 
Was pan-Slavism, then, still a form of Slavophilism? 
Ivan Kireevsky, at the end of his life, denounced in a 
letter to Pogodin the chauvinist perversion of 
Slavophilism. 
In the striving after the Russian people's (narodnomu) 
spirit, there is a possibility of a misunderstanding 
which unfortunately is often encountered, and which 
causes much confusion. 
By the Russian spirit they understand not the animation 
of the universal (obshchechelovechesk(: )go) mind by the 
spirit of Orthodox true Christianity, but only the 
negation of the Western mind. 35 
Peter Christoff argues that both Ivan Kireevsky and 
Khomiakov, at the end of their lives, avoided crossing the 
line into militarist expansionist nationalism, but in his 
study of Konstantin Aksakov he argues that the Crimean War 
showed the seeds of pan-Slavism within Slavophilism. 
Leonard Schapiro points out in his review of this study 
that chauvinistic responses to the Crimean War also came 
from Westernizers like Turgenev. "Pan-slavism, with its 
hard-headed, assertive Russian nationalism, antisemitism 
and expansionism, has nothing to do with the gentle, 
somewhat naive, sentimental and somewhat unrealistic 
Konstantin Aksakov". 36 A cautious assessment would be 
that Ivan Aksakov's State-oriented pan-Slavism was not 
compatible with early Slavophilism, but Khomiakov and 
Konstantin Aksakov themselves on occasion deviated from 
their own doctrine in a State-chauvinist direction where 
pan-Slavism was concerned. 
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One factor pushing the pan-Slavisrs towards the State 
was the Polish revolt of 1863. This was based on the middle 
and lower-middle classes, with the peasants slow to join 
in. Herzen and Bakunin were among the few Russians to 
back the Poles; most Westernizers and the pan-Slavists 
supported the suppression of the Poles by the Russian 
government. As Michael B. Petrovich points out, Poland's 
Westernized elite and Catholic religion were features that 
repelled the pan-Slavists. "Moreover, Polish Messianism 
was a rival of Russian Panslavism in its bid for primacy in 
the Slavic family". Following the outbreak of the revolt, 
Aksakov in Den' accused the Russian government of pursuing 
too liberal a policy in Poland. Nevertheless, Aksakov 
opposed the Russification of Poland as incompatible with 
the Slavophil view of the free development of 
nationalities, and (perhaps worse) as likely to allow 
Polish influence to seep into Russia. Samarin in Den' in 
1863 argued that the Russian government should seek support 
among the Polish people, who despite "Latin" influence, 
retained a "Slav soul" against the Polish gentry and 
Catholic priests. Aksakov took this a stage further and 
called for a democratic Polish parliament, which he 
believed would strengthen the "Slav" peasants at the 
expense of the "Latin" elements. Samarin also called for 
the removal of Polish influence from the Western gubernii, 
where the landlords were mainly Polish and the peasants 
mainly Ukrainian or Belorussian. Samarin referred to 
these peasants only as "Russian". 37 
160 
The government adopted some of 1-hese proposals. In 
the Western subernii, it continued its policy of linguistic 
Russification and took measures to reduce Polish influence, 
increase the power of Russians and promote the Orthodox 
Church. In Poland itself, as well as harshly repressing the 
leaders of the revolt, the government increased the role of 
the Russian language and of Russians in the bureaucracy. 
Samarin drafted the official plan for the emancipation of 
the peasants, which was much more beneficial to them than 
the programme implemented in Russia. 38 
As well as changing in practice his attitude to the 
State, Aksakov was shifting from the anti-capitalism of 
early Slavophilism to an alliance with the Moscow 
merchants. Russia's defeat in the Crimean War had provoked 
an outburst of nationalism among them. For his part, 
Aksakov became convinced that Russian industry needed to be 
developed to meet the Western challenge, despite the social 
consequences. The fight for tariff protection for Russian 
industry, Russian control over Russian railways and State 
sponsorship of industry united the merchants and 
Slavophils. Moscow merchants funded Russkaia-beseda, 
Sel'skoe blagoustroistvo (Rural Welfare), edited by 
Koshelyov, )LeatnU-pramyshlennosti (Herald of Industry, 
1858-1861), edited by the Slavophil Fyodor V. Chizhov, and 
Aktsioner (The Shareholder, 1858-1565; distributed as a 
supplement to DP_11ý from 1863). Y-estnik promyshlennosti 
argued against serfdom on the grounds of the need for wage 
labour. Aksakov advocated the extension of the privileges 
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of the gentry to the rest of society. In 1851 he wrote in 
Den': "the further existence of the gentry stratum as a 
stratum... is impossible". 39 Tsimbaev comments that his 
views in this respect were "progressive". 40 Den' itself, 
despite its central position in pan-Slavism and its 
gaining, for a while, 4000 subscribers, made a loss and 
Aksakov closed it in 1855.41 
The following year Aksakov was asked by some Moscow 
merchants to edit a weekly that would reflect the interests 
of the world of trade and industry. The weekly was called 
Moskva (Moscow, 1867-1868) and later Moskvich (The 
Muscovite, 1858-1869). The merchants' approach was an 
indication of Aksakov's ideological evolution; according to 
Tsimbaev, the 1860s and 1870s saw the conversion of 
Slavophilism into an ideology of the big bourgeoisie. This 
was possible because Aksakov saw the Moscow merchants as 
the guarantors of a special Russian path of development, 
since in his view they were true to the patriarchal way of 
life and old Russian traditions. 
Moskva suffered repeated proscriptions. It was closed 
down after republishing in autumn 1858 some articles from 
Samarin's Journal Okrainy-Rossii (Borderlands of Russia, 
Prague, 1868, Berlin, 1871-1876). Samarin had returned to 
his earlier attacks on the privileges of the German 
nobility in the Baltic and the role of the Lutheran Church, 
and advocated the greater use of Russian. To avoid the 
ban on Moskva, Aksakov changed the title to Moskvich, but 
nevertheless this was also soon closed down. The two 
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papers were critical of the government in many ways, and 
the Moscow censors wrote to St. Petersburg of Aksakov's 
"unconcealed hatred of the administration 
(administratsiia)". 42 Indeed, a private article written by 
Aksakov during the Moskvich period revealed the extent of 
his opposition. He said that if autocracy transcended the 
political sphere, it became "usurpation, tyranny. That is 
what it has been in Russia since the time of Peter". 
43 
Walicki has rightly argued that Aksakov's anti- 
capitalism was transformed into anti-Semitism. The 
beginning of Alexander's reign brought some beneficial 
reforms to Russia's Jews, including the abolition of Jewish 
child conscription. In 1858 both Konstantin and Ivan 
Aksakov signed a protest by 147 public figures, including 
Nikolai Chernyshevsky, Mikhail Katkov, Ivan Turgenev and 
Kostomarov, against the publication by Vladimir Zotov in 
his Petersburg weekly Illiustratsiia of his view that the 
Jews were not worthy of emancipation. Their signatures 
reflected the absence of anti-Semitism from early 
Slavophilism (see above, p. 121). 44 
Ivan Aksakov's anti-Semitism does not seem to have 
surfaced in his public work until 1852. In an editorial 
in Den' (16 February), he attacked a law of 1861 (of little 
practical significance) which had opened government service 
to Jewish university graduates. Aksakov favoured allowing 
the Jews full development of their way of life and to live 
throughout Russia. He insisted, however, that unless they 
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converted to Orthodoxy they could not be given the right to 
participate in administration and legislation in a country 
carrying the Christian banner. It was impossible to be a 
Russian and not Orthodox. Thus a Jew who embraced 
Orthodoxy was much more Russian than a Russian who became a 
Catholic. Den' also published two an-ci-Jewish pseudonymous 
articles in 1852. John D. Klier comments that in the 
debate on the Jewish question in this period, Den' was 
virtually the only journal to use religious arguments in 
favour of excluding Jews from public life. Although 
Aksakov did not find much support at the time, he helped to 
create the "Judeophobic vocabulary of the 70s and 80s,,, 45 
By 1867 Aksakov was writing in more virulent language. An 
article in Moskva (15 July) was entitled "Not the 
Emancipation of the Jews, but the Emancipation of the 
Russians from the Jews Should be Discussed". it 
complained about the position of the Jews in the Western 
and Southern Subernii. "... involuntarily you ask 
yourself: where are we, in Russia or really in Yiddish 
Palestine, as our Western territory has been nicknamed for 
a long time-i11.46 
Slavophilisn. and-pochvennichestvo 
The tendency known as pgchvennichestvo was influenced 
by the ideas of the Slavophils. Since Rochvennichestvo 
itself has been an important trend of Russian nationalist 
thought up to the present, it seems appropriate to examine 
its origins and development in the early 1860s, before 
returning to the development of pan-Slavism. 
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Pochvennichestvo evolved from the thought of the "young 
editors" who collaborated on Pogodin's Moskvitianin from 
1850 to 1856. The most influential was the literary critic 
Apollon Aleksandrovich Grigorev (1822-1864). Grigorev saw 
each nation as an organic whole, animated by a national 
ideal and a national personality. Li--e the early 
Slavophils, he saw Moscow rather than Petersburg as the 
true capital of Russia; but unlike them he did not see the 
peasantry as embodying the national personality. He wrote 
to Koshelyov in 1856, "in the middle class, industrial and 
chiefly merchant, we see the old immemorial Rus"'. 47 Thus 
he anticipated Ivan Aksakov's evolution. Grigorev did not 
see the national character (he used narodnost' and later 
natsional'nost') as fixed, but as evolving in the merchant 
class, from whom it would expand and embrace all Russians 
in an organic whole. 48 
The ideas of pochvennichestvo emerged in the St. 
Petersburg journals Vremia (Time, 18bl-1863) and its 
successor Epokha (The Epoch, 1864-18b5). The core of the 
editorial board of Vremia was composed of the writer Fyodor 
Mikhailovich Dostoevsky (1821-1881), his brother Mikhail, 
Grigorev and the critic Nikolai Nikolaevich Strakhov (1828- 
1896). Fyodor Dostoevsky was the leading figure. Born and 
brought up in Moscow, he lived most of his adult life in 
Siberia, Petersburg and abroad. There is no space here to 
discuss his life prior to 1B61: his interest in Fourier's 
utopian socialism and participation in the Petrashevsky 
circle in 1848, his mock execution and hard labour in 
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Siberia and the beginnings of his reverence for the Russian 
peasant. 49 The position of pochvennichestvo was one of 
reconciliation - the reconciliation of Russia and the West, 
of Slavophils and Westernizers, of the educated society 
with the people and the soil (po2hva). Pochvennichestvo 
has been translated as "native soil" or "return to the 
soil", and Strakhov in 18C52 explained that "soil" had the 
connotation of the unique characteristics of the Russian 
people. The pochvenniki rejected the idea that Europe 
represented the universal ideal. Europe was only part of 
this ideal, and Russia, like every nation, had its own 
principle and role to play in this ideal. Russian 
narodnost', for Dostoevsky, was the ability to synthesize 
Russian and Western ideas. As he said in the Vremia 
manifesto in autumn 1860: 11 ... the Russian idea will perhaps 
be the synthesis of all those ideas which Europe with such 
obstinacy, with such courage, is developing in its separate 
nationalities". 50 In his Winter-Notes-on-Summer 
! Lnprgssions (published in Vremia in 1853) Dostoevsky 
expressed his hostility to the bourgeois individualism of 
Western Europe and contrasted it with the harmony which he 
believed could be created in Russia. This was a position 
very similar to that of Herzen. At this stage Dostoevsky, 
unlike the early Slavophils, did not see Orthodoxy as the 
main factor in Russian narodnost'. Grigorev indeed 
accused him of underestimating the importance of 
Orthodoxy. 51 
The pochvenniki had much in common with the Slavophils. 
They supported the principle of autocracy, supplemented by 
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a Zemskii-Sobor. They favoured the obshchina, and when 
Alexander II introduced the zemstva they pressed for 
democratic elections and freedom from State intervention 
for the new local government organs. They opposed gentry 
privileges, the bourgeois spirit and any sort of 
materialistic socialism; they favoured cottage industry, 
and industrialization through the artel', with the help of 
tariffs and railways. They distinguished between 
"officialism" and "the basic forces of the Russian 
people". 52 Their differences with the Slavophils seemed 
significant as well. They accused the Slavophils of 
idealizing Muscovite Russia. Dostoevsky argued that the 
Raskol was evidence that the common people were alienated 
from Muscovite life, and considered the Old Belief nearer 
true Orthodoxy. Ivan Aksakov, on the other hand, 
supported the official Church and Nikon's reforms. 
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Reflecting Pogodin's influence, the pochvenniki 
supported Peter's reforms and saw them as a necessary 
element of Russian universalism. Dostoevsky wrote: 
Great was that moment of Russian life when the great, 
entirely Russian will of Peter determined to break the 
fetters which were holding back our development too 
tightly. In Peter's work (we shall not quarrel about 
this now) there was much truth. Whether he 
consciously divined the pan-human 
(obshchechelovecheskoe) purpose of the Russian people, 
or unconsciously went ahead, according to the one 
feeling urging him on, the point is that he went 
rightly. But meanwhile the form of his activity, 
through its extreme sharpness, was perhaps mistaken. 
This form into which he transformed Russia was 
undoubtedly mistaken. The fact of the transformation 
was right, but its forms were not Russian, not 
national, but often directly and fundamentally 
contradicted the spirit of the people. 54 
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Dostoevsky recognized that Peter'-s reforms had been 
rejected by the common people, but ccnsidered that, 
contrary to the Slavophil belief, the people had not 
preserved pre-Petrine customs. Russ--an nationality 
existed not only in the peasants but also in the educated 
people. The Slavophils failed to see the dynamic nature 
of nationality, which would develop through the 
reconciliation of the educated strata with the people. 
Whereas the Slavophil ideal was in the past, the pSISjhvennik 
ideal was in the future. The pgchvenniki believed the 
Emancipation was an enormous step towards this ideal. 
Whereas the Slavophils saw existing Russian literature as 
mainly reflecting the spirit of the Westernized gentry, the 
pochvenniki believed literature was a moral force 
representing the ideal of the whole nation. Grigorev and 
Dostoevsky attached particular importance to Pushkin for 
reconciling European ideals and Peter's reforms with 
Russian nationality. Dostoevsky wrote (18bl): "We 
understood in him that the Russian ideal is wholeness, 
universal reconciliation and universal humanity 
Evsechelovechnost'l. "55 
Vremia in 1863 had around 4000 subscribers. This was 
probably more than Den' had by then, about the same as the 
radical Westernizer or revolutionary democratic Russkoe 
slovO, but less than the radical Westernizer Sovremennik or 
the conservative Westernizer Russk. ii vestnik. Although 
Dostoevsky had begun with the idea of reconciling 
Westernizers and Slavophils, by the end of l8b2 he was 
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alienated from the ideas of the radical Westernizers, led 
by Chernyshevsky, Dmitry Pisarev and Nikolai Dobroliubov 
(who had died in 1861). He hated their materialism and 
utilitarianism in politics and art, and (as was the case 
for the rest of his life) he was frightened and appalled by 
the idea of revolution. He also opposed Russkii-vestnik 
because of Katkov's defence of gentry privilege. The 
closeness between Vremia and Den' does not seem to have 
alleviated mistrust. Dostoevsky was hostile to the 
Slavophils and Den' until he read Slavophil writings in 
summer 1863; then he reoriented himself to the religious 
basis of Slavophilism. Grigorev was suspicious of 
Slavophil Moscow centralism, favouring local diversity, and 
for the same reason was against the idea of Moscow as the 
head of political pan-Slavism. Dostoevsky had little 
interest in pan-Slavism at this time. 56 
Vremia was more tolerant than Den'. It will be 
recalled that in 1862 Ivan Aksakov published an editorial 
in Den' saying that Jews who did not wish to convert to 
Orthodoxy should be excluded from public affairs (see 
above, p. 163). Vremia responded by accusing Pen' of 
arousing hatred. The Jewish question would be solved by 
the ending of restrictions against the Jews. Vremi, a in 
fact defended the Jews on a total of three occasions in 
1862. David Goldstein has cast some doubt on the 
genuineness of Vremia's support for them. He shows that 
Dostoevsky was keen to distance himself from the Slavophils 
and tone down his criticism of the revolutionary democrats, 
in order to maintain his influence and thereby facilitate 
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his project for reconciliation of Westernizers and 
Slavophils. Goldstein writes: ... the Jewish question 
provided Time with a precious polemical instrument that 
allowed it to maintain its liberal reputation... 11 
Nevertheless, Goldstein has not directly accused Dostoevsky 
of insincerity, and there would appear to be insufficient 
evidence to back such an accusation. 
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When the censor closed Vremia in 1863, over an article 
by Strakhov on the Polish revolt, Ivan Aksakov refused to 
support the Journal, considering it anti-national since it 
came from St. Petersburg and failed to promote Orthodoxy. 
Nevertheless, Aksakov and the pochvenniki were gradually 
converging, with Dostoevsky paying more attention to 
Orthodoxy. Aksakov did not idealize the peasantry and 
spoke instead of the need for the people to raise itself to 
the level of obshchestyo ("society"), the part of the 
people that was conscious of sharing the national ideal. 
This was akin to the iDochvennik idea of reconciliation. 
Vremia's successor, Epokha, was initially edited by Mikhail 
Dostoevsky. It was hampered by close government 
supervision, the mood of disillusionment among the 
intelligentsia brought on by repression, and then the 
deaths in 1864 of Mikhail Dostoevsky and Grigorev. 
Circulation fell to 1300. Under the influence of 
Strakhov, in particular, who now called himself a 
Slavophil, Epokha became reconciled with Den'. In his 
notebooks of 1864, Fyodor Dostoevsky expounded the idea of 
the Russian people as the bearers of true Chrisitanity. 
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Pachvennichestvo was virtually disappearing into 
Slavophilism. In 1866 Dostoevsky wrote to Katkov that he 
was "a real Slavophil, except for some tiny 
disagreements". 58 
Pau-Slavism, 1867-1878. Dauilevsky 
I shall now turn to discuss the development of the pan- 
Slav movement and the ideas behind it. Dostoevsky's later 
thought will be considered below (pp. 180-204). 
A high point in the development of the pan-Slav 
movement was the holding of the Ethnographic Exhibition and 
the Slav Congress in Moscow in 1867. Eighty-one foreign 
Slavs attended, mainly from Austria-Hungary. The 
Ethnographic Exhibition was a private initiative which the 
Tsar agreed to open. Pan-Slavists, including those around 
the Moscow Slav Benevolent Committee, took the step of 
organizing a Slav Congress at the same time. The 
government did not try to prevent the Congress, and there 
was wide support for it in both Petersburg and Moscow. 
Those most involved in the Congress included Aksakov, 
Tiutchev, Samarin, Koshelyov and Pogodin. Although the 
government apparently warned the Russian pan-Slavists to 
avoid politics in their declarations, the Tsar received the 
visitors and gave them his best wishes. The atmosphere 
of Slav solidarity at the Congress was heady but proved 
short-lived. Russian public opinion lost interest, some 
of the Slav guests were suspicious of Russian domination, 
and there was no practical outcome. On the other hand, 
the anti-Russian Press in Europe had a field day in 
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denouncing pan-Slavism as a tool of Russian imperialism. 
It would be truer to say that the Russian government was 
trying to gain some possible advantage from a movement with 
which it was not fundamentally in symnathy. 
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From 1857, branches of the Moscow Slav Committee 
appeared in St. Petersburg, Kiev and Odessa, but they were 
all fairly small. Among the participants in the 
Petersburg Section were Tiutchev, Samarin, Dostoevsky, 
Strakhov and Nikolai Iakovlevich Danilevsky (1822-1895). 
Russian pan-Slavism was now changing its emphasis "from 
spiritual right to political might". 
tO Aksakov wrote in 
Moskvich, 28 May 1858: "All [the] historical traditions of 
Russia are rooted in her Slavonic origin". 61 This shift 
from religion to race as the basis of Slav unity was 
reflected in the works of Count Nikolai Ignatev, General 
Rostislav Fadeev and Danilevsky. Ignatev, ambassador in 
Constantinople from 1864 to 1877, found that his racially- 
based political pan-Slavism aroused hostility in Gorchakov 
and other government ministers. Fadeev's OpiRion-on-the 
Eastern. 
-Question 
(1869) advocated a pan-Slav federation 
under Russian leadership, created by Russian force, using 
Orthodoxy as a propaganda tool. 62 Danilevsky's "Russia 
and Europe" (completed in 1869)t3 was published in 
Strakhov's journal Zaria (Dawn, St. Petersburg, 1859-1872). 
Zaria is described by Wayne Dowler as "the last Russian 
journal to carry the marks of Roghvennichestvo". Dowler 
concedes that the idea of reconciliation, basic to 
pochvennichestyo, was absent from Zaria. This was 
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typified in Danilevsky's work to which. the journal claimed 
to be "organically linked". 64 
Strakhov described "Russia and Europe" as "a whole code 
(kodeks) of Slavophil doctrine". 65 Danilevsky rejected 
the primacy of Orthodoxy, but he still linked Slav destiny 
with religion. 
From an objective, factual viewpoint, the Russian and 
the majority of the other Slav peoples achieved the 
historical destiny of becoming, with the Greeks, the 
chief guardians of the living tradition of religious 
truth, Orthodoxy, and in this way the continuers of the 
great cause, which was the lot of Israel and Byzantium: 
to be the God-chosen peoples (narodami 
bogoizbrannymi). 66 
Danilevsky believed that Peter's political and military 
activity had been beneficial, but he agreed with the early 
Slavophils that his attempt to uproot customs and morals 
"brought the greatest harm". 67 He wrote, "Our obshchina is 
a historical law", 68 and he believed in a form of "Russian 
socialism" linked with it. The Russians' humility and 
obedience meant that Russia had never had, and probably 
would never have, a political revolution. Danilevsky, 
however, differed from the early Slavophils in rejecting 
their belief that the State was an evil. He stood for a 
strong State. He also rejected the Slavophil view that 
Russia had a mission to perform in Europe. He denied the 
existence of universal civilization, and argued instead 
that civilizations could be divided into a number of 
historical-cultural types. Russia was not part of the 
"Germano-Roman" civilization of Europe, which he believed 
to be in decline, but belonged to Slav civilization, a 
different historical-cultural type. He claimed that 
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Europe hated Russia, with a blind rac:. al hatred, and racial 
hatred was the motive force of histor7- Russia's foreign 
policy should henceforth be determined not by legitimism or 
the "Holy Alliance", but by the Slav interest. The aim 
should be to destroy the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires and 
unite the Slavs in a Slav Federation. He urged war with 
the West to bring this about. Danilevsky's emphasis on 
the State, violence and war leads Robert E. MacMaster to 
describe him as a "totalitarian philosopher". He sought to 
win Slav support by reference to Slav unity and (where 
appropriate) Orthodoxy, and by giving land to the 
peasants. 69 
The Slav Federation that Danilevsky wished to see would 
be led by the Russian Empire, which would be somewhat 
expanded to the West. There would be no provision for 
national minorities within the Empire. Three other Slav 
kingdoms corresponding approximately to today's 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria would be included, 
and "those non-Slav nationalities - Greeks, Romanians and 
Magyars - must enter, willingly or not, the all-Slav 
federation". 70 The Poles, when they began to behave more 
co-operatively, could also join the federation. 
Danilevsky put particular emphasis on the idea that 
Constantinople, or Tsargrad as he called it, should be the 
capital of the federation. It was to be seized from the 
Turks and given not to Russia but to the federation as a 
whole. Constantinople was important above all for 
security reasons, and as the "second Rome" it was also of 
ideological significance. The units of the federation 
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would be autonomous in domestic affairs, but foreign 
affairs and defence would be federal matters. The common 
language would be Russian. The head of the federation, 
stretching from the Adriatic to the Pacific, would be the 
Russian Tsar. 71 
Ivan Aksakov considered Danilevsky's "Russia and 
Europe" to be a Slavophil work. Partly under its 
influence, his desire for cultural and spiritual Slav unity 
gave way to a "striving, by political and military means, 
to expedite the liberation of the southern Slavs and 
achieve their inclusion in Russia's svhere of influence". 
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The old Slavophil desire for freedom was not yet abandoned, 
however. In 1870 Aksakov drafted an appeal to the Tsar 
asking for the relaxation of censorship and for religious 
freedom. This was signed by Samarin, Pogodin, Cherkassky, 
who was now Mayor of Moscow, and a majority of the Moscow 
City Duma. Moscow merchants played an important role on 
the Moscow Slav Benevolent Committee, and in 1874 funded 
the journal Russkii-mir (The Russian World) to encourage 
pan-Slav feeling. Aksakov's opportunity for engendering 
mass support came with the outbreak of conflict in the 
Balkans: a revolt in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1875, and the 
revolt in Bulgaria and the war of Serbia and Montenegro 
against Turkey in 1876.73 
Alexander and Gorchakov refused to be drawn into a war 
against Turkey on behalf of the Slavs, but the Moscow 
merchants gave huge funds to help the Slavs and to finance 
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Russian volunteers to fight for Serbia. This aid was co- 
ordinated through the Moscow Slav Committee, of which 
Aksakov, following Pogodin's death, was now the formal as 
well as the actual head. At the same time, the pan- 
Slavists campaigned for official Russian intervention 
against Turkey. The Soviet historian S. A. Nikitin 
commented: "Aksakov and the Slav Committees, sending 
volunteers to Serbia, were fighting not so much the Turks 
as the Russian government.,, 74 In response, in October 1876 
the government intervened in the Slav Committees and 
subordinated them to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The 
same month, following a Turkish offensive against the 
Serbs, the Moscow Duma unanimously passed an appeal 
drafted by Aksakov asking the government to defend their 
Slav brothers. The Tsar refused to accept it, but two 
weeks later made an anti-Ottoman speech to the Moscow Duma. 
Furthermore, after some hesitation, the government, with 
the Tsar's approval, gave funds to a commission headed by 
Aksakov to provide the Bulgarians with uniforms. Aksakov 
saw the direct involvement of not only the Russian people 
but of Russia "as a State organism, headed by the 
government" as essential to solving the Slav question. 
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Following the collapse of Serbia in February 1877, Aksakov 
made a bitter attack on Russian diplomacy for betraying 
Russian popular sympathy for the Slavs. Finally, on 12 
April 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey. 76 
This declaration of war, against the opposition of the 
Foreign Ministry and Alexander's own former opinion, 
deserves some consideration. In earlier periods of Russian 
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history, as suggested above, ideologIcal pronouncements 
about the Tsar being the protector of the Orthodox had not 
been allowed to weigh against the interests of the State. 
The interests of dynasties had been predominant. Emanuel 
Sarkisyanz has argued that in 1877-1878, and only then, the 
pan-Slavist lobby became strong enougý, to influence the 
Russian government. It should perhaps be emphasized that 
the appeal of pan-Slavism in Russia, and its influence on 
Russian policy, was greatly exaggerated in the West. Ivan 
Aksakov was wrongly considered to be a voice of official 
Russia. As early as 1871 Engels was : elling the readers of 
the Fall-Mall Gazette that Russian public opinion was 
frenetically pan-Slav. He added that there was pressure on 
St. Petersburg to get out of its domestic problems by 
fighting Austria or Turkey. But, as Florinsky points out, 
the autocracy was not accustomed to listening to public 
opinion in the making of foreign policy. It would seem 
that the declaration of war resulted not primarily from 
outside pressure, from Aksakov and others, on the State 
apparatus, but from support for war that existed within the 
ruling circles. Those favouring military intervention 
included the Tsarina, the future Alexander III and those 
around them, the Church and many senior Army officers. Of 
particular importance was the role of Ignatev, supporting 
the Slavs from his embassy in Constantinople. Florinsky 
admits that the level of pan-Slavist agitation was one 
factor in policy formation; another was the changing degree 
of influence with the Tsar of pro-war and anti-war 
individuals. In the end, according to Florinsky, the 
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government was forced into war because the abandonment of 
the Slavs would be seen as "the betrayal of a policy to 
which the government appeared to be definitely 
committed". 77 
Soviet co=entators have generally seen Aksakov's work 
on the Slav Committee (renamed Slav Society in autumn 1876) 
as beneficial insofar as it aided the Slavs culturally or 
helped Slav national liberation movements. There have, 
however, been differences of emphasis. The traditional, 
more Marxist view is represented by Kuleshov, who sees the 
committee as politically "ambiguous, since it masked the 
pan-Slavist strivings of the tsarist government and 
interfered with the demarcation of class interests in the 
all-Slav movement". Tsimbaev writes in detail about 
Aksakov's practical help for the Slavs; he argues that 
Aksakov's "reactionary pan-Slavist ideas" did not interfere 
with his "sincere striving" to assist the Slav struggle. 
Kurilov is the most enthusiastic; he describes Aksakov's 
work and does not criticize his views. 78 
The Moscow Duma voted substantial financial support for 
the war; Cherkassky left for the front, where he later 
died of illness. Russian forces freed Bulgaria, although 
to Aksakov's annoyance they organized for her a 
constitutional monarchy and not an autocracy. Russian 
advances into Turkey provoked British fears that Russia 
intended to seize Constantinople and the Straits. The 
arrival of the British fleet in the Dardanelles in turn 
provoked indignation in Russia. Many who had opposed the 
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idea of seizing Constantinople now supported it, and the 
Tsar ordered it to be taken. The British presence, 
however, made this difficult. In February 1878, Russia and 
Turkey signed the Treaty of San Stefano, with Ignatev, as 
chief Russian negotiator, securing benefits for the Slavs 
and Russia herself. Russia made gains in the Caucasus, 
Bulgaria became an autonomous principality only nominally 
under the Ottomans, and Turkey recognized the independence 
of Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. Aksakov complained 
that "Tsargrad [Constantinople] has not been purged of 
Asiatic nastiness [skvernal"r79, but was generally satisfied 
by the treaty. His hopes that the war would allow the 
interests and consciousness of the Russian people to 
penetrate the autocracy were, however, disappointed. 
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In May 1878, British and Austrian pressure at the 
Congress of Berlin forced the Russian government to give up 
much of what had been won for the Slavs at San Stefano. 
Aksakov saw the Treaty of Berlin as a betrayal of gains won 
with Russian blood. According to Tsimbaev, he had an 
unrealistic understanding of the correlation of forces 
facing Russia. In a speech to the Moscow Slav Society on 
22 June, Aksakov condemned the Congress, with its 
abandonment of the southern Bulgarians, as "a patent plot 
against the Russian people. A plot with the participation 
of the very representatives of Russia. "81 This view was 
widely-held in both Moscow and Petersburg, and Aksakov 
suffered for articulating it. In July the Moscow Slav 
Society was closed down by the Ministry of Internal 
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Affairs, after the intervention of Alexander, and Aksakov 
was exiled from Moscow. Tsimbaev considers his speech 
"the highest point of Aksakov's publicistic activity". it 
strengthened the "friendship of the Russian and Bulgarian 
peoples". A Bulgarian youth group proposed Aksakov's 
candidacy for the Bulgarian throne. But his attempt to 
reconcile pan-Slavism with the Russian State had failed. 
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Dostoevsky 
Since the XX Congress of the CPSU, the influence of 
Dostoevsky's legacy has become of great importance in the 
USSR, among both official cultural circles and dissidents. 
It is appropriate to consider the development of 
Dostoevsky's ideas from the late 1860s to his death in 1881 
in the light of the political environment and events 
outlined above. His political journalism reached a wide 
audience in his lifetime: his periodical The_Diary_of-a 
Writer (Dnevnik pisatelia, St. Petersburg, 1876-1877,1880, 
1881) peaked at a circulation of 6000 in 1877. 
Nevertheless, commentators have questioned whether 
Dostoevsky's politics should be taken seriously. Nikolai 
K. Mikhailovsky (1843-1904), one of the leading narodnik 
theoreticians, says that neither Dostoevsky's supporters 
nor his opponents seriously considered him to be a 
political figure. 83 E. H. Carr, in his biography of 
Dostoevsky first published in 1931, opined that the Diary 
"has little interest for a later generation", and referred 
to some passages as "ravings". 84 Ronald Hingley describes 
Dostoevsky's "Pushkin speech" as "appalling but somehow 
inspired rubbish". 85 The Czech leader, Tomas Masaryk, on 
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the other hand, gave a central role mo Dostoevsky in his 
study of Russian thought. 11 ... what I write about 
Dostoevskii is the core of the underta-king ... an analysis 
of Dostoevskii is a sound method of s--udying Russia 
... 1186 Masaryk liked neither 
Dostoevsky nor Russia; but 
Dostoevsky has always had his disciples among Russians. 
After the Revolution of 1905, Dmitry 'Herezhkovsky entitled 
his biography of Dostoevsky "The Prop! -. et of the Russian 
Revolution". 87 The events of 1917, the Civil War and the 
1930s appeared to many in the Russian emigration to confirm 
Dostoevsky's status as a prophet. 88 
In the USSR, the Institute of Russian Literature 
(Pushkin House) of the Academy of Sciences began in 1972 to 
publish the complete collected works of Dostoevsky in a 30- 
volume edition. The first part of Volume 30 appeared in 
1988.89 The DiarV (republished in 1929 and 1981-1984) 
began to attract attention as the official attitude to 
Dostoevsky became friendlier. V. A. Tunimanov, in a study of 
the Diary published in a collective volume 1972, complained 
that Soviet critics had either shut their eyes to it or 
rejected it as reactionary. He found positive elements in 
Dostoevsky's political journalism, in particular his anti- 
bourgeois attitude and his understanding of events in 
Europe, which coexisted with his reactionary ideas. 
90 Ia. E. 
Elsberg, in the same volume, affirms that the Diarv bears 
witness to the desperate waverings in Dostoevsky's thought, 
between democracy, socialism and civil resurrection 
(&razhdanskomu voskreseniiu) on the one hand, and the 
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and the idealization of the Orthodox Church and monarchism 
on the other. Like many observers, Elsberg sees 
Dostoevsky's philosophy as contradictory. 91 Assessing 
Dostoevsky's legacy, the editors of the volume containing 
these studies declare: 
... the authors are unanimous in that 
the presence of 
conservative elements in the world-view of the writer 
could not obscure the progressive meaning of his 
creative work; in its humanist pathos, its anti- 
bourgeoisness ... it is undoubtedly our ally 
in the ... 
revolutionary transformation of the world. 92 
Other Soviet critics in the official Press and in samizdat 
in the 1970s and 1980s have declared their allegiance to 
Dostoevsky's philosophy. 93 
Before discussing Dostoevsky's ideas, some biographical 
facts must be mentioned. From 1867 he lived in Western 
Europe, avoiding his creditors. On his return to St. 
Petersburg in 1871, his literarV rame wa, -- already 
established by Crime-and-Punishment (1865-1866), The-Idiot 
(1869) and Thee Devils (1871). In 1872 he met Konstantin P. 
Pobedonostsev (1827-1907). Pobedonostsev had been tutor to 
the Tsarevich and was later to become Oberprocurator of the 
Holy Synod (1880-1905) and a prominent adviser to Alexander 
III and Nicholas II. The two became very close friends. 
At the end of 1872, Dostoevsky was made editor of 
Grazhdanin (The Citizen), a conservative journal owned by 
Prince V. P. Meshchersky and supported by the Tsarevich, 
Pobedonostsev, Apollon Maikov, Tiutchev and Strakhov. He 
held the position for a year; the Diary originated as a 
feature within the journal. Pobedonostsev introduced 
Dostoevsky to Court circles, where he made a favourable 
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impression. Alexander II invited him to have discussions 
with his two younger sons, Sergei and Pavel, and the sons 
of his brother. In 1880 he met the Tsarevich. At the same 
time, he maintained links with radical circles; his novel A 
Raw Youth was published in Otechestvennye-zapiski, then 
edited by Nikolai A. Nekrasov, in 1875.94 
Dostoevsky's basic political, philosophical and 
religious ideas do not seem to have changed much after 
l8b8. Having accepted the centrality of Orthodoxy, he had 
become very close politically to the Slavophils, especially 
Ivan Aksakov, and at times was if anything even more 
virulent in his nationalism. He still believed in the 
essence of Peter's reform, but not in all its aspects; the 
abolition of serfdom had removed the worst fault. 
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Riasanovsky correctly says that Dostoevsky's treatment of 
Russia's relations with the West "deeply resembled" 
Slavophilism. 95 His claim that the Russian people was the 
"God-bearing people" (narod-bogonosets) could be seen as an 
extension of the thought of the early Slavophils. He 
retained the pochvennik preoccupation with the need for 
reconciliation (see above, p. 156); indeed, Geoffrey C. 
Kabat describes the gap between intelligentsia and people 
as the "central theme" of the Digýry. 97 But the 
reconciliation was to be on Dostoevsky's own terms. In 
1868, he wrote to Maikov of Russia's role in regenerating 
the world. "A great renovation is being prepared for the 
whole world through Russian thought (which is intimately 
connected with Orthodoxy, you are right) and this will be 
achieved in some hundred years - [that] is my present 
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faith. "98 Around the same time, Dostoevsky's positive 
character Prince Myshkin, the "idiot", was saying: 
Show the Russian man the renewal of all mankind and its 
resurrection, perhaps, by Russian thought alone, by the 
Russian God and Christ, and you will see what a mighty 
and upright, wise and meek giant will grow before the 
astounded world. 99 
A letter to Strakhov of 1869 also expressed Dostoevsky's 
belief in Russia's aiding the "resurrection of Europe". 
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All this fits within the Slavophil canon. Like Khomiakov 
and Ivan Kireevsky, Dostoevsky saw a logical chain leading 
from Catholicism to Protestantism, and thence to 
atheism; 101 but Dostoevsky was particularly interested in 
the link between atheism and socialism, and the 
similarities between Catholicism and socialism. 
Dostoevsky's view of the relation between Russia and 
Europe is summarized in the January 1877 issue of the 
Diary. He saw "three ideas" contending, Catholic, 
Protestant and "Slav". Catholicism in France had produced 
French atheist socialism. "French socialism of today ... 
is nothing other than the most faithful and undeviating 
continuation of the Catholic idea ... nothing other than 
the forcible unity of humanity - an idea coming from 
ancient Rome and then fully preserved in Catholicism. " 
Protestantism was the idea of "the German who blindly 
believes that the renewal of humanity is in him alone, and 
not in Catholic civilization". The German always lived by 
negation. After the fall of Catholicism, Protestantism 
might die because there was nothing left to protest 
against. The German despised the Slav idea as much as the 
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Catholic idea, but had only recently ---egun to take it as a 
serious threat. The Slav idea was on-y coming into being; 
it was still too undefined, but it wo--! ld have an enormous 
influence. 102 
In the realm of social affairs, Russia's moral 
superiority was shown for Dostoevsky by the fact that 
serfdom had been voluntarily abolished by the upper stratum 
on the Tsar's wish. 103 He contrasted this with Europe. 
... in Europe all the great powers will 
be annihilated, 
and for a very simple reason; they will all be made 
powerless and undermined by the unsatisfied democratic 
strivings of a large part of their lower-class 
subjects, their proletarians and 7aupers. In Russia, 
however, this cannot happen at al': our demos is 
. 11 be more content, content, and as time passes, it w-i 
for everything is leading to this, through the general 
mood, or rather through agreement. And so there will 
remain only one colossus on the continent of Europe - 
Russia. This will happen, perhaps, even much sooner 
than people think. Europe's future belongs to Russia. 
But the question arises: what will Russia then do in 
Europe? Is she ready for this role? 104 
Dostoevsky was convinced that Europe hated Russia. 
"Europe has a remarkable dislike for us and has never liked 
us; she has never considered us as one of her own, as 
Europeans, but only as vexatious newcomers.,, 105 He accused 
Europe's leaders of inspiring hatred for Russia, of turning 
their backs on the atrocities committed by the Ottomans, 
"the savage infamous Muslim horde", against the Balkan 
Slavs. "The Slav race is hateful to Europe. "106 Russian 
intellectuals who had been drawn to French socialism became 
detached from the Russian soil and the soul of the people, 
and were not respected in Europe. To win Europe's respect, 
Russians had first to respect their own nationality and 
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become Russians. But Dostoevsky refused to renounce 
Europe; "Europe for us is a second fazherland. "10r7 And 
soon, given the contradictions within Europe, "one can say 
almost with certainty that in the near, perhaps very near 
future, Russia will become stronger than anyone in 
Europe. "108 
In the Diary for September 1877, during the Russo- 
Turkish War, Dostoevsky's expectations of the defeat of 
European ideas reached new heights. "Papal Catholicism, 
dying forever" would in the very near future launch a war 
against the whole world, which would merge with the Balkan 
war. The outcome would be that Catholicism would be 
replaced by "reborn Eastern Christianity". 109 The ending 
of the Russo-Turkish War in no way diminished his 
expectations of a forthcoming conflagration. The political 
situation within the European countries, he wrote in the 
Diary for August 1880, "must unfailingly lead to a huge, 
final, partitioning political war", within the nineteenth 
century or even the decade. In Europe, "the proletarian is 
on the street ... [the proletarians] will 
throw themselves 
on Europe, and all the old order will perish for ever. "110 
Dostoevsky claimed that Catholicism and atheist 
socialism both sought to deny people their freedom in order 
to try to give them happiness. 111 His portrayal of 
Shigalyov's attempt to create paradise in The Devils and of 
.... . .... 
the ideology of the Grand Inquisitor in The-Brothers 
Karamazov are probably attacks on both Catholicism and 
socialism. Shigalyov proposes to give 
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one tenth of humanity absolute freedom and unlimited 
rights over the remaining nine tenths. The latter must 
lose their individuality and turn into something like a 
herd, and by their unlimited obedience will achieve, by 
a series of regenerations, primeval innocence, 
something like the original paradise, although, 
however, they will work. 
But Shigalyov finds a paradox. "Proceeding from unlimited 
freedom, I conclude with unlimited despotism. "112 The 
Grand Inquisitor explains to Christ, who has returned to 
Seville at the height of the Spanish Inquisition, that 
people do not want to be burdened with the freedom that 
Christ gave them. People have instead given their freedom 
to the Church, and in return received "bread", a symbol for 
the certainties of Catholic dogma. The Church has taken on 
itself the burden of the sins of the people, and the people 
willingly submit to the Church. The Grand Inquisitor 
admits that in denying people freedom, the Catholic Church 
has abandoned Christ for "him", the Devil or Antichrist. 
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Mochulsky sees the bread as symbolizing both Catholicism 
and socialism, and argues that Dostoevsky was convinced 
that Catholicism would unite with socialism to form the 
kingdom of Antichrist. Berdiaev believes that the Legend 
of the Grand Inquisitor is directed against all authority 
and is essentially anarchist. 114 
Dostoevsky believed that atheism among the Russian 
intelligentsia was a result of its separation from the 
people. "Cutting themselves off from the people, they 
naturally also lost God. "115 The consequence of the loss 
of God was the ending of morality and the raising of man to 
be a god. In The-Devils, Kirillov becomes a man-god in 
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his own eyes by overcoming the fear --. f death and killing 
himself. 116 The whole novel can be seen in terms of the 
loss of morality in the "nihilist sons" of the 1860s as a 
result of the loss of God by the "lilteral fathers" of the 
1840s. 117 Pyotr Verkhovensky, a "nihilist son", organizes 
the murder of one of the members of his secret 
revolutionary cell. The story is based on a similar 
incident in 1869 involving Sergei G. Nechaev, who had 
earlier collaborated with Bakunin on -, he Catechism-of-the 
Revolutionany. Dostoevsky emphasizes that Pyotr 
Verkhovensky is not a socialist but simply a scoundrel. 
The irrational, depraved, nightmarish world Dostoevsky 
portrays has inevitably been compared with Stalinism. 
Philip Rahv wrote at the height of the Great Purge: "Give 
him [Pyotr Verkhovenskyl state power and you get a type 
like Yezhov or Yagoda. " At the end of the novel appears a 
vision: the "devils" who have supposedly been afflicting 
Russia over the ages enter the liberals and nihilists and 
destroy themselves, like the swine in St. Luke's Gospel. 
Russia is then healed, and "will sit at the feet of Jesus" 
Rahv argues that Dostoevsky was demonstrating the 
inevitability of the Russian Revolution; but it would seem 
that the conclusion to be drawn from this vision, and from 
his Journalism already cited, is that he believed that the 
revolution would be defeated. 118 
The philosophy behind The-Devils is made more 
explicit in The Brothers_Karamazov. Ivan Karamazov 
propounds the view that if, as he believes, there is no God 
and no immortality, then "everything is permitted". 
119 The 
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murder of Karamazov Rare by Smerdiakc7, who had heard Ivan 
express this opinion, and Ivan's reac--ion, are central 
themes in the novel. Commentators on Dostoevsky have 
nevertheless had to face the problem cf whether the author 
really believed in God. From his journalistic writings, 
the question would appear facile, but his novels provide 
room for doubt. 
Shatov is the character in The-Devils who most 
clearly represents Dostoevsky's Russian messianism. After 
Shatov's exposition of the idea that -. he Russian people is 
a "God-bearing people", Stavrogin asks him, 
'Do you yourself believe in God or not? ' 
'I believe in Russia, I believe in her Orthodoxy... I 
believe in the body of Christ... I believe that the 
Second Coming will take place in Russia... I believe... 
Shatov began to babble in a frenz7. 
'But in God? In God? ' 
'I ... I shall believe in God. '120 
It would be wrong to attribute automatically the views 
of a fictional character to the author. Berdiaev said, 
"Dostoievsky himself was not Shatov, but he was fond of him 
and ... there are elements of Shatov in him. " Berdiaev 
believes that Dostoevsky is showing the falsehood of 
people-worship, even though Dostoevsky's own deity "is 
often the Russian God". 121 Mochulsky, on the other hand, 
describes Shatov as the "herald of [Dostoevsky's] 
religious-national credo", and points out that Shatov 
shared autobiographical and physical attributes with his 
creator. 122 Carr calls Shatov a "self-portrait" or "self- 
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idealization" of Dostoevsky. 123 
Ivan Karamazov's rejection of God, expressed in 
conversation with Alyosha, has been cznsidered extremely 
powerful and has cast further doubt ca the depths of 
Dostoevsky's own belief. 124 Pobedoncstsev was greatly 
displeased by the passage. He wrote --o Dostoevsky: "When 
the statue is not a success for the artist, or he is 
dissatisfied, all the metal goes back into the furnace. ', 
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Dostoevsky told Pobedonostsev that his section on Father 
Zosima ("The Russian Monk") was his answer to Ivan 
Karamazov, but, he worried, "Will it be a sufficient 
answer? "126 Masaryk comments that Dostoevsky very much 
wants to believe in God, but has lost his faith and is a 
sceptic. This is not necessarily to accuse Dostoevsky of 
hypocrisy, as Carr suggests it is; the truth may be that 
Dostoevsky thought himself a believer in God, but was 
sufficiently insecure in his belief that he was able to 
produce a repudiation of faith that was stronger than its 
affirmation. Ernest J. Simmons is probably right to regard 
Ivan's argument as a "case of an author's artistic 
integrity triumphing over his personal belief, or perhaps 
it would be more correct to say, over what he wanted to 
believe.,, 127 
What, then, did Dostoevsky really believe in? His 
"self-idealization", Shatov, is vehement in his belief in 
the Russian people. It is 
now the only 'God-bearing' people in the whole world, 
destined to renew and save the world in the name of a 
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new God, and to whom alone have '-, --en given the keys of 
life and of the new word... The --rpose of the whole .r- movement of a people ... is sole-1-7 the pursuit of 
God, 
its own God... 
God is the synthetic personality of thle whole people. A 
people begins to die when it shares i-!: s God with other 
peoples. 
The people is the body of God. Every people is a 
people only as long as it has its own special God, and 
excludes all other gods in the world without any 
reconciliation; while it believes that by its own God 
it will conquer and drive from the world all the other 
gods... If a great people does no-- believe that in it 
alone there is truth (istina) (precisely in it alone 
and precisely exclusively), if it does not believe that 
it alone is able and called on to raise up and save all 
by its truth, then at once it ceases to be a great 
people and at once is converted into ethnographic 
material, and not into a great people. 128 
The view that this was the creed of Dostoevsky himself 
is born out by its reiteration in The-DiarV_of_a-Writer for 
January 1877, Dostoevsky wrote: 
Every great people believes and must believe, if only 
it wishes to be alive for long, that the salvation of 
the world is in it, and only in it alone; that it lives 
in order to stand at the head of the peoples, to join 
them all to itself in unity, and to lead them in a 
harmonious choir to the final purpose, predestined for 
them all. 
He went on to co=end the "ideal of the Slavophils", which 
he interpreted as the universal unity of man, to be shown 
to the world by the Slavs headed by Russia. 129 Father 
Zosima, in more moderate vein, expressed Dostoevsky's faith 
in the Russian people. "The salvation of Rus' comes from 
the people ... The people will meet the atheist and overcome 
him, and Rus' wil be unified and Orthodox.,, 130 Belief in 
God, for Zosima as for Shatov, and probably for Dostoevsky 
as well, can be a consequence of belief in the Russian 
people. 
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Whoever does not believe in God [says Zosima) will also 
not believe in God's people. Bum whoever has come to 
believe in God's people, will also behold His 
sacredness, though he had not believed in it until 
then. 131 
This position was taken up by Russian nationalist Orthodox 
Christians in the 1970s (see below, chapter 6). 
Dostoevsky claimed that the Russian people were 
characterized by great humility and the ability and even 
desire to undergo suffering. This suffering gave them the 
ability to forgive themselves for their sins. The theme of 
redemption through suffering is particularly strong in The 
Brothers Karamazov. 132 The Russian people were not all 
saints, although some were; some were the worst scoundrels, 
but they always knew when they were doing wrong. Pushkin's 
Belkin, the peasant Marei who comforted Dostoevsky when he 
was a child, 133 and in particular Nekrasov's Vlas, the evil 
man who became holy, represented Dostoevsky's conception of 
the Russian people. 
I am still of the opinion that they will say the last 
word - these very different 'Vlases', repenting and not 
repenting; they will show us the new way and the new 
solution to all our seemingly insoluble difficulties. 
It will not be Petersburg that will finally determine 
the Russian destiny. 134 
Elsewhere Dostoevsky attacked the "haughty attitude" of 
St. Petersburg to Russia. 135 In this sense, there is some 
truth in the statement of the Soviet critic Iury I. 
Seleznyov: "Dostoevsky's patriotism was never 'official', 
but was based on a belief in the people's spiritual 
strength., s136 But his faith in the people was not 
absolute; if the people turned out to be different from his 
conception, or if it should reject European culture, then 
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he would renounce the people. 137 
Dostoevsky firmly linked the destiny of' Russia with 
Orthodoxy. 
Isn't there in it [Orthodoxy] alone both the truth 
(pravda) and the salvation of the Russian people, and 
in future centuries of the whole of humanity? Isn't 
there preserved in Orthodoxy alone the divine image of 
Christ in all its purity? And, perhaps, the most 
important pre-ordained assignment of the Russian people 
in the destinies of all humanity consists in preserving 
in itself this divine form of Christ in all its purity, 
and when the time comes, revealing this form to the 
world which has lost its way! 138 
Dostoevsky followed Khomiakov in emphasizing the Orthodox 
traditions of the Russian people, rather than the Orthodox 
Church structures, 139 and in his praise of the obshchina 
for containing the seeds of a new future ideal. 140 
Berdiaev thought that Dostoevsky's Russian messianism 
was incompatible with his view of the humility of the 
Russians. 
[Dostoevskyl looked on the Russian people as the 
humblest on earth, but he was proud of this humility. 
And that, indeed, seems to be the pride of the 
Russians. Dostoievsky saw his people as the 'God- 
bearers', unique among their kind, and consciousness of 
this particularistic messianism is not compatible with 
humility; the feelin and mentality of the Jews of old 
were reborn in them. 
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There was no humility in Dostoevsky's attitude to the 
aspirations of the national minorities of the Russian 
Empire, or to the Slavs outside the Empire. "The master of 
the Russian land is solely the Russian alone (Great 
Russian, Ukrainian [maloruss), Belorussian - it's all the 
same). " As for the Tatars, "There is not a square inch of 
Tatar land" in Russia; they were "aliens" on the Russian 
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land. 142 In the Diary for June 1876, with the risings in 
the Balkans, Dostoevsky proclaimed that Russia was the 
"leader of Orthodoxy", destined to unite "all Slavdom, so 
to speak, under the Russian wing". For this, 
"Constantinople ... must be ours. "143 
Dostoevsky insisted that Russia was motivated by the 
desire to serve, and not by the desire for glory or riches. 
"We will begin, now that the time has come, precisely by 
being servants to all, for the sake of universal 
pacification. " The Slavs would be united, not in order to 
merge them with Russia, but to allow them to be 
regenerated. Dostoevsky realized that Europeans reading 
these lines would think he was interested only in 
annexation, but this was a misunderstanding. Russia's 
whole policy throughout the Petersburg period had been one 
of disinterestedness and service, not the pursuit of her 
own profit. 144 The Russian people were fully aware of the 
mission of Russia and the Tsar among the Slavs. 145 
When Russia finally declared war, the 2i_2, Ly for April 
1877 declared that "the people themselves, headed by the 
Tsar", had risen for the war, a "people's war" 
(narodnaia voina). Dostoevsky emphasized "the union of the 
Tsar with his people". The war, Dostoevsky now asserted, 
following Ivan Aksakov's idea, was not only for the benefit 
of the Slavs: "We are rising also for our own salvation. " 
For Dostoevsky, this was a period of eschatological 
expectation, the awakening of the Messiah Russia. 
"Everyone feels that something final has begun ... a step 
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is being taken towards something altogether new, which 
splits the past into two, regenerating and resurrecting it 
for a new life ... and this step is being taken by Russia! " 
Russia needed war. In a section entitled "Does spilt blood 
save? " Dostoevsky wrote: "Peace, a long peace, rather than 
war, bestializes and hardens man. " Contrasting the 
"disinterested" war being fought by Russia with a war 
fought for markets and stock-exchange interests, he 
concluded. "If not we, our children will see how England 
will end. "146 
In "The Confessions of a Slavophil" in the Diary for 
July-August 1877, Dostoevsky again claims that the word 
from suffering Russia will bring a "new, brotherly, 
universal union of all humanity". 147 In November, it is 
affirmed that the new word from the East is in opposition 
to the approaching socialism; and again we are told that 
this requires Russia's seizure of Constantinople. 148 What 
is claimed to be service turns into great-power chauvinism 
and imperialism; like Khomiakov, but to a greater degree 
and with less criticism of his fatherland, Dostoevsky 
showed how easy was the transition from universalist 
messianism to nationalist messianism. He was aware that 
this transition could be made; the public prosecutor at the 
trial of Dmitry Karamazov speaks of how the desire to 
return to the beliefs of the people often degenerates into 
"narrow chauvinism". 149 Zernov is one of the commentators 
who says that Dostoevsky was not a nationalist, since he 
ascribed the gifts of the Russian people to "their personal 
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meeting with Christ". Anton Florovsky takes Dostoevsky's 
position seriously, considering the Russian entry into the 
war to be disinterested and seeing only spiritual reasons 
for the seizure of Constantinople. 150 Other critics have 
been less kind: Zenkovsky, Mochulsky and Masaryk see 
Dostoevsky as idealizing Russia and falling into narrow 
nationalism, while Ronald Hingley accuses him of asserting 
peaceful intentions to conceal his aggressive appetite. 151 
Dostoevsky's chauvinism is shown even more clearly in 
his attitude to the Jews. The extent of Dostoevsky's anti- 
Semitism has been concealed in the USSR in the past by the 
practice of omitting some of the hostile references to the 
Jews from Soviet editions of his works. 152 Russian emigres 
have also sought to present Dostoevsky as free of national 
animosities. Zernov claimed: "A belief in the special 
mission of one's own nation is often accompanied by 
intolerance and a dislike of other people. Dostoevsky was 
free from these psychological dangers. "153 Joseph Frank has 
argued that Dostoevsky's anti-Semitism should be seen in 
the context of his general xenophobia; "he was probably 
more fiercely anti-Polish than anti-Semitic". 154 Frank is 
right to see conflicts and tensions in Dostoevsky's 
views; 155 one can cite Vremia's defence of the Jews in 1862 
(see above, pp. 1b9-70), the fact that not all Jewish 
characters in his novels are monsters, and his statements 
in the Diary on legal equality. It remains the case, as 
Goldstein shows, that Dostoevsky saw the Jews as playing a 
special role in the world. This is clear not merely from 
remarks by his characters, or from comments in letters 
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(such comments were also made by Marx and Engels) but from 
his political journalism. 
In 1873, Dostoevsky refers to "the decline of morality, 
cheapness, Yid-innkeepers, robbery". 156 He fears that the 
growth of alcoholism (encouraged by these Jewish 
innkeepers) will mean that supposedly Russia will fall into 
the hands of the "kulaks and Yids", and then "the Yids will 
drink the blood of the people. 11157 In the Diary for June 
187b, he writes: 
Now the Yids are becoming landowners, and everywhere 
people shout and write that they are exhausting the 
soil of Russia, that the Yid, having invested capital 
to buy an estate, at once, in order to recoup his 
capital plus interest, drains dry all the forces and 
resources of the land he has bought. But try to say 
something against this and people will at once protest 
to you about the violation of the principle of economic 
freedom and civil equality. 
But the Jews in reality were privileged, according to 
Dostoevsky; they were able to buy up public opinion through 
their influence in the Press, and they enjoyed the 
advantages of being allowed a "State within a State". 158 
Here he seems to have accepted the anti-Semitic 
fabrications of Iakov Brafman. 159 
Not only in Russia but in the West as well he claimed 
to see Jewish finance capital pulling the strings of 
foreign policy and conspiring against Russia. The 
Rothschild family and the British Prime Minister Benjamin 
Disraeli were particular targets. "And surely the truth is 
that the Yid has again begun to rule everywhere, and has 
not only *begun to rule", but never even stopped 
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ruling-e"160 
The Diary for March 1877 contains a chapter called 
"The Jewish Question". Here Dostoevsky responded to 
contemporary accusations that he was anti-Semitic. He 
denied that he had any hatred towards the Jews. He 
defended his use of the term "Yid" (zhid), on the grounds 
that he did not think it was abusive (although by that time 
the term "Jew" levreil was normally used and "Yid" was 
considered offensive). He also stated that he used it to 
refer to a particular "idea", by which) he meant the rule of 
the kulaks and bankers. 161 It might be added that 
Dostoevsky's "Yiddish idea" is very similar to Marx's use 
of Judentum in his "On the Jewish Question". Judentum was 
frequently used at the time (1843) to mean not only Judaism 
but also commerce. Thus Marx wrote: "Money is the jealous 
god of Israel, beside which no other god may exist ... The 
social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation-of 
society-from Judentum. "162 But Goldstein sees Dostoevsky's 
identification of a nationality with capitalist and kulak 
exploitation as "an irrevocable verdict against the 
Jews,,. IC53 
Dostoevsky's chapter goes on to claim that the Jews 
in Russia exaggerate their suffering; the Russian peasant 
is as oppressed as the Jew. Further, the dislike of the 
Russian for the Jew, where it exists, 
arises not at all from the fact that he is a Jew, not 
from any sort of racial or religious hatred, but it 
arises from other reasons where the guilt lies not with 
the native people but with the Jew himself. 164 
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This is what anyone in the Russian borderlands would say 
about the Jews: "'They have been moved for so many 
centuries only by pitilessness towards us and only by the 
thirst for our sweat and blood. '" 165 
The Jews were more prejudiced against Russians than the 
Russians were against Jews. The Jews looked forward to 
world domination; this required them to maintain their own 
close-knit identity. If they were given equal legal 
rights, but allowed to keep their "State within a State", 
they would be more privileged than the Russians. The 
consequences of this situation were already clear in 
Europe. 
Thus it is not for nothing that everywhere there the 
Jews are reigning (tsariat) over the stock exchanges, 
not for nothing that they control capital, not for 
nothing that they are masters of credit, and not for 
nothing, I repeat, that they are the masters of all 
international politics, and what will be in the future 
is known also to the Jews themselves: their reign is 
approaching, their complete reign! lý-5t 
Dostoevsky nevertheless declared himself in favour of "full 
and final equalization of rights", but then hedged this 
with the qualification "insofar as the Jewish people 
themselves will show their ability to accept and exercise 
these rights without detriment to the native 
population.,, 167 
In his letters and notebooks, Dostoevsky claimed to see 
the Jews behind the socialist movement, in both Europe and 
Russia. 
The Yid and his bank are now reigning over everything: 
over Europe, education, civilization, socialism - 
especially socialism, for he will use it to uproot 
Christianity and destroy its civilization. And when 
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nothing but anarchy remains, the Yid will be in com-mand 
of everything. For while he goes about preaching 
socialism, he will stick together with his own, and 
after all the riches of Europe will have been wasted, 
the Yid's bank will still be there. The Antichrist 
will come and stand over the anarchy. 168 
Goldstein shows that Jewish participation in the Russian 
revolutionary movement at that time was in fact very 
low. 169 (It must be conceded, however, that a significant 
number of leaders of the revolutionary movement after 
Dostoevsky's death were of Jewish origin. ) 
"1 . 11 The emigre scholar D. V. Grishin claimed that Dostoevsky 
did not hate the Jews but "hated capitalism, and 
personified capitalism as the Jewish entrepreneurs and 
bankers. " He points out that some members of the narodnik 
movements of the early 1880s shared Dostoevsky's anti- 
Jewish "prejudices", and even sympathized with the 
pogroms. 1'7() R. Pletnev, on the other hand, considers 
Dostoevsky a "blatant anti-Semite", and Goldstein refers to 
his writings on the Jews as a "sea of lies". Hingley 
draws a parallel with Mein-Kampf. 171 
Goldstein argues that Dostoevsky's "blind hatred" of 
the Jews "was the inevitable result of his Great Russian 
Messianism. " The Jewish claim to be the "chosen people" was 
not compatible with his claims for the Russian people. 172 
Robert Alter goes a little further, concluding that 
Dostoevsky considered the Jews the "dark legions of the 
antichrist, not ready to redeem mankind with their blood 
but vampirically sucking the blood from mankind ... "173 It 
seems probable that Dostoevsky's anti-Semitism was brought 
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about not only by his belief that the Jews were exploiting 
the Russians or by his anti-capitalis-r- orientation. In the 
Diary he suggests that the Jews are told by their religion 
that they will come to rule the world; and this would seem 
to be the driving force of his anti-Semitism. The anti- 
Semitism of both Dostoevsky and Ivan Aksakov was based on 
religion, and linked with their hopes for Russia; this 
anti-Semitism was held simultaneously with anti-capitalist 
feeling in Dostoevsky and pro-capitallst feeling in 
Aksakov. 
Dostoevsky's opinion of the Jews did not rob him of the 
acclaim from both Westernizers and Slavophils that greeted 
his "Pushkin speech" of June 1880.174 Pushkin's 
"transformation of his own spirit into the spirit of other 
peoples" reflected the ability of the Russian people, 
benefiting from Peter's turn to the West, to accept the 
cultures of other nations "without racial discrimination", 
and to enter "the all-embracing pan-human reunification 
with all the races of the great Aryan family". 175 (This 
presumably excluded the Jews. ) Dostoevsky went on to make 
what is probably the classic statement of Russian 
universalist messianism, which deserves to be quoted at 
length. 
Yes, the Russian's destiny is incontestably pan- 
European and universal. To become a true Russian, to 
become completely Russian, perhaps means only (in the 
last analysis, underline this) to become a brother to 
all people, a universal-person, if you like. Oh, all 
this Slavophilism and Westernism of ours is a great 
misunderstanding with us, although historically 
inevitable. For a true Russian, Europe and the fate of 
the whole great Aryan race are as dear as even Russia 
herself, as her native land, because her fate is 
universality, acquired not by the sword but by the 
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force of brotherhood and our brot-lerly striving for the 
reunification of people ... Oh, the peoples of Europe 
have no idea how dear they are to us! And later, I 
believe that we, that is of course not we but the 
future Russians, will understand to a person that to 
become a true Russian will mean precisely this: to 
strive finally to bring reconcillation to the European 
contradictions, to show the way out of European despair 
in our own Russian soul, pan-human and all-uniting, to 
embrace in it with brotherly love all our brothers, and 
finally, perhaps, to utter the final word of great, 
general harmony, of the final brotherly accord of all 
races according to Christ's Gospel law. 176 
As several commentators have noted, this is a 
considerably more moderate statement of messianism than 
those of Shatov or the Diary of 1876 and 1877. Dostoevsky 
is talking not about the "God-bearing people" or the 
seizure of Constantinople, but about Russia's role in the 
reconciliation of the peoples. R. Lord suggests that this 
reflects the influence of Vladimir Solovyov, who also 
influenced the content of The-Brothers Karamazov, which he 
was then completing. 177 When Dostoevsky's speech was 
delivered in Moscow, it was received with rapture, since by 
combining the themes of the uniqueness of Russia and love 
for Europe, it appeared to offer something to both 
Westernizers and Slavophils. The Westernizer Turgenev 
embraced him, and the Slavophil Ivan Aksakov declared the 
speech a "historic event". Some of the enthusiasm proved 
to be ephemeral, with Turgenev and Koshelyov both attacking 
the idea of universalism, while Aksakov accepted it 
completely. In content if not in rhetoric, the speech 
differed little from the pochvennichestvo of the early 
1860s; Dostoevsky did not mention the Church, even though 
this played a central role in The Brothers Karamazov. 178 
It might be appropriate to make the connection between the 
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novel's idea of the mutual responsibi-ity of people for 
each other's sins and Dostoevsky's view of Russia's 
responsibilities in Europe and the rest of the world. 
The religious theme is re-emphasized in the last issue 
of the Diary, for January 1881. Here Dostoevsky advocates 
"our Russian socialism": not a programme to raise the 
living standards of the masses, but the aspiration to 
create a universal, ecumenical Church on earth. This, he 
claims, is the "thirst" in the Russian people. "Not in 
communism, not in mechanical forms is the socialism of the 
Russian people expressed. " He re-affirms the faith of the 
Russian people in the Tsar. 179 
In the final section of the issue, however, Dostoevsky 
proposed a new orientation for Russia. Prompted by General 
Mikhail D. Skobelev's massacre of the Turkmen at Geok-Tepe, 
Dostoevsky called for the expansion of Russian power in 
Asia. ... the Russian is not only a European but also an 
Asian. Moreover, in Asia, perhaps, our hopes are still 
larger than in Europe. In our future destinies, perhaps 
Asia is our main end! "180 It would appear that the 
conquest of Asia had replaced the liberation of the Slavs 
as the means of Russia's spiritual regeneration. "In 
Europe we were Tatars, but in Asia even we are Europeans. 
The mission (missiia), our civilizing mission in Asia will 
bribe our spirit and attract us there, as soon as the 
movement begins. 11181 In spite of the use of the phrase 
"civilizing mission", it is clear that Dostoevsky is 
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talking of conquest and not universal "brotherly love". 182 
After the Crimean War defeat, Foreign Secretary Gorchakov 
had proposed the same turn from Europe to Asia as 
Dostoevsky was now proposing-183 (It is interesting to 
note that Engels also favoured a "civilizing mission" for 
Russia in Asia. He wrote in 1851: "Russia on the other 
hand is really progressive in relation to the East. For 
all its baseness and Slavonic dirt, Russian domination is 
civilizing on the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and Central 
Asia and among the Bashkirs and Tatars. " In 1888 Engels 
predicted that, after the overthrow of tsarism, "the noble 
nation of the Great Russians ... will accomplish its genuine 
civilizing mission in Asia. "184) 
Thus at the end of his life, in the last issue of the 
Diary, Dostoevsky managed to combine the call for a 
brotherly universal church with the call for the expansion 
of the tsarist Russian State, to the benefit (or at the 
expense) of Asia. This highlights the essentially 
contradictory nature of his thought, the one constant theme 
of which (at least from 1850) was his belief in the unique 
characteristics and role of the Russian people. 
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Alexander III and Nicholas-lI: Russification and the-pogroms 
In 1881 some terrorists of the Narodnaia volia 
organization succeeded in assassinating Tsar Alexander II. 
His son, Alexander III, inaccurately described as the 
"Slavophile" Tsar, 185 came to the throne with the aim of 
crushing the revolutionary movement and clamping down on 
the expression of dissident opinion in the spheres of 
culture, religion and politics. In this his principal 
advisor was Pobedonostsev, his former tutor. Pobedonostsev 
stressed to Alexander III and later to Nicholas II the 
importance of strengthening the autocratic principle and 
making no concessions to pressures for liberal reform. He 
advocated a form of Great-Russian chauvinism, which sought 
support from the Great Russians of the Orthodox faith by 
emphasizing the allegedly Orthodox character of the State 
and promoting the Russification of national minorities. He 
further hoped that the spread of the Russian language and 
Orthodoxy would crush minority nationalism. Apart from his 
claim that the Russian people were imbued with Orthodoxy, 
his policy had little to do with Slavophilism or any form 
of Russian messianism. Pobedonostsev wrote nothing on the 
"Third Rome" or Russia's "sacred mission". Rather than 
encouraging the blossoming of Russian culture, the tree 
exchange of ideas, or the projection of Orthodox Russia as 
a model to transform the world, the last Tsars devoted 
their attention to preserving their own power. It was a 
replay of "Orthodoxy, Autocracy and narodnost'", now even 
less compatible with Russia's needs than under Nicholas 
1.186 
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Pobedonostsev was hostile on principle to all non- 
Orthodox religious groups. He considered them "enemies of 
the state, because the laws of the Orthodox Church are the 
laws of the state". 187 It was in the religious field that 
he was prepared to make compromises on language policy. He 
supported the efforts of Nikolai I. 11minsky to promote 
Orthodox propaganda in the languages of the Muslim peoples. 
Ilminsky argued that if the government insisted on the use 
of Russian in schools and churches, the non-Russians in 
Muslim areas would be thoroughly Islamicized and absorbed 
by the Tatars. If alternatively the Church used the local 
languages, and the Muslims became Orttodox, they would 
ultimately fuse with the Russians. 188 
Nationalist movements among the non-Russians came to 
the surface in the 1905 Revolution and made some gains for 
the minorities. The government issued an Edict of religious 
tolerance on 17 April 1905. The Imperial Academy of 
Sciences declared Ukrainian to be a language separate from 
Russian, and permission was given for the establishment of 
a Ukrainian cultural society, Prosvita. The victory of 
reaction led to Pobedonostsev's promotion of Russian 
nationalism and anti-Semitism in an attempt to rely on the 
patriotism of the Russian population of the Empire. All 
the branches of Prosvita were closed down by 1910. Hugh 
Seton-Watson states that while popular Russian nationalism 
was strongest in the Western borderlands, where the Jews 
were concentrated and Ukrainian nationalism was strong, it 
was winning support elsewhere. 189 
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In 1881, after the assassination of Alexander 11, 
sections of the aristocracy and police stirred up the 
masses against the Jews. A series ol pogroms occurred in 
the Ukraine and Southern Russia, usually with the 
acquiescence of the local authorities. The government of 
Alexander III tightened the regulations on the residence, 
economic activity and educational opportunities of the 
Jews. Pobedonostsev's anti-Semitism cannot be doubted, 
whether or not he made the remark that one third of 
Russia's Jews should emigrate, one third convert to 
Christianity and one third should die. 190 
Under Nicholas II, the legal position of the Jews 
deteriorated further, and police repression increased. 
From 1903, stories were published about a supposed Jewish 
plot to take over the world, and in 1905 the government 
itself printed one of these. Another version described a 
conspiracy between the Jews (Zionist and Marxist), Russian 
Masons and the British Foreign Office to enslave Russia. 
The so-called Protocols-of-the-Elders-of-Zion, allegedly 
describing a Jewish plan for world domination, may have 
grown out of these fabrications. Encouraged by large-scale 
anti-Jewish propaganda, a pogrom took place against the 
Jews of Kishinyov in 1903. This was followed by a series 
of pogroms in major centres during the Revolution of 1905. 
A key role in the latter was played by the "Union of the 
Russian People" or "Black Hundreds". Nicholas showed his 
support for the pogroms by taking membership in this 
organization. Some Orthodox clergy also joined the Black 
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Hundreds and encouraged the pogroms. In its last years, 
the government revived medieval charges that the Jews were 
carrying out the ritual murder of Chr4, stian children. 
Significantly, these accusations did not find an echo among 
the common people; a jury of peasants in Kiev acquited 
Mendel Beilis, a victim of the "blood accusation", in 
1913.191 
Turning to the foreign policy of the last two Tsars, 
one might expect the sympathy shown by Alexander III to 
Russian nationalism to be reflected 4-n support for the 
Balkan Slavs. In fact, whatever Alexander's personal 
preferences, his reign began with the renewal of the "three 
emperors' league", an alliance of Russia, Germany and 
Austria-Hungary which recalled the "Holy Alliance" of the 
early nineteenth century. This militated against support 
for Slav liberation. Ivan Aksakov, Skobelev and Ignatev 
all attacked Russian policy for failing to support the 
Bosnian revolt against Austria of 1882. In 1885, the 
Russian government opposed Bulgaria's seizure of Eastern 
Rumelia from Turkey. On this occasion, Ivan Aksakov was 
the only journalist to maintain the pan-Slavist position 
and support Bulgaria, while the rest of the Russian 
nationalist Press supported the tsarist viewpoint. From 
then on, the view that Russia had a mission to liberate and 
unite the Slavs ceased to have any political importance. 
The focus of the government was on expansion into Asia, as 
had been advocated by Dostoevsky, Danilevsky and Vladimir 
Solovyov. In the early years of the twentieth century, 
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liberal Russians such as Prince Evgeny N. Trubetskoi 
established societies tor the stud7 cf Slav culture. This 
was associated with the "neo-Slavist" movement, which was 
based mainly in Austria and sought to increase the 
political role of the Slavs in the Hapsburg Empire. 
Conferences were held in 1908 in Prague (the best attended 
of all the international Slav meetings), 1909 in St. 
Petersburg and 1910 in Sofia. These had no practical 
results, and the 1913 war between Bulgaria and Serbia 
dramatically showed the limits of Slav solidarity. The 
changing pattern of Russia's international alliances under 
the last Tsars is largely outside the scope7 of this 
discussion. It is only relevant to point out that the 
reasons for Russia standing by Serbia against Austria in 
July 1914 had little to do with pan-Slav feeling. If 
Russia had deserted Serbia in 1914, it would have been the 
third time in five years that she had done so, and she 
would have lost any influence in the Balkans. It would 
have been a damaging blow to her prestige and might have 
encouraged Britain and France to question her reliability 
as an ally. Nicholas II in 1914 said nothing about 
liberating the Austrian Slavs; Russia instead pursued the 
more prosaic war aims of gaining Constantinople (admittedly 
an old ambition of Russian messianists) and control of the 
Straits. 192 
Leontev 
Any discussion of the evolution of Slavophilism must 
mention the thought of Konstantin N. Leontev (1831-1891). 
As noted above (p. 73), Aleksandr Ianov described Leontev 
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as the "direct-heir" of classical Slavophilism. In the 
1969 discussion in Vqprosy literatur5:, S. I. Mashinsky 
claimed that Leontev (and Danilevsky; were the "historical 
successors and continuators of Khomiakov and Koshelyov". 
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But in his distrust of the Russian people, hostility to 
freedom and belief in authoritarian autocracy, Leontev was 
an apologist for Pobedonostsev. "Wherever the lawful and 
sacred right of coercion over our will has grown weak ... 
there can be no vital strength, no duration, no stable or 
lasting order. "194 The confusion over whether Leontev can 
properly be considered a Slavophil derives partly from his 
own claim to be a Slavophil, in the cultural sense, and 
moreover one "closer to the aims of Khomiakov and 
Danilevsky than the semi-liberal Slavophils of the immobile 
Aksakov type". 195 Leontev certainly emphasized the moral 
strength of Orthodoxy and the decline of the West. The 
Slavophils of his time, however, rejected his claim to be 
one of them, considering him a reactionary. Ivan Aksakov 
held that Leontev was preaching the "lascivious cult of the 
truncheon". Vladimir Solovyov concurred that Leontev had 
never been a Slavophil. 196 
Miliukov considered Leontev's views a product of the 
dissolution of Slavophilism. Leontev's writings make clear 
that in politics his "Slavophilism" was derived from 
Da-nilevsky, and he rejected classical Slavophilism as a 
disguise for egalitarianism and liberalism. Leontev 
believed that these two diseases were destroying Europe and 
threatening Russia. Against them, Leontev wanted to 
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strengthen the spiritual discipline wnich he believed 
Russia had inherited from Byzantium, and the despotic 
Asiatic elements he admired in Russia. He had no time for 
the nationalism of the Slavs, seeing :: heir national 
aspirations as part of a cosmopolitan revolution and 
harmful to the old order, which he wished to freeze. 
Instead, his book Byzantium-and-Slavdcm (1875) predicted 
that the Danilevskian "cultural type" which Russia would 
create would be "neo-Byzantine" rather than Slavonic. His 
opposition to nationalism included opposition to Russian 
nationalism; he opposed the Russif ication of the Baltic and 
Poland, and defended the privileges cf. the German and 
Polish nobles. He considered that the Hapsburg and Ottoman 
empires should continue ruling the Slavs until Russia was 
ready to take them over. 197 
Leontev believed that in the long run, Russia had a 
global mission, deriving from her possession of the moral 
force of Byzantine Orthodoxy. She would have to save 
Europe from herself, by "uniting the Chinese state model 
with Indian religiousness, and subordinating European 
socialism to them. "198 Whether this position can be 
considered a form of Russian messianism is dubious. His 
deep pessimism, authoritarianism and belief' in social 
privilege place him in opposition to those messianists who 
saw freedom as one of the gifts which Russia would bring to 
the world. By the end of his life, Leontev came to the 
conclusion that some form of socialism was inevitable; he 
looked forward to this being organized, in opposition to 
atheist socialism, by a Russian Tsar, a socialist 
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Constantine. Only this Byzantine "pcwertul monarchical 
government" would be able to settle -tl,, e "apparently 
insoluble modern task of reconciling-capital-and 
labour". 199 
Ivan-Aksakov's last-_years 
From 1879, as the revolutionary movement grew stronger, 
Ivan Aksakov continued to regard it with hostility, and 
also to reject the activity of Russian liberals who wanted 
a constitution. This latter position led Koshelyov to 
break with Aksakov, accusing him of betraying Slavophilism. 
At the same time, however, Aksakov advocated freedom of 
conscience, opinion and speech, seeing them all as 
conservative freedoms. From 1880 to his death in 1886 he 
was allowed to edit a weekly newspaper, Ru ' (biweekly 
_s' 
1883-1884), which like his previous ventures was funded by 
the Moscow merchants. Its collaborators included Strakhov; 
its circulation was low. His "Russian political ideal" he 
described at this time as "the locally self-managing land 
headed by the autocratic Tsar". 200 Aksakov was horrified 
by the assassination of Alexander II and he denounced the 
terrorist movement. He did not become a simple apostle of 
reaction, however, but renewed the Slavophil call for a 
"return" to the alleged pre-Petrine alliance between the 
autocracy and the people. 201 
In 1881 Alexander III appointed Ignatev, the pan- 
Slavist, to be Minister of Internal Affairs. Aksakov 
persuaded him to propose to the Tsar the Slavophil plan for 
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the summoning of a Zemskii-Sobor. Ta Pobedonostsev, this 
smacked of a constitution; and the Oberprocurator had 
Ignatev resign. "Pobedonostsev and Katkov will ruin 
Russia, " wrote Aksakov in a letter at this time. 202 
Aksakov found that his emphasis on autocracy alienated the 
liberals and his insistence on human rights alienated the 
government and the conservatives. A collection of his 
leading articles from Rus' which he wanted to publish was 
banned. Leontev commented with some justice that Aksakov's 
autocrat, heading "the locally self-managing land", would 
be deprived of any means of power. It seems, then, that it 
is misleading for Ianov to cite the following statement by 
Aksakov, suggesting that he had completely deserted to 
reaction: 
the situation now is such that there can be no middle 
ground. It is either the nihilists and liberals or the 
conservatives. One has no choice but to go with the 
latter, however sad that may be. 203 
It is true that, in his very last years, Aksakov began to 
defend the division of society into estates. It would be 
more accurate, however, to see this not as the logical 
evolution of his ideas, but as a senile deviation from 
them; rather as Plekhanov, at the end of his life, 
discovered that he hated the German Marxists more than he 
hated the Romanovs. Aksakov's Rus' continued, however 
anachronistically, to attack the government, especially 
over foreign policy. At this time the only type of 
political dissent that could be published was of the 
Russian nationalist variety; but by December 1885, even 
Aksakov's criticism was too much for the government, and 
his weekly faced the threat of a ban. The following month, 
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on the day before he died, Aksakov wr=te that falsehood and 
feelings of hopelessness were oppress:. ng society: "How 
difficult it is to live in Russia! "2C4 
Fvodorov 
I turn now to two thinkers who developed their own 
philosophies of Russian messianism in the late nineteenth 
century and who were highly influential in later Russian 
thought. Both Nikolai F. Fyodorov (1ý28-1903) and Vladimir 
Solovyov believed that Russia, headed by the Tsar, had been 
chosen to bring about world unity. Fyodorov, a librarian 
at the Rumiantsev Museum in Moscow, published little in his 
lifetime, but after his death his disciples released in a 
small edition his ma&num-opus. Filoso--iia_obshche o-dela 
(The Philosophy of the Common Task). 205 In this work, 
written mainly in the 1890s, he strongly supported 
Orthodoxy and autocracy, seeing them as unifying 
influences. He attacked capitalism for its division of 
humanity into rich and poor, learned and ignorant, and town 
and country, and for its militarism. He criticized 
Britain, in particular, for reducing the rest of the world 
to the status of unskilled workers. 20ý) He opposed 
socialism also, not only, like Dostoevsky, for its 
association with atheism, but because the socialist 
movement aggravated the division of humanity by fostering 
the hatred of the poor for the rich. He bemoaned the 
advance of socialism. "Socialism is triumphing over the 
State, religion and science ... socialism is deceit.,, 
207 
Like Marx, Fyodorov was a philosopher of action. He 
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was dissatisfied with the world as it was; the Russian 
famine of 1891 had a particular impacm on him. He believed 
in the unlimited possibility of human progress, and sought 
to hasten this. Humanity could be united in the "common 
task": the regulation of nature, particularly the weather, 
and the conquest of space. The ultimate aim was to bring 
about, by human scientific advance, the resurrection of the 
dead. "The duty of resurrection, the duty to the fathers, 
the filial duty, as one can call it, appeared in the world 
together with man. "208 It fell to Russia to organize this 
unity, because of her Orthodoxy and autocracy, and because 
of the existence of the obshchina, which he idealized. 
Additionally, Russia's geographical position, between 
Europe and Asia and near Africa, and the Russian tradition 
of "the gathering of the lands" would facilitate Russia's 
task. The Russian State was also favoured with a tradition 
of service and self-sacrifice, especially in relation to 
Western Europe. 209 It is not relevant to explain 
Fyodorov's imaginative plan to convert the British Empire 
to Orthodoxy and autocracy, the first step towards unity. 
Thereafter, he suggested that a joint Russo-British 
expedition be sent to the Pamir Mountains to discover the 
remains of the earliest humans, the ancestors of humanity. 
The remains would then be transferred to the Moscow 
Kremlin. This would symbolize the role of Moscow as the 
"Third Rome" (and disavow the Petersburg tradition). 
Another symbol would be the perennial dream of Russian 
messianists, the capture of Constantinople. 210 World unity 
should be achieved, if at all possible, by persuasion; but 
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if this proved impossible, Russia would have to use armed 
force. Unity would be political, linguistic and religious; 
the basis of society would be the obshchina. 
21i 
Despite some similarities, Fyodorov had differences 
with the Slavophils. Lukashevich reports that Fyodorov 
denounced Slavophilism as an "ideology of unfraternity". 
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There is certainly a major difference in that the 
Slavophils, or at least the early Slavophils, looked back, 
while he looked forward. What Fyodorov particularly 
objected to was any tendency towards racial chauvinism, as 
in the work of Danilevsky. Thus he spoke of "Russia's 
difficult mission in the common task, different from the 
problems of other peoples"; but also insisted that "the 
Slav race has definitely no right to claim an exclusive 
position. "213 In 1878 Dostoevsky and Solovyov read some of 
Fyodorov's work together, and Dostoevsky found himself 
agreeing with many of Fyodorov's ideas. 214 Solovyov was 
still more impressed. He wrote to Fyodorov: "I accept your 
'project' unconditionally and without any discussion. "215 
He made the acquaintance of Fyodorov, whose influence is 
reflected in some of his writings up to the early i890s. 
Fyodorov claimed that Solovyov accepted his belief in the 
need to bring about the resurrection of the fathers, but 
was unwilling to say so publicly for fear of ridicule. 
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The two broke off relations around 1892.217 
Fyodorov's influence on later Russian literaure was 
considerable. Nikolai Kliuev, Sergei Esenin, Boris 
Pasternak and Andrei Platonov are among the writers who 
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reflect Fyodorovian ideas. 218 The ex-t: reme utopianism of 
Fyodorov's aims led Berdiaev to comment, "I do not know a 
more characteristically Russian thinker., 4219 Peter Wiles, 
writing in 1965, placed Fyodorov's writings in a Russian 
and Soviet tradition of concern with immortality. 
220 In 
the Soviet period, Fyodorov's belief in the limitless 
powers of humanity has been purged of its association with 
Orthodoxy and autocracy, and linked with atheism and the 
belief in the future united Communist world. Konstantin 
Tsiolkovsky, whose ideas laid the basis for the Soviet 
space programme, knew Fyodorov personally. 
221 According to 
Nina Tumarkin's hypothesis, the intention behind the 
embalming of Lenin after his death was of resurrecting his 
body at some time in the future. 222 An article in 
Izvestiia to mark Fyodorov's centenary in 1928 reported 
that Mikhail Kalinin, member of the Politburo of the 
Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party and 
President of the All-Union Central Executive Committee of 
the Congress of Soviets, had recently quoted Fyodorov's 
words and applied them to the task of building socialism. 
"Freedom without power over nature is the same as the 
emancipation of the peasants without land. "223 
Since the mid-1970s, there has been an upsurge of 
interest in the Soviet Union in the ideas of Fyodorov. 
This was initiated by an article on him published in 1976 
by Svetlana G. Semyonova, 224 who has done more than anyone 
to familiarize Soviet readers with his name. 225 In 1981 
the cosmonaut Vitaly V. Sevastianov, writing in Nash 
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sovremennik, described Fyodorov as the "ingenious teacher 
of goodness and humanism and designer of the cosmic future 
of humanity". 22b In 1982 Mysl', the publishing house of 
the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of 
the USSR, published a 50,000-copy edition of Fyodorov's 
works, including much of Filosofiia-obshchego-dela, under 
Semyonova's editorship. 227 This edition came under strong 
criticism. For example, S. R. Mikulinsky accused Semyonova 
of playing down the reactionary aspects of Fyodorov's 
thought, in particular his support for autocracy. 228 Jean- 
Claude Roberti attributes the publication of the volume to 
an identity crisis in the USSR which has led intellectuals 
and youth to seek stable values in their past, in the 
traditions of messianism and the Third Rome. 229 It would 
seem, though, that the attempt to link the resurrection of 
the dead with the building of Communism is likely to 
encounter opposition from more traditional Marxists. 
Vladimir_Solovyov 
Vladimir Sergeevich Solovyov (1853-1900) has long been 
recognized as one of the major Russian Christian 
philosophers. Discussions of his ideas divide his life up 
into three periods. In his younger years he was close to 
the Slavophils. Then he moved away from them, denouncing 
their Russian nationalism, and also leaning from Orthodoxy 
towards Catholicism. In this second period he developed 
his "theocratic utopia", the idea of the unity of humanity 
through the unity of Christianity, under the spiritual 
leadership of the Pope and the political leadership of the 
Russian Tsar. The role of Russia in this unity represented 
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a new development in Russian messianism. Towards the end 
of his life he realized the impracticality of his plans, 
and became concerned in this last period with what he saw 
as the threat to Christian civilization from the East. 
In 1874, when still only 21, Solovyov wrote Krizis 
g_apadjjoi_filosofii (The Crisis of Western Philosophy). 
Here he defended the Slavophils for attacking the Western 
separation of reason and faith. But at the same time he 
criticized the Slavophils for not appreciating the positive 
aspects of Western thought. It appears that in this he 
identified Slavophilism with Samarin and Ivan Aksakov, 
discounting the willingness of Khomiakov and Ivan Kireevsky 
to learn from the West. His view of Russia's role was 
developed not in relation to Catholicism and Protestantism, 
as in the Slavophils, but in relation to the West and the 
Muslim East. His major article of 1877, "Three Forces", 
marked his closest approach to Slavophilism. 230 It spoke 
of the Orthodox Slav, and especially Russian, mission to 
reconcile the Muslim East, with its despotic unity and 
acceptance of an "inhuman God", and the West, which aspired 
to individual egoism and its product, economic socialism, 
with its "Godless human". The mission involved humanizing 
God and turning people towards God; the Russians had to 
mediate between the divine world and humanity, through 
divine revelation, and were suited to this task by their 
religiosity and lack of exclusiveness. Like Ivan Aksakov 
and Dostoevsky, he believed that the war against Turkey 
would raise the Russian people to their mission. For 
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Solovyov, the Russian conquest of Constantinople was linked 
directly not only with the reconcilia--ion of East and West, 
but with reconciliation between God and humanity. Dmitry 
Stremooukhov has commented: "in essence, it is only with 
Soloviev that Slavophilism becomes true messianism.,, 231 I 
have argued earlier that Slavophilism was a form of 
messianism; what Solovyov did in his Slavophil period was 
to deepen this messianism, portray the Russian people as 
mediators between God and humanity, and stress the 
universalist (Russia as servant) rather than the 
nationalist aspect of messianism. This trend was taken 
further in his "Lectures on God-humanity" (Bowo- 
chelovechestvo, also translated as "Divino-humanity", "God- 
manhood"; 1877-1881). Here, Western and Eastern 
Christianity are "absolutely necessar7 for each other and 
for the spread of Christ's teaching throughout all 
humanity". 232 In these lectures he claimed that humanity 
could become divine through collective unity. 
On Dostoevsky's death in 1881, Solovyov portrayed 
himself as a follower of the writer's ideas. Since 
Dostoevsky's ideas were contradictory, Solovyov singled out 
those ideas which were congenial to him and ignored the 
others. Thus he emphasized Dostoevsky's religiosity and 
ignored the nationalism. He pointed out that a passage in 
The-Devils ridiculed those who worshipped the narod and 
adhered to Orthodoxy only because it was the religion of 
the narod. He claimed that Dostoevsky's social ideal was 
not the people but the Church, which he planned to portray 
in the series of novels beginning with The-Brothers 
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Karamazov. "A person must bow before -ýýhe people's faith, 
not because it is the people's faith but because it is 
genuine. " Further, the faith was not the privilege of a 
single nation but could only be universal. 
233 In 1882 
Solovyov said of Dostoevsky: 
he considered Russia the chosen --eople of God, chosen 
not to rival with other peoples nor to dominate nor 
have primacy over them, but to serve all peoples 
without reward and to realize, in fraternal concourse, 
true universalism and ecumenism. 234 
But already in 1881, this desire for universalism was 
taking Solovyov away from Slavophilism towards Catholicism. 
The desire to reconcile the Christian churches became 
linked with the belief, which had attracted Chaadaev fifty 
years before, that Catholicism was superior to Orthodoxy. 
His articles entitled "The Great Dispute and Christian 
Policy" expressed not only the need for Church unity but 
also admiration for Catholic discipline. They were 
published from 1881 to 1883 in Ivan Aksakov's Rus, but 
Aksakov found it necessary to censor some of them, and 
attacked Solovyov for separating himself from the Russian 
spirit. Zenkovsky notes that Solovyov's "Catholic 
sympathies ... and his Utopian plans completely isolated 
him from Russian society. " In fact Solovyov found a home 
for his ideas in the liberal Vestnik-Evropy, which, 
although disagreeing with him philosophically, found 
congenial his opposition to Pobedonostsev and Katkov (who 
by then had moved to the right). 235 
Solovyov had lost his philosophy lectureship at the 
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University of St. Petersburg in 1881, when he had appealed 
to Alexander III to pardon the assassins of his father. 
Moreover, Pobedonostsev considered Solovyov's ideas of a 
divine humanity subversive, and banned the publication of 
some of his theocratic work. Solovyov, in response, 
attacked the official Russian Church for having become a 
tool of the State. The Russian people, nevertheless, were 
in his view essentially, and even specially, religious. 
They were a "theocratic people" and had a mission. 
236 This 
was not the idea of the "Third Rome", since for Solovyov 
the first Rome had not fallen. The Catholicization of 
Russia would overcome what Solovyov saw as the religious 
root cause of the divisions in Slavdom, both outside 
Russia, and, in the case of Poland, within the Empire. 
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Although Solovyov never became a Catholic, in the late 
1880s he was willing to accept Papal supremacy. He 
attributed to the Russian Tsar a divine role in the 
reunification of Christianity on the basis of Catholicism. 
In La-Russie-et-l'eglise universelle (1889), published in 
France, Solovyov wrote: "the historical task of Russia 
consists in supplying the church universal with political 
might, which is necessary to it in order to save and 
regenerate Europe.,, 238 Russia's contribution to 
Christianity, then, was primarily her coercive power. The 
Tsar was to obey the wishes of the Pope, thereby creating 
the conditions for a universal theocracy and the 
regeneration of Christianity. Russia, said Solovyov, would 
"be free to fulfil its great universal vocation, to unite 
around itself the Slavic nations and found a new truly 
Christian civilization". 239 In this pan-Slavism (which 
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Solovyov himself referred to as "Slavophiiism") he 
acknowledged the influence of the Croat Krizanic (see 
above, pp. 37,59). 240 
I shall now turn to Solovyov's attitude towards 
traditional Slavophilism after his break with it. In 1884 
he warned that the awakening of national (natsional'nY-e) 
feelings which had occurred in the nineteenth century would 
be a "renunciation of universal Christianity and a return 
to pagan and Old Testament particularism" if these feelings 
were limited to "national egoism". The "principle of 
nationalities Inatsional'nosteil" (the right to self- 
determination) could be a "demand for international JjLgLtica 
through which all narodnosti have an aqual. right to 
independent existence and development"; 241 but the 
narodnost' must not be deified. As examples of Russian 
universalism, Solovyov cited the appeal to the Varangians 
to come and rule ancient Rus', and Peter's reforms, ending 
Muscovite exclusivism. Both had enriched Russian State 
power and culture with the fruits of other civilizations. 
Thus Solovyov was again close to Chaadaev in opposing the 
position of Slavophils who regarded Peter as disrupting 
national development. Solovyov argued that true patriotism 
used foreign strengths; religious life, therefore, should 
be open to free communication with the Western Churches. 242 
Also in 1884, Ivan Aksakov attacked Solovyov in Rus' for 
sacrificing Russian national feelings and interests. 
Solovyov replied that Aksakov was confusing nationalism and 
national egoism with narodnost', and therefore equating 
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national self-denial with the annihilation of narodnost' 
itself. 243 
On another Slavophil theme, Solovyov wrote an article 
entitled "What is Needed from the Russian Party? " Here he 
declared himself in favour of voluntary cultural 
Russification (obrusenie) of non-Russians, but against 
forced Russification. In language that Lenin would have 
approved, he wrote: 
The shame is that such attempts, while in no way 
achieving their impossible aim, only in vain stir up 
national antagonism and decisively impede the 
imperceptible but real coming together (sblizhenie) of 
the foreign elements with Russia. 244 
The "Russian Party" should demand "the spiritual 
emancipation of Russia", "full freedom of religion and 
freedom of opinion and speech". 245 
These articles of Solovyov were collected in a volume 
entitled Natsional'nyi-vopros-v-Rossii (The National 
Question in Russia), published in 1888. In the 
introduction, Solovyov pointed out that for many peoples, 
the national question was a question of their existence. 
"The national question in Russia is a question not of 
existence, but of worthy existence. "246 The main article 
of the volume, entitled "Russia and Europe", was a 
criticism of Danilevsky. Whereas Danilevsky saw nations as 
organisms, and denied a universal humanity, for Solovyov 
humanity itself was an organism. Further, in contrast to 
Danilevsky's division of civilization into cultural- 
historical types, counterposing Slavdom to Western Europe, 
Solovyov insisted that "Russia, with all her particular 
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, 247 features, is one of the European natý. =ns. 
A second volume of Natsional'nyi--. -opros-v-Rossii 
appeared in 1891, with the main article entitled 
"Slavophilism and its Degeneration". In this Solovyov now 
accused the Slavophils of subordinating religion to 
national feeling. "For Slavophilism, Orthodoxy is an 
attribute of Russian narodnost'; it is the true religion, 
in the final analysis, only because the Russian people 
believe in it. "248 He accused Khomiakov of comparing the 
concrete historical reality of Catholicism and 
Protestantism, with their one-sidedness and shortcomings, 
with an idealized conception of Orthodoxy, a "synthesis of 
unity and freedom" which the Slavophils themselves had 
conjured up. 249 In this it seems that Solovyov was not 
paying sufficient attention to Khomiakov's criticisms of 
the actual state of the Russian Orthodox Church. Khomiakov 
was showing what Orthodoxy might be rather than what it 
Was. 
Solovyov accused the Slavophils oi idealizing the 
Russian people. The real Russian people had built a 
powerful Russian State and were not interested in the 
freedom of opinion desired by the Slavophils. Katkov had 
taken Slavophilism from the original idealists and 
developed it to "its direct logical consequences". 250 
Solovyov said that Katkov "believed in the Russian State as 
the absolute embodiment of our people's force". It was the 
real Russian people that Katkov believed in, not the 
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Slavophil idealization of them. "He aad the virility to 
free the religion of narodnost' from any idealistic 
embellishments, and to declare the Russian people to be the 
object of faith and worship, not because of its problematic 
virtues, but because of its real force. "251 
Worshipping our people as the favoured bearer of 
universal truth; then worshipping them as a spontaneous 
force, irrespective of universal -1: ruth; finally, 
worshipping those national peculiarities and historical 
anomalies which separate our own people from educated 
humanity, that is, worshipping our people with the 
direct denial of the very idea of universal truth - 
these are the three gradual phases of' our nationalism, 
successively presented by the Slavophils, Katkov and 
the latest obscurantists. 252 
Solovyov, then, held that the "degeneration" of 
Slavophilism arose from the nationalism which he saw at the 
base of the thinking of its original theoreticians. It 
might be objected that his own messianism rested on his 
idealization of the Russian people; but his messianism was 
strongly universalist and not nationalist. Berdiaev saw 
Solovyov's struggle against nationalism as of great 
service. 253 As Solovyov wrote in 1891: 
The sin of Slavophilism was not that it ascribed to 
Russia a higher vocation, but that it insufficiently 
insisted on the moral conditions of this vocation... 
let them proclaim still more decisively the Russian 
people as the gathering Messiah, so long as they 
remember that the Messiah must also act like a Messiah, 
and not like Barabbas. 
The basis of Slavophilism was not Christianity but 
"zoological patriotism". 254 Sergei Levitsky has coTnTn nted 
that Solov7ov was wrong to attribute this to the early 
Slavophils. 255 
The unreality of Solovyov's plans for universal unity 
226 
became clear to their author. The last period of his life, 
from about 1891, represented his disillusionment with the 
possibility of world theocracy. He had found interest from 
Roman Catholics but none from the Tsar or Russian society. 
In political terms, he became still more hostile to the 
Russian conservatives, accusing them of imitating Chinese 
ancestor-worship in their cult of the past. The 
consequence of this would be to weaken Russia and lay her 
open to conquest Irom Asia He became obsessed with the 
"yellow peril": 
0 Russia! - Which is the East 7ou desire to be: 
The East of Xerxes or of Christ? 
ýie had written in "Ex oriente lux" in 1890. His poem "Pan- 
Mongolism" of 1894 saw the Chinese conquest of Russia as 
the end of history. This is taken further in his "Three 
Conversations" of 1899. Cast in prophetic terms, this 
described the conquest of Europe by the combined forces of 
Asia, the appearance of Antichrist in Europe, and the unity 
of the Christian churches as a prelude to the millennium 
and the resurrection of the dead. Thus the attainment of 
"God-humanity" was removed from history to eschatology. 
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To this period in Solovyov's life belongs his important 
article on messianism, published in the Brockhaus-Efron 
Entsiklopedicheskii=slovar' in lBgb (and cited from above, 
p. 11). He identified messianism as a persuasion found 
among several peoples; he cited Slavophiiism as 
representing Russian messianism, although his own former 
ideas would have been a valid example. Messianism had 
E'olovyov. positive and negative features for - 
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In the messianism of peoples depr--ved of political 
independence ... a moral and hercic nature prevails, 
the higher calling is understood as a duty and a 
challenge; in victorious and powerful peoples 
messianism has a contradictory nature - the calling is 
taken here as a ready-made advanTage or a privilege. 
Messianism of the first sort can 'be an important 
inspiration of national renewal, as it was in Italy and 
especially in Germany; messianism of the other type 
degenerates into an exclusive and mindless nationalism, 
blocking the improvement of the people. 257 
Of particular interest in Solovyov's Russian messianism 
is his sympathy for the Jews. Whereas Ivan Aksakov and 
Dostoevsky displayed anti-Semitism, Solovyov's universalism 
and compassion led him to become one of the few defenders 
of the Jews against persecution. 258 More than this, he had 
a positive attitude to them for their religious nature and 
for having been God's people. In the provocatively titled 
"The Jews and the Christian Problem" (1884), he asked, 
"Does it not seem strange that in-the-name of Christ we 
should condemn all Jewry to which Christ Himself 
indisputably belongs? " The Jews, therefore, were a "God- 
beariLiZ race", 259 and they remained a "Chosen People". 
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Nevertheless they had betrayed their mission by failing to 
follow Christ. The Jews were not prepared to renounce 
national egoism and confined the Kingdom of God to 
themselves. But Jews and Christians were both aiming at 
universal theocracy; and the Jews would come to 
Christianity when the Chrisians began acting like 
Christians. 2bl The Russian people would then "spiritually 
fuse" with the Jews. 2b2 
In the USSR, Solovyov attracted attention in the 1970S. 
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S. T. Baranov of Stavropol Polytechnical Institute, in a 1973 
article devoted to his messianism, portrayed him as a 
reactionary who sought to win the masses to Christianity by 
working outside the official Church. Baranov attacked 
Western writers who linked the Russian revolution with the 
supposedly religious "Russian spirit" and Solovyov's ideas, 
Baranov explained that the "historical mission of Russia" 
had been to be the scene of the first socialist revolution 
in the world; the mission of the Soviet Union now was to 
build Communism and defeat imperialism. The use of 
Solovyov's ideas by Western anti-Communism testified to the 
latter being forced back to increasingly reactionary 
positions. 253 A more sympathetic view of Solovyov, by A. N. 
Golubev of the Academy of Social Sciences, appeared in 
1978. It referred to the contradictory nature of 
Solovyov's ideas and their "living content", while noting 
how he suffered persecution under tsarism. 264 
What lessons about the direction of development of 
Slavophilism can be drawn from the thought of Solovyov? 
Miliukov argued that Solovyov's ideas developed out of the 
contradictions within Slavophilism. In his article "The 
Dissolution of Slavophilism" (1893), he stated that the 
former division between Slavophilism and Westernism had 
given way to that between narodnichestvo and democratic 
liberalism. (By that time, he might have added Marxism to 
the descendants of Westernism. ) Original Slavophilism had 
inseparably linked the ideas of nationality 
(natsional'nost') and Russia's universal-historical 
calling. Orthodoxy and the obshchina were the attributes of 
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Russian nationality which alone gave _t universal 
significance. But Miliukov saw an in--ernal contradiction 
in this. "The idea of nationality prevented the necessary 
development of the idea of messianism, and the messianic 
idea prevented the disclosure of the J-dea of nationality. " 
After the early Slavophils, these two ideas had been 
separated: nationality was emphasized by the conservative 
Right group, Danilevsky and Leontev, while messianism, the 
universal-historical role, was resurrected by what he 
called "left Slavophilism", in reality limited to 
Solovyov. 255 
Danilevsky, said Miliukov, with the theory of 
"cultural-historical types", went from universalism to the 
idea of the "compLtte-alienation and-hostility" of 
different cultures, and the defence of the institutions of 
Russia's past as meeting her specific national needs. 
2C56 
With Danilevsky and Leontev, "the national idea of old 
Slavophilism, deprived of its humanitarian content, was 
naturally converted into a system of national. eF, 2Lsm, and 
from the latter there was produced, Just as naturally, a 
theory of reactionary obscurantism. "257 The view that 
Slavophilism had been transformed into a "police religion" 
had been expressed by E. Mamontov as early as 1B73.268 
Miliukov argued that for Solovyov, on the other hand, "The 
rel-L&ious tisk is higher than anything in the world and is 
unconditionally tjZher than-nationality. "269 In other 
words, Solovyov was prepared to give up Russian Orthodoxy 
for the sake of universal Christian unity. The need to 
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abandon nationality for the sake of nessianism demonstrated 
the contradiction within Slavophilism. Solovyov's 
messianism, with its belief in "the chimera of world 
theocracy", was only saved from degeneration into 
obscurantism because of his attachment to the theory of 
progress. 270 
Solovyov rejected Miliukov's suggestion that there was 
any "left fraction of Slavophilism", claiming that he, 
Solovyov, had no co-thinkers, but Miliukov insisted that 
the description was appropriate to Solovyov himself. 
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Nevertheless, to describe Solovyov as any sort of Slavophil 
after about 1883 seems highly problematical. The view that 
Russia could unify humanity not through Orthodoxy, but by 
submission to Rome, is directly contradictory to 
Slavophilism. The fact that Solovyov was influenced by 
Slavophilism is not relevant. Further, Miliukov's 
description of the transformation of Slavophilism into 
chauvinism is, as Riasanovsky calls it, "extremely 
artificial". The appropriation of the Slavophil label by 
Strakhov and Danilevsky did not alter the fact that Pogodin 
and various Western thinkers influenced their ideas more 
than the early Slavophils did. Riasanovsky holds that, 
with minor exceptions, Ivan Aksakov was the last Slavophil; 
no later major thinker can be significantly linked with 
Slavophilism. 272 lanov, for all his hostility to Ivan 
Aksakov, is forced to admit that he denounced "the newest 
pseudo-Slavophiles" for avoiding the essential Christian 
basis of Slavophilism, lanov's claim that Slavophilism 
completed its evolution when it merged with the Black 
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Hundreds derives from taking a partic--; lar aspect of 
Slavophil and Black Hundred ideology - belief in the 
Russian people - out of historical ccntext, and then making 
a connection which is devoid of logic. 
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Vekhi 
Solovyov's influence was very str--ng in the movement of 
Russian intellectuals, from the fip, _de-siecle 
to 1917 and 
beyond, towards religion and mysticism. But different 
aspects of his thought appealed to di-4ferent people. The 
Symbolist TDoets were attracted to his mysticism, while 
rejecting his Christianity; the philosophers were 
attracted to his Christian idealism and liberalism. 
274 The 
ex-Marxists who had evolved towards liberalism found his 
critiques of positivism and materialism helpful in their 
criticism of the revolutionary intelligentsia. This group 
achieved its greatest political impact with the publication 
in 1909 of Vekhi (Landmarks), "A Collection of Articles on 
the Russian Intelligentsia". 275 The inclusion of Vekhi in 
this chapter is justified, because some at least of its 
contributors were heavily influenced by the Slavophils, 
pochvenniki and Solovyov. 
From the time of its reception in Russia up to the 
1980s, Vekhi has suffered serious misinterpretation. The 
contributors certainly believed that the ideologies of the 
intelligentsia contributed to the defeat of the 1905 
Revolution. But it is wrong to say, as Bernice G. 
Rosenthal and Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak did in 1982: "The 
232 
authors squarely blamed the intelli; cýc-ý: ý, zýsia for the 
drawbacks of their country, stressinz -their responsibility 
both for the political and social str"-cture. "276 The 
majority of the Vekhi contributors were critical not only 
of the intelligentsia but also of the regime. They 
believed, however, that political and social progress would 
be possible only if the intelligentsia were to be concerned 
with ethics as well as politics. 
Berdiaev, perhaps the most anti-regime of the 
contributors, wrote that the cultural renaissance of Russia 
demanded "not only political liberatizn, but also 
liberation from the oppressive rule ct- politics". He 
added: "Political liberation is possitle only in connection 
with, and on the basis of, spiritual and cultural 
renaissance. " His attack on the Russian intelligentsia for 
its atheism and materialism echoed the Slavophils and 
poChvenniki, but he put part of the Iblame for the condition 
of the intelligentsia on Russian his-tz)ry, the political 
system and "our eternal reaction". 
277 Another contributor 
who took a similar position was Ser. -ef N. Bulgakov, a 
"Christian socialist" who worked wit! the Constitutional 
Democrats (Cadets) in the Duma but believed in State 
ownership of industry. He blamed the "police regime" for 
the mood of martyrdom and heroism in the intelligentsia 
which led its members to consider themselves Russia's 
saviours. 278 He praised the intelligentsia's struggle for 
enlightenment, but argued that in cutting itself off from 
-self off from the the people's religion it was cutting it 
people and playing into the hands of reaction. (Bulgakov, 
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as a partisan of Orthodoxy, found tt-=-- he had to struggle 
against intelligentsia influence to defend religion. )279 
Pyotr B. Struve referred to "the loat--some triumph of 
reaction" after 1905.280 
-y to autocracy, it Despite such statements of hostillt 
was the claim by Mikhail 0. Gershenzon, the compiler of 
Vekhi, that the intelligentsia should be grateful to the 
government for protecting it from the people, 
281 which was 
seen as representing the essence of the book. Gershenzon, 
however, differed considerably in his views from the other 
contributors, rejecting any political struggle. 
282 His 
emphasis on the need for the pre-eminence of the spiritual 
over the social, for individual self-improvement rather 
than collective action, was expressed in the preface to the 
first edition of Vekhi. 283 This apparently went too far 
for the other contributors, who believed that culture and 
politics should be informed by a morai and spiritual 
content, but were not prepared to abandon political 
action. 284 The preface was dropped from subsequent 
editions. Bogdan A. Kistiakovsky's article also stood out 
from the other contributions. It criticized the 
Slavophils, Marxists and the narodnik Mikhailovksy for not 
realizing the need for a legal order. 255 
Semyon L. Frank, accusing the intelligentsia of 
"nihilism", said that it was preoccupied with distribution 
instead of production, and destruction instead of creation. 
He and other contributors criticized the Russian Marxists 
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for succumbing to narodnik pressures In these and other 
respects (see below, p. 274). 286 Eugene Lampert suggests 
that the vekhovtsy favoured capitalist development, 287 
which is true for some of them; Struve, for example, saw 
the intelligentsia becoming reconciled with the State 
through its embourgeoisement. 288 But this did not prevent 
contributors making positive references to the Slavophils 
and Dostoevsky, as well as to Solovyov. Gershenzon, for 
example, attacked the intelligentsia for not valuing the 
thought of Chaadaev, the Slavophils and Dostoevsky, which 
he saw as representing Russia's uniqueness 
(samobytnost'). 289 Bulgakov's article arguing that the 
Russian intelligentsia was religious in disposition, in its 
propensity for self-sacrifice for an ideal, was favourable 
to Dostoevsky and Solovyov, citing in particular 
Dostoevsky's belief that without Christianity, "all is 
permitted". 290 
It was only Berdiaev and Bulgakov, however, who put 
forward a special role for Russia in world history. 
Berdiaev suggested that while truth could only be 
universal, not national, different nationalities were 
called on to disclose different aspects of the truth. 
Russia's vocation was in the sphere of religious 
philosophy. He saw Russian philosophy as beginning with 
Khomiakov, who surpassed European rationalism; Solovyov, 
he thought, could have been Russia's national 
philosopher. 291 Bulgakov accused the intelligentsia of 
"cosmopolitanism", and of failing to think through the 
"national problem". The intelligentsia was indifferent to 
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the "national idea", to "religio-culturai messianism" and 
to the defence of nationality. Bulgakov said that "the 
greatest exponents of our national self-consciousness - 
Dostoevsky, the Slavophils, Vladimir Solovyov" linked the 
national idea with the world tasks of the Russian Church or 
Russian culture. The failure of the intelligentsia to do 
this was giving a monopoly of patriotism to "militant, 
chauvinist nationalism". 292 
While divisions existed between the Vekhi contributors, 
they all stressed the importance of the individual more 
than did Marxism and most variants of narodnichestvo. They 
emphasized the moral education of the intelligentsia, and 
then the duty of the intelligentsia to extend this 
education to the people, as necessary conditions for a 
stable society. They differed over their attitude to the 
regime, and in subsequent years their differences widened. 
Struve moved to the Right, to Russian nationalism and the 
belief in a strong state. Bulgakov became an Orthodox 
priest. Berdiaev went on to develop the study of Russian 
messianism. He was as universalist as Solovyov in his 
rejection of nationalist exclusiveness and of anti- 
Westernism, but he strongly adhered to Orthodoxy. Like 
Solovyov, he not only opposed anti-Semitism but also had a 
mystical belief in the destiny of the Jews. Berdiaev 
understood that the apocalyptic events of the First World 
War would put an end to European dominance of world 
culture. During the war he wrote: 
The end of Europe will see the appearance of Russia as 
a [the? ] determining spiritual force on the arena of 
23(5 
world history... Russia, occupy----z the place of a 
mediator between the East and WeE7, and being itself 
'East and West, ' has been called --o play a great role 
in uniting humanity. The World Var brings us to the 
problem of Russian messianism. 29--ý 
Berdiaev's expectations of Russia's role appeared to be 
confirmed by the October Revolution. 
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Chapter Four 
Socialism and --Russian--Messianisin: 
Froix Herzen In Stalin 
Russian messianist thinkers as diverse as Pogodin, 
Konstantin Aksakov and Vladimir Solovyov, although critical 
to different degrees of the policies pursued by tsarist 
governments, nevertheless shared a basic belief in the 
principle of autocracy. In this chapter I shall consider 
theorists and activists who believed in the special destiny 
of the Russian people, while calling for the overthrow of 
the political and social system that existed in Tsarist 
Russia and its replacement by a socialist system; and then 
discuss the influence of Russian messianism on the Russian 
adherents of Marxism, itself (I shall suggest) a messianic 
doctrine. 
It would be quite wrong to see in every Russian 
revolutionary, let alone every Russian liberal, the belief 
that Russia was going to save the world. The Westernizers 
of the 1830s and 1840s - Belinsky, Katkov (who moved 
rightwards only in the 1860s), Turgenev, Timofei Granovsky, 
Konstantin Kavelin, Herzen and Bakunin - lamented Russian 
backwardness and viewed favourably Peter's attempt to 
modernize Russia. Even in Belinsky's period of 
"reconciliation with reality" (about 1838 to 1840), when he 
briefly supported the regime of Nicholas I, he did not view 
Russia as a model for the West. 1 In the 1850s and 1860s, 
however, the Slavophil idea of the obshchina began to 
inspire the predecessors and founders of narodnichestvo 
with the thought that Russia could be a model for the 
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world, by creating socialism on the basis ol the peasant 
co=une. Siavophil intluence is clear on such thinkers as 
Chýernyshevsky, Afanasy Shchapov and especially Herzen. 
The anarchist Mikhail A. Bakunin (1814-1876) at certain 
periods used pan-Slav and Russian messianism for his 
revolutionary ends. In his "Appeal to the Slavs", 
published in 1848, he called on them to be the core of the 
democratic worid revolution. The Russian nation was iikeiy 
to be the bulwark of Slavdom, but only after the Tsar had 
been overthrown by the Russian peopie. "In Moscow will be 
broken the bondage of the peoples subjugated by the Russian 
sceptre and of ail the Slavonic peoples; it is also in 
Moscow that ail Europe[aln bondage will be buried under its 
own rubble. "2 The social basis of the Russian revolution, 
Bakunin explained eisewhere, was the obshchina. In i8b2, 
In his appeal "To Russians, Poles and all Slav friends", he 
called for freedom for all the Slav nations, land for the 
peasants and a Slav federal government. He demanded that 
the Russians should expel the Tatars to Asia and the 
Germans to Germany "and we shall be a free, purely Russian 
people. "3 Soon after this, however, Bakunin became 
ambivalent about national movements, and reverted to his 
earlier position that the Slavs would have to co-operate 
with other peoples. His own subsequent lite was largely 
devoted to spreading anarchist ideas throughout Europe. 4 
Herzen 
Aleksandr Ivanovich Herzen (1812-1870) has been 
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described as 'Ithe founding father of populism". 5 He united 
the Slavophil view that Russia should develop on the basis 
of the obshchina with the secularism and commitment to 
individual freedom that characterized the Westernizers. 
Having been arrested in 1834 for participation in a Saint- 
Simonist circle, he returned from exile to Moscow in 1842. 
He wrote of the Slavophils in that year: 
together with hate and disdain for the West go hate and 
disdain for freedom of thought, for law, for all 
guarantees, for all civilization. In this way the 
Slavophils become on the side of the government, and do 
not stop there but go further.... Glory to Peter, who 
repudiated Moscow! 6 
Nevertheless, he found that Slavophil ideas had a certain 
attraction for him. He knew and admired the Slavophils as 
individuals, particularly Ivan Kireevsky, and he 
sympathized with their patriotism. He wrote in 1843 of the 
Russians fusing the best attributes of the European 
nations, and perhaps being called on to unite theory and 
practice for the benefit of humanity. It was almost 
certainly as a result of Slavophil influence that Herzen 
later took the idea that the obshchina was of central 
importance in Russia's future. Already in 1843 he 
described the communal principle and the lack of a 
proletariat as "excellent seed buds" for Russia's 
development. But Herzen thought that the Slavophils forgot 
that even within the obshchina, the peasant had no 
possibility of self-respect, existing in conditions of 
oppression and serfdom. Nevertheless, it was "not without 
foundation", wrote Herzen in 1844, that the Slavophils 
believed in the "enormous future of the Slavs" and their 
ability to solve Europe's problems. 7 But the question was 
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still open as to whether the Slavs, via the obshchina, 
would lead the West to socialism, or whether the West would 
lead the Slavs there. 8 From 1844, his belief that the 
obshchina constrained individual freedom encouraged him to 
look more to the upheavals in the West. 9 
In 1844, despite Herzen's efforts to maintain personal 
relations, the final split occurred between the Slavophils 
and the Westernizers. 10 Herzen, writing in 1861 after the 
deaths of Khomiakov and Konstantin Aksakov, said that 
despite their quarrels, the Slavophils had shared with the 
Westernizers a love for the Russian people. "We, like 
Janus, or the two-headed eagle, looked in different 
diraction, _=, but at the F_-ama time the haar-t beat as one. 
He emigrated to Europe Just before the 1848 revolutions, 
but the triumph of the bourgeoisie led to his 
disillusionment with the West and a renewed concentration 
on Russia. 
From April 1849, he began to emphasize the virtues of 
the obshchina, and spoke of an "internal force" which 
sustained the Russian people against the Mongols and the 
Petersburg bureaucracy. 12 But he still hoped that 
revolution might succeed in France. In his letter to Jules 
Michelet, "Le peuple russe et le socialisme" (1851), he 
claimed that the obshchina was the only authority respected 
by the peasants and the source of their morality. Russian 
peasants very rarely cheated each other, because they were 
protected from the corruption around them by the obshchina. 
"The commune has preserved the Russian people from Mongol 
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barbarism, from civilizing tsarism, from the Europeanized 
landowners and from the German bureaucracy.... It has 
fortunately been preserved up to the development of 
socialism in Europe. " He was not asserting Russian 
superiority; he was claiming equality with Europe for 
Russia. He was stating that Russia might be approaching 
socialism from a direction different from that of Europe, 
but was no closer to it than Europe. 13 Nor did he suggest 
that the obshchina would necessarily develop into 
socialism; Malia and Acton agree in portraying Herzen as 
exploring possibilities rather than stating certainties. 
Herzen was arguing that socialism might come in Russia if 
the obshchina could be combined with an expansion of the 
freedom and dignity of the individual. The role of the 
Westernized "middle gentry" was essential in carrying out 
the socialist revolution in Russia and adapting the 
obshchina to socialism. Herzen's "Russian socialism", 
then, included elements of both Slavophilism and 
Westernism. 14 
From 1852, he became less hopeful about Russian 
socialism and more concerned with the practical problems of 
Russian life. During the Crimean War, he wanted Russia to 
seize Constantinople, which he hoped would lead to the 
creation of a Slav federation. Like the Slavophils, he 
seems to have held some mystical belief that Constantinople 
and war were linked with some great aim - although in 
Herzen's case, the aim was European revolution. It may 
have been Herzen's stance at this time which caused Engels 
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to link him with Bakunin as a pan-Slavist. Engels accused 
Herzen of proclaiming a messianic belief in Russia's 
socialist calling and desiring the Slav conquest of Europe. 
Russia's failure in the Crimean War promoted Herzen's 
disillusionment. The death of Nicholas I reinvigorated 
him, however, and he established a journal Poliarnaia 
zvezda (Polar Star) to which both Westernizers and 
Slavophils were invited to contribute. 15 
Herzen's main concerns became the emancipation of the 
serfs with land, the abolition of corporal punishment and 
the removal of the censorship. In London he published 
another journal Kolokol (The Bell, 1857-1867), which was 
smuggled into Russia and became very influential. When 
Alexander II announced in 1857 that the serfs would be 
freed, Herzen offered him support and co-operation, and was 
willing to abandon the revolutionary struggle. This cost 
him political support among the younger generation of 
revolutionaries such as Chernyshevsky, Dobroliubov and the 
supporters of the proclamation "Young Russia", who failed 
to appreciate Herzen's fear that a revolution in the 
conditions of the time might be more destructive than 
creative. Russian repression in Poland, from 1861 to 1863, 
cast a shadow over the Emancipation and forced Herzen to 
make a stand against the Tsar's policy; but this isolated 
him from Russian liberal opinion, which was anti-Polish. 
He again began to emphasize the socialist potential of the 
obshchina. This provoked Turgenev in 1862 to accuse Herzen 
of treating the Russian peasant like "some coming Russian 
Messiah", when the peasant was really deeply conservative. 
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Herzen did not, however, commit himself fully to the 
revolutionary struggle, and instead criticized those 
revolutionaries who sought to take State power and impose 
socialism on the peasants, against their will. 16 
Narodnichestvo_ELnd_Russia's-; special-path 
The term narodnik (Populist) is used in different ways 
by different people. 17 Broadly speaking, it can cover all 
the non-Marxist revolutionary theories and movements 
existing in Russia from the 1850s. These theories asserted 
the existence of a special Russian path to socialism, 
avoiding capitalism. Sometimes they emphasized the role of 
the peasantry (Populism in its narrow sense) and sometimes 
1.1e the role of a revolutionary elite. Soviet writers 
counterpose narodnichestvo to Marxism, and therefore 
exclude Herzen and the revolutionary democrats of the 1850s 
and 1860s from the designation narodnik, since they see 
these thinkers as precursors of Russian Marxism. 
Nevertheless, Western writers hold Herzen to be the founder 
of Russian Populism: "Herzen created Populism; 
Chernyshevsky was its politician.,, 18 Chernyshevsky, active 
in Russia from 1855 to 1862, followed Herzen in believing 
that the obshchina should be preserved and transformed so 
that it could continue to exist in a socialist society. He 
did not believe that the Russian obshchina would be a model 
for Western Europe; the latter would find her own way to 
socialism. If Chernyshevsky represented a Westernizing wing 
of Populism, then Shchapov in the early 1860s represented a 
Slavophil wing of Populism, with his call for a Zemskii 
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Sobor, local self-government and regionalism (oblastnost' 
- all in the context of a socialist society based on the 
obshchina. 19 
There were continuing debates among the narodniks on 
the role of conspiracy and acts of terrorism in the 
transition to socialism. These methods owed nothing to 
Slavophilism but were imports of Blanquism and Jacobinism. 
Nechaev's methods (see above, p. 188) were rejected by 
classical narodniks such as Pyotr L. Lavrov (1823-1900) and 
Mikhailovsky. It was feared that the use of elitist 
conspiratorial methods to overthrow tsarism would simply 
usher in a new dictatorship. Even Nechaev's former 
collaborator, Bakunin, insisted that the secret anarchist 
vanguard which would continue to exist after his projected 
revolution must not impose its rule on society (although he 
did not say how this could be avoided). 20 
Lavrov, in his Istoricheskie-pislma (Historical 
Letters) of 1869, emphasized the moral development of the 
lichnost', the individual or the personality, and the need 
for "critically thinking lichnosti" to enlighten the 
peasantry. Mikhailovsky, in "What is Progress? " (1870), 
was also concerned with the development of the individual, 
seeing the division of labour and capitalist 
industrialization as the enemy of this. This was partly a 
consequence of his having read Das_Eýýital. Both Lavrov 
and Mikhailovsky favoured the obshchina, without idealizing 
it; but whereas Lavrov participated in the First 
International and supported industrial progress, 
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Mikhailovsky tended to believe that the Golden Age was in 
the past. In this he resembled the Slavophils. His 
socialism was akin to that of Proudhon and Blanc rather 
than Marx and Engels; he and the other "Legal Populists" 
consciously rejected the applicability of Marx's writings 
to Russia. Mikhailovsky posited instead her special path 
to socialism, based on "the moral sense of the Russian 
intelligentsia". 21 He looked to the government to protect 
the obshchina and artel' from capitalist development. This 
pointed to a factor which explained why some Russian 
narodniks, unlike West European socialists, were 
indifferent to questions of civil and political rights: 
they thought autocracy a better system than liberal 
democracy for the achievement of socialism. This led them, 
like the Slavophils, occasionally to offer co-operation to 
the autocracy when it appeared to be protecting the people 
against the wealthy. On the other hand, the "Jacobin" 
narodnik, Pyotr S. Tkachov (1844-1885) argued for the 
formation of a revolutionary vanguard to seize power and 
create a "socialist" society in which equality would be 
achieved through the destruction of the culture of the few 
and the "levelling of individuals" down to a standard 
level. In 1873 Mikhailovsky refused to collaborate on 
Lavrov's Paris journal YRtred! (Forward! ), saying that he 
was not a revolutionary, and hinting that Lavrov was too 
influenced by West European models. Nevertheless, it was a 
central belief of Vpered! at this time that the obshchina 
could be converted into a constituent part of socialism in 
Russia, and Lavrov was prepared to entertain the chance of 
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the socialist revolution appearing in Russia before 
Europe. 22 
In 1874, Tkachov moved towards a political break with 
Lavrov. He argued that the obshchina was dissolving, while 
the kulaks and capitalists were growing stronger. The 
conditions for a social revolution were becoming less and 
less favourable, and it was necessary to proceed with it at 
once. He issued a manifesto attacking Lavrov and calling 
for the creation of a conspiratorial vanguard party to 
carry out the revolution in Russia. Lavrov responded by 
saying that the revolution must be made by the people, not 
by a minority group. If a revolutionary party seized 
dictatorial power, it would not give up power freely and 
another revolution would be necessary. Engels Jumped to 
attack Tkachov, provoking the latter to write him a 
forthright open letter. In turn, Engels accused him of 
portraying the Russians as the chosen people of socialism. 
It would be impossible for Russia to have a socialist 
revolution before Western Europe. The obshchina could 
survive into the socialist era only if a proletarian 
revolution occurred in the West before the obshchina 
collapsed. Tkachov claimed in response that the survival 
of the obshchina showed that the Russian people were 
instinctively socialist. 23 
Marxist nessianisin 
In this section, I shall discuss the elements of 
messianism which were present in Marxism before its 
penetration into Russia. In 1844, in the "Contribution to 
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the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", Marx argued 
that the German proletariat could not free itself from its 
exploitation and suffering without emancipating the whole 
of society. It could "redeem itself only through the total 
redeLuption of-humanity ... Thorough Germany cannot make a 
revolution unless it is a thorough one. The emancipation 
of-the-German is the emancipation-of-the-human". 24 This 
tendency to identify German interests with the needs of 
world socialism recurred throughout the lives of Marx and 
Engels. 
The idea of the proletariat as the universal class is 
central to classical Marxism. It was reformulated, without 
being restricted to Germany, by Engels in the Preface to 
the 1888 English edition of the Manifesto_of the_Communist 
Party: - 
... the exploited and oppressed class - the proletariat 
- cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the 
exploiting and ruling class - the bourgeoisie - 
without, at the same time, and once and for all, 
emancipating society at large from all exploitation, 
oppression, class distinctions and class struggles. 25 
In abolishing private property, the proletariat overcomes 
the division of society into classes and restores the 
communist form of society, which allegedly existed in 
primitive times; but the new Golden Age is at an 
incomparably higher level of culture and technology. The 
role of the proletariat as Messiah is so pronounced in 
Marxism that observers have suggested the direct influence 
of Jewish messianism or Christianity on Marx. For example, 
Zernov wrote: 
Karl Marx believed in the Messiah as only a Jew can 
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believe in Him, but his Messiah was no longer God's 
Anointed, but a body of people, the lowest and poorest 
class of mankind, who did the hardest work and received 
the least remuneration for it. He proclaimed the 
coming of a collective Messiah, represented by the 
proletariat. 26 
Similar views were held by the Vekhi contributors, Bulgakov 
and Berdiaev (see below, pp. 273-74,289-90). It seems 
more accurate to emphasize the importance of Hegelian 
dialectics on Marx's thought, with the proletarian 
revolution as the universal synthesis. The concept of the 
"dictatorship of the proletariat", however, is profoundly 
messianic: there is no explanation as to how the workers 
could actually exercise their dictatorship, or whether 
power would be exercised by a small group claiming to 
represent the workers and suppressing all opposition. In 
fairness to Marx, the phrase occurs only a few times in his 
entire output. Engels was later to emphasize the virtues 
of universal suffrage and enjoin the Social -Democrat ic 
Party of Germany (SPD) to seek power legally. He went so 
far as to assert that the political form of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat would be a democratic 
republic - hardly a dictatorship in the normal sense of the 
term. 27 Rudolf Bahro, a Marxist dissident writing in the 
German Democratic Republic in the 1970s, described the view 
that the proletariat would be "the real collective subject 
of the general emancipation" as "a philosophical 
hypothesis, around which the utopian components of Marxism 
were concentrated". 28 
The need for the international unity of the proletariat 
is a central theme of the Manifesto. "United action, of 
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the civilized countries at least, is one of the first 
conditions of its emancipation. " Nevertheless, "The 
Communists turn their main attention to Germany ... " This 
was justified on the grounds that the forthcoming bourgeois 
revolution would be "immediately" followed by a proletarian 
one, because of the strength of the German proletariat. 29 
The apocalyptic atmosphere of the period found its 
justification in the revolutions of 1848. Engels, however, 
found himself in June of that year not arguing for 
international workers' unity, but applying the Hegelian 
concept of "historical" and "unhistorical" nations. He 
wrote in the Neue-Rheinische Zeitung that the only possible 
outcome of the Prague uprising was a "war of annihilation" 
(Vernichtungskrieg) of the revolutionary Germans against 
the counter-revolutionary Czechs. 30 In January 1849, he 
declared: 
Amongst all the nations and nationalities of Austria 
there are only three bearers of progress, which have 
actively intervened in history and are still capable of 
independent life: Germans, Poles and Magyars. They are 
therefore revolutionary now. 
All the other great and small nationalities and peoples 
have the mission to perish in the revolutionary world 
storm. They are therefore now counter-revolutionary. 31 
It is difficult to avoid accusing Marx and Engels of 
tending to lapse into German nationalist messianism. 
Horace B. Davis suggests that they "may indeed have both 
been unconscious, or subconscious, nationalists in that 
they hoped Germany would take the lead in establishing 
socialism.,, 32 On the other hand Solomon F. Bloom states, 
"Marx simply was not a nationalist. "33 Engels decisively 
rejected the allegations of German nationalism levelled at 
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the Neue-Rheinische-Zeitung, pointing out 
had always supported Polish independence. 
"... hatred of the Russians was, and still 
revolutionary-vagglon of the Germans. "34 
New York Dailv Tribune, Engels praised th 
still more strongly. 
that the journal 
He added, 
is the first 
In 1852, in the 
e German nation 
The history of a thousand years ought to have shown 
them [the "dying nationalities, the Bohemians, 
Carinthians, Dalmatians, etc. "] that if all the 
territory east of the Elbe and Saale had at one time 
been occupied by kindred Slavonians, this fact merely 
proved the historical tendency and at the same time the 
physical and intellectual power of the German nation to 
subdue, absorb and assimilate its ancient eastern 
neighbors; that this tendency of absorption on the part 
of the Germans had always been, and still was, one of 
the mightiest means by which the civilization of 
western Europe had been spread in the east of that 
Continent; that it could only cease whenever the 
process of Germanization had reached the frontier of 
large, compact, unbroken nations, capable of an 
independent national life, such as the Hungarians, and 
in some degree the Poles; and that, therefore, the 
natural and inevitable fate of these dying nations was 
to allow this process of dissolution and absorption by 
their stronger neighbors to complete itself. 35 
Nikolai Ulianov, in a booklet published by the Russian 
X. X 
emigre house Possev, accuses Marx and Engels of exhibiting 
"Nazi chauvinism" towards the Slavs. 36 In private, Marx 
and Engels were still more pro-German. Marx wrote to 
Engels in 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War in which 
they publicly opposed the German seizure of Alsace- 
Lorraine: 11 ... the French need a thrashing.... This [German] 
predominance on the world stage over the French would also 
mean the predominance of our theory over Proudhon's etc. "37 
Engels wrote in an article of 1892 that the SPD would have 
to defend the nation against an attack by Tsarist Russia, 
and fight the French Republic if France were allied with 
tsarism. 38 
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It appears safe to conclude that the founders of 
scientific socialism believed in the special vocation of 
the German people in general and of the German proletariat 
in particular. This was combined with hostility to the 
Slavs and especially to Tsarist Russia. In 1848, Russia 
had suppressed Hungary. In 1853 and again in 1855 Marx 
wrote that the pan-Slavists were looking to the Tsar as a 
Messiah. 39 In 1855, Engels feared (quite without 
foundation) that pan-Slavism was about to become the 
official platform of tsarism. 40 Marx wrote, probably in 
1867, that "the policy of Russia is changeless ... the 
polar star of its policy - world domination - is a fixed 
star. "41 While hostile to Herzen and Bakunin, Marx and 
Engels in their later life nevertheless took a keen 
interest in the Russian revolutionary movement and regarded 
Lavrov as an ally. 
MarxislIL-in-yussia 
The narodnichestvo of the 1860s and 1870s was created, 
in a sense, out of Marxism: Russian socialists were aware 
of Marx's critique of capitalism and wished to avoid the 
miseries of capitalist industrialization. While Engels was 
eager to accuse Russian revolutionaries of Russian 
messianism (and pan-Slavism), it seems closer to the truth 
to say that most Populists were seeking a way to socialism 
that was different from the West European path, rather than 
that they wanted Russia to be a model for Western Europe, 
let alone the entire world. Marx himself gave some 
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Justification to the narcdaik approach, in a letter of 
1877, in which he explicitly stated that his description of 
capitalism in Western Europe could not have universal 
validity. 42 In his letter to the narodnik Vera Zasulich of 
8 March 1881, he described the obshchina as the "mainspring 
of Russia's social regeneration", but stated that it could 
not function unless the forces hostile to it were 
removed. 43 These forces were identified (in the draft of a 
pamphlet) with tsarist policy, not with any inevitable 
capitalist development. In the introduction to the 1882 
Russian edition of the Manifesto, Marx and Engels made the 
survival of the obshchina into the future communist society 
conditional on proletarian revolution in the West. 44 
If narodnichestvo was created out of Marxism, then 
Russian Marxism in the 1880s was created out of 
narodnichestvo. Georgy V. Plekhanov, a leading narodnik, 
believed that capitalism was inevitable in Russia but 
bitterly opposed Tkachov's Jacobinism. This led him to 
break with Populism and establish the first Russian Marxist 
group, Osvobozhdenie truda (Emancipation of Labour) in 
Geneva in 1883. But Russian revolutionary Marxists did not 
believe that Russia would follow exactly the same path as 
Western Europe. Plekhanov told the founding conference of 
the Second International in 1889: "In Russia political 
freedom will be gained by the working class, or it will not 
exist at all. The Russian Revolution can only conquer as a 
workers' revolution ... " Lenin's brother, Aleksandr 
Ulianov (1866-1887), spoke of the possibility of 
telescoping the bourgeois and proletarian revolutions in 
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Russia into one, as had the young Marx in relation to 
Ger=any. 45 In this context, the appearance of Trotsky's 
theory of Permanent Revolution, under the impact of the 
1905 Revolution, does not seem surprising. 
At the end of 1904, Trotsky's friend Parvus (A. L. 
Helfand), a Russian-Jewish Marxist based in Germany, 
preciicted, "The Russian revolution will shake the bourgeois 
world.... And the Russian proletariat may well play the role 
of vanguard of the social revolution. "46 In June 1905 
Trotsky wrote that the Russian working class would be "the 
initiator of the liquidation of world capitalism". 47 His 
book Results and_Prospects (1906) argued that the Russian 
bourgeoisie was so weak and cowardly that the Russian 
proletariat would have to carry out the task of the 
bourgeois revolution itself. It would not stop there, but 
would have to begin the socialist transformation of Russia, 
and in order to stay in power, would have to spread the 
revolution outside Russia as well. 48 Such claims were far 
re=ved from the beliefs of Marx and Engels. 
Commentators have noted the possible influence of 
Jewish messianism on the ideas of Jewish participants, such 
as Trotsky, in the Russian revolutionary movement. Moshe 
Mishkinsky suggests that Jewish workers in late 
nineteenth-century Russia were receptive to socialism 
because of their religious background. "The Jewish labor 
organizations received socialist doctrine as revelation, as 
a messianic vision which had been nourished to some extent 
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by Jewish eschatological traditions and universal ideas of 
redemption.,, 49 Sergei Bulgakov saw a similar connection. 
He wrote in 1905 that "atheistic socialis&' had the same 
"earthly" ideals as Jewish messianism, and counterposed 
both to his "Christian socialism". 50 In 1910 he depicted 
socialism as a "transposition (perelozhenie) of Jewish 
chiliasm", in which the proletariat were the "chosen 
pecT)lell. 51 
Billington sees Populism and Zionism as parallel 
messianic movements in Russia, for Russians and Jews 
respectively. (One may disagree about the messianic nature 
of Zionism - see above, p. 18. ) He suggests that Trotsky 
and other Jews who occupied leading positions "helped give 
the Bolshevik cause the compelling voice of prophecy and a 
contagious conviction that messianic deliverance was about 
to occur on Russian 'soil". 
52 This point must not be pushed 
too far; the Mensheviks were anything but messianic, but 
their leader, Martov, and many other influential members 
were Jewish, while the Bolsheviks were considerably more 
Russian in composition. Robert J. Brym calculates that 37% 
of revolutionaries arrested in 1905 were Jews, although 
they comprised only 4% of the population in 1897. Leaving 
aside the question whether the police deliberately tried to 
arrest Jews rather than gentiles, one reason for the high 
proportion of Jews may have been their high participation 
in the education system and the lack of Job opportunities 
for educated people. Probably more important, however, was 
that in conditions of official anti-Semitism, Jews would be 
more likely to be alienated from society than other 
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nationalities. 53 
While the influence of Jewish messianism may have had a 
role in attracting Jews to Marxism, the previous paragraphs 
leave little doubt that the influence of narodnichestvo 
added a dimension of Russian messianism to Russian Marxism. 
The eschatological mentality penetrated Bolshevism, with 
the "God-building" movement led by Anatoly V. Lunacharsky 
talking about constructing the messianic kingdom on 
earth. 54 Lunacharsky, comparing the proletariat with 
Christ, wrote: "the new Messiah climbs Golgotha, its blood 
flows, it is nailed to the cross. "55 Already in 1906 
Berdiaev was finding a "religious thirst and an 
eschatological hope" in Russian Marxism. 56 In Vekhi he 
went further. In Russia, he said, Marxism had become a 
cover for the traditional narodnik "cliquishness" of the 
intelligentsia. Thus the intelligentsia was not 
interested in whether a theory was true, but only in 
whether it served the people or proletariat. In 
particular, the Russian Marxists had an "exceptional 
belief" in the possibility of achieving socialist 
objectives in Russia earlier than in the West. 57 Frank in 
the same collection wrote that Populism had swallowed up 
Russian Marxism, destroying its respect for culture. 58 
Bulgakov spoke of the intelligentsia having an 
"eschatological dream of the City of God". 59 It is 
relevant to note that at this time Bulgakov and Berdiaev 
were themselves seen by Prince Evgeny N. Trubetskoi as 
seeking to revive Russian messianism. 60 
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The outbreak of the First World War, a severe test for 
socialists throughout Europe, divided those in Russia. The 
majority of the leaders of the narodnik party, the 
Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), gave support to the war 
effort. Most of the Russian Marxist leaders, on the other 
hand, opposed the War; all the Social-Democratic deputies 
in the Duma voted against war credits. In 1915 Trotsky 
condemned the "social-patriots" who had put nation before 
class in these terms: - 
In general it should not be forgotten that there is, 
alongside of the most vulgar reformism, a national 
revolutionary Messianism which deems that its own 
national state, whether because of its industrial level 
or because of its 'democratic' form and revolutionary 
conquests, is called upon to lead humanity towards 
socialism or towards 'democracy'. 61 
August 1914 showed that, with the exception of Plekhanov's 
small group Edinstvo (Unity), the Russian Marxists were 
much less liable to nationalist messianism than either the 
narodniks or the Marxists of other countries. 
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The October Revolution and Russian Xnessianis 
The group which most fully represented socialist 
Russian messianism in 1917 was the Left SRs. For this 
party of romantic revolutionaries, Russia's suffering in 
the war was akin to the Crucifixion, and the October 
Revolution represented redemption. Russia was the 
instrument for the creation of a New World. Providing the 
Bolsheviks with a valuable bridge to the peasantry, the 
Left SRs joined the Council of People's Commissars 
(Sovnarkom) in November 1917, and proved particularly 
enthusiastic in the security police (Cheka). Lenin's 
argument that Russia should not undergo a period of liberal 
democracy but could lead the rest of Europe to the 
socialist revolution appeared to them an implicit 
acceptance of the narodnik position. The adoption of the 
SR land policy by the Bolsheviks made the link explicit. 
For the Left SRs, however, there could be no compromise 
with the Old World; therefore, when Lenin realized the 
necessity of an armistice with Germany and signed the 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, they saw this as a 
betrayal of the world revolution. Not only did they leave 
the Sovnarkom but they used terrorist methods to provoke a 
revolutionary war with Germany. 
The poets known as the "Scythians", grouped around R-V- 
Ivanov-Razumnik, the literary editor of SR and then Left SR 
periodicals, provided a graphic illustration of the 
messianic revolutionary mood. Sergei Esenin called Russia 
"the new Nazareth"; Nikolai Kliuev compared Lenin to the 
Old Believer leader Avvakum. The symbolists, Aleksandr 
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Blok and Andrei Bely, had absorbed Vladimir Solovyov's 
eschatology and had been expecting a cosmic struggle 
against Antichrist. Bely's poem "Rodine" (To the 
Motherland) of August 1917 addressed Russia as the "Messiah 
of the Coming Day". 62 His poem "Khristos voskrese" (Christ 
is Risen) was written in 1918, after the October 
Revolution. Blok's "Dvenadtsat'" (The Twelve, January 
1918), depicted Jesus at the head of a troop of Red Guards. 
It was not accidental that Trotsky called this poem "the 
most significant work of our epoch". 63 In his "Skify" 
(Scythians), written during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, 
and addressed to Europe, Blok portrayed the Russian people 
as barbarians. If Europe failed to join the revolution, 
the Russians would cease to perform their historic mission 
of protecting Europe from the Asian hordes, and would allow 
European civilization to be crushed by the yellow peril. 64 
The influence of Russian messianism on Bolshevism 
itself is much less clear. Consciously, Lenin, Trotsky and 
the leading Bolsheviks were Marxists, seeking to promote an 
international working-class revolution which had started in 
Russia but which would be completed in Europe. 
Nevertheless, they admitted certain narodnik influences. 
Lenin approved Chernyshevsky's ideas and the Narodnaia 
volia organization. Unlike some Western Marxists and the 
Russian "Legal Marxists", he always saw the poorest 
peasants as a progressive force, and praised the narodniks 
for also doing so. Schapiro coTnTn nts: "The victory of 
bolshevism in 1917 was at least as much a victory of 
narodnichestvo as of Marxism. "65 In particular, 
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commentators have widely remarked on the impact on Lenin of 
Tkachov and Nechaev, both of whom Lenin admired. The 
centralized, conspiratorial organization, and the 
subordination of the individual and all morality to the 
needs of the revolution, were taken by Lenin from these two 
figures; V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, who was close to Lenin, 
confirmed that Lenin admired Nechaev, and Pokrovsky 
recognized Nechaev as a founder of Bolshevik organizational 
ideas. 65 Such ideas, however, were rejected by many 
narodniks, and they had no necessary connection with 
Russian messianism, being linked more with Jacobinism. 
Where Bolshevism did appear as a manifestation of 
Russian messianism was in the belief in Russia as a model 
for East and West. The British, American and French 
revolutions all produced people who wished their 
revolutions to be extended to the rest of the world. With 
Bolshevism this was the dominant theme: the workers of 
Europe, and the workers and peasants of the colonial world, 
should themselves overthrow capitalism and imperialism. 
The Communist or Third International (Comintern) was 
established to facilitate this. But, as with the earlier 
revolutions, there were times when it was considered 
expedient to spread the Revolution by force. Only with 
difficulty did Lenin defeat the Left Communists and 
persuade the Bolshevik Central Committee to accept Brest- 
Litovsk. The extension of the revolution by means of 
Russian bayonets was the aim of the attack on Poland in 
1920. It was expected that the arrival of the Red Army 
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would produce support from the Polish workers, but it only 
intensified Russo-Polish national antagonisms. The 
question of the other minority borderlands of the Empire 
deserves separate treatment (see below, pp. 296-307). 
With the defeat of the revolutionary wave in the West, 
Bolshevik attention turned more to the East. An appeal to 
the "Muslim Toilers of Russia and the East" had been issued 
in December 1917. In November 1918 Stalin described the 
Russian Revolution as a bridge between the Western 
proletariat and the oppressed East. At the first "Congress 
of the Peoples of the East" held in Baku in September 1920, 
Zinoviev addressed a mainly Muslim audience: "Brothers, we 
summon you to a holy war, in the first place against 
British imperialism! " Karl Radek openly declared: 
We appeal, comrades, to the warlike feelings which once 
inspired the peoples of the East when these peoples, 
led by their great conquerors, advanced upon Europe. 67 
Sarkisyanz makes a direct link between Blok and Radek, and 
suggests that Russia's Asian policy was linked with Russian 
messianism for the first time under Lenin. 68 The turn to 
Asia did indeed evoke the concerns of Dostoevsky, Vladimir 
Solovyov and Blok's "Scythians". Russia was now seen as a 
model for the peoples of the East as well as the West. 69 
In addition to appealing to West and East, the 
Bolsheviks sought to mobilize Russian patriotism in their 
support in the course of the Civil War. On 21 February 
1918 the Sovnarkom issued a proclamation signed by Lenin, 
declaring: "The socialist fatherland (otechestvo) is in 
danger! Long live the socialist fatherland! 4170 The 
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foreign intervention led many forces in Russian society to 
support the Bolsheviks, seeing them as more authentically 
national than the Whites. As early as October 1917, before 
the Bolshevik Revolution, the former tsarist commander, 
General A. A. Brusilov, had issued an appeal to nationally- 
minded Russians of all parties to save the country from 
chaos. From the start of the Civil War, Brusilov and other 
senior tsarist commanders such as General S. S. Kamenev and 
Admiral V. Altfater went over to the Bolsheviks, for 
patriotic reasons (not because of political opportunism or 
the coercion frequently employed on tsarist officers). The 
War Ministry itself, as an institution, apparently 
transferred its loyalty to the Bolsheviks after they took 
power. These feelings were shared by thousands of tsarist 
officers who freely volunteered to fight for the 
Bolsheviks. V. M. Purishkevich, a former leader of the 
Black Hundreds, and many of the rank and file of that 
organization, expressed their willingness to serve the 
Reds. The Polish-Soviet War gave impetus to this. In May 
1920, Brusilov and other tsarist military leaders issued an 
appeal to Russians to support the Bolsheviks in order to 
defend Russia. 71 In the course of this war, traditional 
anti-Polish feeling was used by Bolshevik propagandists. 72 
These developments attracted the attention of Russians 
who had emigrated after the October Revolution. Vasily 
Shulgin, who had been a conservative nationalist before the 
revolution, claimed, in his book 1920 written in that year, 
that Russian nationalist ideas were penetrating the 
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Bolsheviks. In the Red Army they had rebuilt the Russian 
Army, and they had restored Russia's frontiers. Mikhail S. 
Agursky, formerly a Soviet Jewish dissident, a contributor 
to Solzhenitsyn's From-under-the-Rubble, and a person 
sympathetic to Russian Orthodox nationalism, has written a 
major analysis of "National Bolshevism", Ideologiia 
natsional-bol'shevizma (The Ideology of National 
Bolshevism). An expanded version in English is entitled 
The Third Rome. 73 According to Agursky, it was Shulgin who 
for the first time presented the idea that the Comintern 
was a weapon of Russian national policy. The nationalist 
regeneration of the Bolsheviks would be an unconscious 
process. Shulgin predicted that in the future their ranks 
would produce a dictator of nationalist views, who would 
remove his colleagues and lead Russia on to the national 
path. 74 
In October 1920, after the defeat of Kolchak, the Kadet 
Nikolai V. Ustrialov proclaimed himself an adherent of 
"National Bolshevism". The anti-Bolshevik groups, he said, 
were too closely tainted by foreign links. Soviet power, 
on the other hand, was a "national factor of contemporary 
Russian life"; its interests coincided with Russia's State 
interests, and Bolshevism would "evolve from Jacobinism to 
Napoleonism". 75 The term "National Bolshevism" seems to 
have been coined by Radek to describe the policy of some 
German Communists who attempted to unite with Right-wing 
German nationalists against the Entente. Lenin's use of 
the term gave it popularity. 76 Ustrialov considered that 
National Bolshevism had begun in Russia with Brusilov's 
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appeal of October 1917.77 
In February 1921, in Paris, S. Lukianov, a former 
Oberprokuror of the Holy Synod and a follower of Vladimir 
Solovyov, claimed to see a distinction between the 
"Bolsheviks" headed by Lenin and Krasin, and the 
"Communists", supposedly headed by Trotsky and Zinoviev. 78 
This distinction became widely held: the fellow-traveller 
writer Boris Pilniak in Golyi-god (The Naked Year, 1921) 
portrayed a peasant who supported the "Bolsheviks" but 
rejected the "Communists". It appears that the Communists 
were widely and negatively identified with the Jews, and 
the Bolsheviks were identified as good Russians. Some 
Russian sects identified the Bolsheviks with Antichrist, 
but others viewed Lenin as the "Messiah of the twentieth 
century". 79 The removal of the capital from Petrograd, 
under threat of German invasion, back to Moscow symbolized 
a turning-back from the Petersburg period. Already in 1917, 
before the October coup, the Orthodox Church had restored 
the Patriarchate, not in the then capital Petrograd, but in 
Moscow, "the Third Rome". 80 Lenin and Trotsky strengthened 
the symbolism by choosing to live, like the Muscovite 
Tsars, in the Kremlin. 
Lukianov joined Ustrialov and other former Whites in 
contributing to the collection Smena vekh (Change of 
Landmarks), published in Prague at the beginning of 1921. 
The smenovekhovtsv saw Bolshevism as a Russian national 
phenomenon, the professed internationalism of which was a 
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camouflage. Ustrialov discerned a Slavophil spirit in the 
Bolsheviks. After the New Economic Policy (NEP) was adopted 
in March 1921, Ustrialov regarded it as evidence of the 
evolution of Bolshevism; the Bolsheviks were liquidating 
the revolution. Politically, the smenovekhoVtsv encouraged 
emigres to return to Russia and collaborate with the 
Bolsheviks, in the hope of assisting Russia's evolution 
towards normality. 81 
Lenin, Trotsky and other Bolshevik leaders welcomed 
smenovekhovstYo, insofar as it brought qualified personnel 
back to Russia, but naturally they opposed the political 
aims of the movement. Smena vekh feelings seem to have 
been widespread among the intelligentsia and middle classes 
in Russia. Ilia Ehrenburg, in spite of his Jewish origin, 
and Aleksei Tolstoy were among the creative writers who 
returned to Russia under the influence of Smena vekh, and 
later played a major role in Soviet literature. Smena-vekh 
ideology, as well as socialist feeling, was also important 
in the pro-Bolshevik "Renovationist" or "Living Church" 
(obnovlentsy or zhivaia--tserkov') movement of priests and 
laity inside the Orthodox Church. Lenin told the XI Party 
Congress in March 1922: "The smenovekhovtg_y express the 
mood of thousands and tens of thousands of bourgeois, and 
of Soviet employees who are participants in our New 
Economic policy. "82 At the XII Party Congress in April 
1923, Stalin linked the movement with what he described as 
the growing threat of Great-Russian chauvinism, and warned 
that it was appearing not only in the soviets but also in 
Party bodies. As Agursky notes, this was odd coming from 
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Stalin, in view of his role in Georgia a few months before 
(see below, pp. 305-306). Zinoviev, perhaps because he was 
head of the Comintern, was the leader most hostile to 
smenovekhovstvo at this time. 83 Russian patriotism was 
also emphasized by the emigr2 group called the Eurasians, 
which emerged like Smena vekh in 1921. The Eurasians saw 
Russia as a unique, mystical entity, capable of uniting 
diverse racial groups. 84 
Agursky is right to say that these nationalist 
ideologies, permeating Russian society, provided a 
favourable climate for the reception of Stalin's slogan 
"Socialism in one country", proclaimed in December 1924. 
He seems to go too far, though, in his claim that Stalin 
"accept[ed] National Bolshevism as a political programme 
and put it into practice". 85 He claims that the decisive 
influence on "Socialism in one country" was not "Red 
patriotism" - the use of national sentiments by the 
Bolsheviks - for this "arose in an epoch when Soviet Russia 
was striving for world revolution". "Socialism in one 
country", says Agursky, was "much nearer to National 
Bolshevism than to any other current". 86 S. V. Utechin's 
view that elements of National Bolshevism were incorporated 
in the official ideology only in 1934 seems mistaken; they 
were there from the mid-1920s. 87 Agursky's view of National 
Bolshevism, however, as the main influence on Stalin 
probably reflects a misinterpretation of the nature of the 
ideology. Agursky describes the National Bolshevism of 
1921 as "an attempt to combine the dogmas of Marxism- 
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Leninism with Russian chauvinism". 88 This seems to 
overlook the fact that National Bolshevism was an 
acceptance of Bolshevism for nationalist reasons, in the 
hope that Russia would normalize, rather than an acceptance 
of Marxist ideas. Stalin, on the other hand, remained true 
to the Marxist heritage in several important respects. He 
never openly abandoned atheism; what he did abandon was 
NEP, in order to promote industrialization on the basis of 
State ownership and to collectivize agriculture. In this 
perspective, "Socialism in one country" was a logical 
development of "Red patriotism" in the period of the 
stabilization of capitalism. Agursky attaches considerable 
significance to the publication in the USSR in 1926 of 
Shulgin's 1920 and the writer's visit to Russia in the same 
year. Shulgin was informed of the existence of Russian 
"national forces" who would push out the Jews from their 
positions of dominance. But it stretches credibility to 
suggest that the publication of 1920 was inspired by Stalin 
with the aim of portraying his political programme. 89 
From Stalin's viewpoint, the adoption of "Socialism in 
one country" represented recognition that the USSR would 
have to rely on her own resources to build socialism, 
without the direct help of the West European proletariat. 
It followed from the position Lenin held in his 1918 
"Theses on Peace": now that a socialist government was 
victorious, it was necessary to decide questions from the 
view-point of strengthening the revolution in Russia, rather 
than gambling on its spread elsewhere. 90 From the 
viewpoint of the ordinary Party member, and perhaps the 
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ordinary worker, it allowed a sense of national pride in 
the belief that Russia was to be the first country to 
construct socialism. It was a step in the direction of 
narodnichestvo, for Populists as different as Herzen and 
Tkachov had suggested that Russia might be closer to 
socialism than Western Europe. From Trotsky's viewpoint, 
it meant "a mortal blow to the International". 91 Isaac 
Deutscher spoke of two "quasi-Messianic beliefs" opposing 
each other: "Trotskyism with its faith in the revolutionary 
vocation of the proletariat of the West; and Stalinism with 
its glorification of Russia's socialist destiny. "92 
Trotsky could claim that Stalin's doctrine appealed to 
those who were tired of revolutionary upheavals; Stalin 
could accuse Trotsky's followers of lacking faith in 
Russia. 
Agursky refers to the "exceptionally important role"93 
of the national minorities on the Bolshevik side in the 
revolution and the Civil War. The Jews were especially 
well represented in Party and soviet bodies. The first two 
Heads of State, Lev Kamenev and Iakov Sverdlov, and the War 
Minister, Trotsky, were all Jews; indeed Trotsky rejected 
proposals that he be made head of the Sovnarkom, or 
alternatively Commissar for Internal Affairs, partly on the 
grounds of his Jewishness. 94 The Politburo elected in 
March 1921 consisted of five full members - three Jews, one 
Georgian and one Russian; seven of the 27 members of the 
Central Committee elected in April 1922 were Jews. This 
over-representation fed traditional hostility towards the 
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Jews. In the mid and late 1920s, Stalin surreptitiously 
encouraged the view that the Trotskyite and Zinovievite 
opposition was a "Jewish mutiny", and this seems to have 
been believed by many workers. 95 Trotsky accused Stalin 
of "Messianic nationalism", of seeking to build what he 
called "national socialism". 96 
It is indeed tempting to see in the conflict between 
Stalin and Trotsky a clash between Russian messianism and a 
reconstructed Jewish messianism. To digress briefly, 
Trotsky's writings of the 1930s show striking similarities 
with Jewish messianism, despite his rejection of not only 
Judaism but also Jewish nationality. 97 The theme of 
catastrophe (betrayals by the Stalinist and social- 
democratic leaders, the rise of Adolf Hitler and the 
victory of General Franco, the Second World War) is linked 
directly with the theme of redemption: the imminent world 
proletarian revolution, with the Fourth International 
becoming the most significant political force on Earth. 
Even a sense of personal messianism, with Trotsky himself 
as the Messiah, appears in his writings: "There is now no 
one except me to carry out the mission of arming a new 
generation with the revolutionary method over the heads of 
the leaders of the Second and Third Internationals" 
(1935). 98 
Berdiaev'r. - view of _Russian 
Comminism 
The principal advocate of the interpretation of the 
Russian revolution in terms of Russian messianism was 
Berdiaev. His attitude to Russian messianism, however, was 
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by no means wholly enthusiastic. Already in 1918 he stated 
that the belief in the Russian people held by the 
Slavophils, Dostoevsky and the narodniks had been refuted 
during the revolution. The Russian peasant appeared to 
Berdiaev as a destructive force. Berdiaev contributed to a 
collection, compiled in 1918 by Struve and including 
authors from Vekhi, entitled De-profundis or IZ_&j_jLbLRX 
(From the Depths). The collection could not be published 
in Moscow at the time but was put out by its printers there 
in 1921. The contributors claimed that the revolutionary 
events justified the fears that had been put forward in 
Vekhi about the lack of ethics and religion in the ideology 
of the Russian intelligentsia. The theme of the need for a 
religious consciousness was stronger in De profundis than 
in its predecessor. Izgoev saw the evils of Bolshevism as 
common to all Russian forms of socialism, while Pavel N. 
Novgorodtsev included Russian liberalism with Russian 
socialism as suffering from narodnik illusions. 99 
Berdiaev's attitude to the Russian people was complex. 
In Novoe srednevekov'e (The New Middle Ages, 1923-1924), he 
spoke of the universalism of the Russians, in terms 
reminiscent of Dostoevsky. 
The Russian people, of all the peoples in the world, is 
the most pan-human and universal in its spirit; this 
belongs to the structure of its national spirit. And 
the calling of the Russian people must be the task of 
world unification, the formation of a single Christian 
spiritual cosmos. 100 
He held this idea throughout his life, repeating in The 
Russian Iýjea (1946) that the "Messianic consciousness is 
more characteristic of the Russians than any other people 
288 
except the Jews. "101 Yet he was aware of the dangers of 
"rejudaization" in messianism (see above, p. 27). In 
Novoe-srednevekovle, he saw the Russian people facing two 
temptations: exclusive nationalism and exclusive 
internationalism. Nationalism, while it had positive 
features, had produced the world war and threatened to cut 
Russia off from Europe. The war had, however, demonstrated 
how the fates of all nations were linked. 
Internationalism, in its atheist-socialist form, embodied 
in the Comintern, represented the idea of compulsory 
(prinuditel'nyi) universalism; what was needed was 
Christian universalism. 
The processes directed towards overcoming national 
exclusiveness and forming a universal union I call the 
end of recent history, with its individualistic spirit, 
and the beginning of the new Middle Ages. In this 
sense the Communist International is already a 
phenomenon of the new Middle Ages ... 
102 
For Berdiaev, as for the Slavophils, socialism resulted 
from capitalism and both resulted from humanity's falling 
away from God. As Bulgakov had in 1905, he linked 
socialism with Jewish chiliasm, since both desired a 
paradise on this earth. 103 Berdiaev like Bulgakov saw 
Marxism as a religious faith, a secularized form of Jewish 
messianism. Marx's proletariat was not the real working 
class but an object of faith, like his socialist society. 
The coming catastrophe of capitalism replaced the Last 
Judgement, the proletariat was the chosen people and the 
communist society replaced the Kingdom of God on Earth. 104 
Socialism was in principle opposed to democracy; democratic 
socialism (he mentioned Jean Jaures, the SRs and the Right 
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Mensheviks) was not true socialism. Under socialism, power 
was wielded by a minority which claimed to represent the 
proletariat, and not by the proletariat itself. Socialism 
represented unity in Antichrist. Again like Bulgakov, 
Berdiaev was prepared to call himself a Christian 
socialist, but emphasized that this was not true socialism. 
His conception of socialism, then, was of an atheist, 
vanguard dictatorship. The Russians were not capable, said 
Berdiaev, of creating a liberal democracy. "Khomiakov and 
K. Leontev, Dostoevsky and L. Tolstoy, Vladimir Solovyov 
and N. Fyodorov subvert the bourgeois system and spirit no 
less than Russian revolutionaries, socialists and 
Communists. Such is the Russian Idea.,, 105 The revolution 
had produced an extreme anti-humanist socialism. "The 
Russian people, as an apocalyptic people, cannot create a 
middle-of-the-road humanist realm; it can create either a 
brotherhood in Christ or a comradeship in Antichrist. 19106 
Berdiaev gave himself the ambitious aim, in The-Russian 
Idea, of deciding "... what was the thought of the Creator 
about Russia". 107 He produced a survey which emphasized 
the more extreme aspects of Russian thought, climaxing in 
the Soviet period. He referred to such contradictory 
propensities of the Russians as despotism and anarchism; 
slavery and revolt; nationalism and universalism; the 
unrelenting search for God, and militant atheism; and, 
above all, to the eschatological and messianic elements in 
Russian culture, the striving for universal salvation. The 
same dogmatism and self-sacrifice that was present in the 
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religious schismatics appeared in the Russian 
intelligentsia, and Berdiaev saw all the Russian 
revolutionaries as unconscious chiliasts, expecting the 
Kingdom of God on Earth. The messianic consciousness was 
present in the "Third Rome" concept and in the Third 
International. Just as the messianism of the Third Rome 
degenerated into imperialism, so was the messianic idea 
present in Russian Communism, but distorted by the will to 
power. The Godlessness of the October Revolution came not 
only from Bolshevik attitudes but because the Orthodox 
Church served tsarism. In 1917, Berdiaev said, Marxism was 
Russified and merged with Russian messianism. To Lenin, 
Marxism was above all the doctrine of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat; Tkachov was more a predecessor of 
Bolshevism than Marx and Engels. According to Berdiaev, 
the messianic mission of the proletariat was identified 
with Russian messianism, and it was a universalist 
messianism because it desired a world revolution. 108 
Berdiaev's later writings show an attitude to the 
Soviet regime that was as complex as his attitude to the 
Russian people. The Soviet government was the only power 
that could defend Russia, and, despite its atheism and 
denial of freedom, it was somehow promoting positive 
spiritual values. Communism contained truth and justice, 
in its proclamation of brotherhood and its opposition to 
capitalism; the Stalin Constitution contained the best 
property legislation in the world. "Communism is right as 
against capitalism, " he said. 109 It was inevitable and 
just that the future belonged to the working classes. But 
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would their spirit be that of' God or Antichrist? 
Bolshevism made use of Russian traditions of dictatorship; 
further, the Third International, like the Third Rome, was 
founded on an orthodox faith. The Third International, 
moreover, was not international but represented a Russian 
national idea. Western Communists who joined the Third 
International were joining the Russian people and realizing 
the messianic calling of the Russian people. "... the 
proletariat of the whole world from France to China is 
becoming the Russian people -a unique people in the 
world. " Approaching the Second World War, Berdiaev warned 
that "A defeat of Soviet Russia would be a defeat of 
communism, a defeat of the world idea which the Russian 
people proclaim. "110 Even after abandoning Orthodoxy, the 
Russian masses were seeking God. Under Stalin, the way was 
being prepared for the spirit of community necessary for 
the new Jerusalem; for in the building of the classless 
society, even under a materialist ideology, there might be 
a spiritual renaissance, in which it would be seen that 
atheism and materialism belonged to the past, to the period 
of class conflict. 111 
In evaluating Berdiaev's conception of Russian 
Communism, it should be remembered that the thinkers and 
movements which he considered in The-Russian-Idea were 
almost entirely (Filofei excepted) in oppositon to tsarism; 
the ideas of Peter I, Catherine II, Speransky or Alexander 
II cannot simply be excluded as un-Russian. What Berdiaev 
was presenting was primarily the ideas of the Russian 
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intelligentsia of the nineteenth century, as suggested by 
the subtitle of the Russian edition of the work. While it 
is true that the Petersburg bureaucracy was cut off from 
the narod, the intelligentsia was as well; this was 
demonstrated in 1874. Berdiaev believed not only that the 
Russians had a consciousness of being the chosen people, 
but also that they actually had a divine mission to begin 
to unite humanity. They would not live up to their 
vocation, however, unless they returned to Orthodoxy. 
Meanwhile, Orthodox Russians should understand the 
justified social demands which lay behind the rise of 
Communism, and seek to promote a religious regeneration of 
Russia. 
Berdiaev's views were widely publicized in the West 
throughout his lifetime. His ideas were shared to some 
degree by others in the emigration. Fyodor Stepun held that 
the social policy of tsarism destroyed the Russian people's 
faith in Christianity, because autocracy and Orthodoxy were 
so interlinked. He suggested that Bolshevism had little to 
do with Western socialism, and was an "aberration of the 
religious energy of the Russian people". Russia had to 
reconcile Christian truth, humanistic freedom and socialist 
righteousness. 112 Zenkovsky agreed with Berdiaev that, 
after the "horrible catastrophe of 1917", the Russian 
people could not be idealized. Russia's mission consisted 
only in being worthy of the Orthodoxy with which she had 
been entrusted, without any nationalism or messianism. "If 
the catastrophe of 1917 had its roots in the ideology 
produced in the West, today it is impossible to deny the 
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connection oi this anarchistic-communistic ideology with 
rebellious torces that stem trom within Russia itseif. "-Ll, -' 
If Berdiaev, Stepun and Zenkovsky looked to the Russian 
past for explanations of Uommunist rule, other writers have 
pointed to the non-Russian elements in Bolshevism. 
Explicitly attacking Berdiaev's analysis, H. Valin pointed 
to the existence of messianic and millennial movements among 
the European peoples. While not completely exculpating the 
Russians from the October Revolution, Valin claimed that 
the ideology, finance and personnel involved were mainly of 
Western origin. An insignificant proportion ol the 
revolutionary leaders were Russians; Lenin had no Russian 
blood (his mother having Jewish-Swedish-German blood and 
his father Chuvash-Kalmyk blood). Russia had become like a 
crystal ball in which all peoples could see one of the 
possible variants of their future. Now, however, she was 
developing antibodies to the Western viruses. 114 
Similarly, Solzhenitsyn has emphasized the foreign 
origin of Marxism and the role of the Latvians in imposing 
it on Russia (see below, p. 495). His fellow-contributor 
to the collection Froa_Under_the_Rubble, Igor R. 
Shafarevich, takes a slightly different view. Although he 
does not mention Berdiaev in this context, he rejects 
Berdiaev's view that Bolshevism was a Russian distortion of 
Marxism- "the opinion that Bolshevism is a typically 
Russian phenomenon, the heritage of Nechayev and Bakunin 
and a perversion of Marxism". Shatarevich sees a "striking 
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coincidence of Bolshevik ideology and practice and numerous 
statements by Marx and Engels". He claims that Marxism and 
Russian nihilism are based on the same source - "a burning 
hatred for surrounding life that can be vented only through 
complete annihilation of that life". This is linked to 
Shafarevich's view that a striving for the death of 
humanity is fundamental to socialism. 115 Thus, while for 
Solzhenitsyn Bolshevism is alien to Russia, for Shafarevich 
it is part of a phenomenon which has occurred at different 
times throughout recorded history, in Russia and elsewhere. 
Valin, Solzhenitsyn and Shafarevich all reject Berdiaev's 
view that Bolshevism is a manifestation of the Russian 
spirit. 
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Russian messianisin and !; he nationality_question under-Lenin 
Trotsky saw the slogan of "Socialism in one country" as 
inaugurating the break between the internationalism of 
Lenin and the early years of the revolution, and the 
Russian "Messianic nationalism" (see above, p. 287) that 
was to emerge in the Stalin era. One need not take too 
seriously Nadezhda Krupskaia's observation to her mother- 
in-law that "Volodya ... is a passionate nationalist". 
116 
But other writers, such as Alfred D. Low, Richard Pipes, 
Walker Connor and Mikhail Agursky have analyzed Lenin's 
thought and actions when in power and challenged whether 
Lenin was as internationalist as he claimed to be. They 
see him as seeking to exploit the feelings of the national 
minorities for the benefit of the Russian proletariat. 117 
Low, for example, wrote that Lenin "was partial to the 
Great Russian people and other large nationalities and 
considered the smaller nationalities expendable and their 
rights to self-determination not absolutely valid. "118 
After the Civil War, most of the former Russian Empire was 
re-united in the form of the USSR, under the centralized 
control of the Russian (or Russified) Bolsheviks in Moscow. 
The evolution of the attitudes of Lenin and Stalin to 
Russian messianism and Russian nationalism is best 
illustrated in the policies implemented in relation to the 
national minorities of the Soviet Union. 
Lenin took great pains in his writings on the national 
question, as on other issues, to show that his views were 
derived from applying the method and conclusions of Marx 
and Engels to contemporary problems. In the application of 
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Marxist principles, Lenin showed a high degree of 
flexibility. For example, as a Soviet specialist recently 
put it, Lenin's views on federalism underwent a "difficult 
evolution"119: from hostility to federalism to acceptance, 
under the pressure of events, of the need for it. At the 
same time, Lenin consistently followed the founding fathers 
in both theory and practice by emphasizing the need for the 
unity of the workers of all nationalities, and by 
subordinating the national question to the class struggle. 
He also shared their belief that the interests of the 
proletariat were best served by the existence of large 
states, which offered the maximum potential for economic 
development. 
From his earliest writings onwards, Lenin expressed his 
belief that all the Marxists of the Russian Empire, 
regardless of nationality, should be united in a single 
party. In 1903 he opposed the demand of the Jewish Social- 
Democratic Bund to be allowed to form an autonomous 
section for the Jewish workers in the Russian social- 
democratic movement. Further, he rejected the Bund's 
programme for "cultural autonomy" for minorities in the 
State, and the Armenian Social Democrats' call for Armenia 
to be allowed to federate with Russia. 120 Even more did he 
oppose the demand of the Polish Socialist Party for Polish 
independence. He believed that while Marxists should 
defend the right of nations to self-determination, they 
should also strive for the utmost centralization of the 
State. 121 
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Ten years later, Lenin seemed to have shifted his 
position somewhat. In his letter to S. G. Shaumian of 6 
December 1913 he supported regional autonomy, while 
fiercely opposing federalism. The right to self- 
determination did not signify a right to federation. Lenin 
clearly hoped that the minorities would see the economic 
and political advantages of remaining in a large State, in 
which they would be guaranteed equality and language rights 
as citizens, but no particular collective privileges. If a 
nation wished to secede, however, it could "go to the 
devil". This attitude to national minorities - either join 
a centralized Russian State, or else have nothing to do 
with us - can be seen as having a chauvinist flavour. 
Lenin favoured "democratic centralism" within the State, 
together with "the autonomy of all parts". The right to 
secession was an exception to the general preference for 
centralism, an exception dictated by the need to overcome 
the minorities' fears of Great-Russian nationalism. 
Similar motives were behind Lenin's rejection of Shaumian's 
belief that Russian should be the State language. He 
agreed that it was a progressive step for the minorities to 
learn Russian, but it would be still more progressive if 
they chose to do this voluntarily. 122 
Confusion was to arise over Lenin's attitude to the 
longer-term future of relations between nationalities. In 
his writings he repeatedly referred to the sblizhenie 
(coming together, convergence) and sliianie. (merging, 
fusion) of nations. Unfortunately he used these words with 
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different meanings in different contexts. Sometimes the 
process of sblizhenie and sliianie of nations was occurring 
under capitalism; sometimes he used the terms to refer to 
the unity of the masses against capitalism; at other times 
he used them to refer to the fusion of nations and the 
dying out of national distinctions under communism. These 
differences of meaning account for some of the confusion 
among Soviet specialists on the nationality question as to 
whether sliianie is going on today, under "mature 
socialism", or whether it is a phenomenon of the future. 
Thus in 1913, in his "Critical Remarks on the National 
Question", he wrote of the "sliiani-e of all nations in a 
higher unity", which grew with every stretch of railway 
line, every international trust or trade union. 123 He 
spoke of conscious workers fighting for the of 
workers of all nationalities in the struggle against 
reaction and every bourgeois nationalism". 124 In these 
cases sliianie is a contemporaneous process. In early 1916 
he was clearly referring to the future, however: "An aim 
of socialism is not only the abolition of the fragmentation 
of humanity into small states and every national isolation, 
not only the sblizhenie of nations, but also their 
sliianie. " This sliiaaia was "inevitable"125 and 
it would come after the disappearance of classes. 126 The 
sblizhenie-sliianie formula appears seven times in two 
other works of 1916, referring in each case to a process 
occurring after the socialist revolution. On one of these 
occasions it is stated that the process "will be completed 
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with the withering away of the State. "127 After the 
October Revolution, Lenin continued to use the formulation 
in different senses. Thus in early 1918 he described the 
federation of nations as "a transition to voluntary 
sliianie". 128 A year later, however, he called for the 
"sblizhenie and sliianie of the proletarians and working 
masses of all nations for the revolutionary struggle for 
the overthrow of the bourgeoisie". 129 
In his "Critical Remarks", Lenin made clear his belief 
that assimilation was a good thing. "Whoever is not 
wallowing in nationalist prejudices cannot fail to see in 
this process of assimilation lassimiliatsiial of nations by 
capitalism the greatest historical progress ... , 
130 
Ukrainians or Lithuanians could rightly fear that Lenin had 
little respect for their national cultures. Lenin was 
aware that the internationalist sliianie he was putting 
forward (in the perspective of the distant future) might be 
confused by the minorities with the desire for Russian 
sliianie with small nations held by Nicholas 11.131 This 
was why Lenin argued, against the cosmopolitan Marxist Rosa 
Luxemburg, that to refuse to recognize the right of nations 
to self-determination would play into the hands of the 
Russian nationalists and minority separatists. Walker 
Connor is wrong to say that Lenin underestimated the 
importance of Russian nationalism and the threat it might 
pose to the unity of the nationalities. In 1914, before 
the outbreak of war, he wrote in "The Right of Nations to 
Self-Determination" that minority nationalism was on the 
increase in the Russian Empire, and that this would provoke 
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a rise in Russian nationalism. The proletariat's task was 
"to combat nationalism of every kind, above all, Great- 
Russian nationalism". 132 Lenin's article "On the National 
Pride of the Great Russians" was far from a disavowal of 
all national feeling, however. Written in December 1914, 
it rejected the chauvinism of tsarism and of those who 
supported the War, and took "national pride" in the Russian 
revolutionary traditions of the peasantry, the Decembrists 
and the working-class movement of 1905.133 
In 1916, while still opposed to federation in 
principle, he accepted that it was preferable to national 
inequality, and might be "the only road to full democratic 
centralism". His main point at this time, though, was that 
freedom to secede was a necessary prelude to the later 
sblizhenie and sliianie. 134 But the right of self- 
determination was not absolute; the liberation of large 
nations was more important than the self-determination of 
small nations. Lenin explicitly endorsed Marx's view of 
the necessity of waging war against reactionary nations; if 
a few nations began a socialist revolution and others 
represented bourgeois reaction, the socialist nations would 
have to crush the latter. 135 Other Bolsheviks abandoned 
the right to self-determination during World War One. G. L. 
Piatakov, the Bolshevik leader in the Ukraine, for example, 
rejected the idea of Ukrainian independence on the grounds 
that Russia needed Ukrainian sugar, coal and cereals. 135 
At the VII Party Conference in April 1917, Lenin defeated 
Piatakov's opposition to the right to self-determination, 
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and the Bolsheviks condemned the Provisional Government for 
failing to give unconditional support to the Finnish and 
Ukrainian demands for self-government. 137 
After October 1917, the new Soviet government 
reaffirmed the right of nations to self-determination. 
Already in December 1917, however, the hostility of the 
Ukrainian government to the Bolsheviks led Stalin, the 
People's Commissar for Nationalities, to question this 
right, and in January 1918 he redefined the principle to be 
"a right not of the bourgeoisie, but of the working masses 
of the given nation". 138 Stalin's explicit subordination 
of national self-determination to the needs of socialism 
was in line with the position taken by Marx, Engels and 
Lenin. The idea that self-determination was to be 
exercised by the toilers appeared in Lenin's draft proposal 
for the Constituent Assembly, the "Declaration of the 
Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People". This called 
for a "federation of the Soviet Republics of Russia". The 
workers and peasants "of all the nations of Russia" were to 
decide at their own Congresses of Soviets whether or not to 
participate in the federation. 139 The principle of 
federation was now conceded, in an attempt to win the 
minorities. In practice, however, the Constitution of the 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), 
adopted in 1918, contained no specifically federal 
arrangements. 14() The use of "Rossiiskaia" rather than 
"Russkaia" for "Russian" signified, however, that the State 
was to represent not only the Russian nationality but all 
the peoples of Russia. 141 
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During the Civil War, the Bolsheviks sought to bring 
the toilers, as represented by the Russian ýRossiiskaia) 
Communist Party (RCP), to power in as much ot the former 
Russian Empire as possible. The local nationalities were 
poorly represented among the industrial workers, and so the 
dictatorship of the proletariat meant the dictatorship ol a 
Russian minority, effectively making the Russians the 
"chosen people" in a political sense. The situation was at 
its worst in Turkestan, where in 1917 the local Russian 
Bolsheviks banned the indigenous Muslims from participation 
in the leading bodies of the Soviet. Here, and in 
Bashkiria in 1920, racial warfare broke out between 
Bolsheviks and Muslims. The Turkestan ban on Muslims was 
reversed in 1920, under pressure from Lenin. 142 In 
reality, there was no question of a free choice for the 
toilers of any of the nations; only a military struggle 
between pro- and anti-Bolshevik groups in which outside 
intervention played a dominant role. 143 
Although Lenin, like the Slavophils and Vladimir 
Solovyov, tavoured the maximum use of the Russian language 
in the long term, he was anxious about antagonizing the 
minorities. This is clear from his remarks during the 
discussion of the Party Programme, adopted at the VIII 
Congress in March 1919. 
From the workers of those nations which under 
capitalism were oppressors are demanded special care in 
relation to the national feeling of the oppressed 
nations ... and aid to ensure not only the actual 
equality but also the development of the languages and 
literatures of the formerly oppressed nations, in order 
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to remove all the traces of the alienation and distrust 
inherited from the capitalist epoch. 144 
This was to be a major part of Soviet nationality policy: 
not only equal rights for the minority languages, but their 
further development. Lenin attacked Piatakov for saying 
that nations, and concessions to the minorities, were 
unnecessary. Nations would disappear, but only at a higher 
stage of communism. Communists who opposed the use of non- 
Russian languages were Great-Russian chauvinists. 145 It 
should be stressed that Lenin made these points on many 
occasions. 146 In 1920 he reaffirmed that national and 
State divisions would "still persist for a very, very long 
time even after the realization of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat on a world scale". 147 
The 1919 Party Programme incorporated Lenin's ideas on 
national equality and the right to secede, while 
emphasizing proletarian unity. A "federal association of 
states" was envisaged as "one of the transitional forms" to 
"complete unity" (polnýjýý_edinstvo). 148 As well as the 
RSFSR, Communist-ruled soviet republics were established in 
the Ukraine and Belorussia, and for a time in Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania. But the VIII Congress made it clear 
that despite the existence of these independent states, the 
RCP was to remain a centralized organization operating 
within them all. The Ukrainian and other regional 
committees were subordinated to the RCP Central 
Committee. 149 Thus the leaders of the "independent" 
republics were subordinated to Moscow. 
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In 1920-1921, the Bolshevik conquest (with varying 
degrees of local support) of Azerbaijan, Armenia and 
Georgia, considered strategically and economically 
necessary, raised the question of federal links between the 
soviet republics. Stalin, as Commissar of Nationalities, 
advocated "autonomization", the transformation of the 
republics into autonomous republics of the RSFSR, such as 
had been done in Tataria, Bashkiria, Kazakhstan and 
Turkestan. Lenin had become increasingly worried about the 
behaviour of Moscow's emissaries in Transcaucasia and the 
need to respect native opinion. On 26 September 1922 Lenin 
sent a letter to the Politburo rejecting "autonomization" 
and insisting that the RSFSR and other independent 
republics should federate as equals in a "Union of Soviet 
Republics of Europe and Asia". 150 As a first step, the 
three Transcaucasian republics were federated into one, 
over Georgian Communist objections; then on 30 December the 
RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia and Transcaucasia united in 
the USSR. 151 
On the same day Lenin was in despair at the brutal 
treatment of the Georgians by Moscow's representative, G. K. 
Orjonikidze, and the collusion of Stalin and F. E. 
Dzerzhinsky. He blamed the latter two for what he called a 
"truly Great-Russian nationalist campaign". 152 Lenin noted 
that members of other nationalities (Dzerzhinsky being 
Polish and Stalin Georgian) who became Russified were 
particularly inclined to Russian nationalism. Lenin added 
later that the Chair of the new Central Executive Committee 
of the All-Union Congress of Soviets should "obligatorily" 
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rotate around the different nationalitiesI53 -a point that 
seems to have been completely ignored. The "strictest 
rules" would have to be introduced to guarantee the 
position of the national languages in the republics, and it 
might even be necessary to re-devolve to the republics 
responsibility for all aspects of internal affairs. He 
predicted, in one of his last writings, that with the 
Great-Russian chauvinist domination of the State 
apparatus, the "freedom to secede" from the USSR would be 
"a mere scrap of paper, unable to defend the non-Russians 
from the onslaught of that truly Russian man, the Great- 
Russian chauvinist". 154 
It can be seen that while some of Lenin's policies 
favoured centralization, and therefore Russian control of 
the non-Russians, he was nevertheless very anxious about 
the dangers of Russian nationalism. He saw the October 
Revolution as a model for the workers of Europe and the 
peoples of Asia and the colonial world, and the Communist 
parties affiliating to the Comintern had to accept the "21 
Points" laid down by the Bolsheviks. But unlike the 
Slavophils and some narodniks, he never had a mystical 
faith in the Russian people or proletariat, and always 
regretted Russia's cultural backwardness in relation to 
Europe. Lenin can be placed only at the margins of Russian 
messianism, not in the mainstream. 
Russian messianism-and the__Aationality-question under 
Stalin 
Despite Lenin's last wishes, the 1924 USSR Constitution 
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reserved most powers to the centre. Central RSFSR organs 
were typically converted into the corresponding USSR 
organs. This reinforced the centralized nature of the 
party. 155 On the other hand, the XII Party Congress in 
1923 adopted the policy of korenizatsiia: seeking roots in 
the minority populations by recruiting "national" (ie 
national minority) cadres to run the national republics, 
and increasing the role of the national languages. Lenin's 
goal of sliianie was not abandoned; but national cultures, 
"national in form, socialist in content", would be 
encouraged to blossom, for the time being. Instruction in 
the national languages was rapidly introduced into the 
schools, and in some cases into higher education as well. 
The programme for publishing textbooks in these languages 
had begun in 1918, and by 1924 they were published in 25 
languages. This figure rose steadily to 76 languages in 
1931 and 104 in 1934.156 Many languages which formerly 
existed only in the vernacular, including Belorussian, were 
given alphabets and literary forms. The Russian language 
ceased to be a compulsory subject in the schools of the 
national republics. In the Ukraine, where most of the 
industrial workers were Russian-speaking, the Party 
leadership was handed over to native Ukrainians. These 
promoted the Ukrainian language to the point where, in 
1933, eight-ninths of factory newspapers were in Ukrainian 
and all university lectures had to be delivered in that 
language. 157 The XV Congress (1926) resolved that 
particular attention should be devoted to economic 
development in the formerly backward borderlands. 158 This 
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policy led to the migration of workers, specialists and 
administrators from the RSFSR to develop industry in the 
non-Russian republics and train personnel from the native 
population. At least up to the early 1930s, Party 
recruitment of native cadres was pursued energetically, and 
the share in the membership of the (still over-represented) 
Russians and Jews fell. 159 
But the policy of korenizatsiia was not enough for some 
of the minorities. There was a rebellion in Georgia in 
1924. The Muslim Basmachi waged intermittent armed 
struggle until 1933, while within the ruling Party the 
"Muslim Communists" led by Sultan-Galiev revolted against 
Russian domination. Stalin had Sultan-Galiev arrested in 
1923, and this was followed in 1927 by further purges of 
Muslim Comni nist leaders on charges of nationalism. 160 In 
1929 Stalin was still calling for an expansion of the role 
of the native languages, and asserting that national 
differences would begin to disappear only after the 
establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat world- 
wide. In 1930 at the XVI Party Congress he was still 
saying that Great-Russian chauvinism was a greater danger 
than local nationalism, and this view appeared in the 
Congress resolution. At the same time he openly asserted 
that the aim of encouraging the flourishing (rastsvet) of 
national cultures was to create conditions for their 
ultimate fusion. 161 This seems to indicate the beginnings 
of a change in the public attitude of Stalin, now supreme 
leader, to the national question. He apparently 
increasingly saw the blossoming of the nationalities as a 
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threat to the State. 
In the borderlands, collectivization inevitably took 
the form of an attack on the national minorities, as the 
Russian workers from the towns sought to impose change on 
the non-Russian peasants. It might be noted that in Russia 
proper, even in 1928 the traditional obshchina (which had 
been strengthened by the division of the big estates in 
1917) was defended in the Party Press as a unit of 
socialist society, and the new kolkhoz frequently coincided 
with the territory of an obshchina. 162 The Kirghiz and 
Kazakhs, however, suffered heavy losses as nomads were 
forcibly settled. In the Ukraine, it was openly claimed 
that an aim of collectivization was to abolish the 
individual peasant basis of Ukrainian nationalism. Purges 
wihin the Ukrainian Party in 1930-1932 proved to be the 
prelude to the artificially-induced famine of 1932-1933 
which killed perhaps seven million people. In 1933 N. A. 
Skrypnik, the leading official proponent of 
Ukrainianization, committed suicide amidst charges of 
nationalism, and many nationally-minded intellectuals were 
exiled or shot. 163 
The year 1934 marked a clear change. Party leaders for 
the first time openly began to express and encourage 
Russian nationalist feeling. The Press began to talk about 
the importance of loving the fatherland. Such a form of 
Soviet patriotism, on its own, was not necessarily Russian 
nationalism; but it was followed in subsequent years by the 
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rehabilitation of Russia's pre-revolutionary past. This 
was not the "national pride" that Lenin had taken in the 
peasant revolts or the Decembrists, but the exaltation of 
Russian military heroes, be they Muscovite tsars or 
generals such as Kutuzov and Suvorov. The Press linked the 
patriotism of Alexander Nevsky, who defeated the Swedes in 
the thirteenth century, and of Dmitry Donskoi, who defeated 
the Tatars at Kulikovo Field in 1380, with the patriotism 
of Soviet Russians, and praised the (tsarist) "national 
Russian State". Monuments from, and memorials to, the 
tsarist past were repaired or constructed. The 
smenovekhoKLýy Aleksei Tolstoy and Ehrenburg presented the 
Russian revolution as a Russian national achievement, 
rejecting the "cosmopolitanism of the nineteenth 
century". 164 Agursky sees the purges of the 1930s as a 
counter-revolution, an attempt to impose the right-wing 
nationalist ideology on the Party by destroying the leftist 
leaders. 165 Of particular importance to the non-Russians 
was the re-interpretation of history. Russian historians 
claimed that the incorporation of the nationalities into 
the tsarist Empire, while leading to national oppression, 
was nevertheless the "lesser evil" in comparison with the 
alleged alternative, incorporation in the Ottoman or 
Persian Empires. Further, their presence in the Russian 
Empire enabled them to benefit from soviet power after 
1917.16() 
Accusations of bourgeois nationalism abounded against 
non-Russian Communist leaders, and the native elites were 
devastated in the purges. N. S. Khrushchev's transfer to 
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head the Party in the Ukraine is an example of a Russian 
being sent to do a Job previously done by a member of the 
local nationality. This trend facilitated the resurrection 
of the Russian language among the minorities. By 1938, 
many national schools had omitted Russian from the 
curriculum; in that year, it was made compulsory. 167 It 
would appear that the regime was seeking to build a 
political base among the Great-Russian population, as the 
dominant nation, in order to hold the Soviet Union 
together. 
In May 1941, Stalin took the Russian nationalist 
campaign a stage further. The Central Committee 
ideological journal Bol'shevik published an article, 
entitled "On Engels's Article 'The Foreign Policy of 
Russian Tsarism'" which it said Stalin had written in 1934. 
Stalin's article was a defence of tsarism against an attack 
by Engels in an article of 1890. Stalin accused Engels of 
overestimating the role of Tsarist Russian expansionism as 
a threat to world peace at the time. He had neglected the 
struggle for markets, raw materials and colonies and the 
antagonism between British and German imperialism. It 
appears from the conclusion to Stalin's piece that the 
Bol'shevik editors had in 1934 intended to publish Engels's 
article, and Stalin had told them not to. 168 Stalin's 
criticisms of Engels, it should be stressed, were made 
entirely within a Marxist framework, but their publication 
on the eve of the Nazi attack must have been designed to 
facilitate the use of tsarist patriotic symbols in the 
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defence of the USSR. 
The German occupation revealed the negative 
consequences of the nationality policies pursued in the 
1930s. Western and Soviet scholars disagree about the 
extent of the phenomenon, but it seems that large numbers 
of Ukrainians and people from the Caucasus and newly- 
incorporated Baltic nationalities welcomed the invasion. 
Some fought with the Germans against Soviet Russia (as did 
some Russians also). Stalin's accusation that whole 
nationalities - the Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, Kalmyks, 
Kabardinians, Balkars, Chechens, Ingush, Karachai and 
Meskhetians - had collaborated with the Nazis was disowned 
by later Soviet leaders. 169 But the deportation of these 
groups to Central Asia was a signal to the other 
nationalities, especially the Muslims, to accept their 
subordinate place in the increasingly Russian-dominated 
USSR. (Some Western Ukrainians and Lithuanians continued 
to offer armed resistance against their annexation until 
the mid-1950s. ) 
In terms of its effect on the Russians, however, the 
appeal to Russian nationalism during the Great Patriotic 
War must be considered a success. In September 1941 Stalin 
admitted to Averell Harriman, the American Ambassador, that 
the Russian people were not fighting for the Party. "We 
are under no illusion that they are fighting for us. They 
are fighting for Mother Russia. 11170 From the Lenin 
Mausoleum in Red Square, Stalin addressed the troops bound 
for the front on the anniversary of the revolution, 7 
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November 1941: "Let the manly images of our great ancestors 
- Alexander Nevsky, Dimitry Donskoy, Kuzma Minin, Dimitry 
Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov, and Mikhail Kutuzov - inspire 
you in this war! "171 This invocation of tsarist Russian 
heroes could appeal to Russians, and to many Ukrainians and 
Belorussians, but not to the other nationalities. The 
dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943 was highly 
symbolic, but perhaps not as significant as it is sometimes 
considered to be, for most non-ruling Communist parties 
continued for the time being to be loyal to Moscow. The 
new anthem of the Soviet Union which replaced the 
Internationale in 1943 stated that the USSR had been 
created by "Great Rus"'. Alongside Russian patriotism, 
however, there remained an attempt to appeal to the non- 
Russians through their own traditions, as well as the more 
orthodox Soviet patriotism. Walter Kolarz was moved to 
write during the War that this Soviet patriotism was the 
ideology ol a "new Party" which had replaced the Bolshevism 
y". 172 oi the "old Part, 
Stalin's "victory toast" of 24 May 1945 made clear that 
the Russians were to be seen as the core of the USSR. It 
was both an attempt to carry over into peacetime the 
support that he had won from the Russians during the War, 
and a signal to the non-Russians. 
I would like to propose a toast to our Soviet people, 
and in particular to the health of the Russian people. 
I drink first of all to the health of the Russian 
people because it is the leading nation of all the 
nations belonging to the Soviet Union. 
I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people 
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because it earned in this war general recognition as 
the guiding force of the Soviet Union among all the 
peoples of our country. 
I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people 
not only because it is the leading people, but also 
because it has a clear mind, a firm character and 
patience. 173 
The tremendous losses and sacrifices made in the War by 
the Soviet population, above all by the Russian, Ukrainian, 
Belorussian and of course Jewish peoples, had a major 
impact on the feelings of the masses. One of the themes of' 
Russian messianism now taken up by official Soviet 
propaganda was Russia's military services to humanity. 
Russia had saved Europe from the Mongols, from Napoleon and 
now from the Nazis -a view which reflected Russian popular 
sentiment. 174 Along with this universalist messianism - 
Russia as servant - came a nationalist messianism, 
trumpeted from official platforms. The creativity of the 
Russians was praised to unheard-of heights. Russia owed 
nothing to the West, but led the world in everything. From 
1944, chauvinist claims abounded, such as "Russian science, 
like all Russian culture, has always been original and 
independent. "175 A. A. Zhdanov, the ideology Secretary of 
the Central Committee, claimed in 194b: "Our literature, 
reflecting a system many times superior to any bourgeois 
democratic order, a culture many times higher than any 
bourgeois culture, has the right to teach other people a 
new, universal, human morality., '176 The virulent attack on 
Western culture, characterized as bourgeois 
cosmopolitanism, continued until the death of Stalin. At 
its height, Peter I and even the nineteenth-century 
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Westernizers came under attack. 177 From 1945, more 
emphasis was placed on Marxism in the assertion of Russian 
primacy; it was pointed out that not only did Russia have 
the first successful workers' revolution, but Russian had 
been the first language into which Das,, Kapital had been 
translated, and Marx himself had learned Russian. 
178 
Stalin's ideological innovation, the leading role of the 
Russian nation, combined elements of Marxism, Leninism and 
Russian messianism and nationalism. Commentators such as 
Boris Ishboldin, like Ustrialov in the 1920s, saw the 
possibility of Marxism being undermined from within, with 
the emergence of leaders who would wish to replace Marxism 
with Russian nationalism. i79 In 1950 F. I. Kozhevnikov 
updated Stalin's criticism of Engels's views on tsarist 
foreign policy; American, British and other imperialisms 
had sometimes been more expansionist and predatory than 
Russian imperialism. 180 Clearly, for Stalin the use of 
Russian nationalism was more than a short-term tactic. 
In the non-Russian areas, the national languages were 
maintained in the national schools and Press. An exception 
was West Belorussia, reunited with Belorussia at the end of 
the War, where the Press was in Russian alone, apparently 
because the authorities considered Belorussian nationalism 
to be weak. Stalin expected that only after the world 
victory of socialism would the languages of the world merge 
into "zonal" languages, such as Russian, which would later 
merge into a common world language. The national languages 
became mainly a vehicle for the transmission of Russian 
culture to the non-Russians. It was usually the latter who 
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were obliged to speak of the leading role of the Russian 
nation in the USSR. References were made to the "voluntary 
unification" of particular peoples with the Russians under 
tsarism. In contrast to the theory of the "lesser evil", 
it was claimed in 1951 that "In the economic life of the 
peoples included in Russia, there was much that was new and 
positive. " The non-Russians had benefited from the 
acquisition of Russian culture. 181 Traditional heroes of 
the non-Russians, such as Imam Shamil who resisted tsarist 
expansion into the Caucasus, were portrayed as 
reactionaries. Against this, it should be emphasized that 
Russian culture also suffered badly after the war, as 
exemplified by the silencing of Anna Akhmatova and Mikhail 
Zoshchenko. But among the full and candidate members of 
the Party Central Committee elected in 1952, Russians 
increased from 66.9% (of those elected in 1939) to 
71.5%. 182 
The Russian nationalism of Ivan Aksakov and some other 
nineteenth-century figures had been accompanied by pan- 
Slavism. It was perhaps not surprising that during the War 
Moscow sought to stimulate pan-Slav feeling against the 
Nazi occupiers of Slavdom. In August 1941 an All-Slav 
Meeting was held in Moscow, and addressed by Aleksei 
Tolstoy. The meeting created a committee which organized 
further meetings and a journal Slaviane (The Slavs). This 
promoted the ideas of Slav union and Moscow as the 
spiritual centre of Slavdom. Stalin declared that Hitler 
was seeking to exterminate the Slavs. Support was sought 
1 to 
from Slav emigrants in the Americas. When the Nazis were 
driven back, Slavonic committees were established in 
Eastern Europe with the aim of promoting friendship with 
the USSR. A congress was organized in Belgrade in December 
1946. There seems little dispute that Soviet pan-Slavism 
was a tactic, rather than a long-term ideological change. 
Moscow wanted not a Slav federation, but a sphere of 
influence in Eastern Europe which would extend beyond the 
Slav countries (to Romania, Hungary and Germany), based 
mainly on bilateral relations with the USSR. In this 
context pan-Slavism was an obstacle to Soviet aims, and it 
was largely dropped by 1950.183 
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The Russian Orthodox Church--and Russian messianisiikiinder 
Lenin-and Stalin 
Even before 1917, Lenin's strong antipathy to any form 
of religion took a particularly hostile form as far as the 
Russian Orthodox Church was concerned, because of the links 
of the latter with the tsarist State. At the same time, he 
saw the adherents of the religions other than the official 
Church as potential allies against tsarism, because of the 
persecution some of them had suffered. The 1918 decree on 
religion, separating the Church from the State and the 
school from the Church, and nationalizing Church property, 
severely weakened the position of the Orthodox Church, as 
the established faith, but had less effect on other 
religions. The Constitution of 1918 promised freedom of 
religious and anti-religious propaganda. 184 
The newly-restored Moscow Patriarchate pursued a line 
that was generally hostile to the atheist Bolsheviks (even 
in December 1917 the Sobor demanded that the head of the 
Russian State be Orthodox), although from 1919 it was 
formally neutral between the Reds and the Whites. The 
ruling Party attempted to combine frontal attacks on the 
Patriarchate with support for the efforts of the pro-Soviet 
"Living Church" movement to take over the Church from 
within. Under Lenin, large numbers of hierarchs and 
priests were arrested, and many believers were killed. The 
Patriarch of Moscow, Tikhon, was arrested in 1922. In July 
1923, having been released, he published a "confession", in 
which he stated that he had been involved in "anti-Soviet 
activities" of which he now repented. 185 The Church 
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leaders continued to suffer arrests and exile. Since the 
"Living Church" lacked credibility with the laity, the 
regime sought to pressurize successive leaders of the 
Patriarchate to carry out its wishes. Tikhon died in 1925. 
1n March 1927, the Patriarchal locum-tenens, Metropolitan 
Sergii of Nizhny Novgorod, was released from prison. The 
following summer he made a declaration of loyalty to the 
Soviet government. He asked for the position of the Church 
to be normalized, and for a Sobor to be held to elect a 
Patriarch. 
We want [he said] to be Orthodox, and at the same time 
to recognize the Soviet Union as our civic motherland, 
the joys and successes of which are our joys and 
successes, and the failures are our failures. 18b 
Following this declaration, Sergii was allowed to take 
over the administration of the Church, and the government 
abandoned its support for the "Living Church". The respite 
proved temporary; the 1929 Law on Religious Associations 
removed the legal right of religious propaganda, confining 
the churches to the role of' worship. From 1929 to the mid- 
1930s all the religions in the Soviet Union, including the 
Orthodox, suffered severe persecution. This was associated 
with Stalin's "left turn"; the churches were accused of 
backing the "kulaks" and opposing collectivization. 
Bishops and priests went to labour camps, and churches were 
destroyed, including some of great historical significance. 
One of the effects of this was to drive much religious 
activity underground; considerable sections of the Orthodox 
Church had already rejected Sergii's declaration of loyalty 
to the atheist State. As far as other churches were 
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concerned, the Roman Catholics had been without a single 
bishop since 1926; and by 1939 several Protestant 
denominations had been destroyed. The Russian Orthodox 
Church itself in 1939 had "only a few hundred clergy and 
open churches left, only seven bishops were still in office 
and all diocesan administrations, except those in Moscow 
and Leningrad, had had to cease their activity. "187 
In the late 1930s there seems to have been some 
slackening of the pressure on the religions, as Stalin 
subordinated everything to the struggle to develop the 
defence industry. 188 When the Nazis attacked in June 1941, 
Metropolitan Sergii responded at once with a call on 
Christians to take an active part in the war, emphasizing 
that the fates of the Orthodox Church and the Russian 
nation had always been linked. The Church collected 
millions of roubles for national defence, equipping the 
Dimitry Donskoi tank column and the Alexander Nevsky air 
squadron. In September 1943 Stalin and the Foreign 
Minister, V. M. Molotov, received Sergii and two other 
metropolitans in the Kremlin and promised to improve 
conditions for the Church. A Sobor of hierarchs was held 
and elected Sergii as Patriarch of Moscow. At the same 
time, thousands of Orthodox churches were re-opened 
throughout the country. Other faiths also had their 
position improved and regularized; the All-Union Council of 
Evangelical Christians and Baptists (AUCECB) was 
established for the Protestant groups, and four Spiritual 
Directorates were created for the Muslims. A major factor 
in the change in the official attitude to religion was the 
320 
experience in the Western parts of the Soviet Union. Here 
the Nazi occupiers re-opened the churches, which were then 
filled with believers. This show of religious feeling must 
have suggested to Stalin the propaganda advantages of 
permitting freedom of worship. Provided that religious 
activity was under the control of approved bodies, who 
would proclaim loyalty to the government, another channel 
of political socialization would be created, which could 
imm diately be used to encourage the war effort. 189 
Within the context of the new religious freedom, the 
Orthodox Church was given a privileged position. Whereas 
the other faiths were administered by the Council for the 
Affairs of Religious Cults, it was governed by the Council 
for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Church 
was allowed to publish the monthly Zhurnal Moskovskoi 
Patriarkhii (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), and the 
Patriarch's pastoral letters were published in the 
government paper Igvestiia. Following the death of 
Patriarch Sergii, a Sobor was held in January-February 1945 
to elect Metropolitan Aleksii of Leningrad as Patriarch. 190 
A graphic example of the State's partiality to the 
Orthodox Church was the forced incorporation of the 
Ukrainian Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church into the Russian 
Church. This was accomplished by a so-called Uniate 
"Sobor" in Lvov, held in March 1946, when much of the 
Uniate leadership, including Metropolitan (later Cardinal) 
Slipyj, was in captivity. The Uniate Church, as the major 
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denomination in the Western Ukraine, had been a bastion of 
Ukrainian nationalism, and with the incorporation of the 
Western Ukraine in the USSR Stalin sought to make the 
Uniates illegal. The interests of the Soviet State and the 
Orthodox Church coincided. The State wanted to use the 
Russian Church as an instrument to fight Ukrainian 
nationalism, and the Church wished to expand its influence 
into territories which it considered had been unjustly torn 
from it centuries before. The Orthodox Church was given 
especially favourable conditions to proselytize among the 
Uniates. In practice, many Uniate priests and believers 
went over to Orthodoxy in appearance only, maintaining 
their loyalty to Slipyj. 191 
The dissident Russian Orthodox priest Gleb Pavlovich 
Iakunin (born 1934) wrote in 197b a critical samizdat 
account of the activities of the Patriarchate under Stalin. 
He is right to see Stalin's support for Orthodoxy as part 
of his move to a "nationalist-chauvinist policy", in which 
the Church was given the role of a "catalyst and cementing 
component". 192 The Russian Orthodox Church was the 
traditional church of not only the Russians but also of 
most Ukrainians and Belorussians, covering the three 
largest nationalities in the USSR. In return for Stalin's 
support, the Church heaped the highest praise on him, using 
language normally reserved for Jesus. Stalin was "the 
first man of peace", with an "all-embracing heart which 
takes on itself all the pain of suffering". 193 It was he 
"whom Divine Providence chose and placed to lead our 
Fatherland on the path of prosperity and glory". 194 
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Iakunin suggests that Aleksii expected that Stalin was 
about to declare the country a pan-Slav Orthodox Empire. 195 
The presentation of Stalin as "God's chosen one" was a 
direct descendant of Filofei's portrayal of the Tsar. This 
concept was extended to the messianic presentation of 
Moscow as the "chosen city", the "Third Rome". The 
occasion was the 800th anniversary of the founding of the 
city, in 1947. Archpriest N. A. Khariuzov, for example, 
combining Orthodox and Communist ideas, wrote in Zhurnal 
Moskovskoi Patriarkhii: 
Now Moscow is the centre of the social life of 
humanity, the centre which unites all progressive and 
democratic elements, and in religious life Moscow is 
not the centre of aristocratically despotic Catholicism 
or of anarchic Protestantism. Moscow is the centre of 
true Orthodoxy, rejecting this or that extreme. 
It is not only among us Russian people that the thought 
of Moscow awakens the best memories of our native 
country, but also among the peoples of the fraternal 
republics, among all the Slavs, and among all the 
freedom-loving peoples the thought of Moscow evokes the 
best, bright hopes for the future ... 
Moscow is a beacon, a beacon not only for us Orthodox, 
but also for those seeking true, unclouded civil, 
national and religious freedom. Moscow is a beacon for 
all of toiliný. humanity, for all who seek religious and 
social truth. 6 
In November 1947 the Metropolitan of the Levant, Elie 
Karam, visited Patriarch Aleksii. In a speech he portrayed 
the Russian people as the chosen people. 
I have found out a lot about the great Russian people 
and its Church and am now personally convinced that the 
Russian Orthodox Church is the Church of 
Orthodoxy... The Lord God blesses the Russian people as He once blessed Abraham. The Russian people is like 
the people of the Holy Land and the Russian land can be 
compared with the Holy Land of Palestine. 197 
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More directly, the Bulgarian Metropolitan Stefan said 
in 1948: "Moscow became the Third Rome by occupying the 
place of the First in its confession of Christ's truth. "198 
The last two quotations exemplify the use of the 
Russian Orthodox Church in promoting Soviet foreign policy. 
Part of the price paid by the Church for its relatively 
privileged position in the USSR was the obligation to 
promote among foreign churches, and later in ecumenical 
church bodies, official Soviet views, as well as denying 
the existence of any religious persecution. The Russian 
Church was not successful in its attempt to take over the 
role of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Orthodoxy, the 
Patriarch of Constantinople. But, owing to the Soviet 
military control of Eastern Europe, it was able to 
establish itself as the "elder brother" of the Orthodox 
churches in the Balkans, and hence promote Soviet interests 
through churches in Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. 199 
The Jews_under-_Lenin and_jStalin 
Before the revolution, Lenin and Stalin both argued 
that the Jews were not a nation or a nationality, since 
they did not have a common territory. They were a caste, 
and the best solution to the Jewish question was the 
assimilation of the Jews to the surrounding 
nationalities. 200 Lenin opposed both anti-Semitism and 
Zionism, seeing them as divisive within the labour 
movement, and his own attitude to the Jews has been 
described as "philo-Semitism". 201 Stalin, on the other 
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hand, was anti-Semitic even in his twenties. In his report 
on the V Party Congress (1907), Stalin noted that while the 
overwhelming majority of Bolshevik delegates had been 
Russian, Jews were the largest group among the Mensheviks. 
He added lightheartedly that this had led someone to 
suggest that the Bolsheviks should start a pogrom against 
the Mensheviks. 202 According to Edward E. Smith, in 
Stalin's major work "The National Question and Social- 
Democracy" (1913), he mentioned the Bund, Jews and Jewish 
customs over 185 times, and not one comment was 
favourable. 203 
After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks confirmed 
the ban on religious and national discrimination which had 
been decreed by the Provisional Government. Lenin yielded 
to Jewish pressure and gave the Jews the legal status of a 
nationality. In 1918, Jewish sections (Evsektsii) were 
established within the Party, and in the State machine a 
People's Commissariat for Jewish Nationality Affairs was 
created. (The latter was merged into the Commissariat for 
Nationalities in 1924. ) The prime aim of these bodies, 
composed of Jewish Bolsheviks, was to conduct propaganda 
among the Jewish population. The Evsektsii campaigned 
(until their demise in 1930) against Judaism and Zionism, 
while promoting Yiddish-language schools and publications. 
They had the traditional Jewish community organizations 
dissolved in 1919 for alleged counter-revolutionary 
activity. Hebrew publications and education were virtually 
banned from 1919, because of the association of the 
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language with religion and Zionism. The assault on the 
Jewish religion was at least as strong as on any other 
religion. At a propagandistic "trial of the Jewish 
religion" in Kiev in 1921, it was alleged that the Talmud 
instructed the Jews to "murder the best of the goyim". 204 
This occurred despite the numerous pogroms suffered by 
Ukrainian Jews during the Civil War, which left over 50 000 
dead. 205 
An attempt was made to free the Jews from their 
confinement to a limited number of occupations, by 
reconstructing the whole of Jewish economic life. It was 
considered essential that Jews should become farmers, and 
there was a substantial programme of Jewish agrarian 
resettlement. The most ambitious attempt to enable the 
Jews to preserve their own nationality within Soviet 
society and undermine the appeal of Zionism was the 
creation in 1934 of the Jewish autonomous oblast', known as 
Birobijan. Although it was located in inhospitable 
territory in the Far East, on the Chinese border, tens of 
thousnds of Jews did go there. Kalinin in 192b had said: 
"The Jewish people stands before a great task: to preserve 
its nationality.,, 206. It was envisaged that this 
nationality would be preserved by the use of Yiddish as the 
official language in Birobijan. In practice, the 
overwhelming majority of Jews remained West of the Urals, 
where they soon began to use the Russian language and 
abandon Yiddish. In Birobijan, the share of Jews in the 
total population never rose above about a quarter; Yiddish 
never became dominant, and by 1945 there were no Yiddish 
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schools left. 207 With the decline in Jewish religious 
belief and observance, many Soviet citizens were reminded 
of their Jewish origin only by the nationality entry in 
their passports, introduced in 1932. 
The Soviet Press through the 1920s denounced anti- 
Semitism, and Kalinin admitted that the Russian 
intelligentsia was more anti-Semitic than it had ever been 
before the revolution. In 1929 Pravda even attacked the 
connivance of Party organizations in allowing anti- 
Semitism. Stalin in 1931 and Molotov in 1936 publicly 
attacked anti-Semitism, perhaps for the benefit of anti- 
Nazi foreign audiences, with Molotov even pointing to 
Marx's Jewish origins. The Great Purge marked a turning- 
point in the official attitude: former Jewish leaders of 
the USSR such as Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Radek were 
denounced as traitors, while the patriotism of the Russians 
was being exalted. The Central Committee elected as late 
as 1939 nevertheless still had a Jewish composition of 
10.8% -a substantial decline from the early twenties but 
an overrepresentation of their 5% of the total 
population. 208 
The period of the Nazi-Soviet pact (1939-1941) was, to 
say the least, a worrying time for Soviet Jews. The Soviet 
propaganda machine, in promoting the non-aggression 
agreement, not only ceased to attack fascism but focussed 
on the common interest of the USSR and Germany in the 
defeat of the Western imperialist democracies. The atheist 
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magazine Bezbozhnik (The Atheist) in 1940 praised the Nazi 
attack on Judaism. The Soviet Jewish test pilot Mark 
Gallai wrote in ýjoyyL. mir in 1966 of the atmosphere at the 
time: "Much appeared to us inexplicable, wild, unnatural ... 
fascists ceased to be called fascists.,, 209 The situation 
changed in 1941. The Soviet government held a meeting of 
leading Soviet Jewish representatives of the arts and 
sciences, where it was pointed out that the Jews were the 
chief victims of the Nazis. In April 1942 the Jewish Anti- 
Fascist Committee was established, with the writer Solomon 
Mikhoels in the chair and Ilia Ehrenburg a member. The 
Committee was to mobilize Soviet Jews and win support for 
the Soviet war effort from Jews in the Allied countries. In 
this latter purpose, it was analogous to the pan-Slav 
comittee. At the same time, it seems that the partisan 
detachments who fought behind the German lines were 
frequently viciously anti-Semitic, especially in the 
Ukraine. How much this was to do with the Nazi attempts to 
stir up the Slav and Baltic peoples against the Jews is 
difficult to say. During (as well as after) the War, 
internal Soviet propaganda tended to play down the Nazi 
treatment of the Jews, as indeed did British and American 
propaganda at this time. At least part of the reason for 
the silence on the Soviet side was probably the Soviet 
unwillingness to give any credence to Nazi propaganda 
claims about "Jewish Bolshevism". Any emphasis on Jewish 
suffering, coming from the Soviet media, might have played 
into the hands of the Nazis. Both Germans and Soviets must 
have been aware of the anti-Semitism present in the Western 
part of the Soviet Union at this time and demonstrated 
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later in the Harvard refugee project. 210 
An additional factor in the Soviet attitude was the 
presence of anti-Semitism among the Soviet leaders 
themselves. Ehrenburg was reported to have referred to 
this anti-Semitism in 1945. Further, the Soviet leaders 
believed, according to Solomon Schwarz, that if publicity 
was given to the Holocaust, the Nazi actions might be 
welcomed by the Soviet population. In the Ukraine, the 
Soviet authorities seem to have admitted caution in 
confronting anti-Semitism; they stated that it could only 
gradually be uprooted. Schwarz nevertheless suggests that 
the appointment of a Jew, Lazar M. Kaganovich, as First 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in 1947 was 
intended to condition the population to accept the Jews. 
An alternative explanation might be that it was designed 
positively to encourage anti-Jewish feeling in the Ukraine. 
Jews were virtually excluded after the War (despite their 
positive role in the Soviet Army) from the ministries of 
Defence, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. 211 
Whether this exclusion reflected genuine fears about 
the loyalty of the Jews to the Soviet State in 
international affairs is difficult to ascertain. The 
Soviet recognition of Israel in 1948, despite long-standing 
opposition to Zionism, gave some legitimacy to the idea 
that Soviet Jews might have a homeland outside the USSR. 
The enthusiasm of some Soviet Jews for the establishment of 
Israel was shown by the welcome given to Golda Meyerson 
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(Meir), Israeli Ambassador to Moscow, in October 1948. 
This may well have been the catalyst for the "anti- 
cosmopolitan" campaign which began soon afterwards. The 
Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was dissolved in November 
1948, and the main Yiddish newspaper Einikeit (Unity) was 
"suspended" - that is, closed down - at the same time. In 
April 1949 five leading Yiddish writers were jailed 
(Mikhoels had died in mysterious circumstances in January 
1948). There followed a major attack on the Soviet Jewish 
community, who were accused of being "rootless 
cosmopolitans". The wave of purges and executions was much 
more clearly directed at the Jews than in the 1930s. The 
Press was full of "criminals" with Jewish names, and in 
cases where the individuals had Russian names, their 
original Jewish names were added in brackets. Blows fell 
on all aspects of Jewish culture. The former Soviet Jewish 
physicist and emigration activist, Mark Ia. Azbel, writes: 
Russians were not wholly exempt from these attacks; but 
nine out of ten of the criminals were Jews.... No part 
of the Soviet Union was more amenable to the adoption 
of measures toward the suppression of Jews than the 
Ukraine.... the majority considered the ever-increasing 
dismissals and arrests of Jews in the late 'forties and 
early 'fifties a matter of' indifference, if not a 
welcome change in policy. 212 
The proportion of Jews in the 1952 Central Committee 
(full and candidate members) slumped from 10.8% to 3.0%. 
The campaign reached its climax in the "Doctors' Plot" of 
January 1953, when Jewish doctors were accused of plotting 
to poison Stalin. Anti-Semitism was being stirred up on 
the streets. Rumours spread that eminent Jewish figures 
were about to issue a statement recognizing the "guilt" of 
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the Jewish people, and asking the government to exile 
Soviet Jews to Siberia. Pogroms were in the air. This 
atmosphere lifted only when Stalin died in March 1953, and 
the new leaders announced that the "Doctors' Plot" had been 
a frame-up. 213 
Stalinisin and-Russian messianism: -an--appraisal 
Agursky explains the growth of official Russian 
nationalism under Stalin by the displacement of Marxism- 
Leninism by National Bolshevism as the ideology of the top 
leadership. Rather like Trotsky, 214 Agursky sees the 
purges of the 1930s as part of Stalin's counter-revolution, 
intended to destroy the Bolshevik Party and replace it with 
a party committed to a right-wing nationalist ideology. At 
the same time Stalin did not want to abandon the 
international appeal of Communist ideology, for it could be 
used for Russian national objectives. Moreover, he was 
unsure whether the new elite was prepared to jettison 
Marxist phraseology. Agursky says that the multinational 
nature of the Soviet Union also constrained Stalin. 215 
Opposed to Agursky's position is the view of Frederick 
Barghoorn, expressed in his Soviet Russian_Nationalism 
(1956) and elsewhere. For the latter, Soviet Russian 
messianism is "Communist imperialism" in Russian guise. 216 
Nationalism was only a tactic, under which the Soviet 
leaders concealed their Marxist-Leninist aims. 
... to a surprising degree the rulers have succeeded in 
utilizing for their own purposes these traditional and 
spontaneous forces without themselves succumbing to 
their appeal. 
A great weakness in the Kremlin's use of Russian 
nationalism - and of other elements of traditional 
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culture, such as the Russian Orthodox religion - is 
that it cannot, if it is to retain its ideological and 
power mono oly, be 'sincere' in relation to those 
elements. 2ý7 
Nevertheless, Barghoorn saw Russian nationalism creeping 
into the Soviet ideology, which he described as "a 
synthesis of parts of the Russian tradition and parts of 
Marxism". 218 And he admitted: "To a considerable degree, 
the 'Soviet' themes and symbols in Soviet ideology mask 
'covert' or 'latent' Russian attitudes. "219 
It would not be easy to establish whether Stalin's 
Russian nationalism was sincere. Where Agursky cannot be 
faulted, however, is in his recognition of a profound 
reorientation during the 1920s and 1930s, both in official 
attitudes and in policy, as far as Russian nationalism is 
concerned. The internationalism and universalist 
messianism of the October Revolution gave way to "Socialism 
in one country", initially an attempt to allow the 
revolution to survive in a hostile capitalist world. 
"Socialism in one country" developed, however, into a 
policy of making Russia into something resembling a normal 
member of the international system (reflected in the Soviet 
entry into the League of Nations in 1934), unwilling unduly 
to alienate capitalist allies abroad. Revolution was soft- 
pedalled or repressed in the Popular Front period 
(especially during the Spanish Civil War), and even the 
ideological struggle with Nazism was abandoned during the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. After the War, the division of 
the world into superpower spheres of influence left 
ambiguous the Soviet attitude to revolution in the West 
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(shown in Stalin's unwillingness to aid the Greek 
Communists). 220 The imposition of the Soviet model on the 
East European countries and their subordination to Moscow 
to some extent can be represented as a result of 
nationalist messianism. The compulsory teaching of the 
Russian language in the schools of the satellite countries, 
and in Bulgaria even the Russification of the alphabet, 221 
echoed earlier efforts within Tsarist Russia. The Chinese 
imitation of the Soviet model, outside Soviet control, did 
not evoke Stalin's enthusiasm. 
In the field of nationality policy, Lenin's worst fears 
were borne out. Not only did the freedom to secede become 
a "scrap of paper", but from the 1930s the non-Russian 
Communist leaders were forced to recognize Russian primacy. 
It would be wrong to suggest that Russian culture was 
privileged; many of its creators died in the camps. The 
Russian Orthodox Church, seen under Lenin as particularly 
counter-revolutionary, came back under Stalin in a 
privileged position and did what the Communist Party could 
not: it proclaimed that Moscow was the Third Rome and that 
Stalin was chosen by God. Lenin's opposition to anti- 
Semitism gave way to the apparent adoption of Nazi 
attitudes by Stalin after the War. It seems at least 
possible that a reason for the attacks on the "rootless 
cosmopolitans" was that the very existence of the Jews was 
a threat to the primacy of the Russian "Chosen People". 
The traditional anti-Semitism of Russian nationalism here 
encountered the actual overrepresentation (and sometimes 
dominance) of the Jews in Soviet political life, arts and 
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sciences. In proclaiming Russian primacy, and in 
mobilizing this anti-Semitism at the end of his life, 
Stalin seems to have been appealing for support to the 
Russian and Ukrainian masses. The reaction to his death 
suggests that he got that support. Perhaps Stalin was not 
really motivated by either Marxism-Leninism or by Russian 
nationalism, but by a personal ideology, centring on the 
need for him to maintain and expand his power, at whatever 
cost. 
This chapter has surveyed socialist Russian messianism 
from Herzen and the narodniks to Stalin. There might seem 
to be litle in common between the messianism based on the 
agrarian obshchina and the extension of the power of the 
newly-industrialized USSR into Prague and Berlin. But the 
Populist belief that Russia could be a model for socialism 
in the West fed into Russian Marxism and then Bolshevism. 
The isolation of the revolution meant that it would either 
collapse, or survive "in one country". This made a certain 
appeal to national feeling inevitable. The founders of 
scientific socialism had already shown in the nineteenth 
century how easy it was to combine their doctrine with 
nationalist messianism - in their case, the German variety. 
Stalin, secure in power in a Russia faced with capitalist 
encirclement, replaced the German ingredient with the 
Russian equivalent. 
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Chapter Five 
De-Stalinization and the Growth of Russian National 
Consciousness: The Khrushchey Era. 1953-1954 
In Stalin's last years a form of Russian messianism had 
become integrated into official thinking. Khrushchev did 
not renounce the idea of the Russian people as the elder 
brother of the other peoples of the USSR, but he did end 
the extreme Russian chauvinism and anti-Semitic terror 
which characterized the final period of the rule of his 
predecessor. While Russian nationalism under Stalin was 
tightly controlled, the Khrushchev era saw the re-emergence 
in the USSR of semi-autonomous and autonomous 
manifestations of Russian nationalism. This came about 
through two distinct developments. The first was the 
process of de-Stalinization, promoted by Khrushchev at the 
XX Party Congress in February 1956 and the XXII Congress in 
October 1961. The second was the attempt, proclaimed at 
the XXII Congress, to achieve the basic requirements for 
the transition to full communism in the USSR by 1980. This 
aim threatened the continued existence of differences 
between nationalities, and therefore the existence of the 
Russian nation, and the survival of religion. 
In ideological terms, the most important effect of 
Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the XX Congress was 
the diminution of faith in official Marxism-Leninism. For 
decades the personality of Stalin had been at the centre of 
the ruling ideology. The pro-capitalist dissident Vladimir 
K. Bukovsky recalls in his memoirs that he was bewildered 
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that life continued after Stalin's death. 1 Mark Azbel 
vividly portrays the devastation and sincere grief felt by 
the overwhelming majority of the Soviet population on the 
death of the vozhd'. 2 Yet now the father of his people, 
the architect of socialist industrialization and the 
victory over fascism, was being denounced as a mass 
murderer. The announcement of Stalin's guilt implicitly 
challenged the infallibility of the Party (although this 
was far from Khrushchev's intention; he argued that in 
unmasking Stalin the Party was again showing the people the 
true path). 3 Those who had believed most fervently in 
Stalin, naturally, were the most disoriented, and some of 
these were later to seek a new form of infallibility in 
religion. 
Vladimir Nikolaevich Osipov, the future editor of the 
samizdat journal Veche, described in a 1970 article the 
consequences for him and part of his generation of Komsomol 
members of Khrushchev's "secret speech". Osipov was born 
in 1937 in Chizhikovo village in Pskov oblast'. He became a 
history student at Moscow University. Stalin was the man 
who 
so personified the existing system and ideology that 
the very words 'soviet power' and 'Stalin' seemed 
synonymous. All of us future seditious elements at the 
dawn of our youth were fanatical Stalinists. At the 
call of this man, who seemed to us the summit of human 
intellligence, will and conscience, we were ready to do 
anything. We did not look at life, or notice the 
poverty of the villages and the petty tyranny of the 
officials, and we believed with a truly religious zeal. 
The personality cult was the super-perversion of the 
traditional honouring of the leader. 
Khrushchev's report and the XX Congress annihilated our 
faith, tearing out the heart of our world-view, and 
Stalin was the heart, for such was the propaganda of 
351 
Marxism over the preceding quarter of a century. 4 
Mikhail Iukhanovich Sado, a Leningrader born in 1934, 
was to become deputy head of the underground All-Russian 
Social-Christian Union for the Emancipation of the People 
(VSKh. '-)ON). Like the other leaders of the organization, he 
had been a fervent believer in Stalin and communism, and 
de-Stalinization was a great shock to him. 5 Leonid I. 
Pliushch, the Ukrainian mathematician, tells how 
Khrushchev's speech shook "the foundations of my ideology 
faith in Comrade Stalin's brilliance and endless kindness 
toward workers". ý) Pliushch did not lose his belief in 
socialism, however, but came to combine it with a concern 
for human rights and the national rights of the Ukraine. 
The second effect of the XX Congress was that many of 
the repressive features of the Stalin era were relaxed or 
disappeared altogether. Anatoly Emmanuilovich Levitin- 
Krasnov, born in 1915, an Orthodox Church writer, Moscow 
human rights activist and socialist, says that people were 
no longer afraid to think. 7 The dissident Moscow socialist 
Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev notes, however, that it was the 
XXII Congress which had a much greater impact on the 
political consciousness of the Soviet people. Whereas 
Khrushchev's speech at the XX Congress had not been 
published in the USSR, the anti-Stalinism of the XXII 
Congress was openly expressed, and led to the redesignation 
of places named after Stalin and the removal of his body 
from the Lenin mausoleum. 8 Nevertheless, the reduction of 
repression after Stalin's death showed its effects already 
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in the mid-1950s, even before the XX Congress. This was 
seen in the growing freedom of official cultural life, the 
rebirth of the consciousness of the national minorities and 
the growth of unofficial cultural and political activity. 
All these developments fostered the growth of Russian 
nationalism. 
Literature and. Russian-national consciousness. Early 
village_prose. Solzhenitsyn and Novyi mir 
An important result of cultural relaxation in the mid- 
1950s was the appearance of new literary journals. Among 
these were Iunost' (Youth), published by the Union of 
Writers of the USSR; Moskva (Moscow), published by the same 
body and the Moscow Writers' Organization; XgqL_aQy ngnnj 
(Our Contemporary), established in 1956 as an organ of the 
USSR Union of Writers, but which in 1958 became an organ of 
the newly-formed RSFSR Writers' Union; 11o1_odgiý_Fvardiia 
(Young Guard), published by the Komsomol; and VoP-rosv 
literatury (Problems of Literature), published by the Gorky 
Institute of World Literature. These journals, all based 
in Moscow, provided homes for writers who criticized 
various aspects of Soviet life. Further, two volumes of 
the anthology Literaturnaia Moskva (Literary Moscow) were 
published in 195(5, after which the editorial board was 
disbanded for going too far. The most significant journal 
in the cultural thaw, however, was the long-established 
Novyi-mir (New World), published in Moscow by the USSR 
Union of Writers. 9 
The genre of literature which contributed most to the 
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development of Russian national consciousness, and then of 
Russian nationalism, was that known as derevenskaia-proza - 
village, or rural, prose. This began with a concern for the 
problems of the countryside, and particularly the desire to 
protect the peasants from the exploitation which they 
suffered on the collective farm (kolkhoz). It developed 
into a literature which advocated the protection of peasant 
morality and customs, the villages themselves, and the 
churches and other historical monuments of Russian culture. 
It became linked with the defence of the Russian natural 
environment against the predacity of technological 
progress. The practitioners of derevenskaia-proza became 
known by the rather condescending term of derevenshchiki, 
which was acoustically close to a word denoting rural 
idiocy (derevenshchina). Some derevenshchiki went so far 
as to give a positive portrayal of the peasants' 
traditional Russian Orthodox Christianity. 
Village prose can be dated back to the writing of 
Valentin Ovechkin (1904-1968), whose short story "Raionnye 
budni" (District Routines) appeared in NoyXi_ýMir in 
September 1952, even before the death of Stalin. 10 
Ovechkin portrayed the real situation on the kolkhgzy, with 
peasants trying to avoid their obligations and suffering 
low living standards. He showed the conflicts among the 
kolkhoz leaders and the supervisory Party officials, 
exposing the remoteness and arrogance of some of the ruling 
cadres. A second instalment appeared in Pravda in July 
1953, after Stalin's death. Ovechkin wrote of the need for 
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the peasant to feel that he was the master of his land, and 
in 1956, in his collection Trudnaia-vesna (A Difficult 
Spring), he argued the necessity for an effective system of 
material incentives on the kolkhozy. His stories reflected 
the changing political situation of these years: a bad 
Party Secretary might be replaced by a good one, but the 
problems remained. il Ovechkin became a member of the 
editorial boards of both Novyi-mir and Nash sovremennik. 
In 1962, at the Kursk raion conference of the CPSU, he 
criticized Khrushchev's agricultural proposals. Finding 
himself isolated, he shot himself, but survived and was put 
in a mental hospital. 12 
Ovechkin's work was followed in N=i-mir by other 
writers, in particular Efim. Ia. Dorosh (1908-1973), Gavriil 
N. Troepolsky (born 1905) and Evgeny N. Gerasimov (born 
1903). These three authors advocated a shift of decision- 
making from the central authorities to the farms, 
particularly in the light of Khrushchev's mistaken 
agricultural policies of the late 1950s. Dorosh attacked 
the State's attempt at the "regimentation of human 
activity" in the economic sphere; he and Gerasimov called 
for the expansion of peasant private enterprise and free 
markets, while Troepolsky called for stability in planning 
and for the farms to be allowed to make their own decisions 
about what to sow. 13 Dorosh's Derevenskii-dnevnik (Village 
Diary) was published in a number of instalments from 1956 
to 1970, charting the changing fortunes of the countryside 
in the light of emerging problems and Party reactions. 14 
More than Ovechkin, he portrayed the peasants as 
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individuals and showed his respect for them. He 
sympathetically described their homes, clothes, tools and 
their caring relationship with the environment. While 
denying that he himself was religious, he argued for the 
preservation of village churches and showed appreciation of 
the peasants' religion. He also called for the rapid 
extension of modern utilities to the villages, and for the 
democratization of the kolkhoz, in order to increase The 
peasants' identification with it. Dorosh was not a 
xenophobe; he attacked the government's cultural isolation 
of the Soviet people. "Peoples, like individual persons, 
cannot live in isolation, and the more boldly a people 
draws from the outside, the healthier and more vivacious it 
will be. "15 Dorosh's views in this respect may be 
associated with the fact that, unlike the other writers of 
village prose, who all seem to be Russians, males and born 
in Russian villages, 16 he was of Jewish nationality (and 
born in the Ukraine) and perhaps more inclined to genuine 
internationalist strivings. 
The work of Dorosh and others might be seen as a 
response to the call of Fyodor A. Abramov (1920-1983) in 
Novyi-mir in April 1954 for writers to cease minimizing the 
real problems of the countryside. In 1958 Abramov himself 
began a long series of novels. It concerned the peasant 
Priaslin family of a village in the Arkhangelsk oblast' of 
Northern Russia, during the War and postwar years. It 
depicted their mutual solidarity and their oppression by 
corrupt local Party officials, and was completed only in 
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1978. He came under attack from the authorities for his 
1954 appeal, and for his i9b3 story "Vokrug da okoio" 
(Round and About), which was denounced as anti-Soviet. In 
the Brezhnev era, he became one of the most popular writers 
in the USSR for his novels and short stories. 17 
The story "Rychagi" (Levers) by Aleksandr Iashin (1913- 
1968), born in Vologda in the North, shows the 
transformation of four down-to-earth human peasants when 
they meet as the Primary Party Organization of their 
kolkhoZ, and speak in the bureaucratic-Stalinist language 
of their political masters. This appeared in the second 
Literaturnaia Moskva almanac. His "Vologodskaia svad'ba" 
(Vologda Wedding) published in Novyi ir in December 1962 
portrayed not only the neglect of the villages by the 
authorities, but also the moral degeneration of the 
peasants themselves. Both these stories aroused the ire of 
the literary critics for their outspokenness, perhaps not 
only because of their direct attacks on the Party, but also 
because, unlike in the Abramov series, the events were 
located in the present. 18 
A writer who was to become prominent in the Russian 
nationalist movement came to notice with the publication of 
his "Vladimirskie proselki" (Vladimir Country Roads) in 
Novyi-mir in September and October 1957. Vladimir 
Alekseevich Soloukhin was born in 1924 to a peasant family 
in the village of Olepino in Vladimir oblast', and these 
sketches depict his return in 1956 to his native region. 
This theme of the rediscovery by a town dweller of his 
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village roots was common among the derevenshchiki of the 
1950s and 1960s. Soloukhin showed enthusiasm for marshes 
and meadows. Like Dorosh, he depicted the peasants' 
problems but expressed admiration for their customs, their 
folk art and their churches. Vladimir oblast', as 
Soloukhin himself has said, is "the very heart of 
Russia", 19 including the ancient cities of Vladimir and 
Suzdal, which formed the core of the Russian State prior to 
the dominance of Moscow. It was from Vladimir oblast' that 
Osipov was to edit the journal Veche. Soloukhin's essays 
Kal2li-rosy (Dewdrops, 1962) and his novel Mat' ý"4k _ :::. 
MaghLg. 
("Coltsfoot", literally Mother-Stepmother, 1964) continued 
his preoccupation with the countryside. 20 As Leonid 
Pliushch points out, this concern for Russian culture did 
not prevent him from taking part in the denunciation of 
Boris Pasternak in 1958 after he was awarded the Nobel 
Prize for literature. 21 
Sergei Pavlovich Zalygin (born 1913) turned only 
relatively late in his literary life to the problems of the 
village, with his story "Na Irtyshe" (On the Irtysh) 
published in Novyi-mir in February 1964. Set in Siberia, 
where Zalygin had lived most of his life, it told of the 
injustices perpetrated during the collectivization of 
agriculture. It showed the resistance of the peasants, and 
the unnecessarily brutal way in which collectivization had 
been implemented. This was one of a number of works 
published in N=i-mLr, up to September 1965, which were 
critical of Stalin's peasant policy. 22 
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It was Aleksandr Isaevich Solzhenitsyn, born in 
Kislovodsk in 1918, who had the greatest impact on the 
development of Russian national feeling, both in the 
Khrushchev period and under Brezhnev. His stories "Odin 
den' Ivana Denisovichall (translated as A_Day-in-the-Life-of 
Ivan Denisovich) and "Matrenin dvor" (Matryona's House), 
published in Navyi-mir in November 1962 and January 1963, 
respectively, presented his view of the Russian peasant in 
specific real Soviet contexts. 23 "Matrenin dvor" portrays 
the appalling poverty of a Russian village in 1953. 
Moreover, it takes further than any other of the works of 
village prose the idea of the old peasant woman as the 
repository of traditional moral values, in a rural world 
corrupted by the needs of Soviet industrialization. 
Matryona's spirit of self-sacrifice holds her village 
together, and she, like the author, is motivated by 
Christianity. According to Grigory Pomerants, writing in 
samizdat, "for a million people Christianity began with 
reading 'Matryona's House'. "24 This figure of the old 
Orthodox peasant woman was to recur in later village prose, 
most notably as Valentin Rasputin's Daria in "Proshchanie s 
Materoill (see below, pp. 432-33). 
As a political statement, "Ivan Denisovich" was of 
incomparably greater significance than any of the other 
stories cited here. The illiterate peasant Shukhov shows 
his shrewdness in his successful struggle to survive in the 
Stalinist prison camp. The Christian element here is only 
marginal; Shukhov believes in God, but does not expect any 
359 
good from Him. 25 Solzhenitsyn himself was not one of those 
who had his faith in Marxism shattered in 1956. He had 
gone to the camps as a Marxist-Leninist, and argued there 
that Stalin had distorted Lenin. But through his 
sufferings in prison he changed his convictions and before 
the XX Congress had become an Orthodox Christian. 26 
What was perhaps most remarkable about "Ivan 
Denisovich" was that it was published at all; until then, 
discussion of life in the camps had been virtually banned 
from the official Press. To understand how NoVyi-mir came 
to publish the story, and indeed much of the other work 
discussed here, a word must be said about the evolution of 
the journal and its relation to political liberalization 
and de-Stalinization. Novyi-mir after the death of Stalin 
provided a home not only for those concerned with the 
protection of the villages and peasant traditions, but for 
anti-Stalinist writers of all tendencies. Representatives 
of "youth prose" such as Vasily Aksyonov and younger poets 
such as the liberal Communist Evgeny A. Evtushenko 
published in No vi mir. A shared demand of these different 
political tendencies was the relaxation or abolition of 
literary censorship. Criticisms of the mistakes of the 
Stalin era and of the vestiges of Stalinism in contemporary 
society appeared regularly in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
chief editor, Aleksandr T. Tvardovsky (1910-1971) was 
removed from his post in August 1954 for allowing criticism 
to go too far. Abramov's appeal was one of the items 
specifically attacked. This followed a meeting of the 
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Central Committee Secretariat at which Khrushchev (then 
seeking to ally himself with conservative forces against 
Prime Minister G. M. Malenkov) himself came out against 
Tvardovsky. Konstantin Simonov replaced Tvardovsky (who 
himself had replaced Simonov in 1950 in the same job). 
Simonov, however, was not a conservative, and his 
appointment in 1954 suggested that the Party leaders were 
prepared to allow Novyi-mir to continue in the same 
direction as under Tvardovsky. Simonov published articles 
by writers who had been banned under Stalin, and promoted 
the literature of the national minorities in translation, 
including criticism of Russian chauvinism. Among the anti- 
Stalinist essays and novels which Simonov published was 
Vladimir Dudintsev's Ne-khlebom-ediny onfl, 
August to October 1956). 27 
In 1957, in reaction to the liberalism of Novyi-mir and 
of the Moscow Writers' Organization (and to the Hungarian 
uprising), there was established the Union of Writers of 
the RSFSR. This was headed by Leonid S. Sobolev, described 
by Michael Glenny as a "hard-line Stalinist", and it was 
intended to weaken the influence of the liberal Moscow 
writers. The journals Oktiabr' and Nash-sovremennik, 
previously published by the USSR Writers' Union, were 
handed over to it. As it was specifically the union of the 
writers of the Russian Republic, it is perhaps not 
surprising that it became the major literary centre not 
only of conservatism (as was the intention) but also of 
Russian nationalism. 28 
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Conservative pressure forced Simonov from the 
editorship of Novyi-mir in June 1958. In a major defeat 
for the literary Stalinists, however, his replacement was 
again Tvardovsky. Khrushchev himself seems to have chosen 
Tvardovsky for his anti-Stalinism, seeing him as a bridge 
to the intelligentsia. The editorial board still included 
conservatives who might impede Tvardovsky's efforts. The 
editor's instinct for what at any given time might be 
acceptable, and what unacceptable, to the Party leadership, 
allowed the publication over the next few years of much 
that criticized the Stalin era and proposed improvements in 
contemporary Soviet life. The memoirs of the 
smenovekhovets Ilia Ehrenburg gave some insight into the 
situation of culture under Stalin, while the same writer 
also advocated the publication of the work of Russian 
writers who were not sympathetic to the regime. At the 
XXII Congress, Tvardovsky called on writers to be bolder in 
telling the truth. Following this, he became a candidate 
member of the Central Committee. From September 1961, the 
anti-Stalinist content of Novyi-mir sharply increased. 
Dina Spechler suggests that Tvardovsky feared that the wave 
of de-Stalinization initiated by the Congress would be 
short-lived, and sought to maximize his output in the time 
available. The journal also attacked Vsevolod A. Kochetov, 
who had been appointed editor of the conservative Oktiabr'. 
Kochetov was a Stalinist writer, close to the Central 
Committee Secretaries N. A. Suslov and F. R. Kozlov, who 
themselves were critical of Khrushchev. In this situation, 
Khrushchev was keen to use Novyi-mir against his 
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"Colleagues" in the leadership. 29 
In his memoirs, The-Calf. Butted_the-Oak, Solzhenitsyn 
says that he did not distinguish Rovyj mir as standing out 
from the other Soviet literary journals. More recently, he 
has revised this assessment. In November 1961, having read 
Tvardovsky's speech at the XXII Congress, and remembering 
him as the author of the wartime poem "Vasilii Terkin", 
Solzhenitsyn decided to submit "Ivan Denisovich" to NoVyi 
mir. Tvardovsky liked it, and after Solzhenitsyn made 
certain changes and deletions to render it more palatable 
to the leaders, it was read to Khrushchev. The latter saw 
the value of the story for his power struggle, but he was 
unable on his own to overrule the conservative forces in 
Glavlit, the censorship apparatus, who would oppose 
publication. Two meetings of the Presidium (Politburo) of 
the Central Committee were required before the decision was 
taken in October 1962 to publish the story. Following this 
decision, Pravda published (at Khrushchev's instigation) 
Evtushenko's poem "Nasledniki Stalina" ("The Heirs of 
Stalin"). This drew attention to the conservative forces 
within the leadership which were opposing de-Stalinization. 
The enthusiastic reception given by political and cultural 
figures and Journals, other than Oktiabr', to "Ivan 
Denisovich" facilitated the publication of Solzhenitsyn's 
other work, such as "Matrenin dvor", which conveyed his 
real ideas more openly. 30 
Solzhenitsyn in his memoirs states that he was able to 
have his writings published only by giving the impression 
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that he was a loyal Soviet citizen, while all the time 
really aiming for a confrontation with the authorities. He 
tells how Tvardovsky, a sincere Communist reformer, said of 
Solzhenitsyn's novel The-First-Circle: "... the novel's 
standpoint is that of the Party - it contains no 
condemnation of the October Revolution". 31 Zhores 
Medvedev, the exiled socialist geneticist, has accused 
So1zhenitsyn of rewriting history in relation to his own 
past. He suggests that rather than having tried to cover up 
his real views in the early 1960s, Solzhenitsyn has evolved 
ideologically since then into someone much more critical of 
socialism, and is an "absolutely different person". 32 Here 
Zhores Medvedev follows the views of Vladimir Ia. Lakshin. 
The latter was the chief literary critic of Novvi_mir from 
1962 to 1966, and then unofficially Tvardovsky's deputy, 
until he was removed from the editorial board in 1970. 
Lakshin believes that Solzhenitsyn was probably sincerely 
trying to be accepted in Soviet literature and please the 
top leaders in 1962-1964. If the leadership had had a more 
tolerant attitude to Soizhenitsyn, Lakshin believes that he 
would not have assumed the open anti-Soviet attitudes he 
took in the 1970s. 33 
Lakshin, in a 1975 samizdat rebuttal of Solzhenitsyn's 
memoirs, provided a summary of what he considered to be the 
programme of Novyi-mir under Tvardovsky, from 1958 to 
1970. 
There were, of course, a number of points on which NoKy 
Mir_ saw eye to eye with Solzhenitsyn- We too disliked 
the Soviet brand of centralized, bureaucratic 
socialism; we defended humane justice against dry 
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dogmatism; we were appalled by the horrors of the 
Stalinist prison camps and protested, whenever we 
could, against the many subtle forms of social and 
political hypocrisy practiced in the USSR. But we 
believed in socialism as a noble ideal of justice, we 
believed in a socialism that was human through and 
through and not just with a human face. We regarded 
the democratic rights of the individual as 
incontestable. We sought support for our feelings and 
convictions among the people, and while abhorring the 
cheap, phony pathos that so often mars the use of that 
expression, we always cherished the awareness of a 
common cause with working people. 34 
The balance of evidence suggests to me that Tvardovsky 
and Lakshin misunderstood Solzhenitsyn. The religious 
elements in his outlook (to say nothing of his poem "The 
Feast of the Victors") gave no ground for compromise with 
Marxist ideology or the Soviet political system. The story 
told in The-Calf-Butted-the-Oak, although by most accounts 
biased, of a lone figure with a secret strategy to bring 
down the system that created the GULag, seems both 
plausible and compatible with Solzhenitsyn's actions, as 
described by Lakshin. 
In late 1962 and early 1963, coinciding with the 
publication of "Ivan Denisovich" and "Matryona's House", 
there was a conservative counter-attack on NovYi-mir. In 
February 1963 Kozlov and Suslov persuaded Khrushchev, for a 
time, to end the discussion of the Stalin era and dam the 
flood of prison-camp writing that was surging into Soviet 
literature. Tvardovsky, unlike Khrushchev, did not back 
down, and published an article by his deputy editor, 
Aleksandr G. Dementev (born 1904), defending the need for 
the journal to continue its criticism of alien phenomena in 
Soviet life. 35 Dementev has been portrayed by Solzhenitsyn 
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as a "dark spirit"36 who acted as a brake on Tvardovsky, 
and it is true that he was generally more cautious than the 
lar-ter; but he seems to have been as committed as 
Tvardovsky to the defence of literature, so long as it 
remained within a Communist framework. On the other hand, 
conservative forces moved against "Matryona's House". One 
example was the critic Viktor A. Chalmaev (born 1932) in 
Oktlabr', who was horrified at the idea that the old woman 
might be the most valuable person in her village. 37 
Lakshin produced a strong defence of "Ivan Denisovich" in 
the January 1964 issue of NovyL_mir. 38 But Khrushchev was 
again vacillating on de-Stalinization. He failed to 
intervene to prevent the conservatives, fronted by the 
Komsomol First Secretary, S. P. Pavlov, from denying 
Solzhenitsyn the Lenin Literature Prize for "Ivan 
Denisovich". This weakened Novvi mir, and possibly 
ultimately Khrushchev himself. 39 
The contribution of village prose, and of the work of 
Solzhenitsyn, to the development of Russian nationalism in 
the Khrushchev period was that it presented a source of 
values, based on the Russian village and Russian Orthodoxy, 
which began to provide an alternative to the values of 
Marxism-Leninism, now becoming discredited. This process 
was to go further in the Brezhnev era. 
Unofficial_political_activitV 
Isolated underground revolutionary groups, claiming to 
represent the true Leninist heritage betrayed by Stalin, 
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and bearing names like Istinnyi trud Lenina (Lenin's True 
Work) existed in the USSR from about 1945. More serious 
threats to the regime came from the Western Ukrainians and 
the Baltic nationalities. The effect of the XX Congress 
was to produce a ferment among intellectual youth, with 
clandestine neo-Leninist groups and publications 
mushrooming, especially in Moscow and Leningrad. The 
"Krasnopevtsev-Rendel group" referred to by Andrei Amalrik 
in Will the Soviet-Union Surviy2e until-1984? called itself, 
according to Osipov's account, the "Union of Patriots of 
Russia", and sought to synthesize the best sides of 
Bolshevism, Menshevism and Trotskyism. Vladimir Bukovsky 
belonged for a while to an illegal political organization 
which lacked a political programme, while Major-General 
P. G. Grigorenko in 1963 established the "Alliance for the 
Struggle for the Rebirth of Leninism". 40 
Amalrik's description of the development of the 
"cultural opposition" in the late 1950s has become well 
known in the West. No longer intimidated by mass terror, 
Moscow intellectuals began to read in samizdat the 
literature which Glavlit would not tolerate: Doctor 
Zhivagg, Akhmatova's banned poems, and literary journals 
such as Aleksandr I. Ginzburg's Sintaksis Q issues, 1950), 
Osipov's BýLmeranq (November 1960) and Iury T. Galanskov's 
Feniks (1961). The latter journal reflected the growing 
concern of the "cultural opposition" with political 
affairs. Public poetry readings in Maiakovsky Square in 
Moscow, initially publicized in August 1958 by Moakovskii 
komsomolets, the newspaper of the Moscow Komsomol, took on 
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an anti-Stalinist character. The young people had free 
discussions, praising Iashin and criticizing Kochetov. 41 
Among those who later took part in the Russian 
nationalist movement should be mentioned Anatoly 
Mikhailovich Ivanov, who used the pseudonyms Novogodny and 
later A. Skuratov. Ivanov-Skuratov (as I shall refer to 
him throughout), born 1934, studied history with Osipov but 
was arrested in 1959 for participation in a "circle". He 
was sent to a prison psychiatric hospital but freed in 
1960. Osipov himself was expelled from university and the 
Komsomol in 1959 after publicly defending Ivanov-Skuratov. 
The two came together in 1960 in a political "club" which 
sought to rally the healthy forces of the CPSU to liquidate 
the consequences of Stalinism, and create a society on the 
Yugoslav model. They also took part in an unofficial 
revival of the Maiakovsky Square meetings, which brought on 
them the ire of the authorities. In October 1961 they were 
arrested, together with Eduard Kuznetsov (who later became 
active in the Jewish emigration movement and was the 
central figure in the 1970 "Leningrad hijack" trial). 
Galanskov sent a letter of protest against the arrests to 
the KGB. Osipov was given a seven-year labour camp 
sentence, while Ivanov-Skuratov was given another spell in 
a prison psychiatric hospital. 42 
Khrushchev and-the_resurgence_of the_nationalities 
After Stalin's death L. P. Beria, the Minister for 
Internal Affairs, tried to increase his power base b7 
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promoting the career interests of the non-Russians. 
Beria's colleagues deposed him, but continued to increase 
the role of the national cadres in the republics. The 300th 
anniversary Of the Treaty Of Pereiaslavl, whereby the 
Ukraine was joined to Russia, was celebrated with much 
fanfare in 1954. If the Russians were the elder brother of 
the Soviet family, then the Ukrainians were the junior 
elder brother, and the Belorussians were also specially 
favoured. 43 In 1956, Khrushchev denounced Stalin's terror 
and the "mass deportations from their native places of 
whole nations". 44 Khrushchev published Lenin's last 
armicles, attacking Russian chauvinism and Stalin 
personally. These actions formed a watershed. They laid 
the political and ideological basis for the eventual 
resurgence of the cultures of some of the national 
minorities and their political cohesion. This in turn 
threatened the relatively privileged position of the 
Russians in the USSR, and especially those living outside 
the RSFSR, and also prepared the ground for a Russian 
nationalist reaction. 
An early indication of the confidence of the 
nationalities was the decision by the Azerbaijan Supreme 
Soviet, within months of Khrushchev's speech, that Azeri 
would be the sole official language of that republic. 
Historians from the traditionally Muslim nationalities 
sought to rehabilitate Shamil fully, while Moscow 
historians insisted that he was objectively reactionary. 
Decisions in the late 1950s, particularly the formation of 
the regional economic councils (sovnarkhozv), increased the 
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economic and cultural powers of the Union Republics. 45 
"Natives" predominated among the delegates to the 
republican Party congresses held in 1958, although Russians 
were overrepresented in relation to their share in the 
total population; national cadres increased their hold on 
the republican Central Committees. Russians, however, 
continued to head the republican KGBs. From 1954, natives 
held the position of First Secretary in all the Union 
Republican Central Committees, except Kazakhstan and 
Moldavia. These exceptions might be related to the fact 
that Russians formed a majority of the population in 
Kazakhstan, with the influx of Slavs to participate in the 
Virgin Lands programme; and the very low representation of 
Moldavians in the Party. In the Ukraine, Belorussia and 
Armenia, the Second Secretary as well as the First 
Secretary was a native, continuously up to the early 1970s. 
In Latvia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the local 
nationality supplied the Second Secretary as well as the 
First Secretary for part of the 1950s. In the other 
republics the First Secretary was a native and the Second 
Secretary a Russian (or sometimes Ukrainian or 
Belorussian), which was to become the normal pattern. John 
H. Miller has contended that the Russian Second Secretary 
would not only be a representative of all-Union interests 
but also would look after the interests of the Russians in 
the republic. Evidence for this latter point is lacking. 
As Miller himself shows, the Russian official is normally 
from outside the republic46, and his Job description from 
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Moscow does not appear to include opposing the normal 
tendency for the eponymous nationality to be 
overrepresented in both Party and government bodies. 
At the all-Union level, the Uzbek N. A. Mukhitdinov, a 
Central Committee Secretary, became the first 
revresentative of a traditionally Muslim nationality to 
join the CPSU Presidium (Politburo) as a full member, in 
1957.47 The Russian share of the full and candidate 
members of the Central Committee fell from 71.5% in 1952 to 
62.7% in 1961. The most dramatic change was the increase 
in the Ukrainians - from 6.8% in 1952 to 18.5% in 1961 - 
mainly involving individuals politically associated with 
Khrushchev. 48 
There was around this time a gradual change in the 
connotation attached to the word Rossiia. Previously the 
term had been used for Tsarist Russia, while the RSFSR was 
referred to by its initials or as the Russian Republic. 
Now the feeling arose that Rossiia had not died with the 
revolution but was a living reality. This was reflected in 
the title of the newspaper for the RSFSR which began in 
July 1956, Sovetskaia. Rossiia. The existence of this 
newspaper brought Russia into line with the other 
republics, which had long since had their own daily. There 
was no move to create a Communist Party for the RSFSR 
(which would have dominated the CPSU), but a Central 
Committee Bureau for the RSFSR was established in 1956.49 
These moves seem to have coincided with a growing 
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em, Dhasis on the Russian language. As the 1959 census was 
to reveal, native languages had been gaining at the expense 
of Russian. This process is perhaps exaggerated by a 
tendency for some Soviet citizens to reclassify their 
nationality according to language (a factor which would 
explain why the number of Russians grew faster than 
Ukrainians between 1959 and 1979). 50 With this 
qualification, the figures showed that the proportion of 
native-language speakers rose between 1926 and 1959 for 
every Union-Republican nationality except the Armenians. 
The nationalities of the Autonomous Republics in the RSFSR, 
however (Tatars, Bashkirs, etc. ) showed a falling 
proportion speaking the native language. 51 In 1958, the 
Central Committee and government proposed to make optional 
the study of Russian in national schools and the study of 
national languages in Russian schools. These changes 
appear to have been designed on balance to reduce the role 
of the national languages. At any rate they were perceived 
by several of the republican leaderships to have this 
effect. Azerbaijan and Latvia refused to pass the changes 
in the law, and Moscow's policy was not implemented until 
after the local leaders had been purged. 52 Interestingly, 
the number of Russians studying national languages appears 
to have increased over the following period, in spite of 
the fears expressed. 53 A justification for the promotion 
of Russian was spelt out in Kommunis. t in 1958 by B. G. 
Gafurov, a former First Secretary of the Tajik Party 
organization and then Director of the Institute of Oriental 
Studies of the Academy of Sciences. He said that the 
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"disappearance of national differences and the sliianie of 
nations" was "inevitable", adding that "the future sliianie 
of nations presupposes the formation of a single language 
for the peoples. "54 
Khrushchev was probably hostile to Russian nationalism 
but promoted the Russian language, apparently as a means of 
accelerating the sliianie of nations in the USSR, which he 
anticipated. It may have been the case, as suggested by 
Helene Carrere d'Encausse, that his promotion of slilanie 
was in response to rising minority nationalism. 55 It seems 
more likely, though, that it was his utopian claim that 
communism was around the corner, to be achieved by 1980, 
which drove him to try to reduce the significance of 
national distinctions, Just as it drove him to try to 
eradicate religion. 
The Party Programme of 1961, adopted at the XXII 
Congress, attacked nationalism and chauvinism and posited 
the rastsvet (flourishing) of nations under socialism. It 
laid down that, as communism was built, the nations and 
national cultures would draw closer together (sblizhenie) 
until complete unity (poingle edinstvo) was achieved. The 
word sliianie did not appear in the Programme, although it 
was used at the Congress. The Programme reaffirmed Lenin's 
view that national disinctions would take considerably 
longer to disappear than class distinctions. For the first 
time the Party Programme referred to the Russian language. 
It was described as having become "the language of inter- 
nationality (mezhnatsionallnogo) communication and co- 
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operation of all the peoples of the USSR". The Programme 
left open the possibility of increasing the rights of the 
republics; on the other hand it stated that republican 
boundaries were "increasingly losing their former 
significance". 56 Scholars such as P. G. Semyonov of the 
Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences and 
B. L. Manelis were more specific in indicating the temporary 
na7ure of the federal system. This sounded ominous for the 
national republics, since Khrushchev was proposing to 
rewrite the Soviet Constitution. 57 The emphasis on 
sliianie was equally unwelcome to many Russians, who feared 
the loss of Russian identity in a Soviet "melting pot". 
Semyonov argued that Soviet society was reaching the point 
where the full State and legal sliianie of nations would 
"become a matter of the foreseeable future". 58 Implicitly, 
sliianie might take place in the USSR alone and not depend 
on the world victory of communism. 59 
The Jews under Khrushchev 
In Khrushchev's memoirs he denounced Staiin's anti- 
Semitism, (50 and the Jews were saved from a massive purge by 
Stalin's death. But de-Stalinization did not improve the 
position of the Jews as much as might have been expected. 
For the first time since Stalin's death, Yiddish-language 
books were published again - but only five titles between 
1959 and 1961 and none between 1962 and 1964. In 1961 a 
Yiddish-language literary review, Sovietish Heimland 
(Soviet Homeland), began publication, initially as a bi- 
monthly with a circulation of 25 000. It became a monthly 
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in 1965.61 In other respects Khrushchev continued Stalin's 
policy of reducing the influence of Jews in the political 
system. Khrushchev and other leaders openly explained to 
foreigners that non-Jews - what M. G. Pervukhin called "our 
own intelligentsia" - were now capable of taking the 
leading positions in the republics and the all-Union 
bodies, and so Jews (who allegedly tended to surround 
themselves with other Jews) had been transferred away. 62 
Kaganovich, removed from the Central Committee Presidium in 
1957, was the last of the top leadership (Presidium and 
Secretariat) to acknowledge Jewish nationality. The 1961 
Central Committee included only one Jew (0.3%) among its 
full members (V. E. Dymshits, who became head of Gosplan). 63 
Evtushenko's poem "Babi Yar" published in Literaturnaia 
Razeta in September 1961, attacked the absence of a 
monument to the Jews killed by the Nazis in the ravine of 
that name on the outskirts of Kiev. Khrushchev and some 
conservative writers denounced Evtushenko for ignoring the 
fact that the Nazis had killed Slavs as well. 64 
Judaism suffered particularly badly in Khrushchev's 
anti-religious campaign. The number of synagogues fell 
from about 450 in 1956 to about 100 in 1951. Between 1958 
and 1967 the total number of copies of new books attacking 
Judaism was seven times the number attacking Islam and 
twice the number attacking Christianity - even though Jews 
formed only 1% of the population by then. Further, 
propaganda against Judaism was more vitriolic than other 
anti-religious propaganda. Judaism was presented as an 
exceptionally immoral religion, worshipping the god Money, 
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and inciting the Jews as the "chosen people" to hate other 
peoples. It was argued that Judaism was "inseparably 
linked" with Zionism. A particular stir was caused in the 
West by T. K. Kichko's Iudaizm-bez-prikras (Judaism without 
Embellishment), published in Ukrainian by the Ukrainian 
Academy of 6ciences in October 1963. This not only linked 
Judaism, Zionism, Jewish bankers and Western capitalists in 
a great conspiracy, but also included cartoons of 
stereotyped Jews. In April 1964 the Ideological Commission 
of the Central Committee condemned the book as "crude and 
offensive", 65 but similar works continued to be published. 
Much of the literature against the Jewish religion was 
published in Ukrainian or Moldavian, which Jews rarely 
read, suggesting that its purpose was to stir up hatred 
against the Jews rather than to break Jews from Judaism. 
The stereotype of the greedy Jew was fed by the regular 
publication in the Press of the names of those executed for 
economic crimes between 19bl and l9b4. Over half of the 
250 executed were of Jewish nationality. b6 
It would be difficult to believe that Khrushchev's 
hostility towards the Jews derived from Russian messianism. 
Rather, the treatment of Jews under Khrushchev would 
suggest that he saw them as an element in society which was 
different from, and even alien to, the other nationalities 
of the USSR. The Jews had shown the capacity to survive 
through millennia of repression. It could be speculated 
that Khrushchev and his allies felt that it would be much 
harder to melt Jewish identity in the pot of "fusion" than 
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it would be to deal with the other nationalities. 
The--anti-religious--Qa3mpaign. and the_Russian_Orthodox Church 
In July 1954 a Central Committee resolution attacked 
the success of the Russian Orthodox Church in winning over 
young people and called for the intensification of anti- 
religious propaganda. 67 Four months later, however, 
another resolution criticized counter-productive methods 
used in the struggle against religion. 68 It was not until 
1959 that a massive anti-religious campaign began, headed 
by Khrushchev and the head of the Central Committee 
Propaganda Department, L. F. Ilichev. 69 According to 
Levitin-Krasnov, who was active in fighting persecution 
then, 
1959 to 1954 was a very fearful time. The Soviet State 
with all its powerful apparatus, with the whole army of 
Chekists and secret informers, with all its innumerable 
staff of propagandists, journalists and correspondents, 
struck against the Church. We were isolated from 
everyone in this. It seemed as if the Church in Russia 
was doomed. The Patriarchate took a manifestly 
collaborationist position ... 
70 
There is little doubt that the anti-religious campaign 
was linked with Khrushchev's desire to build communism by 
1980. It was also linked with de-Stalinization. While de- 
Stalinization in other fields meant a relaxation and 
liberalization, in relation to religion it meant an end to 
the detente that had developed under Stalin with the major 
churches. The Russian Orthodox Church suffered from the 
campaign in the same way as other churches. Levitin- 
Krasnov's view that the Moscow Patriarchate collaborated 
with the anti-religious campaign is shared by other writers 
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of Orthodox samizdat in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev 
periods. These include Boris V. Talantov (1901-1971) from 
Kirov oblast', and the Moscow priests who wrote to 
Patriarch Aleksii in 1965, Iakunin (see above, p. 322) and 
Nikolai I. Eshliman. 71 Nevertheless, Patriarch Aleksii 
does appear to have put up resistance to the campaign on 
occasion. In February 1960 he argued that the Russian 
Church had played a major role in the consolidation and 
defence of the Russian State through the centuries. 
Similar themes regularly appeared in Zhurnal Moskovskoi 
Patriarkhii. In May 1963 he intervened to defend the 
rights of the monks of the Pochaev Monastery in the 
Ukraine. 72 The main cause for complaint, however, and a 
turning point in the development of Russian Orthodoxy, was 
the Sobor of bishops of 18 July 1961, held in Zagorsk. 
Here the Patriarch steamrollered the bishops into accepting 
a number of changes in the organization of the Church. The 
most important was that the priest lost all power over the 
parish and was transformed into a wage labourer, 
responsible to an executive committee of three 
parishioners, headed by the churchwarden. Subsequent 
experience was to show that the authorities would use the 
new arrangements to discredit priests and close down 
churches in an offensive against the Church involving the 
Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church and 
local soviets. It appears that Aleksii, the metropolitans 
and many of the bishops were resigned to this situation. 
Similar measures were introduced for other religions. The 
split which developed in the AUCECB, with unregistered 
Baptist congregations leaving the official structures and 
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facing severe persecution, may have stimulated dissent 
within the Orthodox Church. 73 
Eshliman and Iakunin reckoned that 10 000 Orthodox 
parish churches were closed in this period, representing 
one half of all those functioning in 1958. Other estimates 
suggest an even greater proportion. The number of 
monasteries and convents was reduced by four fifths between 
the mid-1950s and mid-1960s. The number of parish priests 
was reduced by about half. These figures conceal an 
unknown amount of intimidation, physical ill-treatment, 
beatings, imprisonment in mental hospitals, rape and murder 
of priests and believers. The evidence for this brutality 
is in samizdat accounts. These documents sometimes 
emphasized the link between Orthodoxy and Russian 
patriotiSM74. Others accused the authorities of abandoning 
Lenin's ideas and following Stalin's policy of persecution, 
despite the talk of de-Stalinization. 75 Samizdat 
allegations could be denied by the authorities. What could 
not be concealed, and which even attracted criticism in the 
official Press, was the wholesale destruction of churches. 
This often took place during the night to avoid opposition 
from the faithful. Thus in July 1964 even the church of 
the Metropolitan of Moscow, the Cathedral of the 
Transfiguration, was destroyed by night. 76 
Cultural figures were active in the defence of churches 
and monasteries as historical monuments. Literaturnaia 
F, azeta on 23 August 1956 carried a condemnation of the 
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destruction of the Smoiensk Cathedrai in Ufa. This was 
signed by the writers Dorosh and Ehrenburg. Izvestiia 
called in 1962 for the preservation of church architectural 
monuments, and the liberal writer Viktor Nekrasov 
complained in NoVyi-mir (November 1962) about the 
destruction of churches and icons. Ordinary believers 
appealed for the preservation of religious objects as 
historical monuments. 77 Such pleas were rejected. On 10 
May 1962 Pravda criticized an article in Moskva which had 
objected to the continuing destruction of monasteries and 
churches in the capital. 78 Khrushchev refused to listen to 
an appeal on the subject by Sergei Mikhaikov, the author of 
the words of the Soviet State anthem. 79 Solzhenitsyn, too, 
understood the importance of churches as monuments to 
Russian culture. In 1958-1959, after cycling around 
central Russia, he wrote his "Miniatures". This included 
"Along the Oka", which described the churches as the source 
of the beauty of the Russian countryside. 80 In August 1963 
he visited Kulikovo Field, and found the ruined medieval 
church of St. Sergei of Radonezh. The iconostasis had been 
chopped up for firewood. 81 
It appears that the anti-religious campaign and the 
destruction of churches provoked a feeling that the 
churches should be defended, a feeling which spread well 
beyond religious believers to many people concerned with 
Russian history and Russian culture. The revival of 
Russian national consciousness, expressed particularly by 
the derevens. hchiki, faced a challenge in the anti-religious 
campaign, from which it emerged strengthened. In 1964 
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Andrei Tarkovsky began his film about the icon painter and 
monk Andrei-Rublev. Completed in 1966, the film was not 
then shown in the USSR, but it attested to growing interest 
in Russia's religious past. Also in 1964 the VSKhSON was 
established with a Russian Orthodox nationalist ideology 
(see below). In October Khrushchev was overthrown. While 
it would be wrong to see the reasons for his fall in the 
anr, i-religious campaign or the destruction of churches, his 
retirement was swiftly followed by an official repudiation 
of the methods of the campaign82 and the establishment of 
organizations to protect Russian historical monuments. 
Despite Khrushchev's desire to create a nationless, atheist 
Soviet land, the national minorities and the Russians knew 
more about their cultures and were more nationally- 
conscious in 1964 than they had been in 1953. The basis 
was laid for the development of a Russian nationalist 
movement, outside the control of the Party. 
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Chapter Six 
Russian Nessianismunder Brezhnev 
During the Brezhnev era (1964-1962), the political 
leadership generally showed considerably more sympathy to 
Russian traditions and Russian interests than Khrushchev 
had. The top leaders and the central Party apparatus were 
divided among themselves as to how much leeway should be 
given to Russian national feeling. The abandonment by 
General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev and Prime Minister A. N. 
Kosygin of Khrushchev's utopian aim of achieving communism 
by 1980, together with the shift towards managerialism and 
pragmatism, widened the ideological gap that had been 
createdbyKhrushche v' -_ de T-)- 11 n c- ia ti ci --n- o± . 13 ta -1 i n-. 
Some 
leaders saw the answer in the satisfaction of material 
demands; others wished to rehabilitate Stalin; others 
wanted to promote more traditional forms of Russian 
nationalism. The l9bOs and 1970s saw a rise in both 
Russian and non-Russian nationalism. i 
Positive discrimination in favour ol the indigenous 
nationalities of the republics outside the RSFSR in 
admission to higher education and to the republican elites 
-a result of de-Stalinization - led to grievances among 
Russians. Within the RSFSR, the feeling of Russians that 
the economic interests of Russia were being sacrificed to 
the development of other Union Republics was fed by 
official propaganda that this was indeed the case. The 
Party Programme, adopted in 1961, had contained the 
sentence: 
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Depending on mutual fraternal help, in the first place 
on the help of the great Russian people, all the Soviet 
national republics have created their own modern 
industry and national cadres of the working class and 
the intelligentsia, and have developed a culture which 
is national in form and socialist in content. 2 
Similar statements on the generosity of the Russian people 
were repeated throughout the Brezhnev period (see the 
following section). 
Moreover, the 1970 census showing the rapid growth of 
the traditionally Islamic nationalities and the stagnation 
of the Russians raised fears about the capacity of the 
latter to continue to dominate the Soviet Union. This was 
linked with fears about the moral degeneration of the 
nýmnnli-. AIr-nhrill-= wa-., nn thc- incr-c--, ar-e. and had led 
to declining male life expectancies. Corruption in everyday 
life was proliferating and was contributing to the spread 
of cynicism. A deep popular fear of China, fuelled by the 
Cultural Revolution and the 1969 border clashes, was 
encouraged by official attacks on Peking. This led people 
to question whether Russian youth was spiritually prepared 
for a possible war. The main impulse behind the growth of 
Russian nationalism under Brezhnev, then, seems to have 
been the desire to defend Russian interests, and the 
Russian people itself, against whatever was threatening it. 
By no means was it mainly an aggressive nationalism, a 
"great-power chauvinism", although such elements did appear 
and were particularly linked with anti-Semitism. 
Together with Russian nationalism went a growing 
interest in the Russian past, encouraged by part of the 
390 
Russian cultural intelligentsia. It is difficult to 
disentangle cause and effect here; did Russians become 
interested in their national past because of their 
nationalism, or did an interest in icons and churches lead 
them on to Russian nationalism? Further, some of the 
figures involved seem to have been at least partly 
motivated by a sympathy for the traditional Russian 
national religion, Orthodoxy. Presumably different people 
travelled in different directions and did not make all the 
connections; not every icon collector was a Christian or a 
Russian nationalist. 
The Brezhnev era saw the development of the Russian 
nationalist movement and the reemergence of Russian 
messianism. In this chapter, I shall consider the 
nationality policy of the regime, looking at ideological 
statements and the actual policies pursued towards the non- 
Russians in the USSR, and discuss the influence of Russian 
nationalism. Next I shall examine some of the officially- 
permitted cultural manifestations of Russian nationalism 
and messianism, looking particularly at the literary 
journals; and then at examples of the writings of the 
unofficial Russian nationalist movement, focussing in 
particular on the journal Veche. After this I shall 
comment briefly on the attitudes of official political 
institutions and leaders towards Russian nationalism. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the attacks on 
Russian nationalism made in the last year of Brezhnev's 
General Secretaryship and in the following period when 
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Iu. V. Andropov and K. U. Chernenko were in power. It will 
be seen that I am touching on a considerable number of 
topics, about some of which much has already been written. 
The amount of work done on Solzhenitsyn alone is 
formidable. I shall necessarily be highly selective, 
concentrating on what I consider the most interesting 
examples of the flourishing of Russian messianism under 
Brezhnev. 
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Brezhuev_And_: the_postponement-of s1iianie 
In the field of nationality relations, the talk of 
sliianie disappeared from Politburo members' speeches. At 
the XXIII Party Congress in March 1966, while speaking of 
the Soviet people in the singular, Brezhnev emphasized the 
sblizhenie ol the peoples (plural) of the USSR. He promised 
that the Party would care for the interests and national 
particularities of every people, and raise all Soviet 
people in the spirit ot proletarian internationalism. 
3 
In outline, the Brezhnev leadership in the 1970s 
settled for an ideological position that defended national 
statehood, i. e. the need for federalism; postponed sliianie 
to the indefinite future; but sought iincreasingly to C5 1 
emphasize the greatness of the Russian people. The last 
factor was never pursued to the extent it had been under 
late Stalinism, and probably could not have been without 
the use of mass terror against the national minorities and 
their elites. On the other hand, the view of Russian 
superiority appeared in Party documents (which it had not 
under Stalin) and thus became enmeshed with the official 
ideology. At the XXIV Congress in March 1971, Brezhnev 
said: 
In the formation, strengthening and development of this 
powertul union of peoples with equal rights, who have 
taken the road to socialism, all the nations and 
nationalities of our country have played their role, 
above all the great Russian people. (Applause. ) Its 
revolutionary energy, selflessness, diligence and deep 
internationaiism have rightly won it the sincere 
respect of all the peoples of our socialist Motherland. 
(Prolonggq-applause. ) 
But he attacked "nationalism, chauvinism, national 
narrowness and conceit in any form" and promised "profound 
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respect for all nations and nationalities". The Party was 
committed to "the flourishing of socialist nations and 
their gradual sblizhenie". Brezhnev made no mention of 
sliianie. A Congress resolution described the "Soviet 
people" as a "new historical community of people", 4 a theme 
which became linked with the idea that the Soviet Union was 
at a stage of "mature" or "developed" socialism. 5 This 
latter viewpoint, formulated in the Brezhnev era and 
accepted under Andropov and Chernenko, implies that 
communism is a long way oft; so therefore is sliianie, and 
it is not necessary to refer to it continuously. 
Brezhnev's speech in 1972 on the fiftieth anniversary 
of the USSR essentially repeated the themes of the XXIV 
Congress, singling out the Russian people. The speech has 
become famous for its claim that "the national question, in 
the form in which it reached us from the past, has been 
solved in full, finally and irreversibly. " But Brezhnev 
went on to say that relations between nationalities 
continued to throw up new problems and tasks, on top of 
existing nationalist prejudices. 6 While the General 
Secretary emphasized the "all-round (vsestoronnee) 
sblizhenie" and "cohesion" (siDlochennost') of the 
nationalities, it is interesting that republican First 
Secretaries on this occasion preferred to speak of 
"flourishing", emphasizing their continued separateness. 7 
At the XXVI Congress in 197b, Brezhnev omitted any special 
reference to the Russian people, and spoke of the 
"unbreakable unity" of the nationalities, not of 
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sblizhenie. 8 
The Soviet Constitution of 1977 retained the federal 
structure, while incorporating the principle of "democratic 
centralism" into the State, as advocated by Lenin in 1916. 
On the adoption of the Constitution, Brezhnev said that 
certain "very few" comrades had argued that the emergence 
of the Soviet people as a "new historical community" meant 
that the republics could therefore be liquidated. They 
were confusing the "socio-political unity of the Soviet 
people" with the disappearance of national distinctions. 
They propose to bring into the Constitution the concept 
of a single Soviet nation (natsiia), to liquidate the 
Union and Autonomous Republics or to sharply limit the 
sovereignty of the Union Republics, depriving them of 
TTQ C- -M 4-1- r 
.41,4- 
to 
the right to leave the US". b. and the J_ gla ýý 
international links. In the same direction are the 
proposals to abolish the Soviet of Nationalities and 
establish a unicameral Supreme Soviet. I think that 
the error of such proposals is clear. The socio- 
political unity of the Soviet people in no way 
signifies the disappearance of national differences. 
It would be wrong "to force artificially ... the process of 
sblizhenie". 9 
In the course of the discussion on the draft 
Constitution, proposals were made to enhance the rights of 
the Union Republics, but the only one incorporated into the 
final version was the suggestion of Moscow University Law 
Faculty to define the Union Republic as "a sovereign Soviet 
socialist State" (article 75). 10 This would appear to 
contradict the reference to the "sovereignty of the USSR" 
(article 75). The Constitution also gave the Union 
Republics power to participate in federal policy-making 
(article 77) and granted them representation on the 
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Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of 
Ministers of the USSR (articles 120 and 129, confirming a 
situation existing since the late 1960sll). 
In the late 1970s, Russian nationalist sentiment became 
increasingly strong in sections of the Party apparatus, the 
Komsomol and in some cultural fields. From 1978, 
anniversary messages from the Central Committee to the 
republics regularly referred to the "great Russian people" 
(not in the ethnic sense of "Great Russian" [velikorusskii] 
but as a socio-political characteristic Lvelikii russkii 
narodl). 12 In 1979 Pravda published an article entitled 
"The Russian Character", written by a veteran of the Great 
Patriotic War, an Armenian living in Baku. The sole 
purpose of the article was to laud the Russians' "kindness 
and justice (sPravedlivost')", qualities with which "the 
Russian person is endowed possibly more than anyone 
else". 13 Lavish praise for the Russians coincided with 
the wave of Russian national feeling connected with the 
600th anniversary of the Russian defeat of the Tatars at 
the battle of Kulikovo Field in 1380. At the XXVI Congress 
in February 1981, Brezhnev's last, he praised the 
"disinterested assistance of the Russian people" to the 
national minorities. He called for the republican parties 
to do more for the cultural and language needs of the "non- 
indigenous" population, presumably referring particularly 
to the Russians. He denounced chauvinism, nationalism, 
anti-Semitism and Zionism, and spoke of "unity" and "all- 
round sblizhenie", but not sliianie. 14 
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While the Brezhnev leadership defended socialist 
federalism and postponed sliianie, academics retained some 
freedom to take different positions on the national 
question. 15 A. E. Mordinov, a Yakutsk philosopher, claimed 
in 1971 that sliianie was a process already occurring under 
socialism. He claimed that Lenin understood sliianie to 
mean "complete unity, and nothing else". Mordinov was 
talking of political, socio-economic and ideological 
sliianie, rather than a racial-demographic process of the 
disappearance of national distinctions. He claimed that 
sliianie had been wrongly associated with the view of Makar 
Nagulnov, in Mikhail Sholokhov's Virgin-Soil Upturned, of a 
L. " 
L-4 Sý, future in which all people W1 .1 have the same 
dar ý- 
colour of skin. Mordinov was implying that national 
differences would not disappear; and he quoted Lenin's 
writings against Russian chauvinism in defence of minority 
cultures and languages. 16 V. P. Sherstobitov in 1972 
rejected Mordinov's interpretaion of Lenin and emphasized 
the latter's centralism; he implied that all national 
differences would ultimately disappear. Like Mordinov, 
Sherstobitov claimed that "elements of sliianie" already 
existed, but it seems that the term "assimilation" would be 
more appropriate to the examples he gave of minor 
nationalities adopting the Russian language. 17 A 
collection co-edited by Sherstobitov in 1975, however, 
hardly mentions siiianie, stressing "flourishing", 
sblizhenie and "spiritual unity". 18 
A scholar whose writing on the national question 
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appeared to reflect the ideas of the Brezhnev leadership is 
M. I. Kulichenko, head of the Section for the Theory of 
Nations and Nationality Relations of the Institute of 
Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee. He has rejected 
Mordinov's view that sliianie meant only "complete unity", 
and cited Engels and Lenin to show that under full world 
communism, ethnic differences beween nations will wither 
away and a single world language emerge. He accused 
Mordinov and others of implying that nations were 
eternal. 19 In a work of 1972, Kulichenko defended national 
statehood in the period leading from the phase of developed 
socialism up to "complete unity". National statehood 
helped encourage national pride in the building of 
socialism and loyalty to the USSR. He noted that in the 
political units designed for the minorities, the leading 
cadres in the Party and State were from the titular 
nationality, even where that nationality was in the 
minority. 20 "Complete unity" would come only when 
communism had basically been achieved. It would involve 
economic and political equality, a reduction in the 
importance of national statehood and the mutual enrichment 
of cultures. Russian would be the language of 
communication between the nationalities, but the national 
languages would continue to develop. Only after "complete 
unity" would the movement towards sliianie begin; although 
he added (somewhat confusingly) that elements of sliianie 
already existed under socialism, in the sense of the 
levelling of social, economic and political life. 21 
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Kulichenko wrote in 1976 that it was generally accepted 
that transformations of nationality relations would take 
place very slowly. This, however, was to ignore the rapid 
changes in the development of some of the backward peoples 
of the USSR; and it was difficult to predict how the world 
victory of socialism would affect Soviet nationality 
relations. The fate of each nation, in the meantime, was 
not "passively to await the inevitable sliianie" but to 
develop its own possibilities. 22 Ethnic differences would 
persist after the disappearance of national states, but 
nations could not continue to exist after the social 
factors that had created them had evaporated. Instead of 
nations, new forms of community would evolve under 
communism. While Kulichenko claimed that +- -h eSoN7 J- e +- -e o 
and the socialist commonwealth represented pointers to 
these new communities, his argument was mainly supported by 
quotations from Marx, Engels and Lenin. 
23 
In two of his works of 1981, Kulichenko emphasized the 
importance of the federal system, which had been protected 
by the 1977 Constitution. He made no reference to the 
declining significance of national statehood24; it was 
necessary to strengthen both the federal bodies and the 
organs of national statehood. Such a statement might seem 
to have little meaning. In fact his emphasis was on 
strengthening the centre, as economic imperatives dictated 
central decision-making on the implementation of technical 
progress and the conservation of natural resources. 
Kulichenko attacked P. G. Semyonov for wishing to create a 
unitary State, asserting that a federal system would be 
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justified for a long time to come. 25 He complained that 
researchers were ignoring problems which were developing in 
nationality relations. Studies of these problems might 
make it possible to warn of the imminence of nationalist 
phenomena. He referred to the April 1979 Central Committee 
decree on ideological work, which called for respect for 
the dignity and culture of the minorities. He rejected the 
idea that the Soviet people (narod) was being transformed 
into a single nation (natsiia); it was composed of many 
nations, although what was common to them was more 
important than what divided them. He criticized some 
researchers for having a nihilist attitude to nationality 
factors. 25 
At a round-table organized by the journal Istoriia-SSSR 
in December 1979, Kulichenko suggested that the role of the 
"narrowly national, specifically national" was gradually 
diminishing. This provoked a sharp response from a Jew, 
Henrikas ýG. O. ) Zimanas, chief editor of the Lithuanian 
Komunistas. Kulichenko, he said, had not made himself 
clear. If he was referring to language, he was wrong, 
because national languages were flourishing under 
socialism. Zimanas asked scholars to stop talking about 
sliianie, since it was not mentioned in any Central 
Committee document. 27 
Perhaps Zimanas's request had some effect. While 
rejecting the "eternity of nations", Kulichenko suggested 
in 1981 that the concept of sliianie might be soft- 
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pedalled. Confusion had arisen from the fact that some 
writers were using the word incorrectly, to refer to 
particular cases of assimilation occurring under developed 
socialism. He pointed out: "there are still not a few 
people on whom the very concept 'sliianie of nations 
Inatsiil' often acts as an irritant, provoking negative 
phenomena in consciousness and behaviour. "28 Kulichenko 
added that sliianie. had not been mentioned at the XXIV 
Congress, and in 1973 and 1977 Brezhnev had rejected the 
idea that sliianie was in progress. Noting that K. P. 
Buslov had claimed that sliianie of nations was occurring 
in a socio-political but not ethnic sense, Kulichenko 
suggested that the term should be reserved for the 
disappearance of ethnic distinctions. Sliianie was 
inappropriate for the present, when national statehood and 
national cultures were being preserved. 29 It should be 
added that P. N. Fedoseev, Vice-President of the Academy of 
Sciences, held a similar position to Buslov's. In a 1980 
article in Kommunist, Fedoseev stated that when Lenin had 
used sliianie with reference to the socialist stage of 
development, he had used it in a political sense: "not the 
removal of national distinctions, but a tighter unity, a 
fraternal union of socialist nations". 30 
Language_policy--and national_egualitv--ýunder Brezhnev 
I now turn to the actual policies pursued towards the 
minorities under Brezhnev. Paradoxically, from the mid- 
1970s, when in the ideological sphere leaders and scholars 
were postponing sliianie to the indefinite future, more and 
more emphasis was being put on the Russian language. This 
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succeeded a period of "flourishing" of national languages. 
Between 1965 and 1972, the number of pupils attending 
native-language schools increased by more than the number 
attending Russian-language schools in every non-Russian 
Union Republic except Estonia, the Ukraine and 
Belorussia. 31 The non-Russian-language Press expanded as 
well: between 1970 and 1975, the circulation of journals in 
the languages of the non-Russian Union Republics, except 
Lithuanian and Estonian, (and also in Tatar) increased more 
rapidly than the circulation of Russian-language 
journals. 32 
A factor in the subsequent promotion of the Russian 
language was the 1970 census, showing a gradual decline in 
the Slav proportion of the population and a rapid increase 
in the traditionally Muslim nationalities. Soviet scholars 
such as F. P. Filin, director of the Institute of the 
Russian Language of the Academy of Sciences, and Iu. V. 
Arutiunian of the Academy's Institute of Ethnography, 
argued that the mastery of the Russian language by non- 
Russians helped to encourage positive attitudes to Russians 
and to promote integration in the Soviet Union. 
33 Already 
in 19456 Iu. D. Desheriev was referring to the Russian 
language as the cement of Soviet society, in terms 
reminiscent of late-tsarist administrators. 
... the Russian language, as the language of inter- 
nationality communication of the peoples of the USSR, 
cements the monolithic nature of Soviet society, and 
facilitates the sblizhenie of peoples and of their 
cultures and the stren thening and development of their 
fraternal cooperation. 
§4 
More pragmatically, one might add that, the needs of the 
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Soviet Armed Forces, in which Russian is the sole language 
of command, and of the Soviet economy dictate the 
improvement of Russian-language teaching. 
Serious concern about this was indicated at a 
conference in Tashkent in 1975, when the USSR Minister of 
Education, M. A. Prokofev, advocated pre-school facilities 
for Russian teaching. In 1978 Academician Fedoseev 
questioned the use of native languages in higher education 
outside philological disciplines, and a decree of the 
Council of Ministers promoted the use of Russian throughout 
the education system, including nursery schools. Then in 
May 1979 an All-Union Scientific-Theoretical Conference on 
"The Russian Language - the Language of Friendship and 
Cooperation of the peoples of the USSR" was held in 
Tashkent. Sharaf Rashidov, candidate Politburo member and 
Uzbek First Secretary, made the main speech. He referred 
to Russian as the language of Lenin and of the highest 
culture, but reassured the non-Russians that growing 
bilingualism would not threaten the national languages. 
Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone commented, however, that the 
implementation of the Tashkent recommendations, which she 
considered unlikely, would reduce these languages "to the 
level of home and folklore vernaculars". 
35 
After 1975, the growth of the native-language Press was 
severely restricted. For example, between 1975 and 1982 
the absolute circulation of non-Russian newspapers fell for 
seven of the Union-Republican languages, including 
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Ukrainian and Belorussian. (The trend was not uniform, 
however; four languages increased circulation faster than 
the Russian-language newspapers. ) It should be noted that 
bilingualism, even where it is achieved, does not lead 
necessarily to linguistic assimilation. The 1979 census 
showed for nearly all the national minorities a substantial 
(and in some cases incredible) increase in the proportion 
of the nationality who claimed fluency in Russian; but 
among the nationalities with their own Union Republics, it 
was only the Belorussians and Ukrainians who showed a 
significant decline in the proportion claiming their 
national language as their mother tongue. 3ý) These two 
nationalities (apart from people living in the Western 
Ukraine and West Belorussia), being traditionally 
culturally close to the Russians, are the most willing to 
adopt Russian. (In Minsk, for example, there is no 
Belorussian-language secondary school. ) Soviet propaganda 
under Brezhnev emphasized the common racial origin and even 
common national consciousness of the Russians, Ukrainians 
and Belorussians. 37 
To what extent was the equality of the nationalities 
achieved under Brezhnev? Ellen Jones and Fred Grupp looked 
at various measures of inequality, and came to the general 
conclusion that the nationalities had come closer together 
in the 1960s and for most of the 1970s. In the late 1970s, 
however, Moscow decided to give a lower priority to 
positive discrimination in favour of the more backward 
nationalities. I confine myself to considering political 
representation. Party membership is a useful indication of 
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inequality since it is correlated with occupation, 
education and urbanization. Jones and Grupp compared the 
proportion of the adult population of each of 43 Soviet 
nationalities who were Party members with the proportion of 
Party members among the Russians. Starting with 1959, they 
found progressively less inequality of representation in 
1970 and 1975, but rather more in 1982. The Georgians were 
the only Union-Republican nationality to be consistently 
better represented than the Russians, while the Armenians 
fell slightly below the Russian level in 1982. Among those 
which had traditionally been under-represented, the 
Ukrainian, Belorussian, Baltic and Moldavian nationalities 
steadily increased their share. The traditionally Muslim 
nationalities were better represented in 1970 than in 1959, 
but after that moved in different directions. The Azeris 
and the Kazakhs were for a time better represented than 
the Russians, but like most Muslim nationalities were less 
represented in 1982 than in 1975. The nationality with by 
far the highest representation was the Jews, in spite of 
the discrimination against them. 38 The major omission in 
the Jones-Grupp calculation is that it does not show what 
is happening to the Russians. The Russian share in the 
total Soviet population fell from 54.5% in 1959 to 52.4% in 
1979, while their share in the Party fell from b3.0% in 
1959 to 59.7% in 1983, reducing this over-representation 
insignificantly. 39 
In the CPSU Central Committee, on the other hand, there 
was a clear trend throughout the Brezhnev era towards 
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increasing the proportion of the already over-represented 
Russians. Among the full members, Russians increased from 
at least 57% in 1956, to about b2% in 1971 and to at least 
68% in 1981.40 This reflected the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of heads of All-Union ministries and 
Central Committee departments, who under Brezhnev normally 
gained full or candidate Central Committee status, were 
Russian. At the Politburo, Russian representation was also 
increased: from b out of 11 full members in 196b (after the 
XXIII Congress) to 10 out of 14 in 1981 (after the XXVI 
Congress), and from 3 out of 8 candidate members in 1966 to 
4 out of 8 in 1981. The Secretariat was completely Russian 
from 1966 to 197b, when one Belorussian was appointed to 
join 10 Russians. The special position of the Ukrainians 
was symbolized by N. V. PodSorny's appointment as President 
from 1965 to 1977, and N. A. Tikhonov's appointment as Prime 
Minister from 1980.41 
In the Union-Republican parties, the First Secretaries 
throughout the Brezhnev period were all from the titular 
nationality. The Ukraine and Belorussia were favoured in 
that a native or a local Russian normally occupied the post 
of Second Secretary. By 1982, the bureaus of the non-Slav 
republics were all dominated by the local nationalities, 
with a significant minority Slav representation only in the 
five Central Asian parties. 42 This korenizatsiia appeared 
in the State apparatus also, with even the heads of the 
republican KGBs outside Central Asia being members of the 
titular nationality by the end of the Brezhnev era. 43 It 
would seem that a division of labour developed under 
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Brezhnev: Russians increasingly dominated the policy-making 
All-Union institutions, while non-Russians played an 
important role in the implementation of policy in the 
national republics. The possibility of removing republican 
leaders who asserted the interests of their own nationality 
too strongly was always open to Moscow. 
Hationality--ýtensions-under-Brezhnev 
De-Stalinization led to the rehabilitation of the 
nationalities which had been deported under Stalin, and 
most were allowed to return to their homelands. An 
exception was the Crimean Tatars. Only in i9b7 was the 
decree accusing them of treason annulled, and even then 
they were not allowed back to the Crimea. The KGB campaign 
against their movement to return included the holding of 
trials in Tashkent. 44 This may have signified a continued 
willingness to intimidate the Central Asian indigenous 
population into accepting Russian primacy. In November 
1969, three months after a Tashkent trial of Crimean 
Tatars, the fiftieth anniversary of a letter by Lenin 
protesting against Great-Russian chauvinism in Soviet 
Turkestan was marked by the publication of a "Joint issue" 
of the Russian-language newspapers of the five Central 
Asian republican parties. 
45 This event would seem to be a 
warning by the Central Asian elites against returning to a 
Stalinist nationality policy, at a time when the 
rehabilitation of Stalin was being actively considered in 
Moscow. It is unlikely that the invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979 was motivated by the desire to teach the 
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Central Asians a lesson, since it was initially mainly 
Central Asian troops who were mobilized against the Afghan 
resistance. In later years, however, it may have been 
feared in Moscow that a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan 
would be regarded as a sign of weakness vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Muslim population. 
The promotion of the Russian language, at the expense 
of the national language, was the principal reason for 
minority discontent in the Brezhnev period. Already in 
1965 the KGB moved against Ukrainian intellectuals 
defending their language and literature. This led to a 
wave of protests and further repression, with the Ukrainian 
First Secretary, P. E. Shelest, giving some surreptitious 
support to the dissidents. He was removed from his post in 
1973, with accusations of nationalism being made against 
him. 46 National movements against linguistic Russification 
later became important elsewhere, especially in Lithuania 
(where it overlapped with the Roman Catholic movement), 
Georgia and Estonia. 47 By 1968, when the Moscow samizdat 
Chronicle-of-Current-Events was launched, the national 
movements were forming links with the human rights movement 
centred in Moscow. 
National grievances on the part of the Russians, on the 
other hand, have two main sources. The first is the 
widespread perception that non-Russians live better than 
Russians. Alain Besancon's statement about political 
rights - "The Russian people has no privilege" - is seen as 
being equally applicable in the economic field. 
48 Victor 
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Zaslavsky refers to the "undeniably lower living standard 
of the Russian population in comparison to those of the 
populations of the non-Russian republics". 49 This is 
described by Vadim Belotserkovsky, a recent socialist 
emigre, as a "myth" with "little currency in the factory 
milieu" (although he accepts it as true for the rural 
population). Belotserkovsky backs up this statememt by 
claiming that workers tend to migrate into the RSFSR rather 
than outward to the national republics, although this claim 
is not born out by the evidence for Central Asia. 50 
Discrimination in favour of the eponymous populations 
of the Union Republics is the second main source of Russian 
national grievances. Such discrimination applies not only 
within the political elite but now within the technical 
intelligentsia, as the process of korenizatsiia has 
produced national cadres for managerial and specialist 
positions. Arutiunian found (in a 1969 study of the Tatar 
ASSR, where one would expect the process to be less 
significant than in a Union Republic) that the 
intelligentsia were as concerned about nationality as were 
other social strata, and sometimes more so. He linked this 
with their professional interests and the supply and demand 
of specialized labour. 51 The sociologist A. A. Susokolov in 
a 197b study found that national feelings among the 
intelligentsia were rising, because more natives were 
competing with Russians for the specialist jobs. There was 
possibly, he wrote, "a more intensive growth of national 
consciousness in those republics where there is a fast 
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increase in the size of both the national and the Russian 
intelligentsia. "52 The survey work of Rasma Karklins among 
ýol I emigre Germans has shown that, at least in Central Asia, 
the Russians perceive the locals as taking over and 
discriminating against them. Throughout the non-Russian 
republics, the titular nationality is perceived by Russians 
as receiving preference in higher education. Even where the 
Russians are overrepresented in relation to their 
population share, they may still have been required to 
achieve a higher admissions requirement than the locals. 53 
The__jews under__Brezhnev 
In July 1955 Kosygin denounced chauvinism and anti- 
Semitism, and two months later Pravda followed this up with 
its first editorial attack on anti-Semitism for twenty 
years. 54 Novvi mir in 1966 carried a warning that the 
Party must not follow prejudices of the masses such as 
anti-Semitism. 55 But the halt to de-Stalinization gave 
encouragement to elements who wished to stir up anti- 
Semitism. The victory of Israel in the Six-Day War of June 
1967 led to a series of campaigns in the Soviet media which 
were out of all proportion to either the military strength 
of the State of Israel or the intensity of Zionist feeling 
among the Soviet population. In these campaigns, Zionism 
was sometimes distinguished from both the Israeli State and 
the Soviet Jewish population, who were stated to be 
overwhelmingly loyal to the USSR. 56 It was indeed true 
that the Jews, as the most urbanized and highly educated 
Soviet nationality, were also the nationality most highly 
represented in the ranks of the CPSU, as well as being very 
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prominent in science and culture. 
57 But the innumerable 
Press cartoons of the grotesque Israeli soldier, wearing 
the Star of David and carrying out the dictates of American 
imperialism, could only convey to the reader that even 
Soviet Jews were not to be trusted. 58 
Israel's victory was accompanied by an increase in the 
national consciousness of Soviet Jews. This may also have 
been a response to the growing nationalism of other Soviet 
nationalities; it may have reflected an increasing 
awareness of discrimination, as the quota systems which 
favoured the more backward nationalities were used to 
toughen requirements for Jews (especially in higher 
education); it may have been a response to anti-Semitism, 
and an awareness that however much a person spoke and 
thought like a Russian, the nationality entry in the 
passport remained "Jew"; it may have been a sympathy for 
Israel. It is likely that all these factors played their 
part. The upshot was the emergence of the Jewish 
emigration movement. 
The Soviet anti-Zionist campaign was pursued for a 
number of different reasons. It suited Moscow's policy in 
the Middle East, and the Third World generally, to win 
friends by posing as the implacable enemy of Zionism. It 
had internal uses: Jews and half-Jews formed a high 
proportion of the activists in the Moscow human rights 
movement, and of the t-zechoslovak relormers and Pollsh 
dissidents of 1968. The notion of an international Zionist 
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conspiracy could be used to try to isolate these figures 
from the native population. In the future, if a serious 
internal crisis developed, some elements in ruling circles 
seemed willing to use the Jews ýZionists) as scapegoats for 
popular feeling. Jonathan Frankel showed in a 1972 study 
that the intensity of the anti-Zionist campaign between 
19bg and 1971 varied with the level of pressure from (and 
from abroad, for) the Soviet Jews to emigrate. Moscow 
probably feared that if large numbers of Jews were allowed 
to emigrate, not only would the USSR lose some highly- 
trained specialists, but other national and religious 
groups might also be encouraged to seek to leave the USSR. 
Efforts to persuade Soviet Jews that they would not be 
happy in Israel coincided with attempts to intimidate them 
from applying for exit visas, and this raised the level of 
Jewish discontent. The increasingly desperate efforts to 
get out, culminating in the attempt to hijack an aircraft 
and in a sit-in at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, 
persuaded the Politburo to make the Jews a special case. 
The decision of March 1971 to allow Jewish emigration was 
probably also influenced by the desire of Brezhnev and 
Kosygin to improve relations with the West. 
59 
The less inhibited form of anti-Semitism was again 
exemplified by Kichko (see above, p. 375). His Iudaizm-i 
sionizm (Judaism and Zionism, Kiev, 1968) linked Judaism 
and Zionism as sharing "the chauvinistic idea of the god- 
chosenness of the Jewish people, the propaganda of 
messianism and the idea of ruling over the peoples of the 
world". Equally notorious was lury Ivanov's Ostorozhno! 
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Sionizm (Caution! Zionism, Moscow, 19(59). 6() In 1972 the 
Soviet Embassies in Paris and Rome published a virulently 
anti-Semitic document. It turned out to be based on a pre- 
revolutionary Black Hundred manifesto, with the word "Jew" 
sometimes replaced by "Zionist". 
61- In 1974 Dr. Mikhail 
Stern, a Jew, was put on trial in Vinnitsa, in the 
Ukraine. One aim of this trial was to punish him for 
refusing to forbid his sons to emigrate to Israel. This 
was presumably intended to intimidate the Jewish emigration 
movement. Another aim may have been to stir up anti- 
Semitic feeling. Originally the authorities wanted to 
accuse him of poisoning Soviet children, in a replay of the 
1913 Beilis case (see above, p. 208). It proved impossible 
to force anyone in the whole town to appear as a 
prosecution witness with such charges, and the indictment 
was amended to corruption. Stern was given an eight-year 
labour camp sentence, but released in 1977 after 
international protests. b2 
References to the world conspiracy continued to 
circulate through the 1970s. In particular V. N. Emelianov, 
a lecturer in Obshchestvo Znanie, the Knowledge Society, 
claimed that the Zionists had a plot for world domination 
by the year 2000. They already controlled the USA, and 
only the USSR could stop them. lanov has spoken of the 
electric atmosphere provoked by such statements of 
transformed Russian messianism at public lectures. 
(Emelianov himself tell from favour atter being accused of 
murdering his wife. )63 A review in the literary journal 
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Nash-sovremennik in 1974 announced, "The Zionists have 
serious pretensions - like the Hitlerites before them - to 
world domination Egogpodstvo]. " The writer attempted to 
place this in a Marxist-Leninist framework, citing Marx's 
"On the Jewish Question"64 (see above, p. 198). Conspiracy 
theories about the Jews expressed in literature and 
historiography will be mentioned below, pp. 427,439-41. 
One work which presented a positive view of the Jews was 
Anatoly Rybakov's Tiazhelyi-pesok (Heavy Sand). This novel 
about a Ukrainian Jewish family from the revolution to the 
German occupation drew Western attention when published in 
the conservative journal Oktiabr' in July to September 
1978, because it stood out against the general anti-Semitic 
mood of the time. 55 
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Guitural__. Russian nationalism, -1964-19'10. -Xolcidaia--gvardiia 
and its critics 
Organizations were officially established in the i960s 
under pressure from the Russian nationalists. Already at 
the October 19b4 Central Committee Plenum where 
Khrushchev's overthrow had been approvecL, the question of 
the preservation oi historical monuments had been raised. 
66 
Then on lb October 1964 - within 24 hours of the tail of 
Khrushchev - the RSFSR Ministry of Culture issued an 
"Instruction on the bringing to light, registration and 
collection of works of old Russian art". 
b'l in that year 
the Komsomol organized the "Rodina" ýMotheriand) clubs for 
young people interested in the protection of monuments. The 
Leningrad artist iiia Sergeevich Glazunov (born 1930) was 
reputed to be the leader. Leonid Pliushch has 
characterized his ideas as "Monarchy, Orthodoxy, truly 
Russian culture", slightly varying Uvarov's i: ormuia ol the 
reign of Nicholas 1.68 The members of Rodina were known as 
rusity ýRussites), and later the term "Russkaia partiia" 
ýRussian Party) was used ior this tendency. In i9bb the 
government allowed the i: ormation of the "Aii-Russian 
Society for the Protection of historical and (. ýultural 
Monuments" ýVOOPIK), under the auspices of the RSFSR 
Ministry of Culture. Similar societies had already been 
established in the three Transcaucasian republics under 
Khrushchev. b9 
The driving forces behind the : rormation o: t VOOPIK were 
ulazunov and Soioukhin. lhe restoration oi churches and 
monasteries has been a major part of its activity. By 1962 
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VOOPIK had 14.7 million individual members. 70 According to 
lanov, it was a forum where Russian nationalist dissidents 
and official cultural figures could mingle. Both here and 
in the Rodina Clubs, Jews were considered outsiders and 
viewed with hostility. 71 The socialist dissident Lev Z. 
Kopelev in 1974 called VOOPIK "in essence a legal 
organization of new Black Hundreds". 72 Soloukhin's 
writings conveyed strong hints not only of Russian 
nationalism but also of Orthodox Christianity. His 
"Chernye doski" (Black Boards, 1969) condemned the 
destruction of churches and religious objects, under 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev too, and described the continuing 
power of Russian icons to attract peopie. 73 The "All- 
Russian Society for the Protection of Nature" (VOOP), in 
which Russian nationalists were also active, was reported 
to have had 19 million members in 1971.74 
The Journal yaprosY-literatury hosted a discussion on 
"The Literary Criticism of the Early Slavophils" in 1969 
(see also above, ch. ii). 75 Four scholars - S. I. 
Pokrovsky, Dementev (late of Novvi-. mir), V. I. Kuleshov and 
S. I. Mashinsky - took the traditional Leninist position 
that the Slavophils were utopian or reactionary. 76 
Dementev, defending the traditions of Belinsky and Herzen, 
argued: "Perhaps it will become clear that both the 
ideologists of official narodnost' and the Slavophils 
developed not a national but a nationalist consciousness 
Lsamosoznaniel, and worked out not a national but a 
nationalist ideology. "77 The other seven were more 
favourable - lanov, Egorov, A. M. Ivanov, L. G. Frizman, E. A. 
416 
Maimin, Vadim V. Kozhinov and S. S. Dmitriev. 
'78 In 
particular the critics Kozhinov and Ivanov praised the 
Slavophils for pointing to the uniqueness of the Russian 
people, 1vanov wrote: 
The chief factor which the Slavophils valued in the 
Russian people was not at all humility, but the 
communal Lobshchinnvil spirit, what we would now call 
the feeling of collectivism, as counterposed to the 
individualism and egoism of the bourgeois West. 
79 
Kozhinov rejected Dementev's accusation that the Slavophils 
were nationalist (see above, p. 134). Mashinsky, for the 
Vopr2sy literatury editorial board, concluded the series by 
warning against what he called the "rehabilitation" of 
Slavophilism. 80 The four "opponents" of Slavophilism were 
all born between 1904 and 1919; the more favourable seven 
were born between 1921 and 1935, with the exception of 
Dmitriev (born 1906). According to Vladimir Pavlov, the 
latter had been criticized after his 1941 Istorik-marksist 
article for having too positive an attitude to 
Slavophilism. 81 In the late 1970s collections of the works 
of the early Slavophils began to be published, together 
with sympathetic biographies (see above, ch. ii). 
Of wider interest was the attempt to claim Dostoevsky, 
traditionally viewed as reactionary in Soviet criticism, 
for the Soviet State. (See also above, pp. 181-82. ) This 
reflected the growth of interest in the religious and 
philosophical thought of Dostoevsky which began in the 
1950s and has not diminished. Glazunov praised Dostoevsky 
as an ally against cynicism and social atomization, and 
claimed that his critique of the bourgeois world was still 
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relevant. Further, he quoted Dostoevsky's statement from 
the manifesto for Vremia, that the "Russian idea" was a 
synthesis of the best of Europe's ideas-82 At a closed 
meeting of literary critics, held in Moscow on 25 April 
1969, Anatoly P. Lanshchikov (born 1929) linked the 
revolution to Russian messianism. 
Our country has a special road. Dostoevsky spoke of 
that. And that is precisely why the revolution was 
achieved in our country. 
To a comment from the floor - "That's Berdiaev's 
conception" - Lanshchikov justified the relevance of 
Berdiaev. Returning to Dostoevsky, he proclaimed: "... if 
the role of Orthodoxy is to be denied, then I don't know 
what there remains of Russia. 1183 The flood of articles in 
connection with the 150th anniversary of Dostoevsky's birth 
in 1971 provided ample oportunities for debate over how 
much of the writer's ideas could be incorporated into the 
Soviet canon. 84 
An important source of support for village prose, for 
the movement to preserve historical monuments and for 
Russian nationalism in general was provided by the literary 
journal and the publishing house of the All-Union Komsomol, 
both called Molodaia-gvardiia. Soloukhin himself and the 
derevenshchik lury Kazakov (1927-1982) were on the 
editorial board of the journal, as was the Kirghiz writer 
who wrote about the traditions of his own people, Chingiz 
Aitmatov. Articies by Giazunov and Soloukhin in Molodaia 
Svardiia did much to popularize the conservation movement. 
Soloukhin's "Pisma iz Russkogo Muzeia" (Letters from the 
Russian Museum) in Molodaia_gvardiia in 1956 complained at 
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the neglect and destruction of Russian treasures and 
monuments - in particular, churches and monasteries. He 
emphasized their aesthetic, cultural and historical value 
and their importance in developing a national consciousness 
needed for a new society. He showed how Lenin himself had 
sought to preserve Russia's heritage. 
85 The journal often 
included a section, "Cherish what is sacred to us" 
("Beregite sviatyniu nashu"). 
In June i9C)7, in response to an attack by Igor 
Zolotussky in Literaturnaia-wazeta the previous April, 
Molodýia_Zvardiia set forth what was in effect its 
political programme. This did not talk of proletarian 
internationalism, the construction of communism or 
socialist morality. Instead, it spoke of the journal's 
concern with educating youth with "respect for the people's 
history, for the native land, for the cultural legacy and 
for national (natsional'nye) values". 86 Around Molodaia 
F, vardiia were gathered not only nationalists who defended 
the peasant past and sympathized with religion (best termed 
the vozrozhdentsv, or revivalists), such as the 
derevenshchiki, but also nationalists who, like the 
National Bolsheviks, believed in a strong Russian State 
(the Sgalidarstyenniki), and in some cases looked back to 
the good old days of Stalin. These two groups were sharply 
divided on questions ranging from the value of religion to 
the necessity for collectivization. 
In 1968, during and after the Prague Spring, articles 
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appeared in Molodaia-gvardiia by the critics Mikhail P. 
Lobanov, an editorial board member, and Chalmaev, who until 
November 1966 had been deputy chief editor, and who already 
under Khrushchev had attacked Solzhenitsyn's work (see 
above, p. 356). The articles appealed to the "Russian 
spirit" against cosmopolitanism and Americanization. 
87 The 
October Revolution was presented as a manifestation of this 
Russian spirit rather than a stage in the international 
class struggle. Chalmaev invoked Sergei Esenin, who he 
said counterposed "the cosmopolitan, soulless civilization 
of America with the spirituality Ldukhovnost'l of Russia. 
88 
He favourably cited the arch-conservative Leontev 
(discussed in ch. iii), and the derevenshchik Fyodor 
Abramov. 89 Unlike the classical Slavophils, Chalmaev 
referred to the attachment to the State (SgjqýLag. Lstvennost') 
of the Russian people. 90 Lobanov (born 1925) recalled 
Dostoevsky's Stepan Verkhovensky from The Devils, and 
denounced liberalism in general. He spoke of the mortal 
struggle of "two irreconcilable forces - moral uniqueness 
[the Slavophils' samobvtnost'l and the Americanism of the 
soul". 91 Chalmaev was supported by Lanshchikov. 
92 The 
journal also published a poem by Feliks Chuev glorifying 
Stalin. 93 
In August 1970 an article "On Values, Relative and 
Eternal" by the historian Sergei N. Semanov, attempting to 
rehabilitate Stalin, appeared. It spoke of the "universal 
equality" brought after the adoption of the Stalin 
Constitution (in reality the time of the worst purges) and 
praised Stalin's appeal in 1941 to the memory of Tsarist 
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war heroes. 94 Semanov, born in 1934 in Leningrad, had been 
appointed editor-in-chief of the series Zhizn' 
zameýhataj. 'nykh liudei (The Lives of Outstanding People), 
published by the Molodaia gvardiia house, the previous 
year. 95 Other articles appeared, some supporting Stalin 
and attacking Trotsky; 96 others supported Russian 
nineteenth-century anti-socialist thinkers such as Strakhov 
(see ch. iii); 97 others called more generally for more 
attention to be given to the Russian past. 
98 Iury D. 
Ivanov criticized the foreign influences on the Decembrists 
and Pushkin. 99 Kozhinov described how the Russian people 
had saved the world three times, from Genghis Khan, 
Napoleon and Hitler. "We came out three times in history 
as a unique force, able to save all the other nations from 
a grandiose war machine which was striving to crush them. " 
He spoke of Russia's "national and universal 
lobshchechelovecheskcii] mission". 100 
The First Secretary of the Moscow Writers' 
Organization, Feliks Kuznetsov, at the above-mentioned 
April 1969 meeting of critics, suggested that Molodaia 
Syardijg, and Nash sqvrgmennik formed a third pole in 
literature and politics. The first two were the liberal 
Nov. yi_Lnir and the conservative Oktiabr'. I think this is 
helpful, if it is understood that the nationalist pole 
represented by Llqj_odýýjýý_Zvardiia and Nash soyremennik 
included both Stalinists, such as Semanov, and anti- 
Stalinists, such as Soloukhin and Valentin Rasputin (see 
below), who condemned the Stalinist attitude to historical 
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monuments and the peasants. Kuznetsov spoke of the 
impossibility of combining Chalmaev's position with 
Marxism. He continued that Soviet misfortunes were "not 
from socialism but from not enough socialism, not from 
Europe but from not enough Europe". 101 
It should be remembered that, behind these discussions, 
two major political developments were occurring. On the 
one hand, the regime was wondering whether to rehabilitate 
Stalin fully; rumours about this spread in 1966 and 1969, 
and in 1970 a bust of the leader was erected above his 
grave behind the Lenin Mausoleum. On the other hand, 
Moscow intellectuals, fearing further curbs on their 
freedom and a return to a cultural graveyard, launched the 
human rights movement. Figures around Novvi--mir such as 
Andrei D. Siniavsky and Iuly M. Daniel were victims of 
persecution, and others such as Dorosh and Ehrenburg were 
participants in protests against persecution. Between 1966 
and 1970, the Main Political Administration of the Soviet 
Army and Fleet (MPA) banned the journal from the armed 
forces. In early 1967, Dementev ("Tvardovsky's closest 
friend and top lieutenant") was removed from the editorial 
board by the officials of the USSR Writers' Union. 
102 
Despite these difficulties, Tvardovsky continued to publish 
much of the best of Russian literature, including village 
prose, and struggled with the authorities in a vain attempt 
to publish more of the works of Solzhenitsyn. Although not 
a participant in the petitions to defend the persecuted, 
Solzhenitsyn became associated with the human rights 
movement after his letter to the Congress of the Writers' 
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Union in 1967, appealing for an end to censorship. 
103 
It was over Chalmaev's articles in Molodaia-gvardiia 
that NoL7yi mir was to clash with the Stalinists. The 
deviations of Malpdaigi -var a from Leninist orthodoxy did 
not pass unnoticed. In February 1968 Iqnost' 
had accused 
Molodaia gvardiia of ignoring proletarian internationalism 
in its adoration of things Russian. 
104 The magazine of the 
Union of Journalists, Zhurnalist, reported in May 1969 that 
Chalmaev had been censured by the Central Committee 
Propaganda Department. 105 In Navyi_mir, Dementev wrote 
an article attacking Chalmaev's chauvinism and rejecting 
his claim that bourgeois cosmopolitanism posed a danger for 
Soviet society. "Chalmaev, " wrote Dementev, "speaks in the 
language of Slavophil messianism rather than in the 
language of our contemporaries.,, 106 This provoked an 
attack on Novyi mir by eleven writers of the Russian 
national orientation, including Anatoly S. Ivanov of the 
Molodaia-sKvardiia editorial board, Sergei V. Vikulov, 
editor-in-chief of Nash soyremennik, Pyotr L. Proskurin and 
Mikhail N. Alekseev. It took the form of a letter to 
Qgongk, the then pro-nationalist mass-circulation journal 
of the USSR Writers' Union, whose editor-in-chief, Anatoly 
V. Sofronov, was close to Glazunov. It asserted that the 
Soviet Union was indeed threatened by corrupting influences 
from the West. 107 Ianov has claimed that Dementev's 
article, by uniting the old Stalinists with the new 
nationalists, sealed the fate of Novyi mir. 108 it is more 
likely that the sacking of Tvardovsky's colleagues in 
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February 1970, and his consequent resignation, was 
connected with his struggle against Stalinism and for 
Solzhenitsyn. 109 
The ideological complexity of this period is shown by 
the position of Solzhenitsyn, who had achieved publication 
only thanks to NoVyi-mir. Solzhenitsyn found himself 
philosophically closer to the semi-Stalinist Chalmaev, who 
had earlier attacked Solzhenitsyn's work, than to P! oyyl_ 
mir, for Chalmaev was defending religious inspiration as a 
historical source of Russian patriotism. Whereas Molodaia 
Syardiia had put up a defence of religion, Novyl mir had 
supported Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign. The 
editors of Q&qaek and Moskva spoke more openly about the 
destruction caused by collectivization than Tvardovsky did. 
(But when Solzhenitsyn offered his work to QSqnek and to 
Litgra±Lurnaia Rossii$ý, the newspaper of the RSFSR Writers' 
Union, edited by supporters of the Russian orientation, 
they rejected it. )110 
The nationalism and Stalinism of Molodaia_Syýjr! ftiia went 
too far for Brezhnev. Iury Melentev, the director of the 
Molodaia gvardiia publishing house, was sacked from his 
post and from his membership of' the CPSU Central Committee 
(after, according to Ianov, he had tried to persuade 
Brezhnev of the need for a 'patriotic' indoctrination 
campaign among the youth and a purge of cosmopolitanism). 
Nevertheless, Melentev was quickly made RSFSR Deputy 
Minister (and then Minister) of Culture, showing that he 
had powerful backers. 111 
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Semanov's article "On Values, Relative and Eternal" 
provoked a vigorous response from the veteran Party member 
Raisa Lert, in the samizdat journal Politicheskii-dnevnik 
(Political Diary), edited by Roy Medvedev. Her article 
"The Charms of the Knout" pointed out that while Semanov 
favoured the preservation of monuments, it was in fact 
Stalin who had carried out much of their destruction. 
Semanov cared nothing for the Russian people and Russian 
culture, but was an apologist for great-power chauvinism, 
tsarism and Stalinism. She somewhat misleadingly referred 
to both Semanov and Chalmaev as neo-Slavophils. il2 
More seriously for Semanov, his article appears to 
have been the catalyst for the Politburo member and Central 
Commitee Secretary responsible for ideology, Suslov, to 
initiate a meeting of either the Secretariat113 or the 
Politburol" to discuss the nationalist challenge. 
Brezhnev reportedly spoke at this meeting, in November 
1970, against the religious themes which were creeping into 
the Soviet media. It was decided to sack Anatoly Nikonov 
from the chief editorship of Molodaia-gvardiia. Lobanov, 
Soloukhin and Proskurin were allowed to remain on the 
editorial board, and in April 1972, A. S. Ivanov, who had 
been deputy chief editor since April 1969, was made chief 
editor. Chalmaev later joined the editorial board. After 
the "purge", though, Chalmaev no longer wrote about church 
bells; the journal had less village prose but more 
patriotic memoirs of such Great Patriotic War heroes as 
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Marshal Chuikov which emphasized Soviet rather than Russian 
patriotic themes. Meanwhile, Vikulov, deputy editor of 
Molodaia-gvardiia until August 1968, having become chief 
editor of Ngsh sovremennik, made that journal the principal 
centre of Russian nationalism. 
Who was backing Mqloýjaia-gvardiia and the rusity? It 
seems likely that the senior patron was the Politburo 
member and First Deputy Prime Minister, D. S. Poliansky, 
who, although apparently Ukrainian, has been identified as 
an extreme Russian nationalist. The neo-Stalinist 
Politburo member and head of the trade unions A. N. Shelepin 
probably also gave support. The Cultural Department of the 
Central Committee, headed by V. F. Shauro, a Belorussian, 
was strongly supporting the nationalists. 
115 According to 
the former Soviet writer Georgy Vladimov, M. S. Solomentsev, 
in 1970 a Central Committee Secretary, was also a 
nationalist supporter. Michael Rywkin records rumours that 
Solomentsev and I. V. Kapitonov, another Central Committee 
Secretary, were behind the nationalists. These two were 
the only representatives of the top leadership to attend a 
Kremlin celebration of the Kulikovo anniversary in 1980. 
Vladimov suggests that Suslov and P. N. Demichev (in 1970 a 
Central Committee Secretary and candidate Politburo member) 
were prepared to use the nationalists against the liberal 
writers and dissidents, but the nationalists went too 
far. llt It is certainly the case that Molodaia-gvardiia 
and Nýsh_sovremennik have always been hostile to liberal or 
cosmopolitan writers such as Evgenii Evtushenko, Andrei A. 
Voznesenskii and Vasilii Aksenov. Roy Medvedev reports 
426 
that the rusity were backed by the MPA and the Central 
Co=ittee of the Komsomol-117 
A particular example of the Stalinist anti-Semitic 
approach in fictional literature was Ivan M. Shevtsov's 
novel Vo-imia-ottsa-i-svna (In the Name of the Father and 
the Son), published by the Moskovskii rabochii publishing 
house in 1970. This conflated Trotskyists and Zionists in 
the negative portrait of Jewry. It includes the suggestion 
that imperialism is a tool of Zionism, and not the other 
way round, as the usual Marxist position would have it. 
118 
This novel was reportedly published only due to the 
pressure of Poliansky. 
119 
A number of attacks on the Russian nationalists, 
following Suslov's moves against them, came from Kommunist 
and from Party ideologists. V. Ivanov in Kommunist in 
November 1970 came out against the "single stream" (edinvi 
potok) view of Russian history which minimized class 
conflict. He criticized the attacks of both Iunost' and 
Novyi mir on Molodaia-gyardiia for going too far. 
Concerning Dementev, he wrote: "In the contemporary 
ideological struggle it is impermissible to belittle the 
danger of the influence of bourgeois ideology. ', 120 On the 
other hand, he mentioned the articles by Chalmaev, Iu. 
Ivanov and Semanov, and deprecated the "non-social, non- 
class, anti-historical approach to the cultural legacy, so 
insistently brought out by a series of authors in Moiodaia 
gvardiia! ". Chalmaev was guilty of idealizing the 
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patriarchal village. Historians such as Semanov deviated 
from Marxism-Leninism to try to "find in the policy of 
autocracy some 'progressive' features, which supposedly 
facilitated the strengthening of national 
consciousness. "121 In an article in 1971 in Kommunist, M. 
Iovchuk, director of the Academy of Social Sciences, 
attacked "one-sided" (i. e. hostile) treatment of 
collectivization, nationalist moods and the idealization of 
religion, naming Solzhenitsyn, Novyi_mir, Molodaia 
gvardiia and even "Fyodor Kuzkin". 
122 Kuzkin was the hero 
of a Nqyyl mir story by the derevenshchik Boris Mozhaev. 
In the story, Kuzkin, discontented in his kolkhoz, 
struggles hard to leave and finally succeeds. There is a 
happy ending, however, because he joins another one where 
there is scope for his talents. 123 
The following year A. N. Iakovlev, later to become a 
leading ally of Gorbachov but then acting head of the 
Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, published 
in Literaturnaia-gazeta a long and detailed attack on both 
official and dissident nationalism. From a traditional 
Leninist viewpoint, he attacked the derevenshchiki for 
seeking an eternal, classless morality; Mqj_qdýjia_Zvardjjýj 
for its positive portrayal of nineteenth-century 
conservatives; and Solzhenitsyn for anti-communism. 
124 
The article is believed to be the reason for his removal 
from the Propaganda Department and demotion to be 
Ambassador in Ottawa. 125 
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Russian_nationalisi3i-in-literature__and_art_in the 1970s 
In a book published in 1980 (based on a conference held 
in 1978) Jack V. Haney claimed: "the revival of interest in 
Russia's past on the part of writers and critics, although 
certainly not ended, is nonetheless muted now ... because 
there no longer exists an open forum of' discussion. " 
Extraordinarily, his chapter makes no reference to Nash 
gigyremennik. 126 As I shall try to show below, Russian 
nationalism in literature, art and the study of history 
flourished throughout the 1970s. 
It is worth noting that many of the concerns of the 
derevenshchiki were acted upon by the Brezhnev leadership. 
The peasants were allowed greater freedom of enterprise, 
with the increase in the size of the permitted private 
plot. Collective farmers were given internal passports, 
allowing them to leave the kolkhozy if they wished. In 
place of the Virgin Lands scheme, Brezhnev emphasized the 
development of the Non-Black-Earth zone of Central Russia. 
Investment in fertilizer, irrigation and the rural 
infrastructure increased dramatically. 127 The 
derevenshchiki passed from a preoccupation with the village 
to wider concerns about life and morality. 128 In the idea, 
frequently implicit in their writings, that Russia's future 
was best secured by a return to what they considered to be 
peasant values, they had (and have) much in common with the 
61avophils and Dostoevsky. Unlike their nineteenth-century 
predecessors, however, there is little to suggest that the 
village prose writers see Russia as a model for the rest of 
the world. Their concern is solely with Russian problems, 
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and not even with the non-Russian republics of the Soviet 
Union (although they have their counterparts there). 
Vasily Ivanovich Belov was born in 1932 in Vologda 
oblast', and won fame with his story "Privychnoe delo" (A 
Normal Situation), published in Sever (The North) in 
January 1966. Sever is a journal of the Writers' Unions 
of the RSFSR and the Karelian and Komi ASSRs and of the 
Arkhangelsk, Vologda and Murmansk Writers' Organizations. 
As such, and within the realities of Soviet politics, it 
seeks to represent the interests of the inhabitants of the 
Russian North. Ivan Afrikanovich, the hero of "Privychnoe 
delo", became an archetype of village prose as a well- 
intentioned, easy-going peasant. 129 Belov progressed from 
a defence of the peasants' immediate interests to the 
position in his novel Kanuny (Eves, 1972-1976), partly 
published in Sever, of arguing that the New Economic Policy 
should have been continued at the end of the 1920s as an 
alternative to collectivization. 130 (Sergei Zalygin took a 
similar position in his novel Posle-12uri [After the 
Tempest], the first parts of which appeared in 
Druzhba-narodov between April 1980 and May 1982. )131 
Mikhail N. Alekseev, born in 1918 in a village in Saratov 
Q121ast' , was chief editor of Moskva, 
the monthly of the 
RSFSR Writers' Union and the Moscow Writers' Organization 
(a position he still held in 1989). He was a signatory to 
the 1969 letter attacking Novyi_lpir. The author of a 
series of novels of peasant life, he wrote in 
Nash sovremennik in September 1972 about the 1933 famine in 
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the Volga region which accompanied collectivization. 
132 
Oleg V. Volkov (born 1900), a literary critic and former 
political prisoner, wrote in the same journal in November 
1978 of peasant resistance to collectivization. 
133 
The stories of Vasily M. Shukshin (1929-1974) about 
rugged individualistic peasants attracted much favour among 
Russian readers. While the independence of spirit and 
restlessness of his characters tend to mark him off from 
the derevenshchiki, he has points of contact with them. 
His story "Kalina krasnaia" (Snowball Berry Red) published 
in Nýýsh_sovremennik in April 1973 won still greater 
recognition when he made it into a film, bringing images of 
the Russian village (including a church) to a large 
audience. In his sympathy for the unspoilt, primitive 
past, Shukshin has been called a "Scythian" and compared 
with Ivanov-Razumnik. 
134 
Probably the most popular of the derevenshchiki is 
Valentin Grigorevich Rasputin. Successive volumes of his 
stories, in print runs of hundreds of thousands, sell out 
immediately and become unobtainable. This has normally 
been the case with the most valuable Soviet literary 
creations. Rasputin was born in the Siberian village of 
Ust-Uda on the Angara in 1937, and in 1988 was still living 
in Irkutsk, only 300 miles from his birthplace. As well as 
depicting the hardships of the Russian peasants in 
different periods of Soviet history, he came to challenge 
the whole notion of progress. 
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His "Den'gi dlia Marii" ýMoney for Maria, Angara, April 
1957) depicts the poverty on the kolkhozy and the cruel 
behaviour of the authorities. 135 The story "Zhivi i pomni" 
(Live and Remember, Nash sovremennik, October-November 
1974), deploys religious symbolism and reveals his debt to 
Dostoevsky. The relationship between the deserter Andrei 
and his wife Nastyona echoes that between Raskolnikov and 
Sonia in Crime-and Punishment, 13ý) while the behaviour of 
Andrei himself comes to resemble that of one of 
Dostoevsky's Devils. 
Rasputin's novel "Proshchanie s Materoi" (Farewell to 
Matyora, Nýsh soyremennik, October to November 197b) 
depicts the preparations for the death of a village, 
Matyora. The village and the island of the same name are 
to be flooded for a hydroelectric power scheme. His 
positive character, the old peasant woman Daria, believes 
that people have forgotten their God-given place and have 
no right to interfere with the environment. Rasputin seems 
to be recalling Dostoevsky's concept: if there is no God, 
then "all is permitted". In the epoch of the scientific 
and technological revolution, Daria knows that if man 
deifies technology he will become its slave. Daria's 
religion, it should be pointed out, has pagan elements; she 
prays to the sun but considers herself a Christian. Daria 
follows Rasputin's earlier peasant-women protagonists - 
Maria in "Den'gi dlia Marii", Anna in "Poslednii srok" 
kBorrowed Time, Nash-sovremennik, July-August 1970) and 
Nastyona in "Zhivi i pomni". They are mother figures in 
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whom moral values are concentrated, especially the 
readiness for self-sacrifice. David Gillespie suggest that 
these women symbolize "Mother Russia". 
137 They evoke 
memories of Solzhenitsyn's Matryona. 
138 The end of Matyora 
is presented in apocalyptic terms with the waters 
threatening not only the island but the lives of Darla and 
the other old people who refuse to be evacuated. 
In a Vopros)r-literatury discussion on Rasputin's 
stories, 0. Salynsky and V. Oskotsky criticized Rasputin 
for identifying with his heroine's failure to appreciate 
the benefits of progress. 139 Of significance were the 
views of the Fosudarstvennik critic Iury Ivanovich 
Seleznyov, who was born in Krasnodar in 1939 and died in 
1984 (see also the next section). He welcomed the story 
enthusiastically. Rasputin was concerned not only with the 
disappearance of the countryside but with socio- 
philosophical and moral problems: "Who are we on this 
earth; what is this earth for us? " For Seieznyov, Matyora 
signified not a territory, or a flooding zone, as the 
bureaucrat sees it, but "mother", "mother-earth" (mat'- 
Zemlia) and motherland (mat'-Rodina). He compared 
"Natyora" with Pushkin's "Bronze Horseman": both portrayed 
the conflict between the individual (lichnost') and the 
interests of the State (Zosudarstvennost'). (Seleznyov 
presumably believed that such technological feats were in 
fact against the interests of the State. )140 
It should be noted that Rasputin was beaten up twice 
after the appearance of "Matera", in 1977 and 1980, 
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although there is no evidence to link this with any 
official organs. 141 With the exception of some short 
pieces published in Nash-sovremennik in July 1982, he 
produced no fiction until 198b. In a 197b interview, he 
listed his main sources of inspiration among writers then 
living as Sholokhov, Shukshin, Belov, Viktor P. Astafev, 
Evgeny I. Nosov, Abramov and the Belorussian Vasyl 
Bykov. 142 But in 1983 he made clear a deeper debt: 
11 ... there were and are (and will be, in my view) no 
phenomena in literature deeper, more central, more human- 
directed and eternal than Dostoevsky. "143 
From the mid-1970s, religious themes became almost a 
regular feature in literary Journals such as Molodaia 
Svar! ftiia, Nash sovremennik, yolga and Sever. Zalygin's 
Komissiia (The Commission, Nash sovremennik. September to 
November 1975) positively portrayed the peasants' religion. 
Belov wrote a series of essays entitled "Lad" (Harmony, 
Nash sovremennik, 1979-1981), investigating the attitudes 
and customs of the peasant in old Russia. 144 Village 
prose writers such as Viktor I. Likhonosov and Astafev 
defended Orthodoxy. (Astafev's main concern had been the 
protection of nature, especially in his native Siberia. ) 
Proskurin's hero, an obkom secretary, comes to see 
Orthodoxy as the spiritual foundation of Russia. i45 Many 
writers, including the poet Valentin Sorokin, emphasized 
the role of the Orthodox Church in the Russian defeat of 
the Tatars and Mongols at Kuiikovo Field in 1380.146 This 
trend in literature reflected the wider tendency among 
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sections of the intelligentsia towards the study of 
religious thought, especially of that of Dostoevsky, 
Solovyov and the Vekhi writers. 
147 The cult of N. F. 
Fyodorov with its emphasis on progress was rather different 
but equally non-Marxist (see above, pp. 216-18). 
The journal Nash sovremennik, the principal centre of 
Russian nationalism at this time, attracted many of those 
derevenshchiki who had previously published in Novyi-mir. 
In November l9b8 the composition of the Nash soyremennik 
editorial board had been almost entirely replaced. The new 
chief editor was the poet and derevenshchik Vikulov, who 
signed the 1969 attack on Ngyyi mir. Vikulov adhered to 
the view that the peasants were the best representatives of 
Russian traditions. 148 Chalmaev became the deputy chief 
editor, a position he held only until March 1970. Shukshin 
joined the board in 1973, Rasputin in 1975 and Belov in 
1978. Other derevenshchik members included Astafev, Nosov, 
Ivan A. Vasilev, Georgy V. Semyonov and Troepolsky. The 
gosudarstvennik litterateur Seleznyov was made deputy chief 
editor in May 1981 but dropped from the list in May 1982, 
when the gosudarstvennik historian Apollon G. Kuzmin became 
an editor. From June 1981 the journal carried a slogan 
"Russia - my Motherland". This was a bold nationalist 
statement, in view of the traditional position that the 
motherland for Soviet citizens is the USSR as a whole. In 
1973 Soizhenitsyn, by then a Russian nationalist dissident, 
expressed his continuing affinity with officially-permitted 
Russian nationalist literature. He named fourteen writers 
whom he felt represented the core of contemporary Russian 
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prose. Of these at least eight (Abramov, Astatev, Belov, 
Kazakov, Mozhaev, Nosov, Soloukhin, and Vladimir 
Tendriakov) belonged to the derevenshchiki, and a ninth, 
Shukshin, was close to them. 149 
Religious motifs were never far from the art of 
Glazunov. His portraits of Russian historical figures such 
as Ivan the Terrible and Boris Godunov conveyed religious 
images, and other paintings were primarily religious in 
content. An example is "The Eve. Before the Battle of 
Kulikovo", showing St. Sergii of Radonezh. Many of his 
paintings include iconographic figures. Like the Orthodox 
Church hierarchy, Glazunov has been a faithful ambassador 
of the Soviet Union abroad. He visited Vietnam in 1967 
during the war, and Chile in 1973, where he painted a 
portrait of President Salvador Allende. In 1977 his 
enigmatic "Mystery of the Twentieth Century" became widely 
known. Christ appears above a collection of political 
leaders and cultural figures, including Lenin, Stalin, 
Nicholas II, Churchill, Solzhenitsyn and the Beatles. His 
"Return of the Prodigal Son" shows a penitent Russian youth 
in jeans returning to a peasant father who is surrounded by 
Russian saints and heroes. Widespread Russian interest in 
Glazunov was indicated by the attendance at his art 
exhibition, featuring national and religious themes. In 
Moscow in 1978 500 000 people came, and perhaps a million 
in his native Leningrad in 1979. IbO Pravda published a 
review of the exhibition in Moscow, by the Zogýýqýjrgitvennik 
historian Dmitry Zhukov The latter appraised Glazunov's 
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patriotism positively, but criticized his "partiality to 
religious motifs", and his failure to depict events such as 
"the birth of the mighty Soviet State". 
151 Oleg Volkov 
entitled his Nash-sovremennik review of the exhibition '"I 
saw Russia"' . 
152 
At the exhibition in Moscow, Glazunov met the priest 
Dimitry Dudko. He later approvingly quoted to some of 
Dudko's followers Dostoevsky's aphorism that one could not 
be Russian without being Orthodox. 
153 Glazunov encountered 
much opposition from the Union of Artists but had the 
support of the RSFSR Writers' Union. Olga Carlisle wrote 
in 1978: "In Moscow it is generally recognized that 
Glazunov, a virulent anti-Semite, is a KGB official, 
although he denies it. "154 Undoubtedly Glazunov became 
accepted by the top Party leaders; he painted a portrait of 
Suslov, which pleased the ideology Secretary, and his 
portrait of Brezhnev was published in Sofronov's Ogonek155. 
This does not, of course, make him a KGB official. The 
Russian nationalist dissident Leonid Borodin wrote a 
samizdat article in 1978 praising Glazunov's art and his 
Orthodox symbols. He declared: 
To those who see in 1. Glazunov's official status 
something almost obliterating his whole activity, I 
would like to remind or make clear that we are not 
striving for revolution, in which 'whoever is not with 
us is against us', but for the transformation of all 
our people, our nation, all strata and levels. 
15CD 
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Russian nationalism_in--ýhistc3ry_in__ýthe_1970s. Likhachov, 
_the 
gosudarstvenniki and Kulikovo 
Among Russian historians, the most important advocate 
of the Russian national revival (vozrozhdenets) was 
Academician Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov. Born in 190b, he 
served time in Stalin's prison camps but was rehabilitated 
under Khrushchev. He became the Director of the Department 
of the Literature of Ancient Rus' at the Institute of 
Russian Literature (Pushkin House) of the USSR Academy of 
Sciences' Leningrad division. He played a major role in 
VOOPIK. In 1975 he was beaten up and had a rib broken in 
circumstances suggesting the involvement of the 
authorities. He had previously refused to sign an attack 
on Academician Andrei D. Sakharov. 157 
An indication of the differences between the 
vozrozhdentsy and the gosudarstvenniki was shown by the 
reaction to the book by the Kazakh poet Olzhas Suleimenov, 
Az_i_Ia. (The title is a pun on the first and last letters 
of the old Russian alphabet with the "and" in between them, 
spelling "Asia". ) Suleimenov's book, printed in Alma-Ata 
in 1975 but unobtainable, challenged the accepted Russian 
view of the origins of the literary epic SlOvo_o-po, lku 
! Zoreve (The Tale of Igor's Campaign). He proclaimed a 
Turkic influence on the poem; he also suggested that 
Russians were racists and had an inferiority complex, and 
called the Jews the "chief People". Likhachov wrote a 
scholarly answer, taking Suleimenov's claims seriously but 
refuting them. The Sggg!; ýIrstyennik Kuzmin wrote a sneering 
review in Mglodaia gvardiia, which after dispatching the 
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Kazakh launched into an attack on Judaism. 158 Another 
gosudarstvennik, Seleznyov, mocked Suleimenov in a Moskva 
review. He said that the book would be only a short-term 
sensation. He accused the writer of considering the Jews 
the "chosen people", an idea which was akin to Nazism. 
Condescendingly, he described the book as "not only anti- 
scientific, but hurtful" to the Turkic peoples who were 
creating their own cuiture. 159 
The g. 2sudarstvenniki in the late 1970s seemed to be 
becoming increasingly influential. In 1976 Semanov became 
editor-in-chief of the journal of the Ministry of Justice, 
Chelovek i_zakon, which henceforth took a strong anti- 
Semitic line. He produced a collection, Serdtse rodiny 
(The Heart of the Motherland) in 1977, calling himself a 
supporter of a strong State (Sqqjiýjarstvennik) and attacking 
"rootless cosmopolitanism". According to Semyon Reznik, 
Semanov respects the Tsars, Lenin and Stalin, and opposes 
all the opponents of Russian governments, from the 
Decembrists onwards, apart from the Bolsheviks. Thus his 
biography Brusilov praised the General's loyalty to the 
Tsar and to the Bolsheviks. Semanov, like the National 
Bolsheviks, elevates the Russian State above all else. 160 
While Semanov was editor of Chelovekizakon, the journal 
Kommunist carried an article on the need to preserve 
historical monuments and works of art, attributed to the 
"collective correspondent" of Kommuniat, the journal 
Chelovek i zakon. 161 Chaimaev, for his part, showed his 
E, osudarstvennik credentials when he complained in Moskva 
about writers who placed "ethical-moral problems over 
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State-patriotic ones". 162 This appeared to be an attack on 
the derevenshchiki as well as the liberals. 
On 21 December 1977, a meeting was held in the Moscow 
writers' headquarters at which anti-Semitic statements were 
openly expressed by the deputy director of the Gorky 
Institute of World Literature, Pyotr Palievsky. Anatoly 
Efros, a theatre director of Jewish nationality, objected 
to the proceedings and was sent an anonymous note saying: 
"Organize your own national theatre and mutilate Russian 
classics there as you wish. "163 Efros was supported only by 
Evtushenko. Kozhinov was forced to deny accusations of 
anti-Semitism, but (after Efros had read out the anonymous 
note) informed the meeting that his wife had stopped going 
to Efros's theatre because of what Efros did to Chekhov's 
plays. 154 Seleznyov reportedly managed to introduce an 
attack on Zionism into the proceedings, proclaiming "The 
Third War of the Fatherland is now at its height". 165 
When Seleznyov succeeded Semanov as editor-in-chief of 
the series Zhizn' zamechatel'nvkh liudei it became an 
instrument of the SgjýlqýkgLatvenniki. Works by Kuzmin, Oleg 
Mikhailov, Lobanov, Iury Loshchits and Seleznyov himself 
promoted a positive attitude to tsarism. According to the 
Fosudarstvennik ideology, the non-Russians supposedly all 
joined the Russian State voluntarily. It was only in the 
nineteenth century that the Empire began to degenerate, 
under the influence of "cosmopolitanism"; the October 
Revolution put the State back on the "national" path. 
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Anti-Semitic innuendoes were a regular feature of the 
series. Still more significant was the wide popularity 
enjoyed by Valentin S. Pikul''s novel, U-poslednei-cherty 
(On the Brink), published in Nash-soyremennik from April to 
June 1979. This depicted a supposed Jewish-Masonic plot 
against Russia during the First World War, with the monk 
Rasputin being a Zionist agent. 166 
The nationalists and &osudarstvenniki were not 
unopposed, however. Feliks Kuznetsov continued to defend a 
Marxist position. "The idealization of the patriarchal way 
of life in the Russian village is one of today's widespread 
deviations from the historical Marxist-Leninist social and 
class approach to the problem of spiritual and ethical 
values. "*167 K. N. Lomunov, in the 1978 Gorky Institute 
volume on Slavophilism, denounced the Molodaia gvardiia 
critics. He accused them of trying "to resurrect the 
Slavophil counterposing of the patriarchal village to the 
industrial town", and present the peasants as "even today" 
the preservers of "the people's aspirations and 
persuasions". 168 A leading article in Kommunist in October 
1979 attacked manifestations of nationalism and 
patriarchalism in Soviet literature. It singled out a book 
on Goncharov by Iury Loshchits (1977) in Seleznyov's series 
and a story by Astafev entitled "Padenie lista" (The Fall 
of a Leaf). 169 Brezhnev's denunciation of anti-Semitism 
as well as Zionism, and of chauvinism as well as 
nationalism, at the XXVI Party Congress in 1981, may not 
have been purely ritualistic. 
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A major occasion for an outburst of Russian national 
feeling was the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kulikovo 
Field, which fell in September 1980. In October 1979 the 
RSFSR Council of Ministers announced a number of measures 
to celebrate the anniversary, including the repair of 
monuments, in particular the Church of St Sergii of 
Radonezh. 170 It may perhaps be significant that it was an 
RSFSR body, rather than an All-Union body, which was in 
charge; this meant (in the absence of a Communist Party of 
Russia) that it was officially handled primarily as a 
government rather than a Party matter. The impression 
might have been given that the top leadership was 
distancing itself' from the occasion; only two 
representatives attended the Kremlin celebration (see 
above, p. 426) on 8 September 1980. This was organized by 
the Moscow Forkom (city committee) of the CPSU, the Moscow 
City Soviet, the Academy of Sciences, the RSFSR Ministry of 
Culture and VOOPIK. 171 
Two weeks later, Pravda carried an article by 
Academician Likhachov on the importance of preserving 
Russia's historic and cultural environment, and linking 
this to the Kulikovo celebrations. He described how a 
Moscow church had once conveyed to him a "mysterious idea"; 
but this church had later been destroyed, in the 1930s. 172 
In March 1980 No vi mir featured an important article by --VY -- 
Likhachov, "Zametki o russkom" (Notes about 
Russianness). 173 In this he defended patriotism and 
distinguished it from nationalism. Nationalism was "based 
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on hate towards other peoples", while patriotism was "based 
on love for one's own" people. 174 This, with other parts 
of the article, appears to be a rebuke to the 
gosudarstvenniki. He discussed the relationship of Russian 
patriotism to history, nature, the open spaces and the 
Russian character. He also wrote of the beauty of the 
English countryside and the Scottish Highlands, and the 
influence of European culture on Russia. It was the 
ability of Pushkin to make his own the culture of all 
Europe which led Dostoevsky to consider him "the ideal of 
the Russian person". 175 Likhachov also argued that Russia 
had a responsibility to protect and develop the cultures of 
the peoples which history had joined to Russia. The 
article was later expanded to a book which passed through 
two editions. 176 Likhachov was also in 1980 allowed to 
edit a volume on the architecture of the Solovetsky Islands 
in the White Sea. The islands were the site of an old 
Orthodox monastery, and later of the camp where Likhachov 
himself was a prisoner. 177 
Valentin Rasputin devoted a whole article to Kulikovo 
in Sovetskaia-kul'tura, the newspaper of the Culture 
Department of the Central Committee. It was based on 
Blok's poem "Pole Kulikovo" (Kulikovo Field). Rasputin 
expressed a view often repeated in 1980, that the Russian 
people had saved Europe at Kulikovo, but at a huge cost to 
themselves. The battle was of great significance: "Russia 
of course did not begin with Kulikovo Field, but she was 
given direction and defined by it. " Blok had predicted a 
return to such events as the battle; and Rasputin asked: 
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"Will it not be our fate to go out on Kulikovo Field, in 
order again to defend Russian land and Russian blood? " I 
am unable to concur with the view of the amiEnes Vladimir 
Solovyov and Elena Klepikova that this article is 
"militaristic". For one thing, Rasputin answered his own 
question by expressing the hope that Blok would "turn out 
to be an unsuccessful prophet". 178 Rasputin's article 
appeared in January 1980, one week after the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, but apart from this coincidence of 
timing there is no evidence to link the two. 
A number of books were published in 1980 to commemorate 
the anniversary. Iury Loshchits made another contribution 
to the Zhizn'-zamechatel'nvkh. 
-liudei series with 
his 
biography Dmitrii Donskoi. 179 Vadim Ashurkov published the 
fourth edition of a monograph on the battle, and the 
Institute of Archaeology of the Academy of Sciences brought 
out a volume by Anatoly Kirpichnikov. 180 Two volumes of 
medieval war tales appeared (one published by Molodaia 
gvardiia and the other with an introduction by 
Likhachov). 181 A collection including the work of literary 
writers and critics, past and present, was compiled by 
Vladimir Kuprin. 182 In 1982 the Academy's Institute of 
History published a collection of scholarly articles183 and 
the following year Moscow University brought out an 
anthology. 184 Ashurkov was one of the relatively few 
commentators to take a more traditional Marxist approach. 
While celebrating Moscow's success in uniting the Russian 
people, he added that the victory "was accompanied by the 
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strengthening of the exploitation of the mass of the people 
on the part of the feudalists and the government of the 
Grand Prince. "185 
A curious feature of some of the writing about Kulikovo 
concerned the national composition of the army which faced 
the Muscovites. While it had traditionally been referred 
to as Mongol, Tatar or Mongoi-Tatar, the &Sjýýudarstvenniki 
and others saw an opportunity to portray Kulikovo as an 
example of the "struggle against cosmopolitanism". 
Kirpichnikov, leaning to the more traditional view, 
referred to "Mongol-Tatar troops". He explained in a 
footnote that the forces of the Golden Horde were 
ethnically mixed, but the "Mongols (Tatars) constituted the 
nucleus of the ruling class. "186 
For the gosudarstvenniki, Seleznyov wrote an article on 
Kulikovo in Nasbý_sovremennik. He portrayed the battle as a 
victory not only for the Russians, but as "a festival for 
all the peoples of the country". He listed the Tajiks, 
Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Turkmen and Uzbeks as having thrown off 
the yoke of the Golden Horde after Kulikovo (although in 
reality some of these peoples had not come into existence 
at the time). He dissociated the Tatar population of the 
USSR from the Mongol-Tatar invaders, by saying that the 
occupying Tatars had left their name to the people of the 
Volga who were formerly Bulgars. Like other writers at 
this time, he avoided using the term "Tatar yoke" and 
referred instead to the "yoke of the Golden Horde". As was 
commonplace, he saw historical continuity in the victory at 
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Kulikovo and the defeats of Napoleon and the Nazis. What 
distinguished 6eieznyov's approach from that of traditional 
Soviet scholarship was his description of the Horde as 
"cosmopolitan". This allowed him to make a link with 
modern imperialism, which he said was also a cosmopolitan 
phenomenon. The Golden Horde was a denationalized group: 
similarly, Napoleon and Hitler did not represent the 
national interests of the French or the Germans. 187 
Loshchits' book, similarly, reterred to the "cosmopolitan 
invasion ot the Russian land". Although the leaders ol the 
enemy army were Tatar-Mongoi, their lorces included many 
races and reiigions - pagans and shamanists, Musiims, 
Cathoiics, Jews and Karaites. Even the (-3-enoese infantry 
was cosmopolitan and not purely italian. 
The battle of 8 September 1380 was not a battle of 
peoples. It was a battle of the sons of the Russian 
people with the cosmopolitan conscripted or bought 
rabble, which had no right to speak in the name of any 
of the peoples of Rus'. 
The anniversary was thus a festival for all the peoples of 
the Soviet Union. 188 The gosudarstyennik position was to 
be taken still further in 1981 by Kozhinov, who spoke of 
the victory ol the so-called "multinational Russian 
LRossiiskoeJ State", rather than of the Russian people ýsee 
below, pp. 534-35). 
The Russian Orthodox Church sought also to gain from 
the anniversary. Eight ot the 12 issues ot the Zhurnal 
Moskovskoi_patriarkhii for 1960 had materiai on Kulikovo, 
An article on Andrei Rubiyov linked his icon-painting to 
the defeat of the Tatars. 169 Archbishop Pitirim of 
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Volokolamsk, the editor of the journal, claimed: "The 
decisive victory, determining the cultural and historical 
tasks of the whole Russian people, was inspired and 
prepared in the Sergii-Trinity Monastery. "190 In December 
a feature emphasized the Church's role in consolidating 
Russian patriotism. Patriarch Pimen claimed that the 
Kulikovo battle had great significance not only for Russia, 
but also "for the peoples and states of Europe, which at 
the cost of huge losses for Rus' were saved from alien 
invasion. "191 
The journals OFLonek, Oktiabr' and Moskva all carried 
material on Kulikovo during 1980, but I shall confine 
myself to that in the latter journal. The articles in 
Moskva, although nationalistic, did not emphasize the 
anti-cosmopolitan message. The article by Vladimir 
Sushchenko and Iury Tiurin in July was laced with 
quotations from Anna Akhmatova, who had been silenced in 
Stalin's latter years, and it emphasized the role of the 
Russian people. 192 V. V. Kargalov's article in the 
following issue stressed the role of Moscow and the 
Muscovites in the Russian victory. 193 The October issue 
featured a series of colour pictures, entitled "Field of 
Russian Glory", celebrating the victory, and giving some 
prominence to the churches in the landscape. i94 
Three articles which appeared at the time of the 
anniversary itself are worth mentioning. All put the 
traditional Soviet position rather than that of the 
F, osudarstvenniki. One was by Academician A. L. 
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Narochnitsky on page 3 of Izvestiia; the second, on page 3 
of Pravda, was a report of the triumphal meeting in Moscow 
on 8 September 1980; and the third was by Feliks Kuznetsov, 
on the front page of Literaturnaia_Zgzeta. 195 All agreed 
that Russia had shielded Europe from the Horde at a high 
cost to her own development. Narochnitsky and Kuznetsov 
both attacked the cult of Genghis Khan which they claimed 
was being fostered by Maoist China, but which in fact was 
being promoted by Soviet Central Asians. Despite his 
opposition to nationally-minded trends, Kuznetsov hailed 
Kulikovo as a moral and spiritual victory of the Russian 
people. Even he sounded a note of Russian messianism in a 
quotation from Pushkin: "The developing Enlightenment was 
saved by a devastated and dying Russia. " The West should 
remember its debt to the Russian people. Having defeated 
the Horde and the Nazis, the country was now trying to save 
the world from the "apocalypse" of nuclear annihilation. 
In Andrei Tarkovsky's film Mirror (made in 1974 but not 
released until 1979), Pushkin's words about Russia being a 
shield protecting Europe from the Tatars were read while 
footage was shown of Soviet soldiers defending the border 
against Chinese soldiers who were aggressively shaking 
Mao's Red Book. Vladimir Kuprin, in his collection, also 
took up the theme of self-sacrifice. "In the Kulikovo 
battle was revealed the main distinguishing feature of the 
Russian national character - to sacrifice oneself in the 
name of saving others. "196 
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Coinciding with the anniversary, VOOPIK published what 
was described as the first issue of a twice-yearly 
anthology, Pamiatniki-otechestva. There had in fact been 
four volumes published by VOOPIK with the same title, 
appearing in 1972,1975,1977 and 1979. The 1979 issue 
included articles by the RSFSR Prime Minister Solomentsev 
and by Likhachov (the latter, on Kulikovo). 197 In spite of 
the size of VOOPIK, the print run was limited to 10 000 for 
the first two issues and 8000 for the next two. The issues 
published for 1980 had a larger print run, at 50 000, were 
considerably glossier and included full-colour 
illustrations. These issues were much less concerned with 
Lenin and the revolutionary heritage, in comparison with 
those for 1972-1979; the emphasis was on the Russian State, 
and on churches and monasteries. This was to continue 
until the issues for 1983, by which time the political 
climate had changed. The first issue for 1980 included 
material on Kulikovo, a statement by Lenin on the 
protection of monuments, a recent RSFSR decree on the same 
subject, and essays by the writers lury Bondarev, Rasputin, 
E. A. Isaev and the editor-in-chief of Pravda, Viktor 
Afanasev. It listed an editorial council headed by I. V. 
Petrianov-Sokolov which included Rybakov and Semanov, who 
had both been on since 1972, and Glazunov, Likhachov, 
Seleznyov, Dmitry Zhukov and Sevastianov. The anthology 
joined the existing series Pamiatniki_literaturv Drevnei 
Rusi (Literary Monuments of Ancient Rus'), published by 
Khudozhestvennaia literatura since 1978. The environmental 
conservationists also became involved in the Kulikovo 
celebrations; they proposed turning the battlefield into a 
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nature reserve. 198 
The wave of Russian national feeling, linked with the 
Kulikovo anniversary, was reinforced by the lavish praise 
for the "great Russian people" which was coming from 
official platforms (see above, pp. 393-96). In the 
cultural sphere, three groups could be broadly 
distinguished in regard to Kulikovo. Both the anti- 
nationalists, such as Feliks Kuznetsov, and the 
vozrozhdentsy, such as Rasputin and Likhachov, emphasized 
the victory of the Russian people. The Sqqqdarstyenniki, 
such as Seleznyov and Kozhinov, emphasized the victory of 
the Russian State, and linked this with the struggle 
against "cosmopolitanism". It might also be suggested that 
the memory of the Russian victory over the Tatars would 
psychologically strengthen the image of Russian domination 
over the Muslim peoples in the Soviet Union, and the 
Russian ability to crush unwelcome religious or physical 
influences from Afghanistan, at a time when the Soviet 
invasion was having unfavourable effects on some Central 
Asians. In May 1981, Kommunist seemed to reflect a mixture 
of Sgsu! ftarstvennik and vozrozhdenie influences when it 
attacked "bourgeois-consumerist cosmopolitanism" and linked 
Soviet patriotism with the historical memory of the people 
and the Kulikovo battle. 199 The lone voice of Evtushenko, 
in an English-language collection of his photographs, 
attacked those for whom patriotism was still a "last 
refuge". 200 
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The_All-Russian Social-Christian Union far_ýthe Emancipation 
of the__FegpIe_(VSKhSQI) 
Under Brezhnev, Russian messianism found its most 
authentic expression in the uncensored literature of 
samizdat, written by revolutionaries, oppositionists and 
dissidents. Of importance in the political development of 
Russian messianism was the All-Russian Social-Christian 
Union for the Emancipation of the People (VSKhSON). This 
was both the first post-Stalin political organization known 
to have a Russian Orthodox orientation and the largest 
revolutionary organization to be uncovered since the death 
of Stalin. The aims and history of the group have been 
described in some detail in the very useful book, The-New 
Russian Revolutionaries (1976), by John B. Dunlop. 201 It 
would be superfluous to repeat his account at length, but 
some outstanding points should be mentioned, together with 
material that has emerged since the book was written. 
VSKhSON was founded in Leningrad in February 1964, and 
survived, although the KGB knew of its existence for about 
two years before arresting its members in February 1967. At 
the end it had nearly 30 members and 30 candidate members. 
Its membership was overwhelmingly from the intelligentsia, 
and its original base was in Leningrad University. The 
leader was Igor Viacheslavovich Ogurtsov, born in 1937 in 
Stalingrad, who was taken to Leningrad when very young. 
His charismatic personality played a major role in the 
creation of the group. The deputy leader and head of 
security, Sado (see above, p. 352), was of Assyrian 
nationality; both were in the Faculty of Oriental Studies 
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at Leningrad University. The chief ideologist was Evgeny 
Aleksandrovich Vagin, a Dostoevsky specialist, born in 
Pskov in 1938. Among the rank and file was Leonid 
Ivancivich Borodin, born in Irkutsk in 1938, a 
headmaster. 202 According to Vagin, who emigrated in 1976, 
the formation of the group was the culmination of political 
discussions which had begun in 1960. They were aware of 
the Novocherkassk workers' uprising of 1962 and believed 
that it might be repeated on a countrywide scale. 203 The 
secret organization, paralleling the Leninist organizations 
which had existed since the late 1940s, aimed over a period 
of 15 or 20 years to recruit 10 000 members, and then stage 
a coup-d'etat by high-ranking military officers to 
overthrow the CpSU. 204 
The VSKhSON Programme followed the teachings of the 
early Slavophils in seeing socialism as the offspring of 
capitalism, and opposing them both. In their place, it 
offered "Social Christianity". The economy was to be mixed 
and "personalized", a rather vague formulation implying 
some degree of worker co-ownership after large-scale 
privatization. All companies would have to be organized in 
"corporations" corresponding to the branch of industry; 
although this idea is reminiscent of Italian fascism, it 
was justified on the grounds of social welfare. There 
would be a Popular Assembly (veche) elected from the 
localities and corporations. Its decisions could be vetoed 
by a Supreme Council (Sobor), one third of which would be 
from the upper hierarchy of the Orthodox Church and two 
thirds "outstanding representatives of the people, elected 
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for life". 205 The Head of State, elected by the Supreme 
Council and confirmed by popular vote, would nominate the 
Prime Minister, who would be responsible to the Popular 
Assembly and the Head of State. The right of political 
opposition in the Assembly would be guaranteed, together 
with freedom of association. These ideas are in line with 
the oppostion of the early Slavophils to a strong State. 
But the Programme rejected both a single-party system and a 
multi-party system. 206 On a Radio Liberty programme after 
he had emigrated, Vagin told Levitin-Krasnov that the 
organization had not envisaged universal elections. Russia 
was to be run by "the best people". Levitin-Krasnov 
commented in his memoirs that this meant a new 
dictatorship. 207 Vagin later provided a fuller reiteration 
of his view. 208 His defence of the need for a hereditary 
monarchy may not, however, reflect the feelings of other 
VSKhSON leaders at the time. 209 
The messianism of VSKhSON was primarily universalist. 
"Universal Christianity, which is in process of uniting, is 
laying the religio-cultural foundations for supranational 
unity. " Even a (non-Slavophil) note of sympathy for 
Catholicism creeps in. 210 The universalist works of 
Berdiaev, especially Novoe srednevekov'e and Russkaia-ideia 
were considered among the classical texts of the 
organization. Indeed, Osipov's article on VSKhSON was 
called "The Berdiaev Circle in Leningrad". 211 Vagin said 
in 1977 that Dostoevsky's poýbLKýaajcbeqtyo, Solovyov and 
Berdiaev had been the major formative influences on the 
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group, and they were also interested in the social doctrine 
of the Catholic Church. He, however, had come to reject 
Berdiaev and follow Danilevsky, Leontev and especially 
Fyodorov. 212 Iury Galanskov, on meeting Borodin and 
another member in the camps, wrote that the Social 
Christians "maintain that Orthodoxy is the thought of the 
Russian people and that Russia will save the world from all 
corruption". 213 Such a statement of the group's Russian 
messianism is stronger than appears in their documents. 
Galanskov himself died in the camps a "Russian patriot". 214 
There were also nationalist elements in the group's 
messianism. One area on which the Programme is silent is 
that of the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR. The 
impression is left that the group wished to maintain the 
existing frontiers of the Soviet Union. In interviews 
conducted with Vagin in emigration, the issue was not 
raised. 215 Amalrik reports that when in 1977 he asked 
Vagin what he wanted to do with the Soviet Muslims, "he 
only shrugged. "216 As far as the East Europeans are 
concerned, the Programme was more forthright. "Those 
foreign countries in which Soviet f'orces are temporarily 
stationed can be offered help to initiate their own 
national self-determination on the basis of Social- 
Christianity. "217 
Dunlop saw the main significance of VSKhSON in the 
potential of its ideas to win support. 
Soviet leaders probably fear few things more than an 
opposition based on Russian nationalism and seeking to 
resurrect the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. 
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Such an opposition will inevitably find broad-based 
support among the populace. 
... the revolutionary union was fast becoming a 
threat ... VSKhSON was unmasked just in time. 
218 
Vladimir Bukovsky was less impressed. "All they had time 
for was to write a silly programme and read Berdyayev (as 
if half' the country wasn't reading Berdyayev anyway, 
without any parties! )., i219 At the trials of the members 
in November-December 1967 and March-April 1968, Ogurtsov 
was given fifteen years imprisonment and five years exile 
for "treason", Sado thirteen years imprisonment, and 
nineteen others received lesser sentences. The use of the 
"treason" charge rather than merely "anti-Soviet activity" 
does imply the seriousness with which the KGB regarded the 
case. Iury Lury, a defence lawyer in the second trial who 
later emigrated to Canada, believes that the KGB 
exaggerated the strength of VSKhSON, whereas Dunlop thinks 
that they underestimated it. 220 Further, Lury has accused 
Dunlop of exaggerating the willingness of' the organization 
to use violence. 221 Osipov, too, emphasized that the 
practical activity of the group was limited to recruitment 
and the study of literature, and Levitin-Krasnov understood 
the immediate aim as the dissemination of the works of 
Solovyov, Berdiaev and others. 222 
Dissent within the Russian-Orthodox Church_and Russian 
mbessianism 
The fall of Khrushchev ended the extreme measures of 
the anti-religious campaign and led to a thaw in relations 
between the State and the churches. Levitin-Krasnov 
believes that Khrushchev's fall saved himself from imminent 
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arrest. 223 Some members of the Russian Orthodox clergy 
began to write appeals to the new leaders to improve the 
conditions for the Church, and to the Patriarch and bishops 
about their close relations with the regime. In summer 
1965 Archbishop Ermogen of Kaluga and seven bishops asked 
Patriarch Aleksii to rescind the decisions of the 1961 
Sobor. The Holy Synod responded by confining the 
Archbishop to a monastery. At the end of 1965, the two 
Moscow priests Iakunin and Eshliman sent appeals to 
President N. V. P(: )dgorny and Aleksii. Further appeals 
followed from the two priests in 1966 and from Ermogen in 
1967-1968. The priests were suspended from their parishes 
in May 19(5(5.224 These protests were not spontaneous. 
Levitin-Krasnov tells of a strategy meeting in spring 1965 
attended by Eshliman, lakunin, Father Aleksandr Men, Father 
Dimitry Dudko, Feliks V. Karelin and himself. 225 One can 
speak of a dissident movement within the Orthodox Church at 
this stage, paralleling the human rights movement, although 
the Church dissidents had much less support from the 
hierarchy than the human rights dissidents initially 
received from leading writers and scientists. 226 
The November 1965 appeal of Eshliman and Iakunin to the 
Patriarch emphasized the importance of Russian Orthodoxy 
both for world Christianity and for the Russian State, 
including ideas of Russian messianism. 
There can be no doubt that the Russian Church has a 
special role to play in the great universal task of a 
new Christian renaissance. There is much to convince 
us of this. 
Despite its tragic situation ... the Russian Church 
still remains the largest of all autocephalous Orthodox 
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Churches and the most influential representative of 
catholic Orthodoxy among other Christian confessions. 
The historical fate of' the Russian Church is 
inseparably linked with the fate of the Russian people, 
whose role in world history has been steadil 
increasing for the past five hundred years. 2ý7 
Eshliman and Iakunin continued by describing the 
contribution of the Church to Russian culture, and in 
creating a national consciousness directed against the 
Tatars. 
The religious zeal of St. Sergius and of his disciples 
ideologically paved the way for the uniting of national 
territories around the principality of Muscovy, brought 
about a great renaissance of Russian culture in Moscow 
and inspired the people to a decisive struggle with the 
Tartars. 
It would not be an exaggeraion to say that the State of 
Muscovy was literally nurtured by the Russian Church 
228 
Like the Slavophils, the two priests attacked the 
subordination of' the Church to the State by Peter I, but 
they said that the situation had become far worse since 
Sergii had allowed the Church to be dominated by the 
atheistic State. Referring to the reign of Khrushchev, 
they asked the government to remove the effects of 
"subjectivism and bureaucracy in leadership" on Church 
life. 229 
It should not be thought that all those active in the 
dissident movement within the Church were Slavophils. 
Levitin-Krasnov (born 1915) described himself in 1966 as 
"a Christian, a socialist and a democrat". 230 His father 
was a baptised Jew, his mother Orthodox, and he has 
remained Orthodox throughout his life, being thoroughly 
imbued with Russian culture. 231 In 1957 he wrote to Pope 
Paul VI: "The construction of industry without a 
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bourgeoisie is a great historical victory of the Russian 
people. " In his Stromaty (1968) he wrote: "The October 
Revolution was a great victory of the Russian people. "232 
His concern for human rights was not confined to the 
Church: from 1955 he participated in the mainstream human 
rights movement, signing petitions and joining the 
Initiative Group for the Defence of Human Rights in the 
USSR, formed in 1969.233 He was subsequently arrested and 
sent to a labour camp. In the final volume of his memoirs, 
Rodnoi prosjLaL (Native Space, 1980), he called for a fourth 
revolution in Russia, to establish democracy and socialism. 
Citing Belinsky, Herzen, Lavrov and Mikhailovsky among his 
mentors, he clearly is in the narodnik tradition, 
embellished by Orthodox belief, but without emphasizing an 
exclusive role for Russia. 234 
The "Fetisov group", including the economist A. A. 
Fetisov and the architect M. F. Antonov, took a chauvinist 
position quite different from those just mentioned. They 
claimed that the Jews had created chaos in Europe for 2000 
years, until Hitler and Stalin, embodying the "German and 
Slav principles", had ended this. The group's programme 
called for the restoration of the obshchina in European 
Russia and the transfer of industry and the working class 
to Siberia. Fetisov left the CPSU in early 1968, allegedly 
in protest against de-Stalinization, although by then that 
process had ceased. Shortly thereafter the members of the 
group were put in mental hospitals. 235 
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The growth of Russian nationalism and Russian 
messianism among the intelligentsia was confronted by the 
pseudonymous Orthodox writers of the "Metanoia" symposium, 
circulated in samizdat and published in the Paris Vestnik 
RusskgZo_StqdgjnqhýjghgZo Khnigj: LiajjqkgZq_Dyjzheniia (Herald 
of the Russian Student Christian Xovement) in 1970. The 
articles called on the intelligentsia to return to the 
Orthodox Church, in order to bring about the liberation and 
renaissance of Russia and her transformation into a truly 
Christian people. The introductory article declared 
Communist rule to be an organic result of' Russia's past 
sins, not something imposed from abroad. In place of 
messianism, the author proposed repentance. 
More Evil was brought into the world by Russia than by 
any other country, and it is impossible to return to a 
pre-sin state (which did not exist in Russian 
history). It is possible to be reborn only through 
repentance. It is the only way. Spiritual temptation 
lies at the basis of communism; messianic temptation 
lies in the idea of the religious purity and 
preeminence Epredizbrannost'l of the historical forms 
of Orthodoxy before other churches, and this temptation 
of Great-Power strength is obvious even in contemporary 
politics. 236 
In the same symposium, 0. Altaev spoke of the "double- 
think" of the Soviet Russian intelligentsia, involved in 
the creation of the regime's ideology but alienated from 
and despising the ideology and the regime. He observed 
that intellectuals were now seeking to enlighten the 
government rather than the people. But the history of the 
intelligentsia since 1917 had been to succumb to a series 
of "temptations" to believe that the regime was improving, 
and therefore to cooperate with it. He listed the 
revolution itself, smenovekhovshchina, the period of 
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industrialization and collectivization, the War, the thaw, 
technocracy and finally chauvinism. If the intelligentsia 
were to succumb to the latter, Altaev warned that the 
result might be "a new Russian messianism of the German 
National Socialist type". 237 
V. Gorsky's article in the same collection, "Russian 
Messianism and the New National Consciousness", argued that 
Russian religious messianism was the essence of Russian 
national consciousness. "As also in ancient Israel, at the 
basis of Russian national consciousness lies the idea of 
the God-chosenness and religious vocation of the people, 
the affirmation of a special ordinance between it and 
God.,, 238 He traced Russian messianism from Filofei to the 
Populists, seeing in Bolshevism "the extreme 
revolutionization of Russian messianism". 239 Far from 
being a foreign import (as VSKhSON had suggested, and as 
Solzhenitsyn was to claim), "Great Russia nourished 
Bolshevism more than any other soilti. 240 Russia would 
become free only when she rid herself of the idea of 
national greatness and "national renaissance", and of the 
idea of Russia "as the means of the future universal 
happiness of humanity". 241 The national task was the 
"renaissance of Christianity and true culture in Russia", 
and the achievement of a free democratic society, in which 
the Baltic, the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia 
would have the right to secede. 242 
The "Metanoia" symposium was of particular importance 
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because of the opposition it provoked from people who had 
not lost their laith in Russia. Borodin attacked it in 
Veche, emphasizing the large number of Jews among the 
Bolsheviks. 243 Solzhenitsyn's main contributions to From 
under the Rubble were rebuttals of the symposium (see 
below, p. 496). GT. M. Shimanov wrote that the articles 
revealed a hatred of everything Russian. 244 
A strong statement of Russian messianism came from a 
certain K. Radugin in a samizdat article published in 
Vestnik. He expounded Dostoevsky's view of Russia's 
religious mission, her "special apocalyptic service" to 
world Christianity. Dostoevsky came to his opinion not 
because of the greatness of the Russian State but because 
of the sufferings of the Russian people, the narod- 
bgZongsats. Dostoevsky had caused the ancient millennial 
doctrines to be reborn in modern Russian Orthodoxy. He 
shared two basic assumptions of the apocalyptic 
consciousness: "unlimited greed for the realization of the 
absolute God here and now, on this earth and in human 
history - and a tragic understanding of the inevitable doom 
of all utopian attempts. "245 Radugin then presented his 
expectations of the crucifixion and resurrection of Russia, 
the Messiah, and the inauguration of the universal 
millennium. 
Orthodox Russia climbed to Golgotha, and was crucified, 
and taken down from the Cross and placed in a coffin 
and covered with a stone .... 
... the hour approaches of the glorious and terrible 
Resurrection: the earth will tremble, the stones will 
shatter, and the peoples of the earth shall see with 
great wonder the Light flowing from the East. 
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Holy Rus' will be resurrected, and infinitely enriched 
by the tragic experience of centuries of suffering, 
will be the heart of the peoples reuniting in Christ, 
of the strongholds in the struggle with Antichrist, the 
prophetic prefiguration of the Millennial Kingdom. 
Holy Rus' will be resurrected, for the word is said to 
her heart: 
So be it! 
From the East this star is shining out. 246 
This is precisely the sort of position that "Metanoia" was 
rejecting. Holy Rus', the Russian people (not the Russian 
State) have suffered through the centuries; under the yokes 
of the Tatars, of Petersburg and of Communism. Through her 
suffering will come redemption - not only for herself but 
for all humanity. Radugin does not spell out the political 
implications of this statement; the Millennial Kingdom will 
be both of*, and not of, this world. 
Slovo_jiatsii 
The samizdat programn signed by anonymous "Russian 
Patriots", I'Slovo natsii" (A Nation's Word or A Nation 
Speaks, about 1970), took a clearly political position. 
The authors asserted that in the USSR the Russian people 
were not privileged, as widely claimed, but were exploited 
by the other nationalities. The Jews had a virtual 
monopoly on arts and science. There was no communist party 
for Russia, as there was for the other republics, and this 
weakened the Russians vis-a-vis other nationalities. 247 
The document particularly attacked Ukrainian nationalism. 
The Crimea had been given to the Ukraine, and its Russian 
population was allegedly being "forced to learn the 
Ukrainian language". 248 Racially-mixed marriages were 
threatening to cause the bioiogical degeneration of the 
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Russian people. Russia "must become the ruling nation 
[gospodstvuiushchei natsieill''249 with the abolition of the 
Union Republics and the transformation of the USSR into a 
Russian national State. In foreign policy, it called for 
an end to military confrontation between East and West, but 
only with the recognition by the West of Russia's 
uniqueness (samobvtnost'). It proposed the withdrawal of 
American and Soviet forces from Europe, the abolition of 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the reunification of Germany; 
a treaty with the West on the non-use of nuclear weapons; 
"the creation of a League of Slav States; and the uniting 
of Russia, the United States and India against China. 250 
"Long live the victory of Christian civilization over the 
chaos rebelling against it! Long live great, single and 
indivisible Russia! God be with us! "251 In its 
authoritarianism, centralism and anti-egalitarianism the 
document recalls Leontev rather than the Slavophils, and 
its racism evokes memories of the Black Hundreds. 
An article in Veche reported that "Slovo natsii" was an 
answer to the "anti-Russian" part of the "Programme of the 
Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union" (1969). 252 This 
programme, signed by anonymous "Democrats of Russia, the 
Ukraine and the Baltic" advocated self-determination for 
all the peoples of the USSR, and cultural or economic 
autonomy for nations wishing to remain in the 
federation. 253 The Veche article stated that "Slovo 
natsii" was "a compromise between the so-called 'legal 
Slavophils' and yesterday's opponents of the regime", 254 in 
other words, between establishment and dissident Russian 
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nationalists. Levitin-Krasnov writes that Ivanov-Skuratov 
(see above, p. 368) was the author of "Slovo natsii". 255 
Indirect confirmation of this has come from Iuliia 
Vishnevskaia of Radio Liberty. She writes that the name of 
the author "was well known in Moscow" (where she herself 
was at the time), and he was arrested in 1981 "on a 
different charge". 256 Ivanov-Skuratov was arrested in 
Moscow in 1981 on charges of anti-Soviet agitation and 
propaganda (see below). 257 The Chronicle of-Current Events 
reported on the existence of "Slovo natsii" in December 
1970, and also on the response of a democrat, V. Gusarov, 
who criticized the "great-power and racist views of the 
g patriots',,. 258 
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Veche 
The most significant embodiment of Russian nationalist 
samizdat in the i970s was the journal Veche (named after 
the popular assemblies of ancient Kiev and Novgorod). This 
was the organ of several tendencies of Russian nationalism. 
Ten thick issues appeared between 1971 and 1974; 
regrettably, it does not seem possible to estimate the 
circulation of the journai. 259 It was founded by Vladimir 
Osipov, who edited and published the first nine issues. In 
the prison camps he had been converted to Russian Orthodoxy 
and Slavophilism. Freed in 1968, he settled in the town of 
Aleksandrov in Vladimir oblast', as near to Moscow as he 
was legally allowed, and he found work as a fireman. 
Visiting lury Galanskov, he met Levitin-Krasnov, who 
introduced him to the Orthodox priest Dimitry Dudko. The 
latter seems to have been an important influence on Osipov; 
in January 1980 Dudko called him his "spiritual son". At 
least two former members of VSKhSON - Leonid Borodin and 
Georgy Bochevarov - Joined Osipov on Veche. 260 
Osipov's nationalism was expressed in his "Tri 
otnosheniia k rodine" (Three Attitudes to the Motherland, 
1970). 2bl The three attitudes he identified were hatred of 
Russia and the Russian people; "speculation" on, and 
manipulation of, patriotism, as practised by the regime; 
and love for the nation. "Love for humanity can appear 
only through one's own nation. " Attacking "unprincipled 
cosmopolitanism", he declared: "Unly the Motherland, the 
Motherland, can regenerate the people .... The nation 
Lnatsiial, the nation, above all. "262 
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Osipov rejected the ideology of the regime; but he now 
proclaimed his loyalty to the Soviet State. Unlike the 
editors of the Chronicle-of-Current-Events, he printed his 
name and Vladimir oblast' address in Veche and distributed 
it through the mail. Since he was allowed to edit nine 
issues of the journal, from January 1971 to December 1973, 
a time when other samizdat journals like the Chronicle and 
the Ukrainian Herald were stopped, it seems clear that he 
was protected from above. A parallel may be drawn with Roy 
Medvedev, who appears to have been protected by other 
regime circles who wished to keep the door open to reform 
in the future. 
Mikhail Meerson-Aksyonov has suggested that the 
appearance of Veche may have resulted from the fear, 
following Susiov's move against Molodaja_ZKaKjdii9,, that 
some extreme nationalist views could no longer be published 
in the official Press. 263 Confirmation of this view is 
given by Mikhail Kheifets, a Zionist activist who met 
Osipov in the camps (after the editor had been resentenced 
in 1975), and who later emigrated to Israel. 
People who had supported Molodaia Rvardiia 
ideologically, Osipov told me, wer; mortally offended 
by the dispersal of its editorial board. Many of them 
occupied important seats and offices and considered 
themselves, being 'Russian patriots', to be the 
foremost defenders of the Soviet authorities. And then 
they suddenly gave them such a kick in the arse! And 
they gave me the initial means for publishing the 
journal and the first literary connections. 
So, the 'FoajLdarstvenniki' entered and occupied the key 
positions in the party created by a 'Slavophil' Ei. e., 
Osipov]. 254 
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Kheifets says that the differences between the circles 
which came together to produce Veche were greater than the 
differences between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. 
With one exception, he does not identify the officials and 
cultural figures who backed Veche, but says that in fact 
their financial contribution was small. The exception was 
Ilia Glazunov, who was more generous, 265 and about whose 
work and life Osipov wrote a warm and laudatory article in 
Veche. 266 
We have no first-hand account of how the situation on 
the editorial board developed, but we know that in March 
1974 the founder, editor and publisher of Veche, Osipov, 
announced that the journal had ceased publication; and that 
in April 1974 most of the editorial board produced "Veche 
No. 10" without Osipov and denounced him. Aleksandr Ianov 
has argued, in line with his conception that dissident 
Russian nationalism inevitably tends, in the long term, 
towards collaborating with the State, be it Tsarist or 
Soviet, that Veche had two faces: "and that its liberal 
face, so to speak, was gradually but inexorably supplanted 
by its chauvinist face". 267 The view that the split in the 
editorial board between Osipov and the editors of Veche No. 
10 was a split between the liberals and the chauvinists is 
not, however, born out by the evidence. It seems that 
personal factors, and perhaps the intrigues of the KGB, 
played a role too. For exampie, one of Osipov's opponents 
was Adel Naidenovich, who had been Osipov's third wife in a 
marriage of convenience, and who was the principal link 
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between Veche and the human rights circle around Pyotr 
Iakir. 268 Further, Ivan V. Ovchinnikov, the editor of No. 
10, had himself, in August 1973, co-signed with Osipov, 
Levitin-Krasnov, Viacheslav S. Rodionov and Valentina E. 
Mashkova (Osipov's wife) an appeal on the situation of 
Soviet political prisoners. 269 Moreover, Ivanov-Skuratov 
had been the author of an article in Veche No. 1 which 
decidedly placed him (at that time) among the 
"liberals". 270 Yet he was a key figure in the anti-Osipov 
group. 
The role of Ivanov-Skuratov on the editorial board has 
been a subject of comment. He had testified against Osipov 
in 1961, but Osipov had apparently forgiven him. Ivanov- 
Skuratov had excused himself to Osipov by pointing out that 
he was legally a madman, and Osipov need not have confirmed 
his testimony. Osipov turned to him for support in 
publishing Veche. Kheifets describes Osipov as a natural 
organizer (rather than a thinker), who looked to Ivanov- 
Skuratov to be the journal's ideologist. 271 Levitin- 
Krasnov writes that after Osipov (whom he describes as 
honest, and with whom he remained friends, despite their 
political differences) began publishing Vtý4t, a 
"completely odious public" crawled on to the editorial 
board. Among these stood out Ivanov-Skuratov, "a 
thoroughly enigmatic individual". 272 Semyon Reznik 
reported in 1982 that Ivanov-Skuratov was in fact an 
atheist. 273 If he was an atheist when he was writing for 
Veche, and claiming to be Orthodox, then he was clearly 
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playing the part of' a provocateur. But it would be wrong 
to draw this conclusion without more evidence. Kheifets 
points out that Ovchinnikov, a Veche collaborator, had 
defected to the West in the 1950s and then returned to the 
Soviet Union, in circumstances which suggested a link with 
the KGB. Further, in the early 1960s, he had testified to 
the KGB against Iury Mashkov and the then wife of the 
latter, Valentina Mashkova. Both Mashkov and Mashkova 
collaborated on Veche. Iury Mashkov, however, was in the 
habit of denouncing Jews to the authorities. Valentina 
Mashkova was now married to Osipov. One can sympathize 
with Kheifets's point that Osipov was forced to work with 
morally unprincipled people. 274 
In the absence of other adequate discussions of the 
topic in English, it seems appropriate to make an attempt 
to summarize the contents of the most important Russian 
nationalist samizdat journal of the post-Stalin era. 275 
The introduction to the first issue of Veche referred to 
the growth of crime, selfishness, alcoholism and the 
collapse of the family. It announced itself as a "RUSSIAN 
PATRIOTIC JOURNAL" (in block capitals) which would 
"continue the guiding line of the Slavophils and 
Dostoevsky" and seek to aid the rebirth of Russia. 276 The 
first article was by Ivanov-Skuratov and argued that 
Slavophilism was inseparable from Orthodoxy. He 
particularly praised Khomiakov for seeing the Russian 
people rather than the Church hierarchy as the bearers of 
Orthodoxy. Konstantin Aksakov and Ivan Kireevsky, he said, 
had, under the influence of German messianism, seen Russia 
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as the ruling nation of the era, but Khomiakov had been 
above this. Konstantin Aksakov had rightly regarded free 
speech as an inalienable human right; but an obstacle to 
implementing this was Aksakov's own belief that the Russian 
people were not political, which justified the principle of 
autocracy. The most important contribution of the 
Slavophils was their emphasis on Russian national 
originality. 277 
The next article, however, was more chauvinist and 
reflected the opinion of those nationalists closer to the 
regime and more willing to adapt to Leninism. The title 
was "The Teaching of the Slavophils - the Highest 
Achievement of National Consciousness in Russia in the Pre- 
Leninist Period", and its author was the "Fetisovite" 
Mikhail F. Antonov (born 1927; see above, p. 458). 
Successive parts of this article appeared in the second and 
third issues of Veche, comprising over a quarter of the 
total number of pages of the first three numbers. 278 
In the first part, Antonov attacked those who, from the 
Westernizers of the nineteenth century to the contributors 
to the Great Soviet En vclopaedia, linked Slavophilism to 
"official narodnost'". Paradoxically, he also claimed that 
Nicholas I himself had sympathies with Slavophilism, which 
he was politically unable to express. 279 Expounding 
Khomiakov's views, Antonov praised him for his opposition 
to liuMPenstvo. which Antonov identified with the tendency 
to fawn before the West, and for his support for Russian 
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customs. In this context Antonov approvingly cited 
Vladimir Soloukhin's attempts to rediscover Russian 
traditions, which had led to his being accused of 
"rusofil'stvo and of abandoning proletarian 
internationalism,, 280, The first part of Antonov's article 
was followed by a rejoinder by "A. S. ", presumably Ivanov- 
Skuratov. This drew attention to the lack of clarity of 
the term liumpenstvo as used by Antonov, and to the "naive 
peasant belief in the good Tsar, surrounded by evil 
gentry", which was found in Fetisovite writings. 281 The 
editorial board issued statements that it was not in 
agreement with Antonov's views, 282 and that the article was 
being printed "without the sanction of the author" (in 
blocks). 283 
In the second part, Antonov discussed Khomiakov's views 
on philosophy, religion, the Slavs and the obshchina, and 
announced: "Again and again we have to underline one 
thought: in the obshchina is the essence of Russia, the 
Russian people and Leninism. "284 This last word explained 
why A. S., in his earlier rejoinder, had criticized Antonov 
for portraying Lenin as seeing the regeneration of Russia 
coming from the village rather than the town. 285 Antonov's 
final part (considerably shortened, according to an 
editorial note) outlined the views of the Kireevsky 
brothers. Emphasizing the need to return to Russian ways, 
he condemned the contemporary attempt of "rootless and 
cosmopolitan elements" to destroy the old centre of Moscow 
and make it a copy of European capitals. 
The idea of Moscow as the Third Rome, as the New 
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Jerusalem, as the embodiment of Lenin's highest Truth 
and Justice on Earth - this is what ought to lie ... as the basis of the General Plan for the Reconstruction 
and Development of Moscow. 28b 
Ivan Kireevsky could not link the teachings of the Church 
Fathers with changes in Russian life; only Lenin could do 
this. An adequate Russian ideology could come only from 
"the unification of Orthodoxy and Leninism". 287 Communist 
morality would benefit from an infusion of the teachings 
"proceeding from the deepest origins of Russian life". In 
a discussion which contained no analysis of Lenin's real 
ideas, Antonov declared: "Leninism has incomparably more in 
common with Orthodoxy and the Slavophils than with Marxism- 
Cathoiicism. "288 
Another major article, spanning the second, third and 
fourth issues, concerned the military and political 
achievements of the nineteenth-century general, M. D. 
Skobelev. 289 The article was anonymous, but it has since 
been attributed to Ivanov-Skuratov. 290 It detailed 
Skobelev's role in the conquests of Khiva and Kokand, in 
the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War, and in the capture of 
Geok-Tepe (see above, p. 203). Although the author was in 
other respects a devoted admirer of the general, he blamed 
Skobelev for the "repulsive scenes" of the massacre of 
Asians which followed the fall of the city in January 1881. 
Skobelev justified the massacre on the grounds that 
otherwise "the Asians would not consider themselves 
conquered". 291 The article concludes by emphasizing 
Skobelev's support for Ivan Aksakov and Danilevsky. 292 
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Having given its readers a view of the early Slavophils 
and Skobelev, Veche carried a series of articles on later 
Russian thinkers. Those included were Dostoevsky, 293 
Leontev, 294 Danilevsky, 295 the contributors to Vekhi and Iz 
glubiny, 296 and Rozanov. 297 Of particular interest was 
the article on Danilevsky, which has since been attributed 
to Ivanov-Skuratov. 298 The author sympathetically outlined 
Danilevsky's theory of "cultural-historical types" and his 
pian for a Slav federation, but criticized his wish to 
Russify the national minorities of the Russian State. In 
relation to Russian messianism, the author made clear his 
support for the position of Danilevsky rather than for 
classical Slavophilism. 
Danilevsky preserved and developed all the basic 
positions of the early Slavophils, save only one - 
Slavophil messianism, the claim to world leadership. 
The great service of Danilevsky was that he tried to 
work out a theory which would make absolutely 
impossible any kind of 'rationale' for such claims. 299 
This rejection of messianism and the insistence on the need 
for pragmatism in Russian foreign policy seems to place the 
author on the side of the &osudarstvenniki. As Ianov 
points out, Danilevsky's "isolationism" was contingent on a 
considerable expansion of Russian influence in Europe (see 
above, pp. 172-75). 300 
A pro-messianist viewpoint was put by the anonymous 
author of "Thoughts-Projectors", a collection of aphorisms 
in Veche No. 2, which argued that Russia's sufferings gave 
her a special position in the world. 301 
Russia is hated, Russia is accused, Russia is said to 
be going to perish... But all the same the main thing 
is that Russia is not understood. All the judgements 
about her are human conjecture. 
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Russia is the greatest sufferer, slandered and 
crucified. 
Russia will be resurrected in spite of each and all. 
Suffering must have some meaning! 
Christ achieved victory through suffering. Suffering 
brings salvation, and the more suffering, the nearer is 
salvation.. 
This is our faith. And without faith there is nothing, 
and nothing is needed. Truly: one can only believe in 
Russia! [a quotation from Tiutchev - see above, p. 1561 
In Russia a mysterious process is being accomplished, 
which encouraged the Catholic [FranSois] Mauriac and 
which gives us the strength not to be depressed! - to 
bear everything, to conquer, to rise from the dead. 
And look at Russia, at the Russian person, at her 
Church. Surely, do you see nothing but crimes? 
Surely the sweat and blood of Russian people, surely 
millions of tormented and thousands of shot people do 
not signify nothing to you? ... Surely God will save her'? 
Russia will not perish, Russian culture will not 
perish, the Russian person, the God-bearing people will 
not perish. She will not perish, although it would 
seem that everything has perished and there is no 
hope.... the brightest future awaits us! .... What Russia has understood and what Russia has undergone 
puts her in a special position. The Russian person is 
also in a special position. 
... Christ is risen! - this is heard from Russia. 
Religion must be preserved through national feelings, 
then it will be an organic phenomenon. 302 
Further "thoughts" emphasized the need for nations to have 
their own uniqueness and national feelings; cosmopolitanism 
is denounced as "spiritual slavery" and "the preparation 
for the way of Antichrist". At the same time the author 
attacks the idea of the "universal person", 303 the term 
used by Dostoevsky lor the Russians (see above, p. 201); 
this is surprising because of his earlier use of 
Dostoevsky's term, "God-bearing people". 
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The author hints that the growth of Russian nationalism 
is linked with the nationalism of the non-Russians. 
Why is the creation of Israel greeted throughout the 
world, and we too say that the Jews must have their own 
State - ... but why are our love for Russia and our 
Russian views maliciously labelled chauvinist and not 
tolerated'? 304 
The same comparison between Israel and Russia was made in 
No. 7 by I. Starozhubaev. "The springing-up of Russian 
nationalism in the sense of self-defence and self- 
preservation is a natural desire for today. " He attacked 
cosmopolitanism, and those shouting for freedom and 
democracy; he spoke instead of the broad Russian soul and 
of messianism - Russia saving all mankind through her 
example. His main theme was that Russian nationalism was 
defensive. 305 In a rare statement on a specific foreign 
policy issue, Veche took what could be termed a defensive 
nationalist position on the Japanese attempts to raise 
claims against the Kurile Islands. It called on the Soviet 
government to take a firm stand, and noted that the Chinese 
Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai, had given support to the 
Japanese "revanchists". 306 
In relation to literature, the journal devoted some 
A 
attention to attacking H2vy' nd such betes-noirs of L. mir, a 
Molodg. ig, 
_Zyardiia as 
Aksyonov, Evtushenko and 
Voznesensky. 307 Ivanov-Skuratov wrote two articles on 
Solzhenitsyn's AýL&jiat 1.211, accusing him of being pro- 
German and anti-Russian in his portrayal of the collapse of 
the Russian Army. 308 The fifth issue carried further 
discussion of the nove1309 and contained two chapters of 
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the memoirs of Solzhenitsyn's first wife, Natalia 
Reshetovskaia; and the ninth contained two new chapters 
from Solzhenitsyn's First-Circle. 310 The Veche editors 
were clearly split in their attitude to Solzhenitsyn. 
Osipov was ideologically close to him, as later became 
clear in his response to Solzhentsyn's Letter-to_the Soviet 
Leadýýrs. but Ivanov-Skuratov and the SqaqdQrstvenniki 
considered him to be anti-Soviet. Osipov had sought 
Solzhenitsyn's collaboration on Veche, but he had refused 
on the grounds that the line of the journal was unclear. 
According to Kheifets, Osipov was very upset at the 
prospect of Solzhenitsyn's divorce, because of his central 
position in the Russian national movement, Like many 
Russian nationalists, Osipov saw the hand of the Masons in 
the calamities affecting Russia. He suspected that the 
Masons were behind Solzhenitsyn's attraction to Natalia 
Svetlova, who was to become his second wife. When Osipov 
went to warn Solzhenitsyn about the Masons, Solzhenitsyn 
told him that his fears were "exaggerated". 311 The 
appearance of Solzhenitsyn's chapters in No. 9, with 
Solzhenitsyn's permission, attests to the continuing 
strength of the liberal nationalist tendency in VeChe right 
up to the end. 
The demographic problems of the Russian nation 
attracted some attention from Veche. K. Voronov spoke of 
the need to take drastic action to end "the catastrophic 
decline in the birth rate in many districts of the RSFSR", 
especially affecting rural communities. The situation 
showed the disadvantaged position of the Russians in the 
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USSR. 312 The protection of the world environment, 313 the 
Moscow City Soviet's plan for the destruction of older 
parts of the capital, 314 and the preservation of historical 
monuments in general were discussed. 315 The destruction of 
Moscow monuments was condemned not only for aesthetic but 
also for political reasons, in view of the perceived 
Chinese threat. "On what patriotic feelings will it be 
possible to win the approaching war? "316 Osipov's article 
on Glazunov particularly praised his role in fighting to 
preserve historical monuments and the architecture of 
Moscow, and in the establishment of VOOPIK and the Rodina 
clubs. 317 
Veche carried a considerable amount of material on 
religion and Church affairs. The anonymous "Russian 
Christian" in the first issue spoke of the link between 
patriotism and Orthodoxy. He also made two positive 
references to Stalin, which attracted a special disclaimer 
from the editorial board. 318 The second issue included an 
attack on the modernist theology of Metropolitan Nikodim of 
Leningrad, written by a collective which included Feliks 
Karelin, Lev Regelson and Viktor A. Kapitanchuk. 319 Of. 
particular interest was the appeal to the Sobor of 1971 
(held to elect Pimen as Patriarch), by Georgy Petukhov, a 
priest from Zagorsk, Hierodeacon Varsonofy Khaibulin, from 
Vladimir oblast', and a Moscow layman, Pyotr Fomin. This 
was a call for greater trust between Church and State, 
which allegedly was being threatened by Satanism and 
Zionism. "The agents of Satanism and Zionism... 
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artificially create tension between the Church and the 
State with the aim of their common weakening. " They were 
promoting "anarchical liberalism". 
Distrust and doubt relating to all spiritual and 
national values, cosmopolitanism, the spreading of 
debauchery and drunkenness, the extreme proliferation 
of abortions, forgetting and neglecting the fulfilment 
of family, parental and patriotic duty, hypocrisy, 
betrayal, falsehood, money-grubbing and other vices - 
this is how they try to seduce our people and all 
humanity.... 
It has now become a generally obvious truth that world 
Zionism is conducting an artful struggle against our 
State from within and without. 
Realizing its holy mission of saving humanity from sin 
and its consequences, the Church is a moral strength 
and buttress of the State in its noble struggle against 
the forces of destruction and chaos. 
What was needed, the authors concluded, was the coming 
together (sblizhenie) of the Church and the State,, on the 
basis of "complete non-intervention in the internal life of 
the Church". 320 Such positions were aimed against both the 
general human rights movement and those dissidents within 
the Church who sought to distance the Church from the 
State. 
In an article for the London journal Survty, published 
in 1973, Dmitry Pospielovsky reviewed the first and third 
issues of Veche. While sympathetic to the Russian national 
trend, he criticized the journal and Osipov for including 
the work on Slavophilism by Antonov, whom he described as a 
"neo-fascist", and warned of the danger of racism and anti- 
Semitism developing into genocide, citing in particular the 
above-mentioned appeal. 321 An article by "O. M. " in the 
ninth issue rejected these criticisms. It reported that 
Antonov had married a Jewess, while Fetisov had admitted 
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that his childhood had lasted 40 years, but his sole 
interest now was religion. As far as genocide was 
concerned, the Americans allowed 20 million people to 
starve every year in the world, despite their wealth, and 
this was as bad as the Nazi Holocaust. Pospielovsky had 
ignored the positive proposals of the appeal to the Sobor, 
commenting only on the link made between Satanism and 
Zionism. 322 
The appeal of Petukhov, Khaibulin and Fomin was not 
typical of Veche's material on the Church. The fourth 
issue reprinted Pimen's Christmas message. 
Solzhenitsyn's "Lenten Letter to the Patriarch" (1972), 
criticizing the Church leaders for not speaking out against 
persecution, appeared in the fifth issue in full, together 
with two critical responses, one anonymous and the other 
from Father Sergei Zheludkov. The latter, while expressing 
respect for Solzhenitsyn's struggle against censorship, 
accused Solzhenitsyn of overestimating the ability of the 
hierarchy to act against the wishes of the State. The 
Patriarchate had to compromise to survive, and for this 
reason it was unable to answer Solzhenitsyn's charges. 324 
Veche also carried appeals by Orthodox believers for their 
rights. One was by Iakunin against his dismissal, 325 Two 
others opposed a new education law, which would oblige 
parents to bring up their children in "the spirit of lofty 
communist morality". Iakunin, Kapitanchuk and Karelin 
signed one of these. 32b Ia the other, Gennady Mikhailovich 
Shimanov (of whom more below) proposed to amend the law so 
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as to read 
in the spirit of the LOFTY MORALITY OF SOVIET 
PATRIOTISM and a careful relationship to socialist 
property TO INSTIL IN THEIR CHILDREN A FEELING OF DEEP 
LOYALTY TO THEIR PEOPLE AND ITS CULTURE, AND ALSO A 
FEELING OF TRUE RESPECT TO ALL OTHER PEOPLES OF OUR 
PLANET ... 
327 Lblocks in original] 
The belief in the need for respect for other 
nationalities was reflected in the article in the sixth 
issue, entitled "The Russian Solution of the National 
Question", dedicated to the fiftieth anniversary of the 
USSR. In contrast to the position of "Slovo natsii", it 
was a defence of Soviet federalism. "The new federation of 
peoples was created in the Russian manner. " It preserved 
the tradition of respect for other peoples, the 
UNIVERSALITY of the Russian person, to which Dostoevsky 
pointed, universality as compassion and love for others 
The union of equal republics, preserving their national 
uniqueness, by its very structure shows what 
distinguishes internationalism from cosmopolitanism. 
The article attacked Russification, recalling Lenin's 
attack on Stalin for great-power chauvinism, and claiming 
that the latter was mainly instigated by non-Russians. It 
rejected the idea of a single Soviet nation (natsiia. ), 
pointing out that the nationality question specialist S. 
Kaltakhchian had denounced this in Pravda (17 March 1972). 
Paraphrasing the State anthem, the article expressed pride 
that Great Rus' had gathered together a multinational great 
power. 328 A similar position was expressed in the 
anonymous article in No. 7, "The Struggle with So-Called 
Russophilism lrusotil'stvol, or the Path to the Suicide of 
the State". This was an attack on Iakovlev's article in 
Literaturnaia=&azeta, and defended the importance of 
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national traditions for the Soviet State. While citing 
Berdiaev, Dostoevsky and Solzhenitsyn, the author also 
defended the &SLýýg. Estvennik Semanov. Praising Lenin's 
internationalism, based on respect for the nation, the 
article linked Iakovlev with cosmopolitanism, national 
nihilism and Trotskyism. 329 Both these articles reflected 
the Eosudarstvennik trend within Veche. 
The Veche editorial board took the opportunity to set 
out its position on the Jewish question in response to an 
open letter from Mikhail Agursky (see also above, p. 281). 
The latter was a Jew who had converted to Orthodoxy but 
also remained a Zionist. He appealed for support from 
Russian nationalists for Zionism, as a Jewish national- 
liberation movement. Veche's response was largely 
friendly. While it claimed that the Jews had the "best 
material conditions" in the USSR, it went on: 
'Russian' does not at all mean 'anti-Semite'. On the 
contrary, the Jewish national movement, where it does 
not claim a privileged position for the Jews in Russia, 
is not infected by racism and does not hope for the 
world domination of the 'chosen people', evokes from us 
the warmest sympathy, like any other national 
movement., 3,30 
Veche No. 10 carried on the dialogue, with both Agursky and 
Vechýý expressing their opposition to the assimilation of 
the Jews. 331 
Osipov consistently maintained that the journal was 
legal, but he was forced to engage in a struggle with the 
regime to ensure the rights of the journal under the Soviet 
Constitution. 332 Whereas Shimanov, in line with the early 
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Slavophils, denounced formal constitutional guarantees as 
"external" and "bourgeois", and took what he called an 
"openly pro-Soviet position"333, Osipov was more 
sympathetic to the human rights movement. This may have 
been connected with the personal links he had made before 
his sentencing in 1961, but it was also directly connected 
with the harassment that the Veche editors, and especially 
Csipov himself, suffered from the internal affairs organs 
(XVD) and the KGB. In late 1971 the police several times 
invaded the flat of Adel Naidenovich, threatening to arrest 
her and Osipov for producing Vtqhe. This contributed to 
the death of Naidenovich's mother. 334 On 23 May 1972 
Osipov was taken from a Moscow street to a police station, 
where he was subjected to a body search and the 
confiscation of his samizdat. He sent a protest to N. A. 
Shchoiokov, the Minister for Internal Affairs, which was 
published in Veche together with accounts of the 
incident. 33b On 29 December 1972 Adel Naidenovich was 
interrogated by the KGB in connection with the case of 
Pyotr Iakir and Viktor Krasin, former leading figures in 
the human rights movement who by then had been forced to 
collaborate with the authorities. 33b 
The human rights movement seems initially to have been 
wary of Veche. The Chronicle noted the difference between 
the racism and despotism of "Slovo natsii" and the attitude 
of Veche, but found Judophobic: and Stalinist trends in the 
first issue. The Chronicle contributor stated that as 
Veche was not concerned with human rights, future issues 
would not be annotated in the Chronicle. 337 The second 
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issue of Veche denied the accusation, attributed to Radio 
Liberty but perhaps shared by liberal dissidents, that the 
journal was "extremely chauvinist"; it was concerned to 
protect Russian culture while respecting other cultures. 338 
The Chronicle did after all in fact annotate subsequent 
issues of Veche. 339 
One human rights activist who wrote to Veche was 
Levitin-Krasnov- Veche No. 9 included a letter to Osipov 
from Levitin-Krasnov, who had seen "Three Attitudes to the 
Homeland" and Veche No. 3.340 Levitin-Krasnov attacked the 
nationalism of the journal, saying that Chernyshevsky, who 
called Russia a "serf nation", loved her more than all the 
Slavophils. Osipov had rejected official "speculation" 
with patriotism, but Levitin-Krasnov found that in reality 
Veche was "penetrated by official patriotism". 341 Petukhov 
and Khaibulin (authors of the "Satanism and Zionism" 
appeal) reminded him of Bulgarin and Grech, the official 
ideologists of Nicholas I. The opposition to mixed 
marriages, expressed in another article, evoked memories of 
Nazism for Levitin--Krasnov. Osipov in his reply defended 
the need for free discussion; he added that the number of 
mixed marriages had "grown unusually". He defined his 
nationalism as "THE RESURRECTION OF THE CULTURE AND 
MORALITY OF OUR PEOPLE". 342 
Osipov seems to have expressed his views more clearly 
outside Veche than in it. His interview with two American 
correspondents in April 19721 included an attack on "world 
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cosmopolitan forces" and a statement of his "very 
sympathetic attitude" to the human rights movement. 343 In 
November 1972, he distinguished his position from those he 
termed "'legal Slavophils' (Soloukhin etc. )" by saying that 
he was not a Marxist. (The assumption that the "legal 
Slavophils" themselves were "Marxists" must be questioned. ) 
Osipov explained that the journal was not political, or 
anti-government. it made no sense for the democratic 
dissidents to complain that his nationalism had points of 
similarity with the official ideology, because the 
democrats themselves based their position on the Soviet 
Constitution. "The problem of human rights in the USSR, " 
said Osipov, "is LESS important at this juncture than the 
problem of the death of the Russian nation. " This was why 
Osipov had moved from active opposition to the regime. If 
the Russian people were to return to Orthodoxy, they would 
be sure to survive, but at the moment the only bridge to 
religion was nationalism. 
Christ and his teaching, in the final reckoning, are 
more important to me than nationalism. But I know the 
soul of the modern Russian: the national principle at 
this time is more alive and clear than the religious. 
So patriotism, national consciousness and self-respect 
form the only reliable bridge to moral, cultural and 
biological salvation! 344 
Osipov's position here is like that of Father Zosima in The 
Brothers Karamazov, that belief in God's people will lead 
to belief in God (see above, pp. 191-92). 
The accounts of both Kheifets and Levitin-Krasnov 
present Ivanov-Skuratov as the main figure of opposition to 
Osipov on the editorial board. 345 He was the most 
frequent contributor to Veche. In addition to the articles 
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mentioned already, he wrote a number of other historical, 
literary and philosophical pieces. 346 I cited above (pp. 
467-68) evidence to suggest that the split in Veche was not 
solely between &qýýudarstvenniki, led by Ivanov-Skuratov, 
and supporters of human rights, headed by Osipov. 
Kheifets's account of the last months of Veche, based on 
what Osipov told him, cannot be considered first-hand, but 
in the absence of other information it seems worth 
summarizing. 
With Veche coming under pressure from the authorities, 
Ivanov-Skuratov suggested that the journal, in order to try 
to prove its loyalty to the Soviet State, publish an 
article supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization. 
Svetlana Melnikova, who was the Moscow link between Osipov 
and official cultural figures and who, according to 
Khaibulin, was the co-editor of issues 3 to 10, had an 
additional reason for supporting such an article. Kheifets 
says that Melnikova thought that a pro-Palestinian article 
might attract outside funding from the Libyan leader, Col. 
Muammar Qadhdhafi. Osipov opposed the article, saying that 
the journal was concerned with internal Russian affairs, 
and, furthermore, he was opposed to terrorism. Borodin 
agreed with him, and the editorial board split evenly, two- 
two. After this, Osipov became suspicious that Melnikova 
was a provocateur. He accused her, but found himself 
isolated. Rumours than spread among Osipov's collaborators 
that the Masons had got control of him. To save Veche, he 
persuaded Borodin to become editor. Unfortunately, 
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Borodin's home then burned down, making it impossible for 
him to fulfil the editorial responsibilities. Khaibulin 
insists that no one in Veche was working for the KGB, and 
the disagreements arose only from personal failings. 347 
On '7 March 1974 Osipov announced that the KGB 
were preparing false charges of anti-Soviet activity 
against him, although he had occupied a loyal position in 
relation to the Soviet system. He warned Veche's 
supporters that the journal had ceased publication with No. 
9.348 On 25 March the editorial board announced that 
Osipov had been replaced as editor. 349 On 17 April, 
Naidenovich, Ovchinnikov and nine other members of the 
editorial board, although not (perhaps for tactical 
reasons) Ivanov-Skuratov and Melnikova, issued a statement 
claiming that Osipov had betrayed the journal and that he 
had made made unfounded attacks on its collaborators, 350 
Veche No. 10 was dated 19 April 1974 and included articles 
by Ovchinnikov, Kapitanchuk, Ivanov-Skuratov, Shafarevich 
and Berdiaev, and Agursky's letter and Patriarch Pimen's 
Easter message. It appears to have been compiled before 
the split with Osipov. 351 
In July the new board announced that it was ceasing 
publication because a criminal case had been begun against 
the journai. 352 Osipov, however, assisted by Viachesiav 
Semyonovich Rodionov from Alexandrov, produced two issues 
of a new journal, Zemiia ýThe Land). They were dated i 
August and 25 November 1974.353 The first issue included a 
programmatic statement by the two editors, entitled "To the 
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Land! " This made three major points. 
1. Nationalism is unthinkable in separation from 
Christianity ... 
2. The chief task of Russian nationalism today is the 
resurrection of the people's morality and of the 
national culture. 
3. The absence of Elasnost' and of constitutional 
guarantees biocks the realization of the national 
tasks. 
This final point reaffirmed Osipov's closeness to the human 
rights movement. The statement went on to stress 
continuity with the Slavoptils and Dostoevsky. The choice 
of the title Zemiia deliberately referred to both "native 
land" and to the land as the nourisher of the peopie. 354 
Of the 170 pages of the first issue o± Zemlia, i0o 
pages were devoted to Dudko's conversations, and a lurther 
35 pages to an article on Dudko by Levitin-Krasnov. 355 
(This was included in spite of the previous differences 
between Levitin-Krasnov and Veche, and perhaps reflected 
Osipov's wish to open up towards the human rights 
movement. ) Osipov contributed his article "The Last Day of 
Moscow", which pointed out how the destruction of old 
Moscow had proceeded in spite of public opinion, with more 
historical buildings being scheduled for the bulldozer. 356 
The "Chronicle" section included coverage of the protests 
against the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn from the USSR. One 
item here was an open letter on Father Vsevolod Shpiller's 
criticisms of Solzhenitsyn, signed by Osipov, Rodionov, 
Borodin, Agursky, Mashkova and six others. 357 
The second issue inciuded more of Dudko's 
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conversations, an article by Shimanov "On Equality and 
Inequality in Marriage", work by Shafarevich and the 
deceased Galanskov, and an open letter from Osipov to the 
editors of two emL&Lt newspapers, asking for support 
against the illegal conduct of the authorities towards 
him. 358 An article by Mashkova, "Who Must Repent? ", 
reviewing Solzhenitsyn's article on repentance (see below, 
pp. 495-96), stated that Russia was "different" (inoe) from 
other nations. St. John's Gospel, i, 1-4, tells of God 
being the beginning of all things, but Mashkova, citing and 
paraphrasing these verses, substituted Russia for God. 
Where verse 4 says, "In him was life; and the life was the 
light of men", Mashkova wrote, "In her [Russia) was life; 
and the life was the light of men. "359 It is perhaps not 
surprising that in an interview in the same issue, Levitin- 
Krasnov, who was about to leave for abroad, stated that he 
would collaborate with the journal only if "chauvinist and 
anti-Semitic tendencies do not appear". This provoked an 
editorial response, which reiterated that "a Russian 
nationalist [was) first of all an Orthodox Christian", not 
a chauvinist or an anti-Semite. 360 
In March and April 1974 the KGB carried out searches at 
the homes of people connected with Osipov. 361 In September 
two of those involved with Veche No. 10, Ovchinnikov and 
Ivanov-Skuratov, sent a letter to a Western radio station 
denouncing Osipov and Zemlia. They accused him of a 
Watergate-style cover-up of his misdeeds and compared his 
removal from Veche with the resignation of President 
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Richard M. Nixon. 3b2 If these misdeeds had included 
Osipov's interventions in the human rights field, they had 
continued in 1974; in May he protested against the KGB 
break-in at the home of Neonila G. Snesareva, and the theft 
of all her papers by and about So1zhenitsyn; 363 and later 
in the month he issued an appeal to Amnest7 International 
and the Irish politician Sean McBride on the situation of 
Dgurtsov in a labour camp. 364 In November, unemployed and 
faced with a KGB campaign to remove his seven-year-old 
daughter from her parents, he appealed to Senator Henry 
Jackson to try to improve his position. 365 But on 28 
November, three days after the appearance of Zemlia No. 2, 
Osipov was arrested. Rodionov issued a statement promising 
to continue with the journal, but no further issues were 
produced. 366 
On the day after Osipov's arrest, 1b activists drew up 
a protest. It claimed that even the publication of loyal 
journals was considered a threat to the State. The 
signatories included Rodionov and Borodin; three 
contributors to From Under the Rubble - Shafarevich, 
Agursky and Vadim Borisov; the Zionist Aleksandr Voronel; 
and ten mainstream human rights figures, including Iury 
Orlov, Valentin Turchin, Sergei Kovalyov, Tatiana 
Velikanova, Tatiana Khodorovich and Andrei Grigorenko (son 
of pyotr). 367 This protest was reprinted in the 
Chronicle. 368 One day later Andrei Tverdokhlebov issued a 
further appeal, calling on people to defend Osipov, 
regardless of their opinion of his Slavophil ideas. Noting 
that Osipov had appealed to Jackson, Tverdokhlebov asked 
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whether this was the reason for his arrest. 369 Osipov's 
wife also sought to mobilize world public opinion. 370 
In September 1975, however, Dsipov was sentenced to 
eight years in a strict-regime labour camp. According to 
the Chronicle, Ivanov-Skuratov testified against him. 
Melnikova, by Kheifets's account, denounced Osipov as anti- 
Soviet. The tmigre Vestnik RKhD reported that at the trial 
two witnesses had rescinded their testimony, according to 
which Osipov had received money from the West for the 
journal. The witnesses claimed that their earlier 
statements had been made under pressure from the 
investigators. The prosecutor had ignored the withdrawal 
of the testimony. The major accusations against Osipov, 
according to Vestnik, were that Osipov had published 
articles in the West, and the "chauvinistic nature of the 
journal". Solzhenitsyn attacked the harshness of the 
sentence, pointing out that Osipov had acted openly 
throughout. A number of representatives of the human 
rights movement issued protests in Osipov's support, and 
Academician Sakharov mentioned his participation in the 
defence of political prisoners and of Solzhenitsyn as 
factors additional to his editing of Veche which had led to 
his punishment. 3'71 
In a 1974 samizdat document attacking anti-Semitism, 
Agursky suggested that "neo-Nazi" circles within the regime 
hoped to make Veche their unofficial mouthpiece. Osipov 
and other Christian nationalists constituted a major 
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obstacle to this, however, and these regime figures 
withdrew their protection from Veche. This allowed Osipov 
to be put on trial. 372 lanov's explanation, which is 
compatible with Agursky's, links Osipov's trial with the 
decline in Poliansky's influence (and therefore in his 
ability to protect Výche), which began in 1973 and 
continued until he was dropped from the Politburo in 
1976.373 Sheiepin, too, was losing influence, leaving the 
Politburo in 1975. The moves against Veche coincided with 
the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn from the USSR and the 
publication of his Letter to-th9L. Soviet-Leaders and the 
collection From under_the_Rubble. 374 It may be that the 
wide circulation given to Solzhenitsyn's nationalist views 
made the Brezhnev leadership more determined to clamp down 
on unofficial Russian nationalism (although nobody went to 
the camps for contributing to From under-the_Rubble). 
Clearly the regime was hostile both to Osipov's combination 
of human rights activity and Christian nationalism and to 
the idea of an uncensored regular &qsudarstvennik Journal, 
such as Vechý might have become without Osipov. 
An attempt to create a successor to Veche, without the 
participation of Osipov (and perhaps not as sympathetic to 
the human rights movement) was made by Borodin. The title 
Moskovskii sbornik (Moscow Compendium) evoked the 
periodical of that name published by the Slavophils in the 
1840s. Borodin's introduction to the first issue, which 
appeared in September 1974, conveyed the intention of 
publishing materials on religious and national issues which 
were already in samizdat. He also included a polemical 
491 
attack on Levitin-Krasnov's "Zemlia dybom" (The World 
Upside Down - itself a critique of Soizhenitsyn's Letter to 
the Leaders - see below). Borodin ridiculed the 
eclecticism (or diversity) of influences on Levitin- 
Krasnov. The material concerning religion included 
Shimanov's article "Moscow, the Third Rome" (see below), a 
work of Agursky's on Jewish Christians and an article on 
Dudko. A long historical article by Ivanov-Skuratov 
concerned Grigory Rasputin. 375 The second issue, dated 
January 1975, failed to reach the West but the Chronicle 
reported its contents. It again included articles by 
Ivanov-Skuratov and Shimanov, and it was dedicated to the 
memory ol Galanskov. 37b After this, the KGB moved in, 
confiscating the third issue and giving Borodin a stern 
warning. 377 
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Solzhenitsyn and Russian-messianism. Letter to the Soviet 
Leaders and From under the Rubble 
The role of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in the Russian 
nationalist movement (as in the human rights movement) in 
the early 19'70s was of great significance. So much has 
already been written about him and his works, however, that 
my discussion here can be brief. 378 Press attacks on 
Solzhenitsyn and on Andrei Sakharov, the other leading 
dissident, grew to a climax in summer 1973. Even figures 
such as Chingiz Aitmatov, Vasyl Bykov and Sergei Zalygin 
were forced to sign petitions against him. About this time 
the KGB discovered The_Guiag_ArchijDela&o, with its 
uncompromising insistence that the roots of Stalinism lay 
in Lenin's repressive policies and ciass-based morality. 
In February 1974 Soizhenitsyn was arrested and forcibly 
deported to Switzerland. His Letter_to the Soviet Leaders, 
completed the previous autumn, was thereupon published in 
the West and in samizdat. In November the anthology Erom 
Under the Rubble, edited by Solzhenitsyn, was launched at 
Press conferences in Moscow and Zurich. 379 
The progra=e outlined in his Letter and in his 
contributions to Fromunder the_Rubble is authoritarian and 
nationalist, but comes out against Russian great-power 
chauvinism. A central point is that the non-Russians have 
the right to secede it they desire. Here Solzhenitsyn 
differs from the position of Shafarevich as expressed in 
the same volume. Shalarevich said that the Russians were 
at least as much the victims ot communism as the other 
Soviet nations. There would be no benefit from the 
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minority nationalities breaking from a post-Soviet Russia. 
"There is nothing to indicate the necessity of dismembering 
states into national atoms. "380 History had joined the 
peoples of the USSR together, and they now had a "historic 
mission ...: to point the way out of the labyrinth in which 
mankind is now lost. "381 Solzhenitsyn implicitly rejected 
this Russian messianism (see below, p. 497). He was 
expiicit on the national minorities. "With regard to all 
the peopies in and beyond our borders forcibly drawn into 
our orbit, we can fully purge our guilt by giving them 
genuine freedom to decide their future for themseives.,, 382 
In the Letter, he spoke of being concerned solely with 
Russia and the Ukraine; the other republics should be 
allowed to leave. In the third volume of Gulg, &, he goes 
further (conscious of being half-Ukrainian himself), and 
offers the Ukrainians the right of self-determination. "We 
must leave the decision to the Ukrainians themselves - let 
federalists and separatists try their persuasions. "383 
Free of the wish to maintain an empire, the Russian 
government would be able to renounce Xarxism-Leninism and 
replace it with the moral authority of Orthodoxy. The 
alternative would be catastrophic. Driven by ideology, the 
Soviet leaders had exported revolution wherever they could, 
including China. But now the ideological dispute with 
China threatened to lead to war between the two countries. 
Solzhenitsyn called on the Soviet leaders, as Russians, to 
abandon ideology to the Chinese, and to concentrate 
resources on Russia. Her own North and Siberia should be 
developed, to keep out the Chinese and revive the spirit of 
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the Russian people. As well as renouncing the ideology, 
the leaders should restore some power to the soviets. 384 
Although he shares the hostility of his fellow-contributor, 
Shafarevich, to all forms of socialism, 385 Solzhenitsyn's 
emphasis is on morality and repentance rather than 
politics. He speaks of the guilt of the Russians before 
other nations, but considerably softens the effect by 
rei - erring to the oppression of Russians by Poles, Tatars 
and Latvians (in and after 1917), suggesting that the 
Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians have suffered from 
evil governments more than anyone else. 386 
Solzhenitsyn's article "Repentance and Self-Limitation 
in the Life of Nations" refers to the "natural proclivity 
of Russians to repent". 387 But this proclivity was 
undermined by Nikon's and Peter's reforms. "The whole 
Petersburg period of our history -a period of external 
greatness, of imperial conceit - drew the Russian spirit 
even further from repentance.,, 388 This attitude to Peter I 
is shared by two other contributors to From=under the 
Rubb. le, Vadim Borisov389 and the pseudonymous F. 
Korsakov. 390 These contributors share with the early 
Slavophils a tendency to idealize pre-Petrine Russia. 
Opposition to State chauvinism also distinguished the early 
Slavophils (most of the time). Solzhenitsyn succinctly 
describes, and condemns, what he calls National Bolshevism 
(although what he is describing seems closer to what I have 
referred to as the &osudarstvennik ideology than to 
National Bolshevism): "the Russian people are the noblest 
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in the world ... tsarism and Bolshevism are equally 
irreproachable ... blood alone determines whether one is 
Russian or non-Russian. "391 Shafarevich, also attacking 
national megalomania, comments that Veche's celebration of 
Skobelev's conquests "looks like some sort of deliberate 
provocation. "392 Borisov goes so far as to call 
nationalism, along with universalism, an "atheist" 
ideology. 393 
A major factor uniting Solzhenitsyn, Borisov and the 
early Slavophils is the belief in the need for the 
spiritual rebirth of the Russian nation. In the "Metanoia" 
symposium (see above, pp. 458-61), Solzhenitsyn saw 
"nothing but a denunciation of the irredeemably vicious 
Russian people". 394 The view that at the centre of 
Bolshevism was Russian messianism appalled Solzhenitsyn. 
The Communist ideology, rooted in French and German 
theories, had made Russia into an occupied country whose 
traditions were vilified. 395 For Solzhenitsyn, as for the 
early Slavophils, it was the intellectuals who were the 
most responsible for the contemptuous attitude to things 
Russian. His article "The Smatterers", attacking the 
contemporary Soviet intelligentsia, specifically praised 
the Vekhi authors for their prescience in seeing the need 
to put individual moral change before institutional change. 
He attacked "Metanoia" and the dissidents Grigory Pomerants 
and Semyon Telegin for pinning their hopes on the 
intelligentsia rather than on the Russian people. 396 
Borisov similarly attacked Pomerants, Roy Medvedev, 
Sakharov and other intellectuals for fearing the 
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development of national consciousness among the Russian 
peopie. 397 Pointing out how the regime depended on the 
intelligentsia for its ideological support, Solzhenitsyn 
demanded that Russians be prepared to make sacrifices for 
the sake ol: change, to bring about a moral revolution. "DO 
NOT LIE! DO NOT TAKE PART IN THE LIE! DO NOT SUPPORT THE 
LIE!,, 398 This abandonment of Leninism could, Solzhenitsyn 
believed, bring about the peaceful transformation of 
Russia. 399 
While the emphasis on peaceful change again recalled 
the Slavophils, one difference in Solzhenitsyn's approach 
was the absence of Russian messianism. For Solzhenitsyn, 
Russia's "national mission" is her own North and East. 
"The Northeast ... will signify that Russia has resolutely 
opted for self-limitation, for turning inward rather than 
outward. " Only when her own problems were solved would she 
begin to help others. 
When we have recovered our health and put our house in 
order we shall undoubtedly want to help poor and 
backward peoples and succeed in doing so. But not out 
of political self-interest, not to make them live as we 
do or serve us. 400 
Shafarevich was less restrained in his discussion of 
Russia's mission. He made the link, common in messianic 
thought, between suffering and redemption. 
It is hard to believe that any country has ever 
suffered such a multitude of catastrophes as has been 
unleashed on Russia during the last half century. 
Surely they cannot have been senseless and in vain? ... 
The whole of mankind has now entered a blind alley. It 
has become clear that a civilization founded on the 
ideology of 'progress' gives rise to contradictions 
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that that civilization cannot resolve. And it seems to 
me that the path to Russia's rebirth is the same as the 
path that will enable man to find a way out of his 
blind ally, to find salvation from the senseless race 
of industrial society, the cult of power and the 
darkness of unbelief. We were the first to reach this 
vantage point, whence the uniqueness of this path 
became visible, and it is now up to us to set foot on 
it and point the way to others. This is my idea of 
Russia's possible mission ' thejurpose which can 
justify her future existence. 4 
Chaadaev had suggested that Russia's purpose might be "to 
provide some great iesson ±or the world" atter undergoing a 
period of misery ýsee above, p. 86). Shatarevich now 
seemed to be saying that Russia had shown where the path of 
socialism and atheism would lead. Through her suffering 
she would be a negative example for the rest of humanity, 
but by returning to Christianity she could illuminate the 
true path. 
Among the contributors to From=under-the-Rubble, it was 
Evgeny Barabanov who most clearly articulated messianic 
strivings. He was concerned not only with the fate of 
Russia and Orthodoxy, but with the crisis facing the Church 
(in the singular) worldwide. The Church was lorgetting its 
"objective: the transformation of the world and of life for 
the glory of the approaching fullness of the Kingdom of 
God. " When he says "we have been entrusted with the great 
task of transforming the world", there is some ambiguity, 
but the impression is that "we" is not only Russian 
Orthodoxy, but world t-hristianity. 402 
A considerable number of dissidents felt the need to 
co=ent on Solzhenitsyn's Letter, showing his position at 
the time as the leading unofficial thinker. Agursky 
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coilected 14 articles about the Letter in a samizdat 
symposium, "What Awaits the Soviet Union? ". A summary of 
the symposium appeared in the Chronicle. 403 Sakharov 
criticized Solzhenitsyn for his authoritarianism and for 
over-emphasizing the importance of ideology. He agreed 
with Solzhenitsyn that Russia should "refrain from imposing 
our socialist messianism on other countries". But he found 
Solzhenitsyn's nationalism reminiscent of official "anti- 
cosmopolitan" campaigns, and feared that it could become 
"dangerous" if taken up by reactionary elements among the 
leadership. 404 Replying to Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn rejected 
any accusation of "great power nationalism". Russia needed 
her "national consciousness" to prevent her own ruin. A 
strong authority, not the sudden introduction of democracy, 
was essential, otherwise "wars between nationalities in our 
country will drown in blood the birth of democracy.,, 405 
Osipov expressed his disagreement with Sakharov and 
with the scientist's advocacy of political pluralism. He 
fully supported Solzhenitsyn, as did Leonid Borodin and 
Ivanov-Skuratov. 40b Shimanov criticized Solzhenitsyn for 
saying that Russia was not ripe for democracy, thereby 
suggesting that democracy would be appropriate for her in 
the future (see next section). At the other extreme, Raisa 
Lert argued that the "quiet" (tikhii). nationalism of 
Soizhenitsyn would "inevitably grow over" into the 
aggressive nationalism of Staiin. 407 Levitin-Krasnov, 
while agreeing with Solzhenitsyn that Christianity was 
Russia's only salvation, feared that the development of 
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Siberia could only be accomplished with Stalin's 
methods. 408 Roy Medvedev, like Lert and Levitin-Krasnov 
attacking Solzhenitsyn from a democratic socialist 
viewpoint, showed the extent to which Solzhenitsyn's 
nationalist concerns were shared by a wider public. He 
felt that Russian national life was hampered much more than 
that of the non-Russians; Russian villages were more 
neglected, and Xoscow had almost lost its Russian 
traits. 409 Lev Kopeiev, also a socialist, defended Marxism 
against Solzhenitsyn with a quotation from Berdiaev. 410 
Osipov, in a further article, noted that in an important 
respect Roy Medvedev, Levitin-Krasnov, Sakharov and 
Solzhenitsyn were united in a belief which he shared: the 
need for gradual democratizing evolutionary changes from 
the top. "We must persuade the administration that the 
presence of a loyal opposition will not harm but will 
benefit the Soviet State. "411 
The debate over Solzhenitsyn's programme continued for 
the remainder ot the i970s and beyond. In 1975 Roy 
Medvedev and Lert began to publish a socialist samizdat 
journal, XX-i-vek (The Twentieth Century), which carried 
articles critical of Solzhenitsyn. 412 Although ýýL&Ee 
politics are generally outside my scope here, Vadim 
Belotserkovsky's collection Demokraticheskie al'ternativy 
(Democratic Alternatives, 197b) probably should be 
mentioned. It included articles by Leonid Pliushch, 
Levitin-Krasnov, lanov, German Andreev and Belotserkovsky, 
advocating an anti-nationalist "New Left" alternative to 
Solzhenitsyn. 413 Andrei Siniavsky, who is far from being a 
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Westernizer and has described himself as close to Berdiaev, 
has expressed opposition to Solzhenitsyn's tendency to 
blame Russia's problems on the West. In 1978 he began to 
publish. the journal Sintaksis in Paris to oppose 
nationalist and anti-Semitic views. 414 Much of the ýImL&re 
Press in the 1970s and early 1980s was sympathetic to 
Solzhenitsyn, including Kýstnik RKhD (Paris), Posev 
(Frankfurt), and some newer journals such as Russkoe 
vozrozhdenie (Paris, 1978- ) and Veche (Munich, 1981- 
The debate showed that despite Solzhenitsyn's own 
renunciation of messianism and his concentration on Russia, 
his opponents continued to fear that his nationalism could 
lead to xenophobia and chauvinism. 
Gennady Shimanov 
The Veche contributor Gennady Mikhailovich Shimanov 
differed fundamentally from Solzhenitsyn on the nature of 
the Soviet State. He was born in 1937 in a Communist 
family. In i9b2 he voluntarily entered a psychiatric 
hospital, and at about the same time became an Orthodox 
Christian. In 1969 he was forcibly recommitted to a 
psychiatric hospital in connection with his religious 
beliefs and meetings organized at his home. 415 After his 
release he came to consider himself a Slavophil and a 
believer in Russian messianism. 416 The "Metanoia" 
symposium provoked him to write to the editor of Vestnik 
RSKhD, Nikita A. Struve, protesting against its 
publication. He claimed that the "Metanoia" writers hated 
everything Russian and suggested that they might be non- 
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Russians, hiding behind pseudonyms. Two further letters 
attacked Struve for failing to publish his criticism. 417 
In a letter written in or before 1975, Shimanov 
compared his faith in the Russian people to his faith in 
God. 
... just as I in my time came to belief in God, 
inescapably and for always, now I have come to belief 
in the Russian people, to a belief near to my heart, 
but because of a bad education my heritage was 
inaccessible to me for a long time. 418 
In moving from belief in God to belief in the Russian 
people, Shimanov was travelling in the direction opposite 
to that suggested by Father Zosima and Osipov. Like other 
Russian nationalists, Shimanov complained that patriotism 
was considered (by the liberal intelligentsia) acceptable 
for Jews and Tatars but was immoral, even fascist, for 
Russians. Pomerants was an example of this approach. "But 
our faith is that of Tiutchev, Gogol, Pushkin, Dostoevsky 
and the Slavophils... IT IS NECESSARY TO BE TOGETHER WITH 
THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE.,, 419 The Russian people, according to 
, "'himanov, were returning to the Church; while some, in the 
post-Staiin ideological vacuum, looked to the West, the 
most sensitive turned to Orthodoxy. The Soviet government 
was publishing the works of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy; the 
Russian religious philosophers, Merezhkovsky, Berdiaev and 
Bulgakov would be studied, and "the true leaders, the 
Slavophils, will begin to occupy the minds of the awakening 
pe opl e. -, 42 0 (1t should be noted that these words were 
written before the critical works of the classical 
Slavophils had been republished in the USSR). Even 
Evtushenko, who was supposed to be an atheist, had used 
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reiigious phraseology. A danger facing Russia, which was 
not yet taken seriously, was posed by Rome. The Vatican 
was planning the Catholicization of Russia, and Vestnik 
RSKhD was a tool in this strategy. 421 
Shimanov's answer to Soizhenitsyn was entitled "How to 
Understand Our History and What to Strive for in it". 
According to Shimanov, with the fall of Byzantium, Russia 
was right to feel herself the sole preserver of the true 
Orthodox faith. While the Mongol yoke reduced the external 
moral and cultural position of the people, it strengthened 
the Russian Orthodox soui, so that no subsequent 
difficulties could destroy it. The Westernization brought 
by Peter and his successors led to the slow decay of 
Russia, culminating in the democratic February Revolution. 
The October Revolution, on the other hand, was the end of 
the February Revolution and of ail the previous decay. 
Shimanov agreed with Orthodox priests who welcomed the 
victory of militant atheism in Russia, as preferable to the 
disappearance of Christianity in the West in the bourgeois 
spirit to which Western Christianity had given birth. For 
atheism would only be temporary: 11 ... as crucified Christ 
was resurrected, so Russian Orthodoxy will also be 
resurrected, and the light from it will regenerate other 
peoples. , 422 
The centralized Soviet State, seeking to overturn the 
whole world, would be the best possible instrument of God's 
purpose once the leadership saw the need to embrace 
503 
Orthodoxy. The leadership would have to do this because of 
the decline of Communist belief and the need to regenerate 
Russia to defend herself against China. The Soviet Press 
should explain that a mistake had been made, and God did, 
in fact, exist. 
Only Soviet power, having accepted Orthodoxy and 
revealing in itself the source of the water of life, is 
capable of BEGINNING THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
WORLD. And this would happen - all humanity would sigh 
with the -reatest reliet and would reach out after our 
country to a new type of life. (Shimanov's capitals, 
here and below). 423, 
Shimanov criticized Solzhenitsyn for saying that Russia 
was not yet ready for democracy, instead of rejecting 
democracy as a bourgeois and Protestant phenomenon. 
Equally unacceptable was Solzhenitsyn's belief in a 
democratic solution to the national question. Solzhenitsyn 
had said 
not a word about the possibility that the Soviet Union 
is not a mechanical conglomerate of nations, ethnically 
and religiously homogeneous, which had 'accidentally' 
fallen into Russia's orbit, but a MYSTICAL ORGANISM, 
composed of nations mutually complementing each other 
and, headed by the Russian people, composing a LITTLE 
MANKIND -a source and spiritual detonator for the 
larger mankind. 424 
Shimanov nevertheless expressed the view elsewhere that the 
different nations of the world, including the different 
nations of the Soviet Union, should not associate 
unnecessarily with other nations. He was particularly 
opposed to mixed marriages. 425 
The tones of Russian messianism appeared again in his 
article "Moscow, the Third Rome". The October Revolution 
was of universal significance. 
504 
The world needed the death of Russia, in order to be 
resurrected after her... 
Moscow has not ceased to be the Third Rome because in 
Russia the October Revolution took place. On the 
contrary, Moscow was preserved as the Third Rome 
precisely because of the Revolution... 
After Great October we must talk about the 
ORTHODOXIZATION OF THE WHOLE WORLD. 426 
Like the nineteenth-century Slavophils, Shimanov 
considered that the tsars had prevented the Church from 
functioning freely and had subordinated it to government 
interests. Also like the Slavophils, he rejected democracy 
as "the power of money". 427 The introduction of democracy, 
or liberalization, in Russia, could let in the real ruler 
of the liberal-anarchic West - "CAPITAL" - and prevent a 
religious revival. 428 Liberalism would be particularly 
disastrous in Russia, because it would unleash extreme 
nationalism. This would lead to massacres of Russians in 
the borderlands and retaliator7 massacres of non-Russians 
in the centre, and to the expansion of China. One should 
proceed not from juridical forms, like the democrats, but 
from Christianity. In Soviet power, Shimanov saw "THE 
SECRET MEANING AND HAND OF GOD, leading our people through 
the greatest fall to the greatest rebirth". 429 
Referring to Uvarov's trilogy, Shimanov said that it 
was unnecessary to complement Orthodoxy and with 
autocracy. He would choose monarchy in preference to the 
"contemporary Western bourgeois-democratic system", but 
monarchy in Russia was now impossible. Christians should 
be loyal to the system as it existed, and try to harmonize 
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reiations with the State for the co=on good. Shimanov's 
loyalty to the 'Soviet government is linked with St. Paul's 
view that "All power is from God", but it goes much 
further. 430 In a 1975 article, "The Ideal State", he 
ex-Dlains that the Soviet regime is "pregnant with 
theocracy" and predicts that the "approaching" 
transformation of the CPSU into the "Orthodox Party of the 
Soviet Union" will bring about the "ideal State". This 
wi-l be a prelude to the creation of the millennial 
Kingdom. 431 
Shimanov has denied suggestions that he is anti- 
Semitic. "I am against hostility to the Jews as such.,, He 
had never called them the enemies of Russia, although many 
of them "slander the Russian people", while others respect 
and understand other peoples. He believed in the equality 
and brotherhood of all nations in God. The Jewish people 
was perhaps the most unfortunate of all "not owing to 
suppression by those among whom they lived (this is the 
favourite theory and almost a poem of all Zionists), but 
owing to certain internal circumstances, arising because in 
the past they rejected the Messiah. I recognize that 
compassion for this poepie is necessary, but only insofar 
as it does not threaten the existence of other peopies. "432 
In an interview with the Jewish samizdat journal Evrei v 
SSER (Jews in the USSR), Shimanov tried to explain the 
social roots of anti-Semitism. He claimed that the 
tendency of jews to give each other support was 
"objectively directed against the people in whose milieu 
they are iiving". He calied for Jews to be aiiowed to iive 
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together autonomously. The Zionist solution was not likely 
to be successful, because it was rooted in inhumanity 
towards the Arabs. He also expressed the wish that Jews 
would become Christian and take part in the theocratic 
transformation of Russia. 433 
Shimanov explained in his 1976 article "The Basis for 
Hope" why the Christian transformation of Soviet power was 
probably inevitable. Although Communism had some religious 
roots, in the chiliastic teachings of Judaism and 
Christianity, it grew out of the bourgeois world and had 
never articulated values which differed in principle from 
bourgeois values. In the USSR, society was becoming 
bourgeoisified and Americanized, with people pursuing 
private consumer and sexual interests, while paying lip 
service to government policy out of fear. The government 
would have to find ways of recreating patriotic enthusiasm 
and crowding out bourgeois values. Externally, the USSR 
had faced two defeats: the split with China, which now 
posed a threat, forcing the Soviet leaders into detente 
with the West; and the breaking of the Communist parties in 
the capitalist world with the idea of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat. The West was trying to fight the spread 
of Communism by striving for the liberalization of the 
Soviet regime. Such liberalization, however, would give 
nothing to the West and would lead to a catastrophe in the 
Soviet Union and to fatal consequences for the whole world, 
The West should insist not on liberalization but on 
humanization and the liberation of Christianity in the 
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Soviet Union from administrative suffocation. In the long 
term, this would lead to a Christian rebirth in the Soviet 
Union, the transformation of' the country and a chain 
reaction around the world. If, however, there was no 
Christian revival, the Soviet tower would crash down. 
"Without any war our land to the Urals, if not further, 
will be coloured yellow, and there will be no way out of 
the world convulsions. "434 
Shimanov himself acted on his desire for greater 
freedom for the Orthodox Church. In July 1976 he wrote to 
Pattriarch Pimen, asking him to speak out against State 
restrictions on the clergy, 435 and in August he sent a 
letter to Brezhnev against the internment of Aleksandr 
Argentov of the Christian Seminar (see below) in a 
psychiatric hospital. 435 in these actions, he was adopting 
the practice of the human rights movement, despite his view 
of the Soviet State. 
It is possible that Shimanov's views were close to 
those held in the Brezhnev era by the upper hierarchy of 
the Russian Orthodox Church, who may have been reconciled 
to Soviet political and economic structures but wished to 
influence the authorities to move in a religious direction. 
While his loyalty and almost idoiization of the Soviet 
State tempt one to assign Shimanov to the camp of the 
&osudarstvenniki, his insistence that the State will have 
to abandon Marxism-Leninism and accept Christianity before 
it becomes an instrument of God's will differentiates his 
position trom them. it is difficult to accept his own 
b08 
label of "Slavophil" either, because the nineteenth-century 
Slavophils never wanted to extend the powers of the State. 
Shimanov's Russian universalist messianism (Russia will 
save the world through Orthodoxy) is tempered by a 
nationalist hostility towards the Jews (albeit denied) and 
the West. 
Dimitry Dudko, the Christian Seminar and the Christian 
Committee 
Unofficial Russian nationalist activity after 1975 was 
centred on people whose primary concerns were religious. 
This was connected with the revival of interest in 
religion, which continued through the Brezhnev era. It is 
difficult to estimate how much this revival affected the 
ordinary Russian, outside cultural circles. Reports of 30 
to tO million members of the Russian Orthodox Church are 
cited, but this may refer to little more than the number of 
people baptized. 437 The existence of a religious revival 
is attested to by unofficial representatives of the Russian 
Orthodox Church, such as Levitin-Krasnov, who emphasizes 
the attraction of Orthodoxy for urban intellectual 
youth. 438 Mikhail Meerson-Aksyonov sees the religious 
revival in terms of "the conversion to Christianity of tens 
of thousands of young people who belong to the second and 
third generation of Soviet citizens and who have received 
atheist education". 439 
E"ome official leaders of the Church under Brezhnev also 
felt able to co=ent favourably. Metropolitan Iuvenaly 
claimed, "What today exists in the Russian Orthodox Church 
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... is a spiritual revivai., 
@440 From about the mid-i970s, 
the Church hierarchs seemed to display a certain degree of 
confidence in their strength. The Journal of-the Moscow 
Patriarchate began to mention tavourably ideologists who 
were hostile to Marxism: the ninteenth-century Slavophils 
(here it reflected and reinforced trends in the cultural 
intelligentsia) and even twentieth-century thinkers who had 
'Of 11, 
opposed Bolshevism, including tLnIgnes like Sergei Bulgakov, 
and Father Pavel Florensky who died in a Stalinist iabour 
camp. 441 The Party Central Committee seems to have been 
sufficiently concerned about the Russian Orthodox Church to 
call for a report from the Council lor Religious Affairs. 
This categorized the bishops in terms of their loyalty to 
the State. 442 
A major role was played by Father Dimitry Dudko (see 
above, pp. 437,45b, 4b5,467-88). Born in 1922 in a poor 
peasant family in the region of Briansk, he had entered the 
Novodevichy Monastery seminary in 1945 but had then been 
sent to the camps. After the XX Congress, he was 
rehabilitated. In 1958 he was awarded the degree of 
candidate of theology by the Spiritual Academy for his 
thesis "Sobornost' Tserkvi" ýThe sobornost' of the Church). 
The title evokes Slavophil strivings and, according to 
Levitin-Krasnov, Dudko belonged to the tradition of 
theological thought begun by Khomiakov. Levitin-Krasnov 
reports that Dudko also followed Berdiaev in seeing freedom 
as the basis of religious life. 443 As priest at St. 
Nicholas' Church in the Cemetery of the Transfiguration in 
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Moscow, he gained popularit7 and baptized a number of 
adults into Orthodoxy. 444 In September 1972 he was warned 
that the authorities wished to remove him, but his 
parishioners responded to his appeal for support and he was 
left at his post. 445 His question-and-answer sessions in 
the winter of 1973-1974 attracted many young people to his 
church. He avoided specific questions of politics and human 
rights, but Gemonstramed a reiigious Russian nationaiism. 
"My patriotism is based on faith, " he expiainecL. 446 Like 
Shimanov, and like the Church hierarchy, he promoted a 
certain loyalty to the regime. Religion, he said, is "(if 
it comes to that) a good builder of communism.,, 447 
Futhermore, he preached a pure Russian messianism. 
Now with us in Russia a great miracle is taking place - 
not only the crucifixion of Christ but also his 
resurrection from the dead.... 
... Golgotha isn't simply sufferings, but sufferings 
which lead to resurrection, and enlighten people... 
Golgotha is in Russia, and where Golgotha is, there too 
is resurrection. 448 
In May 1974 Dudko was removed from his parish, and in 
September he was appointed to the village of Kabanovo, 
fifty miles from Moscow. This led to an appeal by his 
parishioners to Patriarch Pimen, asking that he be returned 
to them. 449 Muscovites continued to attend his sermons in 
Kabanovo, and in December 1975 he was dismissed from there 
as well. This provoked a wave o± protests: one from 300 of 
his parishioners; another from Shatarevich, Vadim Borisov, 
Feliks Svetov and other Orthodox inteiiectuais; another 
from Gleb Iakunin and Lev Regeison. 450 In April i97b, he 
was given a church in the village of Grebnevo, outside 
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Moscow. Despite continued pressure, he continued to write 
on the Golgotha theme. His 1977 article, "From the Russian 
Golgotha", regretted that some people could not hear about 
Russia calmly: "for them appears at once the Third Rome, 
Russian nationalism-chauvinism, and most recently National 
Bolshevism. " But "Russia and the Russian person are 
unthinkable without Christianity. " After references to 
Dostoevsky and Tiutchev, he described Russia as 
a spiritual force, which cannot be destroyed... 
[Russia] knows from her own experience how to escape 
from the misfortune which has hung over the whole world 
gone mad. Russia is now not only in those territories 
which the USSR has illegally occupied - she has 
penetrated everywhere... 
Russia is not a question of a particular State, the 
question of Russia is a world question. On the 
solution of this roblem depends whether or not the 
world will exist. 
&5i 
In September 1978 he began publishing a newspaper V-svete 
Preobrazheniia (In the Light of the Transfiguration, 
subtitled An Orthodox Weekly Newspaper). This survived to 
j98(). 4b2 
Dudko's influence was present in the Christian Seminar, 
which was established in Moscow in 1974 and which in 1978 
renamed itself the Christian Seminar on Problems of the 
Religious Renaissance. This group of people, mainly young, 
discussed Russian Orthodox thinkers of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. In a list of subjects discussed 
in the Seminar between September 1974 and July 1970, the 
names mentioned most Irequently were Vladimir Soiovyov (lour 
times) and Khomiakov ýthree times). The founder of the 
Seminar was Aleksandr 1, Ogorodnikov, who was born in 1950 
512 
and converted to Christianity only in 1973. "From Marxist 
convictions, through nihilism and the complete denial of 
any ideology, through attraction to the 'hippy' way of life 
we arrived at the Church, " wrote Ogorodnikov in 1976.453 
Elsewhere, he and his co-seminarist Boris Razveev wrote: 
"Khomyakov, Dostoevsky, V. Soiovyov, Fr. S. Bulgakov and G. 
Florovsky brought us up to the threshold of the Church and 
set us bef ore its doors. The ES'eminar also discussed 
aspects of Western religious and political thought, the 
Russian saints and their relationship to the State, and the 
sermons of Dudko. 454 Dudko considered Ogorodnikov among 
his spiritual children, and Ogorodnikov called Dudko his 
spiritual tather. 455 
In 1977 the Seminar published a religious and 
philosophical samizdat journal with the Slavophil-sounding 
title Obshchina ý. Commune, or Community), under 
Ogorodnikov's editorship. A declaration of the principles 
of the Seminar was compiled by Ogorodnikov. This called 
for the right to practise religion and to live according to 
the Christian conscience, and for the Church to pay 
attention to the world as well as to heaven. The 
declaration predicted that the Orthodox Church would come 
through its crisis and "affirm itself in its glory through 
the whole Russian land, also inviting other peoples to the 
Christian Transtiguration". Towards this end, the Seminar 
would seek to create a "Christian obshchina", develop the 
Orthodox world-view and theological education, pursue 
missionary activity and defend religious freedom. On the 
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fumure of Russia the declaration stated: 
At the centre of the interests of the Seminar stands 
the question of the history and future fate of Russia 
and the Russian Orthodox Church. This question cannot 
be decided without considering the muitinational 
composition of our country, 
There followed a reference to the "Russian Golgotha", and a 
statement that the Seminar was united in "love for Russia 
as for a mother... brotherly love for Christians of all 
nanionaiities ... respect ior the nationai dignity ot 
pec; Die of different ethnic groups. " This was as : tar as the 
declaration was prepared to go tor the non-Russians. "Holy CD 
Rus"', the conclusion added, was "the holy of holies of our 
na--ional consciousness-, -. 45b 
There were severai such groups in Moscow and other 
cities; the Christian Seminar had links with the religious 
and philosophical seminar in Leningrad, founded by Orthodox 
believers such as Tatiana Goricheva but not limited to the 
Orthodox. This group published the journal 37,20 issues 
oi which appeared between 1975 and 1981, edited by Viktor 
Krivulin. 457 
According to the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group 
member Liudmila Alekseeva, the "main center" of Russian 
nationalism from early 1977 was the Christian Committee for 
the Defence of Believers' Rights in the USSR, founded in 
December ig7(5.458 Two of the three founder members were 
former Veche supporters, Khaibuiin and Kapitanchuk, 
aithough Khaiubuiin left the Committee in i978. The third 
was Iakunin, who continued into the i97Os his campaign of 
appeals for religious freedom, sometimes together with Lev 
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Regelson. 459 Of particular note was the June 1976 
ecumenical appeal to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme 
Soviet for religious freedom, signed by Iakunin, Regelson, 
Shaiarevich, Dudko, Zheludkov and others -a total of 28 
Christians from six denominations. 460 
The Christian Committee confined its membership to 
Orthodox believers, saying that since the Orthodox Church 
had been responsible for religious repression for centuries 
when it was the State Church, the Committee considered it 
its "special duty to take the initiative in the cause of 
the defence of the religious freedom of ail believers in 
the country, irrespective of their contession". 461 it 
produced thousands of pages, documenting the persecution of 
people of virtually all the Christian denominations in the 
USSR, and also of the Jew Iosif Begun, who was sentenced 
for teaching Hebrew. Meerson-Aksvonov claimed that the 
Committee had the "silent connivance of the Church 
hierarchy", but this may overestimate its basis of 
support. 462 It is true, however, that Father Vasily 
Fonchenkov, one of the later Committee members, was allowed 
to continue lecturing at the Moscow Theological Academy for 
a while after joining the Committee, and that the Committee 
was never openly attacked by the Patriarchate. 463 
lakunin's report to the Committee, "On the Current 
Situation of the Russian Orthodox Church and Perspectives 
for the Religious Rebirth of Russia", highlighted the 
interest of the intelligentsia and of young people in 
religion, and the inability of the Patriarchate to meet 
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their needs. 464 Since the activity Of the Christian 
Committee was in the defence of human rights, rather than 
in the development of Russian messianism, its activity will 
not be discussed in detail here. In the attachment of its 
members to OrthodoxV and of at least two of them to Russian 
nationalism, the Committee can be seen as a reflection of 
the evolution of the Slavophilism of the i970s towards the 
human rights movement. 465 
The activities of the Christian Seminar and the 
Christian Committee were not ignored by the authorities. 
Aleksandr Argentov was the first member of the Christian 
Seminar to suffer persecution: on 14 july 1976 he was 
confined to a psychiatric hospital in Moscow for a few 
weeks and given harmful drugs. 466 The newspaper 
Literaturnaia -azeta carried a long attack, over two 
issues, in April 1977 on Ogorodnikov, Iakunin, Regelson and 
Dudko. 467 One week after the second part appeared, Iakunin 
and Dudko fought back with a Press conference at Dudko's 
ilar-. 4b8 While some Seminar members were harassed, the 
authorities allowed the Seminar and the Christian Committee 
to function. As Jane Ellis has pointed out, from the 
middle of 1977 to the middle of 1979 the KGB generally left 
religious cases alone while they dealt with the activists 
of the Helsinki Monitoring Groups, presumably because they 
saw the latter cases as more serious. 469 An exception was 
the Christian Seminar leader Ogorodnikov, arrested on 21 
November 1978 and initiaiiy sentenced to a year in the 
camps for "parasitism". Regeison replaced him as leader of 
the Seminar. 470 
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From the middle of 1979 came a crackdown on all forms 
of dissent. This was initially believed to be connected 
with the desire of the Soviet leaders to clear Moscow of 
all dissidents in time for the Olympics, due to be held 
there in summer 1980. The invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979 was the culmination of the collapse of 
demente with the West (. at least as far as the USA and 
Britain were concerned, if not yet the rest of Western 
Europe). This removed the reason for the Soviet leaders 
not to move against the activists for religious freedom, 
for lear of alienating Western public opinion. Vladimir 0 
Poresh, the Christian Seminar's representative in 
Leningrad, was arrested on i August 1979 for his role in 
publishing gbshchina. He was tried in April 1980 and given 
five years in a strict regime camp and three years exile. 
Ogorodnikov was not released when his year was over but 
retried in September 1980 for editing Obshchin. a, and 
sentenced to six years of strict re-ime camp T)lus five 
years exile. As far as the Christian Committee was 
concerned, Iakunin was arrested on i November 1979 and 
Regelson on 24 December. Kapitanchuk was left at liberty 
until 12 March 1980. After his arrest the Committee 
announced that it was expanding to include ten anonymous 
members, but the supply of documents dried up. 471 
Probably the most serious blow to the Orthodox revival, 
and to Russian messianist thought, was the arrest of Dudko 
on 15 January 1980 and his "recantation" of his activities 
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on 7-elevision on 20 June. The recantation was later 
reprinted in major newspapers. Without in any sense 
renouncing his Orthodox faith, he said that his struggle 
against atheism had become a struggle against the Soviet 
State, and he had become a tool of the West. 472 His 
apologetic letter to the Patriarch was published in the 
Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. 473 After his broadcast 
he was released, but the loiiowing month he began to recant 
his recantation. He wrote letters reproaching himseii for 
misleading his spiritual children by giving in to KGB 
pressure, but also justifying his action. He seems to have 
been contused and felt isoiated at this time, deserted by 
the same spiritual children. It is not easy to identify 
the precise reasons for his capitulation to the KGB. It 
may have been the result of drugs or of threats. There may 
have been pressure on Dudko from the Patriarchate, who 
could have been mediating between the KGB and the priest; 
it was rumoured that Metropoiitgan Iuvenaiy of Krutitsy and 
Kolomna, or even Pimen himself, had seen Dudko while the 
latter was in prison. 474 
The political activity of the Orthodox Church 
dissidents was now in the doldrums. Regelson, Kapitanchuk 
and Feliks Karelin gave evidence against lakunin, who was 
sentenced in August i980 to five years camp and the same 
time in exile. Regeison and Kapitanchuk repented at their 
trials, in September and October, and were reieased. 475 
One journal which succeeaed in appearing twice during the 
crackdown, in 1980 and 1981, was Mnogaia=leta (Many Years), 
edited by Shimanov and carrying major contributions from 
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Karelin and L. Ibragimov. In accordance with Shimanov's 
views, outlined earlier, it argued for closer co-operation 
between Orthodox people and the State. 476 A samizdat 
article accused it of being a KGB journal. 477 
The evolution of dissident Russian nationalisin under 
Brezhnev 
The dissident Russian nationaiist movement under 
Brezhnev can be schematically described as passing through 
three stages. It began with underground organization, 
represented by VSKhSON; it passed through the stage of 
programmatic samizdat journals, such as Veche, putting 
forward an ideology (or range of ideologies) which differed 
from -that of the regime, but which claimed loyalty to the 
Soviet Constitution; and it ended with open human rights 
activity, exemplified by the participation of Osipov in 
protests against repression and by the work of Khaibuiin 
and even Kapitanchuk in the Christian Committee for the 
Defence of Believers' Rights. 
The movement from ioyai nationaiism to the human rights 
movement was precisely the opposite of that predicted by 
Ianov. It is true that some of the Sosudarstvenniki who 
worked in Veche disappeared from samizdat after 1974; but 
these people seem to have always been close to, or part of, 
-che cultural establishment and never -to have broken irom 
their olficiai positions. In its three stages of 
deveiopment, Russian nationalism paraiieied the democratic 
opposition; from underground groups, through samizdat 
journals, such as the Chronicle or Valery N. Chalidze's 
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Fjbshchestvennyýý pL21ýleEýy, to open human rights groups such 
as the Initiative Group of 19(59 and the Helsinki Monitoring 
Groups. The Russian nationalist movement overlapped with, 
and drew strength from, movements within the Orthodox 
Church. The Christian protests frequently used nationalist 
and messianist images. So did the apparently non-poiiticai 
samizdat writings of Christians which appeared in Veche and 
elsewhere. The Christian Seminar and other unofficial 
Christian movements also saw a link between Orthodoxy and 
nationalism, and Dudko's messianic view of Russia as 
Golgotha seems to have had wide currency. 0 
Russian-nationalism and the Brezhnev-leadership 
Russian nationalist dissidents in the Brezhnev era were 
in general allowed much more leeway than non-Russian 
nationalists. Liudmila Alekseeva finds that even as late 
as the early 1980s, non-democratic dissidents like the 
Russian nationalists (excluding those linked with the human 
rights movement) received favoured treatment from the 
authorities. 478 The articles in Veche attacking 
"cosmopolitanism" (and even some of Cisipov's statements) 
are sometimes reminiscent of the work of the officially- 
published gosudarstvenniki, and the evidence of Kheifets is 
that they in fact often emanate from the same circles. It 
may not have been the nationalist or even the Christian 
orientation of Veche that led to its closure; after all, 
Christian motifs were tolerated in the cultural journais, 
and displayed in the Manege at Glazunov's exhibition. The 
samizdat journal Mnogaia_leta was tolerated as late as 
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ig8i, despite its Orthodox nationalism. What was not 
tolerated was the link between Russian nationalism and the 
human rights movement which Osipov, facing harassment from 
the authorities, was forced to make. 
The Russian nationalists had poweriul backers. 
According to Reznik, Sofronov's 0 onek published Glazunov's 91 
portrait of ivanov-Skuratov. 479 Russian nationaiism also 
. c. 'ained support from the Cultural Department of the Central 
Committee under Shauro. The fact that the Central 
Committee Propaganda Department was headed from 1977 by 
E. M. Tiazheinikov, formerly First Secretary of the 
Komsomol, may have removed some of the barriers to the 
spread of Russian nationalist ideas. Tiazhelnikov's 
presence at the Kremlin celebration of the Kulikovo victory 
adds weight to this surmise. 480 
Up to about the middle of the i970s, the Brezhnev 
. Leadership seems to have been hostile to the more extreme 
iorms oi Russian nazionaiism, as is shown by the moves 
against Xo1odala=gvardiia, but supportive ol milder forms, 
as is suggested by the demotion of the anti-nationaiist 
Iakovlev. In the later i970s, however, with the general 
"decline in social discipline" went a relaxation of 
ideoio, -icai control. The leadership seems to have drifted 
Jinto a situation where Marxist-Leninist values were 
regularly being challenged by Russian patriotic and 
ieeiings, without any single member of the 
leadership (after the fall of Poliansky) being obviously 
responsible lor promoting this. 
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Agursky described a Russian "national reaction", which 
gained support from Russian oblast' Party bodies and 
Russians in the central Party apparatus. He said that this 
trend opposed both the "internationalist" group based on 
republican Party leaders and headed by Brezhnev, and a 
"super-industrializing" military-industrial complex, mainlv 
Russian in composition, headed by Kosygin, Central 
Committee Secretary A. P. Kirilenko and Minister of Defence 
D. F. Ustinov. 481 Agursky's schema has some attractions, 
but many oblast' leaders are part of the military- 
industriai complex, and Brezhnev must undoubtedly have 
drawn support from Russians on the Central Committee. It 
seems clear that the armed forces' Main Political 
Administration (MPA) and the Komsomol gave support to 
Russian nationalists. The MPA has been promoting the 
concept of "military-patriotic education" of S'oviet youth 
since the 1970s, with references to tsarist military 
heroes. 482 
The role of the KGB is less clear. Probably, like 
other institutions, it was divided on the question. The 
ý2]EL&res Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova claim that 
when Andropov became KGB head in 1967, he inherited a 
legacy of nationalism, He then tried to channel this to 
fuel his political ambitions, while keeping it at a 
distance. 483 Real evidence linking Andropov with any form 
of Russian nationalism is tenuous, to say the least, 
although his subordinates may have been affected by it. It 
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might be noted that Solovyov and Klepikova are the only 
writers to claim that the "Russian Party" is not simply a 
tendency of people with similar ideas but actually "the 
name of an organization" which has its own members, 
meetings and central committee. 484 
The attitude to Russian nationalism of Suslov at the 
ena ol his iiie is a matter oi dispute. Reznik claims that 
Susiov personally supported (--7iazunov's exhibitions, and 
Dunlop believes that he protected cultural nationalists. 485 
It has also been claimed that Suslov prevented corruption 
charges trom being brought against Soironov. 486 Roy 
Xedvedev, on the other hand, states that Suslov was 
friendly with Glazunov because he liked the artist's 
portrait of him, but he had no personal sympathy with the 
rusit 487 - Y-- Glazunov presumably did not need Susiov's 
support it he was friendly with Brezhnev. Agursky claims 
that Suslov supported the Zosudarstvenniki ("aggressive 
imperial nationalism") and opposed the vcDzrc: )zhdentsv 
ý"J-=oiationist conservative Russian nationaiism"). 468 
Ooncern for the problem is shown by the tact that in April 
i979 the Central Committee passed a decree "On the further 
improvement of ideological and political upbringing work". 
An article on the implementation of this decree was 
published over Susiov's name in Kommunist in October 1979. 
He attacked iiterarv works which conveyed "unhistoricai, 
distorted representations of the past, strange 
predilections ior the characters ot historical adventurers, 
and superficial judgements about contemporary affairs". 489 
This would seem to be directed against ail types of 
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nationalists. 
Did the Russian nationalists have any effect on Soviet 
policy, despite the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn and the 
arrest of Osipov? In terms of economic development, the 
Brezhnev leadership seems to have agreed with Solzhenitsyn 
in prioritizing I'liberia. The plan to reverse part of the 
flow of the Siberian rivers, the Ob and the irtysh, into 
Central Asia to provide irrigation for the burgeoning 
population of Central Asia was not implemented, but neither 
was it dropped. In 1981 changes were introduced in family 
benefits to encourage Russians to have more children, 
without further encouraging the population growth in 
Transcaucasia and Central Asia. 490 In foreign policy, on 
the other hand, Russian nationalist pressures for 
isolationism were ignored, as the leaders sought to 
increase their influence in the Third World at the expense 
of the USA and China, without risking a war with either. 
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Andr-opov, Chernenko and Russian_ýnationalism 
It is difficult to deduce the political positions of 
different members of the top leadership, since statements 
by Politburo members are as likely to reflect the Politburo 
majority position (or consensus, where this exists) as the 
individual position of the politician. From May 1982, when 
Andropov became Central Committee Secretary with 
responsibilities in the ideological field, it seems that it 
was his policies which became the official line, rather 
than those of the ailing Brezhnev. In the period of 
Andropov's General Secretaryship, from November 1982 to 
February 1984, Chernenko was the ideology Secretary, but 
the public position of the two leaders in relation to 
Russian nationalism was the same. Chernenko as General 
Secretary appears to have also held the ideology 
'portfolio' until late 1984, when Gorbachov took it over. 
The latter seems to have avoided committing himself on 
Russian nationalism before becoming General Secretary in 
March 1985. 
Observers as different in their views as Georgy 
Vladimov and Zhores Medvedev agree that Andropov, at the 
end of his life at least, was hostile to Russian 
nationalism. 491 The fact that Andropov was keen to stamp 
out Russian nationalism, and that he was not merely 
allowing Chernenko to pursue his own ideological interests, 
is suggested by his use of the KGB, still under his 
control, against it. Vitaly Fedorchuk, Andropov's 
successor at the KGB, is said to have described Russian 
nationalism as the main (glavnoe) enemy. 492 Sheila 
525 
Fitzpatrick speaks of the "possible" offence 
Russian nationalism to the non-Russians. 493 
surmise that Andropov, as former head of the 
puts many more non-Russians than Russians in 
for political dissent, was aware of the ill- 
by the expression of Russian nationalism. 
caused by 
One may 
KGB, which 
labour camps 
feelings caused 
In 1981-83 the KGB moved to mop up most of the 
dissident Russian nationalists. In August 1982 Zoia A. 
Krakhmalnikova, editor of the Orthodox samizdat journal 
Nadezhda (Hope), whose nationalist overtones were very 
mild, and which reportedly had the backing of the Church 
hierarchy, was arrested; she was later given a relatively 
light sentence. 494 Of wider significance to the 
nationalist movement was the arrest of Ivanov-Skuratov in 
August 1981. In connection with this case, not only 
dissidents such as Borodin but also the establishment 
figures Glazunov and Semanov were questioned. 495 The trial 
in June 1982 revealed that Ivanov-Skuratov's work had been 
produced on the typewriters of the General Staff. 495 
Ivanov-Skuratov "confessed" to anti-Soviet agitation and 
was given a light sentence. A report circulated in late 
1982 that Semanov had been arrested, but this was later 
refuted. 497 In May 1983, the purge climaxed with the trial 
of Borodin, on charges which covered the whole of his 
samizdat activity and sending literary works abroad. He 
had refused to co-operate with the Ivanov-Skuratov 
investigation, and he was sentenced to a harsh 10 years in 
a labour camp and 5 years internal exile. 498 Further 
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repressive measures included the re-sentencing within the 
camps of members of the Christian Seminar when they were 
due to be released, a process already applied to 
Ogorodnikov. 499 The effect of these policies was to 
diminish but not totally eliminate the volume of Russian 
nationalist activity. 500 
Opposition to Russian nationalism was evident from 
statements by the leadership. In July 1982 the Central 
Committee adopted a decree "On the creative links of the 
literary and belletristic journals with the practice of 
communist construction". The decree made some concessions 
to the derevenshchiki by inviting writers to encourage 
"love for the land, nature and agricultural labour". But 
"some journals" were scolded for portraying "events in the 
history of the fatherland lotechestval, the socialist 
revolution and collectivization" in a distorted way, and 
for failing to evaluate social phenomena "from clear class 
positions". 501 This was an attack on Nash soyremennik and 
other journals for idealizing the tsarist past and 
expressing doubts about the new order in peasant life. In 
December 1982, the pro-nationalist Tiazhelnikov was demoted 
and replaced as head of the Propaganda Department by Boris 
Stukalin. 502 This was immediately after a strongly 
nationalist article by Proskurin on the uniqueness of 
Russia appeared in Pravda. 503 
Andropov's increasing influence coincided with the 
assertion, albeit temporary, of a more traditional Leninist 
line in discussing the future of the nationalities. In 
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its first issue for 1982, Istoriia-SSSR had carried an 
article entitled "The Role of the Russian Socialist Nation 
in the Development and Strengthening of the 
Internationalist Unity of the Soviet People". This was a 
paean of praise to the Russian people, "and first of all 
the Russian working class", for their aid to the other 
Soviet peoples. In keeping with Brezhnev's line, the 
article made no reference to the future sliianie, which 
would mean Russification as well as Sovietization for the 
non-Russian nations, and also the disappearance of the 
Russian nation into a denationalized melting pot. 504 But 
already in the same month in which Andropov rejoined the 
Secretariat, the May issue of Problemv--mira--i-sotsializma 
included an article by D. A. Kunaev, Politburo member and 
Kazakhstan First Secretary, citing Lenin on sliianie. 505 
At a conference in Riga in June 1982, R. I. Kosolapov, 
chief editor of Kommunist and a Central Committee member, 
launched a strong attack on those who wished to abandon the 
concept of sliianie, and who had even made it difficult for 
others to discuss it. Citing Lenin's view that sliianie 
was an aim of socialism, Kosolapov said that some people 
nevertheless linked it with great-power chauvinism. He 
specifically attacked Kulichenko for soft-pedalling the 
concept in order not to upset people. But Kosolapov's view 
of sliianie did not include the elimination of all ethnic 
distinctions. His view was similar to that of Mordinov in 
1971 (see above, p. 397); he cited the same passage from 
Sholokhov as Mordinov had, also claiming that it portrayed 
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a false conception of sliianie. Kosolapov ridiculed the 
idea that people in all continents would have the same 
skin, eyes, hair or even language. He went on: 
Racial-national-ethnic disinctions between large groups 
of the population ... will be subject to essential 
changes, but are in principle indestructible. Only 
under this condition can one realistically think of the 
future sliianie of nations. 50(5 
Kosolapov claimed that economic development was bringing 
the nations and classes of the USSR together, a theme 
repeated by other speakers such as Arutiunian, who 
emphasized the growth of the production intelligentsia 
among the non-Russians. Referring to the "vanguard role of 
the Russian workers", Kosolapov spoke of the dangers to 
social and national relations if substantial numbers of 
industrial workers were not recruited from all the major 
Soviet nationalities. He pointed to the ideological 
benefits that would result from the proposed redeployment 
of surplus labour from Central Asia and the Caucasus to the 
labour-deficit areas of the RSFSR. 507 
Kosolapov appears in Riga to have been alone in his 
attitude to sliianie; certainly B. N. Ponomaryov, candidate 
Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary, avoided 
the term. 508 Nevertheless, a leading article in 
Kosolapov's journal in August, discussing national 
relations, referred to the "future sliianie of nations", 
while asserting that nobody wished to accelerate it 
artificially. 509 The speech by Andropov, by then General 
Secretary, on the sixtieth anniversary of the USSR in 
December 1982, seemed at first to mark the full 
rehabilitation of the concept of sliianie. 
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Andropov said: 
Our final goal is clear. It is, to use V. I. Lenin's 
words, 'not only the sblizhenie of nations, but also 
their sliianie'. The Party well understands that the 
path to this goal is long. Here it is impossible in 
any event either to run ahead or to allow any holding 
back of processes that have already matured. 
Nationality problems would survive "while nations exist, 
while there are national distinctions. And they will exist 
for a long time, much longer than class distinctions. "510 
Andropov's implication was that national differences would 
ultimately disappear; it would seem, then, perhaps 
paradoxically, that Andropov did not subscribe to 
Kosolapov's understanding of sliianie, but was closer to 
Kulichenko's. 
Progress had led to growing national consciousness, 
said Andropov, but this should not lead to national 
arrogance, conceit or disrespect for other nationalities. 
The continued existence of these was due not only to 
throwbacks from capitalism but also to mistakes of the 
present. All the nationalities in a republic should 
receive their due representation in Party and State bodies. 
While praising the Russian people (in a low key), Andropov 
called for tact and attention to be paid to questions of 
language, historical monuments, historiography and the 
allocation of cadres, in order to promote 
internationalism. 511 Addressing the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet in January 1983, Andropov urged that more 
attention be given to the specific needs of all the 
nationalities, "especially the small peoples". 512 
530 
Thus Andropov combined sliianie with expressions of 
concern for national rights. K. U. Chernenko, Politburo 
member and Central Committee Secretary with responsibility 
for ideology, made a passing reference to sliianie in 
December 1982.513 After this, it appears that no Politburo 
member or republican leader mentioned it. Why the word was 
introduced and then abandoned remains a mystery. Martha 
Olcott is right to see Andropov's sixtieth-anniversary 
speech as an assertion of his authority in nationality 
affairs. 514 It seems likely that both Andropov and 
Chernenko, whatever their other differences, were united in 
reasserting the importance of ideology, in reaction to the 
cynicism of the later Brezhnev years. Whether either of 
them wished to use sliianie as an ideological weapon 
against those who promoted "eternal Russia", and whether 
they backed down in the face of opposition, are matters for 
speculation at present. In June 1983 the Central Committee 
held a Plenum specifically devoted to ideology. Andropov 
and Chernenko both used sblizhenie. Chernenko spoke of the 
need to study the specific needs of the nationalities, if 
ideological work was to be effective. 515 To look ahead 
briefly, Chernenko as General Secretary appears to have 
made little impact on the national question; in his speech 
to the April 1984 Central Committee Plenum on the 
preparation of the new Party programme, he referred to the 
"gradual but undeviating ablizhenie" of nations. 51f) 
At the June 1983 Central Committee Plenum, Chernenko 
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made the major speech as ideology Secretary. The only 
political trend in literature that he attacked was Russian 
nationalism. "It is disturbing that in certain works 
deviations from historical truth are allowed - in the 
evaluation of collectivization, for example - and that 
'god-seeking' motifs and idealization of the patriarchal 
order creep into them.,, 517 Later that year A. N. Iakovlev, 
who a decade earlier had paid with his job for making 
similar criticisms, was brought back from Canada to head 
the prestigious Institute of the World Economy and 
International Relations. During his General Secretaryship, 
Chernenko made no innovations or major statements in 
relation to Russian nationalism, but emphasized ideological 
orthodoxy. In his address to the Union of Writers in 
September 1984, he insisted that literature serve the needs 
of the Party and follow "socialist realism". He called for 
more attention to the "military-patriotic theme". 518 In 
this stifling atmosphere, two leading Russian nationalists 
decided not to return to the USSR after visits abroad: Iury 
Liubimov, director of the Taganka theatre, offered his 
resignation in September 1983, and was replaced in March 
1984 by Efros; and Andrei Tarkovsky, director of the film 
Andrei-Rublev, chose to stay in the West in July 1984.519 
Throughout this period, argument raged among writers 
and critics. A 1980 book by Feliks Nesterov, S-viaz' vreme--n 
(A Bridge across the Ages) described the patriotism and the 
supposed closeness to the State of the Russian people 
through history. It emphasized the role of tsarist 
military traditions and the patriotism of former tsarist 
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oiticers in the Bolshevik victory in the Civil War, as 
opposed to the class factors. Ubshchestvo Znanie awarded 
it first prize in 1981 for the best "popuiar-scientific" 
book; and it was enthusiastically reviewed in Nash 
sovremennik by Kargalov (of whom see above, p. 447). 520 In 
a review which did not appear until January 1962, NoVyi mir 
took the opposite position: it quoted Nesterov as saying 
that the Russian State was supported "by all social strata 
of the Russian people", and accused him of ignoring the 
peasant revolts. b21 (A second edition of Nesterov's book, 
"with changes", appeared in 1984. ) 
Susiov was barely buried before Pravda carried an 
attack by Vasi17 I. Kuleshov, head of Russian Literature at 
Moscow University, on a number of critics for their 
uncritical attitude to Dostoevsk7 . 
522 The year 1981 had 
seen a spate of articles marking the 160th anniversary Of 
the authors's birth. 523 The gSjýýudarstvennik lury Seleznyov 
published two admiring studies of Dostoevsk7, in 1960 and 
j981.524 The Molodaia gyardiia critic Mikhail Lobanov, 
reviewing the earlier study in Oktiabr--', attributed the 
world significance of Dostoevsky to his position in the 
struggle of good and evil, and to the role of the Russian 
people in world history, "beginning with the October 
Revolution". Welcoming Seleznyov's work, he said that it 
showed the existence of "healthy forces" in literary 
criticism and in the wider social consciousness. 525 
Kuleshov's principai target was the &Sjýýudarstvennik 
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Kozhinov for a November 1981 article in Nash sovremennik 
dedicated to Dostoevsky's anniversary. In this important 
article, Kozhinov had claimed the existence of a "Russian 
idea", which he traced from Metropolitan Ilarion's sermon 
"On Law and Grace" in the eleventh century through Filofei, 
Pushkin, Belinsky, Chaadaev, Ivan Kireevsky, Herzen, Gogol 
and Tolstoy to Dostoevsky's "Pushkin speech". 526 (He did 
not mention Berdiaev. ) Kozhinov emphasized the uniqueness 
(svoeobrazie) of Russian thought: its ability to understand 
and absorb the thought of other nations. He claimed that 
nobody, since the "Pushkin speech", had disputed 
Dostoevsky's idea that "the Russian soul, the genius of the 
Russian people, is perhaps the most able of all peoples to 
contain within itself the idea of pan-human unity". 527 
Among Dostoevsky's predecessors, Belinsky had wondered 
whether the Russian talent for receiving the fruits of 
other cultures was not a sign of superiority but rather the 
result of Russia's own lack of culture. Chaadaev had 
progressed from this to believe in Russia's "ecumenical 
mission". 528 The striving for universalism, according to 
Kozhinov, could be achieved only through the nation and was 
opposed to "cosmopolitanism": the basic direction of 
Russian literature (with Dostoevsky representing the 
apogee) "always preserved the unity of pan-humanity 
Evsechelovechesnostil and narodnost'". 529 
Kuleshov complained that Kozhinov had presented a 
string of writers, both supporters and opponents of 
tsarism, as if they were all co-thinkers of Dostoevsky. He 
was particularly upset by Kozhinov's view of Kulikovo. 530 
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Kozhinov depicted this not as a battle of Russia against 
the Tatar-Mongol conquerors, but as "the multinational 
Russian State" against the "aggressive cosmopolitan 
armada". 531 It is also noteworthy that, with the help of 
long quotations from Lenin, Kozhinov emphasized Russia's 
role in Asia, which Dostoevsky had foreseen. 532 It seems 
likely that this is linked with Soviet involvement in 
Afghanistan. A disciple of Kozhinov, and proponent of a 
"new messianism", is the poet Iury Kuznetsov, who was 
claimed by Sergei Iurenen of Radio Liberty to be perhaps 
more popular in the USSR than Evtushenko ever was. 
Kuznetsov wrote a poem, apparently dedicated to Kozhinov, 
after the invasion of Afghanistan, depicting Russia 
"turning her back on the West". Kuznetsov has made no 
secret of his indifference to socialism. 533 
In 1981 and 1982 a number of attacks were made on 
Soloukhin. The journal Nash sovremennik, in one of a 
series of collections of short essays by Soloukhin, 
published in March 1981 the following statement by him. 
"In the twentieth century, for every healthily-thinking 
person there are no doubts that in the world, in the 
Universe, in the variety of life there is a higher rational 
source I vyýýhee razumnoe nachalol . "534 This suggestion of 
the existence of a Supreme Being led Kommunist in January 
1982 to criticize the passage and accuse him of "god- 
building". 535 In April (after Suslov's death) Nash 
sovremennik suffered changes in its editorial board, 
including the removal of the deputy editor, Seleznyov. 
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Kommunist in May carried a letter from Nash-sovremennik, 
recognizing the justice of the criticism of Soloukhin's 
article. It also carried a letter from the Party secretary 
of the Moscow Writers' Organization, reporting that 
Soloukhin had assured the Party bureau that he "was and 
remains a convinced atheist". 536 The October issue of Nash 
soyremennik reprinted the first letter but not the 
second. 537 The case of Soloukhin, together with Pravda's 
attack on Kozhinov, suggests that Suslov's death may have 
cleared the way for attempts to re-assert the "class 
approach" in literature and history. It might be more 
accurate, on the other hand, to link these attacks with the 
growing influence of Andropov, and thus only indirectly 
with Suslov's death. Nash sovremennik sought to adapt to 
the Andropov style by introducing into its pages a section 
called "Discipline, order, consciousness". 
Another storm was created over an extraordinary article 
in the journal Volga (published by the RSFSR Writers' Union 
and the Saratov writers' organization) in October 1982 by 
Lobanov. This purported to be a review of Mikhail 
Alekseev's novel, Drachuny (The Brawlers). It praised 
Alekseev for his portrait of the horrors of the famine of 
1933, which accompanied collectivization. At the same time 
Lobanov conveyed a negative attitude to the whole of 
twentieth-century Russian history, including the socialist 
construction of the i93Os and socialist realist literature. 
He exempted some derevenshchiki, whom he considered loyal 
to the Russian tradition. What stood out in the article 
were his gratuitous attacks on the writers Soloukhin, Ilia 
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Ehrenburg, Zalygin and Fyodor Abramov - with all of whom 
one would expect him to be in at least some measure of 
political agreement. Lobanov stated openly that for him 
the sources of moral and patriotic values were the people, 
in particular the peasants, and the soil. He implicitly 
defended the "patriarchal principle". The Volga editors 
printed a disclaimer of Lobanov's views, but Justified 
printing them because of his "sincerity". 538 With his 
attacks on some derevenshchiki, one might have speculated 
that the article represented an attack by the 
gosudarstvenniki on the vozrozhdentjgy, were it not for the 
fact that Lobanov was attacking the achievements of the 
State. 
The criticism of the critic began in January 1983, when 
Literaturnaia_gaýeýLa attacked him for failing to recognize 
the historical justice of collectivization. It accused him 
of following the pgc4yfLnniki. 539 Literatu, rnaia Rossiia 
followed up the attack, accusing Lobanov of a nihilistic 
attitude to Soviet achievements. 540 The Secretariat of the 
Board of the RSFSR Writers' Union had a special discussion 
of the article, at which his sarcasm towards other writers 
appears to have caused as much offence as his attitude to 
collectivization. 541 Other attacks continued into July 
1984.542 It should be added that the RSFSR Writers' Union 
and Nash_sovremennik nominated Alekseev's novel for the 
1984 Lenin Literature Prize'543 apparently in the hope that 
Chernenko would be more favourable than Andropov to the 
Russian orientation, but these hopes were unjustified. 544 
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After Andropov's rise the Press continued to express 
considerable concern about the "non-class" approach to 
Orthodox thinkers. Voprosy-filosofii accused the editor of 
Fyodorov's works of playing down the reactionary aspects of 
Fyodorov's thought, in particular his support of 
autocracy. 545 The Secretariat of the Board of the USSR 
Writers' Union put under the microscope the journal Sever, 
which had published important examples of village prose, 
and discovered errors in its analysis of Dostoevsky. 546 An 
article in Kommunist attacked a novel published by the 
Molodaia gvardiia publishing house for presenting an 
uncritical view of the ethics of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. 
It made the interesting claim that existentialist, 
structuralist and neo-Marxist fads which had had an impact 
on the West had not affected the Soviet Union, where the 
greater danger came from the ideas of the Slavophils and 
Fyodorov. 547 Literaturnaia-gazeta complained of the 
influence of Fyodorov and two other religious thinkers, 
Vladimir Solovyov and Pavel Florensky. 548 But with 
Andropov out of action, in December 1983 Nash sovremennik 
re-asserted itself with an attack on Evtushenko. 549 It was 
a review by Glazunov's admirer, Volkov, of an anti- 
Stalinist novel Iagodnye esta (Berry Country) that 
Evtushenko had published in 1981, and which included a 
hostile portrait of Glazunov. To complicate matters, the 
novel had been endorsed by Valentin Rasputin, who was a 
member of the Nash_sovremennik editorial board. Rasputin 
said: 
I would call Iagodnye-mesta an agitational novel in the 
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best sense of the word. This is agitation, uniting in 
itself literature and civic duty, for the benefit of 
all that is best in our society, all that is best in a 
person and best in the world, when the world over the 
last two or three decades has become smaller, and in 
people there have opened new heights and depths, and 
not only noble ones, of course. 550 
It appears that in early 1984 a neo-Stalinist alliance 
developed between the journals Ogonek and Molodaia 
Evardiia, directed against both the pgjgLhvenniki and other 
writers of a more liberal orientation. Under Chernenko, 
all three tendencies found a public hearing (the liberals 
less so). Novyi mir and Iunost', which were seen as pro- 
Andropov, suffered public criticism. In a system where the 
print run of a journal was determined more by the Party and 
State than by the readership, these two monthlies had been 
allowed to increase their print run during the period of 
Andropov's influence, while the nationalist Nash 
sovremennik and Druzhba narodov and the conservative 
Oktiabr' all suffered significant cutbacks. 551 According 
to Sergei Iurenen, by early 1985 a polarization of literary 
forces had appeared. On the one hand were the neo- 
Stalinists (now less 'neo' and more openly Stalinist), the 
National Bolsheviks and other proponents of a strong state 
(&osudarstvenniki). On the other were the pochKftnniki, 
vozrozhdentgiy and the liberals, united first by the desire 
for more tolerance in literature, but also by a desire for 
friendlier relations with the West and probably for some 
economic decentralization. If Iurenen were right, the 
situation would have similarities with that in the early 
1960s when both nationally-oriented and liberal- 
internationalist figures were protected by LVýi. mir 
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against the political uncertainties outside. 552 
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Conclusion 
I have tried to show that Russian messianism, the 
concept of the Russians as the chosen people, has persisted 
as a trend of thought in one form or another since the 
sixteenth century, with roots going back much earlier. It 
has usually been linked with Russian Orthodoxy. It has by 
no means always been a dominant trend, but has emerged and 
re-emerged periodically throughout Russian history, up to 
the 1980s. 
The concept of a "chosen people" penetrated into 
Christian thought from Judaism. It emerged in a number of 
Christian countries in the West. In North-West Europe it 
first took the form of radical millenarian movements. From 
the seventeenth century it accompanied the revolutions in 
Britain, the USA and France, as politicians and ideologists 
sought to spread the good news to other lands. In Russia, 
however, messianism has recurred repeatedly in intellectual 
thought and, it appears, in the popular consciousness as 
well. Berdiaev was right to highlight this tendency. 
While the concept of the chosen people was not as central 
to Russian consciousness as it was to Judaism, for some 
Russian thinkers it became the main feature of their 
philosophy. 
With the Jews, messianic tendencies were strongest at 
times of crisis: the destruction of the temple at Jerusalem 
by the Romans; the mass persecution of the Jews from Spain 
to Russia around 1666; and, in a somewhat distorted form 
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(without a Messiah), in reaction to the Nazi Holocaust, the 
establishment of the State of Israel. It was also at 
crisis points that Russian messianism sometimes came to the 
fore: the formation of the Russian State around Muscovy and 
the struggle against the Tatar yoke; the period of the 
crisis of serfdom, threatened by pressure from the serfs 
and (more questionably) from tendencies favouring 
capitalist development, a crisis which was accompanied by 
the appearance of Slavophilism; the period of the crisis of 
the autocracy, from the 1870s to 1917, and the early 
revolutionary years, which were accompanied by the 
development of narodnichestvo and of a Russian form of 
Marxism which was heavily influenced by the narodniks; 
Stalinism, with the messianic slogan "Socialism in one 
country", in reaction to the capitalist encirclement of 
Russia, and the messianism of the Great Patriotic War; and 
in the Brezhnev period, when Russia seemed to some to be 
threatened not only by the possibility of thermonuclear war 
destroying all humanity, but specifically by biological 
degeneration, drunkenness, falling life expectancy, 
corruption, the rise of non-Russian nationalism and the 
possibility of war with China. 
In the Jewish concept of the "chosen people" there was 
a tension between the nationalist messianist belief that 
the Jews were chosen to rule over the rest of humanity and 
the universalist messianist belief that the Jews were 
chosen to serve humanity, The tension has existed in 
subsequent national messianisms, including Russian. In 
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Russia, two trends of messianist thought may be identified, 
one emphasizing the State and the other emphasizing the 
people. In the sixteenth century, the theory of "Moscow, 
the Third Rome", as developed in the Orthodox Church, 
centred on the person of the Tsar and the Muscovite State. 
The popular folklore of "Holy Rus'" put the emphasis on the 
land and the people. In the hands of Prince Kurbsky, the 
Old Believers and later opponents of the Tsar, it was a 
subversive instrument, when accompanied by allegations that 
the occupant of the Muscovite or Petersburg throne had 
betrayed Russian traditions. The nationalist view of 
messianism as rule over others was linked with the State 
and chauvinism; the universalist view of messianism as 
service was linked with the Russian people and the land. 
The concepts of the "Third Rome" and of "Holy Russia" 
were not entirely mutually exclusive; both emanated from 
Orthodoxy, and on occasion the notion of "Holy Rus"' was 
used by supporters of the autocracy, especially in the last 
decades before 1917. The term "Slavophil" has been applied 
to opponents of the policy of the Petersburg autocracy, and 
to supporters of it. The early Moscow Slavophils supported 
the principle of autocracy but believed that the tsars were 
betraying the principle, particularly since the reign of 
Peter the Great. They emphasized Russia's uniqueness and 
hoped she would avoid the capitalist path of development 
followed by the West. Some saw Russia as having the role 
of saving Europe, through her Orthodoxy and the obshchina. 
The Slavophils were influenced by, but different from, the 
S4-S Of - -1 L L, "official narodnost"' who backed the J. LIeolOg4 
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Petersburg regime and rejected messianism. While the 
Slavophil Konstantin Aksakov saw the State as an "evil", 
his brother Ivan came for a time to see the Russian State 
as a possible instrument of Russian messianism. Narodnik 
messianism was nearly always opposed to the Russian State, 
except for a brief period following October 1917 when the 
Left SRs thought that the New World was dawning; on the 
other hand, Bolshevik and Stalinist messianism supported 
the State from October 1917. Under Brezhnev, two major 
tendencies of Russian messianism and Russian nationalism 
could be identified. On one side, the FLEsudarstvenniki 
favoured a strong Russian State, and saw this State as the 
main reason for the existence of the Russian people. On 
the other side, the vozrozhdentsy saw the policies of the 
Soviet State and, by implication at least, the Marxist 
ideology as responsible for the demoralization of the 
Russian people. They favoured the cultural and moral 
revival of the Russian people, explicitly or implicitly 
linked with Russian Orthodoxy. Both these tendencies had 
some access to official media but also used samizdat. 
Ianov's view that Russian nationalism inevitably leads 
to a convergence with the State is not borne out by the 
development of nineteenth-century Slavophilism. When, 
after the revolutions of 1848, Nicholas I inaugurated a 
cultural and political clampdown, the "official 
nationalist" Pogodin joined the Slavophils in opposing the 
Tsar's policy. It was when the State began to reform, in 
the early years of Alexander II, that Slavophils such as 
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Samarin and Koshelyov became involved in the State 
structure, by participating in drawing up the plans for the 
emancipation of the serfs. When Slavophilism developed 
into pan-Slavism, it was still regarded by the State as 
subversive. Even when Ivan Aksakov came out in favour of 
the State and against the nihilists, the authorities still 
suspected him and periodically censored his journals. The 
other branches from the Slavophil tree were even less 
acceptable to the regime. Vladimir Solovyov's pro-Catholic 
universalist messianism could be tolerated neither by the 
Church nor by the State, and Fyodorov's project for world 
unity under Russian leadership could be published only 
after his death. Among the narodniks, Mikhailovsky hoped 
that the autocracy would be a barrier to capitalist 
development, but he can hardly be considered a supporter of 
the regime. Most narodniks were revolutionaries. The 
policy of Russification and anti-Semitic pogroms, followed 
under the last two tsars, had little in common with 
Slavophil ideology. 
From 1917, Russian patriotism seems to have been used 
more successfully by the Bolsheviks than by their 
opponents. While Lenin was not a messianist, except in the 
pragmatic sense that he wanted the socialist revolution 
begun in Russia to spread all over the world, Russian 
messianism eff ectively entered the service of the Communist 
Party, especially after the proclamation of "Socialism in 
one country". The rehabilitation of the Russian past in 
the 1930s and the relaxation of relations with the Orthodox 
Church during the War meant that Orthodoxy could be 
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mobilized in support of the regime. Moscow was again the 
Third Rome, as far as the Church was concerned. De- 
Stalinization led to the loosening of the controls that had 
been placed on the expression of Russian nationalist ideas. 
Together with the decline in faith in official Marxism- 
Leninism, the political situation favoured the resurgence 
of official and dissident Russian nationalism which 
appeared in the Brezhnev era. 
The division between what Russian nationalist 
literature could and what could not be officially published 
under Brezhnev did not correspond to the division between 
the nationalism which focussed on the Russian State and 
that which focussed on the Russian people. In official 
publications, the gosudarstvenniki attacked the moralism of 
the officially-published derevenshchiki, while 
gosudarstvenniki and supporters of human rights 
collaborated on the samizdat journal Veche. It is tempting 
to draw parallels between the gosudarstvenniki and 
ygzrc3zhdentsy in the contemporary USSR, and the "official 
nationalists" and the Slavophils under Nicholas I. The 
methods of Peter I seem to be generally admired by the 
Sosudarstvenniki, as they were by the official 
.., --=hdentsy, nationalists, but rejected 
by the vo-r as they 
were by the Slavophils. In their attitude to more recent 
phenomena, the contemporary nationalists sometimes need to 
be more circumspect. Vozrozhdents who are being published 9-Y 
officially normally have had to declare their support of 
the October Revolution (although this has begun to change 
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under Gorbachov), whereas those in samizdat are under no 
such obligation; Soýýu! jarstvenniki both in the official 
media and in samizdat declare their loyalty to Leninism. 
Most vozrozhdentsv (and also Lobanov, who otherwise appears 
to be a gosudarstvennijl) are doubtful about the means of 
collectivization of agriculture, and probably of the end 
also. 
Not all the contemporary nationalists fit into the 
gosudarstvennik/vozrozhdenets dichotomy. Just as Pogodin 
represented the nationalist wing of official narodnost' (as 
opposed to the dynastic wing of Bulgarin and Grech), so 
Glazunov and Soloukhin with their emphasis on religious 
motifs, together with their political proximity to 
the regime (at least under Brezhnev), fall between the two 
categories. Nevertheless, the differences between the two 
wings should not be underestimated. In Russian history, as 
Herzen and Miliukov said, there was a gulf between the 
State and the people. The Russian historian Vasily 0. 
Kliuchevsky put it very well when he wrote before the 
revolution on Russia's political development: "The state 
swelled up; the people grew lean". 1 This was still more 
true of the expansion of the State under Stalin, at the 
expense of the Russian people. The socialist dissident 
Pyotr Abovin-Egides aptly summed up the Sosudarstyennik 
view in the phrase "not Russia for the people, but the 
people for Russia". 2 He then linked this with the "Third 
Rome" imperial idea. 3 Solzhenitsyn in From under the 
Rubble showed his rejection of the Egsudarstvennik 
ideology. Kheifets portrays the Eýosudarstvenniki as 
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considering the Russian people to be fools, who are easily 
manipulated by evil foreigners, like figures on a 
chessboard. He considers the gosudarstvennik position to 
be "deeply canti-Russian". 
4 
Was Russian messianism ever a predominant influence on 
the formation and execution of State policy? Most tsars do 
not seem to have regarded the conversion of their "alien" 
(non-Russian) subjects to Orthodoxy and the Russian 
language as a high priority. The main exception was in the 
case of the Ukrainians, who being mainly Orthodox and 
culturally and linguistically close to the Russians were 
considered to be simply Russians, and forbidden to use 
their language in the Press, Church, school or drama. The 
emphasis on the benefits of the Russian language and 
"fusion" favoured by revolutionaries such as Pestel and 
Lenin resulted not primarily from any Russian messianism, 
but from a Jacobin desire for centralism. Similarly, the 
administrative centralism pursued by Catherine Il reflected 
a quest for efficiency rather than ideology. Russification 
only became of general importance under Alexander III and 
Nicholas II. Prior to this, the Russian government was 
usually happy to rule in alliance with Muslim mullahs and 
Lutheran German nobles. It was perhaps only in a country 
where not only was the monarchy of predominantly foreign 
extraction (not an unusual phenomenon), but where the 
rulers often preferred to speak in a foreign language 
(French or English) that the concept of narodnost' would 
have to be proclaimed so insistently. The dismissal of 
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Uvarov by Nicholas I symbolized the unwillingness of the 
regime to make concessions to the people whose spirit it 
had claimed to reflect. 
The Jews were the only group under tsarism who suffered 
persecution solely by virtue of their religion - first by 
being physically excluded from Russia, then by attempts at 
forced conversion and finally by pogroms. Whether or not 
Russians believed themselves to be the chosen people, they 
had no doubt that the Jews had no right to consider 
themselves such. Russians of profoundly different beliefs 
such as Pobedonostsev, Ivan Aksakov and Narodnaia-volia all 
came out against the Jews. Both late tsarist and Soviet 
politicians (from the 1930s) also saw the advantages of 
using the Jews as a scapegoat for the failings of their own 
political systems. The concept of the Russian people as the 
leading people of the USSR, proclaimed by Stalin, reversed 
Lenin's nationality policy and sought support for the 
system primarily from the Russian people. In the Brezhnev 
period, the central position of the Russians became an 
integral part of the official ideology, with lavish praise 
being given to the Russian people, the Russian language 
promoted as never before, and the top Party and State 
bodies being predominantly and increasingly staffed with 
Russians. 
In foreign affairs, the tsars normally put the 
interests of the State and the dynasty over those Of the 
nation. The "Holy Alliance" was not a body to promote 
Orthodoxy but was to protect the interests of the empires, 
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and in particular the Emperors, of Europe. The emphasis on 
dynastic legitimism did not exclude the possibility of 
posing as the defender of the rights of Orthodox subjects 
outside Russia in attempts to put pressure on neighbouring 
empires. The only occasion when the desire to help fellow 
Orthodox Slavs became a dominant factor in Russian foreign 
policy was in 1877-1878, when the pressure of public 
opinion spilt over into the tsarist bureaucracy. After 
1917, Russian messianism was expressed in the view that it 
was essential to spread the revolution around the world, 
and also in the opposing view that it was necessary to 
consolidate the revolution in one country. Soviet leaders 
since Stalin have naturally sought to expand the world 
influence of the USSR, whilst avoiding a military conflict 
with the capitalist countries and China. It is not easy to 
determine whether this expansionist urge is primarily 
defensive in origin, or whether it arises from an 
aggressive desire to assert the power and authority of the 
USSR. It might be the case that the Soviet leaders, having 
perceived the weakness of the USA after Vietnam and of 
China after the Cultural Revolution, pragmatically took 
opportunities to expand their influence in the way that the 
leaders of any great power in the past might have done, 
without any particular ideological motivation, "Russian" or 
"communist". What I tried to show in my discussion of the 
Brezhnev period, however, was the ideological disunity of 
the elite, with some politicians promoting "Leninist" 
positions and others protecting "Russian" views. 
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Different ideological positions are illustrated in 
relation to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. 
Brezhnev justified the Soviet action to the XXVI Congress 
firstly in terms of the world-historical movement towards 
communism and the reaction of the bourgeoisie. 
"Imperialism launched a real undeclared war against the 
Afghan revolution. " But he then added a defensive 
justification, from the point of view of the interests of 
the Soviet State. "This also created a direct threat to 
the security of our southern border., '5 Among the 
gosudarstvenniki, however, the invasion has been seen in 
quite a different light. A leading representative is the 
writer Aleksandr Prokhanov, who published two full-page 
articles in Literaturnaia-gazeta in 1985.6 He referred 
not to the spread of socialism, but to the "eternal great- 
power cause" (vekovechnoe derzhavnoe delo). 7 In other 
words, the Soviet troops in Afghanistan were advancing the 
age-old interests of the Russian State. The war was seen 
in positive terms: for the first time since 1945, Soviet 
soldiers were being given combat experience. According to 
the samizdat writer Sergei Khovansky, Prokhanov is close to 
"former leaders of the country and -influential people 
within the military". Khovansky describes the position of 
this group as "war is better than peace". 8 The continuing 
strength of nationalist ideas within the military was borne 
out by an article in the MPA journal Kommunist 
vooruzhennykh sil in 1985, which listed the successes of 
the Russian armed forces over eight centuries. 9 Prokhanov 
in his second article specifically attacked the 
-h eternal and absolute derevenshchiki for their concern wit 
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morality. Further, Afghanistan had brought out "individual 
self-sacrifice and renunciation of personal welfare in 
favour of the State". For Prokhanov, the time of detente 
had passed. In its place had come the "idea of calamity, 
of a storm, of impending catastrophe; it prompts us to 
reread the Apocalypse. "10 
There is a danger when considering the ideas of the 
gosudarstvenniki (as when considering Slavophilism) to 
attribute to them all certain ideas which may be held only 
by one or a few. The following general tentative picture 
is offered (with much uncertainty) based on a combination 
of the views of the poet lury Kuznetsov, the critic 
Kozhinov, the writer Prokhanov and other gosudarstvenniki. 
The multinational Russian State (tsarist and Soviet) has 
been engaged in a centuries-old struggle for the "Russian 
idea", against enemies such as cosmopolitanism, Zionism and 
freemasonry. At the end of his life, Dostoevsky had 
predicted a shift of Russian attention from Europe to Asia. 
Russia by the end of 1978, while seeming unable to make 
gains in Europe, faced the combined hostility of Japan, 
China and the USA. (In August 1978 China and Japan, with 
American encouragement, signed a treaty directed against 
the USSR; in December the USA and China announced their 
readiness to normalize relations. )ll Russia, in the words 
of Kuznetsov's verse, "turning her back on the West" (see 
above, p. 535) proceeded to strengthen her position in the 
East. The invasion of Afghanistan then appears as the 
natural extension of the efforts of General Skobelev to 
590 
subdue the Central Asians. 
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Russian messianism under Gorbachov (1985-1989) 
The major contribution of Gorbachov to the development 
of Russian messianism. has been his inauguration of the 
policy of glasnost'. Normally translated as "openness", 
its practical application has been the gradual elimination 
of a series of taboos affecting literary and public 
activity. Emerging in 1985, with criticisms of the latter 
Brezhnev period as the "stagnation period", glasnoýt' 
gathered strength following the January 1987 Central 
Committee Plenum and, despite setbacks, was in full swing 
in 1989. The partial democratization of the political 
system, exemplified by the XIX Party Conference (June 
1988), the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies 
(GPD) and the first meeting of the CPD itself (May-June 
1989), led to a transformation of the political and 
cultural atmosphere throughout the Soviet Union. There was 
an explosion in the quantity of interesting political, 
historical and cultural articles in the official periodical 
Press. Unofficial "informal groups" with their own 
programmes and publications mushroomed from the Baltic to 
the Pacific. Ideas formerly confined to samizdat erupted 
into the official journals and on to the agenda of the 
Politburo. To analyze the flow of new material on Russian 
messianism would require a book. In view of my intention 
to concentrate in this work on developments up to 1982,1 
can give only a very abbreviated account of the trends 
under Gorbachov. It is necessary to emphasize the dangers 
of trying to analyze processes which are still continuing 
and whose outcome is uncertain. With hindsight, it may 
become clear that I have missed important developments or 
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given excessive attention to ephemera. 12 
Some early moves of the new leadership suggested an 
inclination towards meeting some of the grievances of the 
Russian nationalists, especially the vozrozhdentsy. In his 
stern measures against alcohol, Gorbachov took up one of 
their particular concerns. 13 The driving force of the 
campaign may well have been the Politburo member and (at 
that time) ideology Secretary, E. K. Ligachov, who has shown 
sympathy for conservative Russian nationalists. Alcohol 
has been portrayed as a non-Russian vice introduced by 
foreigners. 14 Valentin Rasputin's short story "Pozhar" 
(The Fire), published in Nash sovremennik in July 1985, was 
a well-timed portrayal of the consequences of drunkenness 
in the villages. 15 The campaign was unpopular with much of 
society, and was partly circumvented by an expansion of 
illegal home brewing. 
Kommunist in July 1985 included a "patriotic" 
discussion of the Slov(D q polkll Igoreve. In this, 
Academician Likhachov emphasized that the three Eastern 
Slav peoples, Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians, had a 
"common mother" in ancient Rus' . 
1ý) In 198b Likhachov was 
named head of the newly-formed Cultural Foundation of the 
USSR. This prestigious body, intended to preserve the 
cultural heritage of the peoples of the Soviet Union, 
included among the members of its board Metropolitan 
Pitirim of Volokolamsk and Iuriev, the head of the 
publishing department of the Moscow Patriarchate, and Raisa 
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Gorbachova, the wife of the Generai Secretary. 
A considerable victory for the Russian nationalists, 
and especially the vozrozhLdentsy, was the decision not to 
proceed, at least for the time being, with the plan to 
reverse part of the flow of the Ob and Irtysh rivers in 
Siberia. This scheme would have brought much-needed 
irrigation water to Central Asia. Opposition to this 
project has been a major issue among ! ý: ereyenshchiki such as 
Rasputin and Sergei Zalygin, the journal Sever and 
Academicians Likhachov and Rybakov. 17 Supporters have 
claimed that the project is essential for the burgeoning, 
traditionally Islamic, Central Asian population. On the 
other hand, Russian ecologists worry about the effects of 
the diversion of water on the temperature in the Arctic 
Ocean and thence the climate in the northern hemisphere. 
Rasputin has expressed the fear that the withdrawal of 
water would adversely affect soil fertility in Russia and 
destroy the Russian North. 18 In January 1986 Kommunist 
published an article, co-authored by Likhachov, on the need 
to preserve the North as a monument of Russian culture. 
19 
The project allowed the vozrozhdentsY- to focus on their 
traditional concerns: the defence of the Russian land, the 
Russian village, historical monuments, the world 
environment, as well as the threat to smaller Soviet 
nationalities such as the Komi (allegedly threatened by the 
scheme) for whose fate they considered the Russian people 
responsible. They counterposed ethics to the unbridled 
worship of technology. If it had appeared that vital 
Russian interests were being sacrificed for the Central 
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Asians, there could have been a strong Russian nationalist 
backlash. But the guidelines for the development of the 
Soviet economy up to the year 2000, adopted at the XXVII 
Congress, made no mention of the diversion project. 
Instead there appeared the injunction "Use water resources 
more rationally". 20 Belov and Rasputin nevertheless 
complained at the USSR Writers' Union Congress in June 1986 
that work was still going ahead, and the liberal 
Voznesensky added his voice to the opponents of the scheme, 
forming an alliance with the vozrozhdentsy. 
21 It was 
confirmed after a Politburo meeting in August 1986, 
however, that the project had been abandoned. 22 
Nevertheless, a year later the Uzbek Press again began to 
argue for the project, apparently with the backing of the 
USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources. The 
topic has remained live. 23 Under the impact of the 
Chernobyl disaster of April 1986, public opinion throughout 
the USSR has become more sensitive to environmental issues, 
and less willing to allow interference with nature. 
The appointment of A. N. Iakovlev as head of the 
Propaganda Department, and then, at the XXVII Congress, to 
the Central Committee Secretariat, apppeared at first to be 
bad news for the nationalists, in view of his earlier 
opposition to them. By the time lakovlev had been promoted 
to be a full Politburo member in 1987, it had become clear 
that he was a leading ally of Gorbachov in the battle for 
glasnost'. Whatever was Iakovlev's personal position on 
nationalism, his stance on glasnost' allowed both 
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"Westernizers" and nationally-minded people to put forward 
their ideas. The new edition of the Party Programme, 
adopted at the XXVII Congress, avoids any nationalist 
references to the "great Russian people". 
24 In his report 
to the Congress, Gorbachov spoke against attempts being 
undertaken "in certain works of literature and art and 
scholarly works ... to present in idyllic tones 
reactionary-nationalist and religious survivals, 
contradicting our ideology, the socialist way of life and 
the scientific world-view (Applause). "25 This was clearly 
aimed at both Russian and non-Russian nationalism. On the 
other hand, the appointment in August 1986 of Zalygin to be 
editor of NgyyL Lnir in succession to the liberal former 
political prisoner Vladimir Karpov, who had been appointed 
First Secretary of the USSR Writers' Union, represented a 
victory for the vozrozhdentsy. 26 
As gjasnost' developed, unofficial political activity 
be-an to revive, after the repressive climate of the first 
half of the decade. The Russian nationalist group which 
attracted the most attention in the late 1980s, in both the 
Western and the Soviet media, was Pamiat' (Memory). This was 
founded in Moscow in 1980 (originally by staff of the Ministry 
of the Aviation Industry) with the aim of campaigning to 
preserve historical monuments. The group attracted support, 
but leii into the hands of people whose chief concern was not 
conservation but the "internationai conspiracy" by Zionists 
and Masons which, they claimed, was threatening Russia. The 
key organizer and ideologist was Dmitry D. Vasilev, a 
photographer, while the head of the Council was Kim 
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Andreev, who was a CPSU member. Others involved included 
veterans of the official anti-Zionist campaign of the 
Brezhnev period, such as V. Ia. Begun and V. N. Emelianov 
(see above, p. 413). From late 1985, the group had regular 
public meetings in Moscow, Leningrad (on a weekly basis in 
1988) and Novosibirsk. In a hysterical atmosphere, the 
leaders read the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" and 
denounced not only the "Masons" and "Satanists", but also 
more liberal Russian nationalists such as Likhachov and 
Glazunov. The documents of Pamiat' also talk hysterically 
about plots, all the while (like everyone else) claiming to 
support Gorbachov and perestroika. 
27 An appeal of 8 
December 1987, headed "Patriots of the world, unite! ", 
declared: 
In our country these days the activity of enemies is 
becoming more obvious. They are entrenching themselves 
in all the sections of the PARTY, the leading force of 
the USSR. Dark elements in it, speculating with Party 
slogans and Party phraseology, are in practice carrying 
out a struggle with the indigenous population of the 
g-ountry. and annihil4tipF, the nation4l face of the 
Deg_121es. They are reanimating Trotskyism, in order to 
discredit socialism, in order to sow chaos in the 
State, in order to open the sluices to Western capital 
and Western ideology. 26 
In particular it attacked Iakovlev, accusing him of 
Russophobia and of persecuting Pamiat'. Seeking the 
support of Orthodox Christians, it demanded "full freedom 
of conscience for believers"; promoting a peace-loving 
image, it called for an end to "the criminal war in 
Af ghanistan". 29 
The Moscow section of VOOPIK fell under the control of 
Famiat' in April 1987. The following month, Pamiat' 
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organized a series of demonstrations in Moscow and was 
allowed a meeting with B. N. Eltsin, at that time a 
candidate member of the Politburo and First Secretary of 
the Moscow Eorkom of the Party. From that time, the main 
Soviet newspapers and Central Television have regularly 
denounced Pamiat', comparing its leaders to the Black 
Hundreds and the Nazis. Readers' letters and journalists 
asked why the law was not being invoked against them for 
stirring up racial hatred. 30 One article mentioned that 
Emelianov had murdered his wife. 31 The Komsomol journal 
Sobesednik in June 1989 opened its pages to allow a Pamiat' 
representative to denounce Zionism, the Masons and the 
"enemy within the State". He denied that Pamiat' was anti- 
Semitic, or that they believed that the Russians were the 
chosen people. He did, however, quote a statement by 
Gorbachov to the effect that Soviet Jews - officially O. b9% 
of the population - represented ten to twenty per cent of 
people in culture and administration. He denounced this 
overrepresentation and went on to refer to the activities 
of several Old Bolsheviks of Jewish origin as "criminal". 
32 
How did the Russian nationalist dissidents who had been 
imprisoned under Brezhnev and Andropov fare under 
Gorbachov? In 1986 Oleg Volkov (see above, pp. 431,437, 
538) circulated a samizdat document, "Zametki o glasnostill 
(Notes on glasnost'), In this he asked the new leadership 
to demonstrate the break from past practices by releasing 
the dissidents, and he mentioned in particular Borodin. 
33 
From the beginning of 1987, the authorities gradually 
released virtually all the dissidents (of all shades of 
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opinion) who had earlier been imprisoned for political 
reasons. Poresh had been released early, in February 1986; 
Ogorodnikov was freed in February 1987, Iakunin in March 
and Borodin in June. 34 Many former prisoners resumed their 
political and cultural activity. Ogorodnikov, for example, 
published the Biulleten' khristianskoi obshchestvennosti 
(Christian Community Bulletin) from July 1987.35 Meanwhile 
Ogurtsov, the former leader of VSKhSON, emigrated in 
November 1987.36 Dudko issued a statement regretting his 
recantation of 1980.37 
Osipov had completed his sentence in 1983 but had been 
prevented from resuming his public activity. In August 
1987 he was able to circulate a samizdat article on 
perestroika. He attacked what he considered the 
monopolization of the Press by what he called the 
"Evtushenko" tendency. He defended Pamiat', saying that 
the group had never attacked the Jewish nation. 
38 Towards 
the end of 1987 he brought out the third issue of his 
samizdat journal, Zemlia. 39 On 17 December 1988 he was 
chosen leader of the Council of the "Christian Patriotic 
Union" (Khristianskii patrioticheskii soiuz) at its 
founding congress. This group seems to have grown out of 
the "Initiative Group for the Spiritual and Biological 
Salvation of the People", created in July 1988; Zemlia 
served as the journal of the latter, and then of the 
Christian Patriotic Union. The Union also published a 
monthly information bulletin, Russkii vestnik (Russian 
Herald). 40 
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At least six issues of a Russian Orthodox patriotic 
Journal, Vybor (The Choice), edited by Viktor Aksiuchits 
and Gleb Anishchenko, have appeared since 1987. Aksiuchits 
himself contributed to the third issue his article 
"Russkaia ideia" (The Russian Idea), which includes an 
analysis of Russian messianism. 
The uniqueness of Russian patriotism is in the 
realization by the people of the unity of its land, the 
unity of the nation even in spite of the shattering of 
the State. It was not the State which united the 
people, but the religious-messianic idea. 
41 
Aksiuchits sees the way out of the clash between the two 
chosen peoples, the Jews and the Russians, in the "return" 
of both peoples to Christ. 42 It seems safe to classify him 
as a vozrozhdenets. 
Other Russian nationalist dissidents succeeded in 
getting heard in the official media. In May 1988 
Literaturnaia Rossiia published a story by Borodin about 
Lake Baikal. 43 The journal Iskusstvo kino (Cinema Art) 
conducted in June 1988 a questionnaire which brought into 
the official Press the samizdat debates of the early 1970s, 
with some of the same participants. The first question 
began: "What, in your view, are the sources of the Russian 
messianic idea'?,, 44 Shafarevich, who has appeared quite 
frequently in the media, denied that the Russians had ever 
had the consciousness of being the chosen people in the 
sense that the Jews had. He described Berdiaev's ideas as 
"dilettante". 45 (Palievsky [see above, p. 4401 in the same 
debate flatly denied the existence of Russian 
messianism. 46) On the other hand, Pomerants (a target of 
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the From Under the Rubble symposium) provided a 
sociological explanation of the phenomenon of Russian 
messianism. He added that the writings of Astafev and 
Belov (see below, p. 604(ý) revealed a "fantastic ideology" 
and were "symptoms of illness". 
47 
In June 1989 Nash sovremennik published a shortened 
version of a long article by Shafarevich, entitled 
"Rusofobiia" (Russophobia). This accused liberal samizdat 
and emigre writers, including Amalrik, Pomerants, Levitin- 
Krasnov and (in particular) Ianov, of "Russophobia" for 
their concern about the danger of Russian messianism. He 
praised the Vekhi authors and made no concessions to 
Marxism. 48 The ideas of Solzhenitsyn began to be discussed; 
in February 1989 the journal of the Soviet Peace Committee, 
Vek XX i mir (Twentieth Century and Peace) published his 
"Do Not Live by the Lie! "49; and in July 1989 Rový[i mir 
announced that it would be publishing Solzhenitsyn's works, 
starting, in accordance with the author's wishes, with The 
GuLýýZ-Arch"elg, F, o. 50 
Gorbachov has had both allies and opponents among the 
Russian nationalists. Broadly speaking, the 
gosudarstvenniki have been hostile and the vozrozhdentsv 
sympathetic. Novyi mir under Zalygin became the flagship 
of the pro-ReLestroika liberal nationalists; other leading 
representatives on this side include Likhachov and the head 
of the Filmworkers' Union, Elem Klimov. The key organizer 
among the anti-perestroika conservative Russian 
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nationalists appears to be the writer Iury Bondarev, a 
member of the Bureau of the USSR Writers' Union, deputy 
head of the RSFSR Writers' Union and a member of the Nash 
sovremennik editorial board. The group also includes 
Proskurin, now head of the RSFSR Cultural Foundation, and 
Mikhail Alekseev and Anatoly Ivanov, still editors-in-chief 
of Moskva and Molodaia g-vardiia respectively. John Dunlop 
has identified a "centrist" group of nationalists between 
the two poles, including Astafev, Belov, Rasputin, 
Soloukhin, Kozhinov and Glazunov. 51 At least some of 
Dunlop's centrists, however, have conservative tendencies. 
In January 1989 Astafev, Belov and Rasputin joined 
Proskurin and Alekseev, together with the editor of Nash 
sovremnnik, Vikulov, and the conservative film-maker, 
Sergei Bondarchuk, in a joint letter to PLavda attacking 
QZ, onek. Bondarev himself did not sign the letter: one of 
QZonek's alleged sins had been to publish an attack on 
him. 52 Since Vitaly Korotich, a Jew, became editor-in- 
chief of OZonek in 198b it has become a pacemaker for 
perestroika, and as such has been regularly attacked by the 
conservative nationalists, especially in Ncgýsh sovremennik. 
Kozhinov's article in that journal in January 1989, for 
example, was directed primarily against Korotich. 
53 
In this wide-ranging, programmatic article, Kozhinov 
claimed that Nash soyremennik had inherited at least part 
of the mantle of Tvardovsky's Novvi mir, in terms of the 
writers who had migrated from one to the other. Kozhinov 
was trying to argue that the letter of the eleven to QZonýh 
in 1969 about Xgyyi mir (see above, p. 423) was not in fact 
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directed against Tvardovsky -a rather difficult task. It 
was noteworthy that three of the signatories to the 1989 
letter about Ogonek - Alekseev, Vikulov and Proskurin - 
were among the signatories of the 1969 letter about Noyyi 
mir. Kozhinov's article reflected the same concern as the 
1969 letter: the threat to Russian traditions from the 
bourgeois West. He asserted that Lenin was unlike the 
other Bolshevik leaders in seeing the need to preserve pre- 
revolutionary Russian culture. Bukharin, who was now 
idealized by the contemporary Westernizers, had been as bad 
as Stalin and Trotsky in his desire to root out the old 
traditions. Kozhinov was concerned primarily with culture; 
but his view also related to economics. The perestroika 
radicals, such as Nikolai Shmelyov, Gavriil Popov and 
Leonid Abalkin argued in varying degrees for the 
introduction of market forces into the Soviet economy. 
Kozhinov argued that the solution to Russia's problems 
could be found not by imitating Western models but by 
looking back into her collectivist traditions. 54 The 
argument had been made at length by Mikhail Antonov, the 
ex-Fetisovite and author of the Veche article which sought 
to combine Leninism and Slavophilism. In a July 1986 Nash 
soyremennik article, he argued against "cosmopolitan" 
attempts to import the methods of unemployment and 
"hedonism" (consumerism) from the West. Citing Ilarion, 
Likhachov and the derevenshchiki - as well as Marx - he 
called for a moral and patriotic approach to applying the 
"human factor" to improve the economy. 55 Unlike Kozhinov 
and Antonov, Soloukhin in the era of Slasnost' saw no need 
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to pay lip service to Lenin. He declared that he had 
refused to sign an appeal of the Memorial Society (led by 
pro-perestroika radicals) concerning the victims of 
Stalinist repression, because it ignored the atrocities of 
the Civil War. 5(-) 
Speculation has inevitably arisen about the links between 
three distinct groups: the conservatives in the political 
leadership; the conservative Russian nationalists in 
literature; and Pamiat'. Belov's popular novel Vse viDeredi 
(Everything is Ahead) published in Nash soyremennik in 1986 
depicted contemporary Russia as the victim of a Zionist- 
Masonic conspiracy. 57 The same theme was in the background 
to his latest novel on collectivization, published in Novyi 
mir in March j939.58 Following this, he was challenged by 
Igor Vinogradov in the radical pro-12erestroika newspaper 
Moscow News to say whether he really believed in this 
conspiracy. 59 Valentin Rasputin has been one of the few 
public figures to defend Famiat'; without supporting their 
whole philosophy, he noted their (supposed) concern for 
history and culture and asked that they be given the right 
to speak in the Press. 60 Kozhinov, like Pamiat', Shimanov 
and, for that matter, Dostoevsky, denies charges of anti- 
Semitism; but, like them, he proceeds to complain about the 
privileged position of the Jews. In his January 1989 Nash 
soyremennik articie, he cited Gorbachov's statement about 
Jewish participation in Soviet life (see p. 599) and 
complained about the "sharp violation of proportionality in 
relation to other nations". 61 Apart from a similarity of 
views between Pamiat' and some literary nationalists, there 
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is other evidence of joint activity. Evtushenko has 
described a meeting held in Moscow on 23 January 1989, 
organized by the journals Moskva, Molodaia gvardiia and 
Roman:: ýSazeta, where the speakers incited anti-Semitism and 
Pamiat' banners decorated the hall. b2 
As far as the political leadership is concerned, nobody 
has defended Pamiat'; the Politburo member E. K. Ligachov, 
widely seen as Gorbachov's leading conservative critic, 
has, however, been associated with the more conservative 
Russian nationalist writers. He is also widely believed to 
have been behind the Stalinist and anti-Semitic article 
published in Sovetskaia Rossiia on 13 March 1988 over the 
name of Nina Andreeva. (53 
Leaving speculation aside, So1zhenitsyn's fears that 
the process of democratization in the Soviet Union would 
lead to the growth of tension between nationalities (see 
above, p. 499) were shown to be justified in the period of 
glasnost'. Nationalist anger appeared in Kazakhstan in 
December 198b, following the sacking for corruption of 
Kunaev as First Secretary and his replacement by a Russian. 
Through 1987, from the Ukraine to Uzbekistan demands grew 
for the greater use of the native language, while 
demonstrators in the Baltic republics began to demand 
secession from the Soviet Union. In 1988 tension between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan over the future of Nagorny Karabakh 
escalated to the point of an undeclared war. Popular 
Fronts appeared in the Baltic republics with mass support. 
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Their demands included controls on immigration and the 
granting to the native language in each republic the status 
of being the sole official language. The year 1989 saw 
clashes over nationality issues resulting in numbers of 
deaths in Georgia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The Popular 
Fronts in the Baltic won the majority of seats to the CPD 
and proceeded to escalate their demands. The growth of 
nationality unrest threatened Gorbachov's whole programme 
of perestroika. It allowed conservative elements in the 
leadership, such as Ligachov, to argue that Zlasnost' had 
gone too far. 
The growth of non-Russian nationalism gave impetus to 
Russian national awareness. In late 1988 conservative 
Russian nationalists began a campaign to promote the pride 
of the Russians in their history and their State, The 
"Association of Russian Artists Irusskikh khudozhnikov]", 
formed in November 1988, included Rasputin, Belov, Astafev, 
Bondarev, Loshchits, Lobanov, Kozhinov, Ivanov and 
Vikulov. The Association's declaration expressed alarm at 
the threat posed by non-Russian nationalism. The danger 
(it said) was aggravated by the degeneration of the Russian 
people, for which it blamed official policy. It continued: 
The command methods used by the leadership in the 
sphere of nationality relations [have] led to a 
situation in which it has become common to identify the 
will of the administrative bureaucratic apparatus with 
the views of the Russian people, whereas it is 
precisely Russia that is in the most critical position, 
close to collapse. And the collapse of Russia will 
inevitably lead to the loss of the unity of the 
political and state system of the whole country. 
(54 
In this version of Russian messianism, Russia has suffered 
the most, and only she can now save the S-oviet Union from 
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catastrophe by a national moral regeneration. 
Three more organizations were established in March 
1989. In Moscow, the "Otechestvc: )" (Fatherland) Society was 
set up, with the involvement of Moskva, Nash sovremennik 
and Molodaia gvardiia. b5 A Federation for Slavonic Writing 
and Slavonic Cultures was established, based on official 
cultural bodies and involving Ukrainians and Belorussians 
as well as Russians. 66 The "Union for the Spiritual 
Revival of the Fatherland" was formed with the 
participation of Russian nationalist groups from different 
parts of the Soviet Union. Molodaia_Fyardiia was among the 
sponsoring organizations; Metropolitan Pitirim was elected 
to the Council, indicating the tacit approval of the Moscow 
Patriarchate; and Mikhail Antonov was chosen to chair the 
group. 67 It seemed that, in public view, there was arising 
a network of intellectuals who, while claiming to support 
perestroika, were really driven by other ideals. 
Valentin Rasputin articulated these ideals and feelings 
in his address to the CPD in May-June 1989. The speech 
showed several similarities with Solzhenitsyn's Letter to 
the Soviet Leaders. It expressed concern for morality and 
for the environment. The main difference was that it was 
delivered after the emergence into the open of nationality 
tensions. 
Russophobia has spread in the Baltic and in Georgia, 
and it is penetrating into the other republics, to some 
less, to others more, but it is notable almost 
everywhere. Anti-Soviet slogans are joined with anti- 
Russian ones, and emissaries from Lithuania and Estonia 
travel with them, creating a united front, to Georgia, 
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and from there local agitators are sent to Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. 
In injured tones, he went on to suggest to the non- 
Russian nationalists: 
perhaps Russia should leave the [Soviet] Union, if with 
all her misfortunes you accuse her, and if her weak 
development and clumsiness burden your progressive 
strivings? 
Rasputin added that this would allow Russia to preserve her 
own resources, regain national awareness, have her own 
Academy of Sciences which would reflect Russian 
Irossiiskim] interests, and restore morality. b8 
In 1988 and 1989, the Popular Fronts in the Baltic 
republics and Moldavia succeeded to some extent in 
persuading their governments to introduce legislation to 
remedy national grievances, Part of the Russian-speaking 
population of the republics responded by forming 
"internationalist" movements to resist what were seen as 
attacks on their own rights. It seemed likely that anti- 
perestroika forces within the central Party and State 
apparatus or the security forces were stirring up the local 
Russians and trying to create a backlash. Strikes occurred 
in Estonia in July 1989 over proposals to restrict 
political rights for immigrants from outside Estonia. lury 
Rudiak, a leader of the (predominantly Russian) 
interdvizhenie (Internationalist Movement) in Estonia was 
reported by M2sc2ýý-News as saying: 
We are extremely worried about the growth of 
nationalist and separatist forces supported by the 
leadership of the Republic, By setting the peoples of 
the Soviet Union against each other and lashing out 
against the Russian people[, ] who are accused of all 
the sins of Stalinism and the stagnation era, they are 
altering the direction of perestrolka from building up 
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real socialism to restoring the bourgeois system 
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Within Russia herself, pressures for power to be 
devolved from the USSR to the RSFSR began to penetrate 
political circles. On 27 July 1969 the Prime Minister of 
the Russian Federation, candidate Politburo member 
A. V. Vlasov told the Russian Supreme Soviet of plans 
to increase the sovereignty of the republic by creating new 
bodies which existed at the All-Union level but not yet at 
the republican level. He mentioned ministries, social 
institutions and a Russian Academy of Sciences, as well as 
a new television channel. 70 On 2b August 1989 the 
Leningrad oblast' Party conference took this direction to a 
logical conclusion and proposed the establishment of a 
republican Party for the RSFSR, with elective leading 
bodies. 71 
In response to the growing ethnic tension, Gorbachov's 
strategy seems to have been to show a readiness to make 
concessions, promising to respect the national cultures and 
give more independence to the republics. While repeatedly 
invoking the name of Lenin in relation to the nationality 
question, he effectively repudiated Lenin's idea of 
sliianie in January 1989. "We of course cannot permit even 
the smallest people to disappear or the language of even 
the smallest people to be lost. "72 He told the CPD in May 
1989: "The federal structure of the State should now be 
filled with real political and economic content. "73 In 
summer 1989 the nationality situation seemed so serious 
that Gorbachov was forced to make a special television 
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broadcast. He declared it his duty "to warn of the growing 
danger of the sharpening of relations between 
nationalities, "74 The theses for a special Central 
Committee Plenum on the nationality question, due to be 
held in September 1989, called for both a "strong union" 
and "strong republics". 75 At the same time it seemed clear 
that no republics would be allowed to secede. This left 
open the possibility that the Kremlin might resort to 
military intervention to preserve the integrity of the 
State. Gorbachov had presided over the withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, and permitted the democratization of Poland 
and Hungary, but was not willing to (or would not be 
allowed to) give up Soviet territory. 
In spite of the promises of national equality, 
Gorbachov has not neglected the use of Russian motifs in 
his style of government. This has been most obvious in 
questions of cadre policy. Here he has followed Brezhnev 
and Andropov in promoting a disproportionately high share 
of Russians to the top leadership. A major exception was 
Gorbachov's selection of E. A. Shevardnadze (a Georgian) as 
Foreign Minister in 198b. Zhores Medvedev reported that 
the Russian public was disappointed at Shevardnadze's move, 
believing that the job should have gone to a Russian. 
75 
The Politburo elected at the XXVII Congress included 8 
Russians out of 12 full members and b Russians out of 7 
candidate members, while the Secretariat was composed of 10 
Russians and one Belorussian. By August 1989 9 out of 12 
lull ? oiitburo members and all 6 candidate members were 
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T- the over-representation of Russians was , ussians. Thus 
strengthened. This may reflect the view that during a 
period of decentralization and tension between 
nationalities, it is important that the central posts be 
held by individuals whose loyalty is to the Soviet Union as 
a whole, and Russians are more reliable in this respect. 
At the same time, a consequence of the anti-corruption 
campaign in Central Asia is that the traditionally Islamic 
nationalities are now entirely unrepresented in the 
Politburo. 
Gorbachov has also tried to appeal to Russians by 
showing his sympathy with pre-Soviet Russian cultural 
traditions. In September 1986 Pravda quoted him as 
endorsing Dostoevsky's Pushkin speech. 
... Raisa Maksimovna and I were reading Dostoevsky. He 
wrote that, perhaps, the Russian heart - and I would 
now say that of the Soviet people - is more than 
anything open for brotherhood and unity. 
Further on he spoke of the "spirituality" of Russia. 77 In 
1988, the millennium of the Russian Orthodox Church was 
celebrated almost as it it were a Soviet holiday. In April 
1988 Gorbachov met Patriarch Pimen and assured the 
believers that democratization and alasnost' were intended 
to benefit them, as toilers and patriots. He promised a 
new law on freedom of conscience. 78 The State made 
concessions to religious bodies, allowing the opening of 
more churches and the training of more priests. 
Symbolicaily, the Patriarchate moved from Zagorsk back to 
Moscow, Gorbachov was trying to win active support for his 
policies Trom the believers, perhaps ýlike the 
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vozrozhdentsy) seeing in them reserves of morality and 
energy which were lacking in the Party and State 
apparatuses. 79 
Calls appeared in the Press for the publication of 
Russian religious thinkers. In 1989, two of the most 
influential Christian writers on Russian messianism 
appeared in the periodicals. NovYi-mir published a 
selection of Vladimir Solovyov's writings. This included a 
warning from Natsional'nvi yopros v Rossii about the 
dangers of narodnost' being converted into nationalism. 
80 
An article by Berdiaev appeared in Vgiprosy--jilosofii with R -- - 
an introduction by the contributor to From under the 
Rubble, Barabanov. 81 
How much support did the public give to the different 
nationalist tendencies, be they &ggludarstyenniki or 
vgZEgzhdgntsýL? A Soviet opinion poll taken in Moscow in 
late 1988 showed that consumerist interests and desire for 
Westernizing reform were more widespread than the total 
support for both varieties of nationalism. The 
F, osudarstvdenniki (a term used by the organizers of the 
survey) clearly had more support than those the survey 
described as "patriots", favouring a Russian spiritual 
revival. 82 In the territorial elections for the CPD, 
Bondarev and Shafarevich failed to get in, whereas such 
Westernizers as Evtushenko, Korotich and Roy Medvedev were 
successful. The elections were not always fairly run, 
however, and much presumably depended on the quality of the 
other candidates. More research needs to be done on Soviet 
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public opinion in the conditions of alasnost'. 
Future prospects 
Theoretically, Russian messianism could come to power 
in two ways: either through revolution, or through the rise 
of Russian nationalists through the Party and State 
structures to the top. The least implausible variant of 
revolution is probably a military intervention (probably in 
alliance with certain Party figures), perhaps intended to 
prevent the secession of one or more republics, in a case 
where the central political leadership proved unwilling to 
act. The possibility of Russian nationalists coming to 
power through the existing political system is perhaps 
stron-er. I have tried to suggest that the political elite 
as well as the cultural elite has contained individuals and 
groups sympathetic to Russian messianist ideas. The 
differences between the vozrozhdentsy and the 
E&osudarstvenniki are so large as to make it meaningless to 
talk of a single Russian messianist trend. Ianov's fears 
of the tendency for official and unofficial Russian 
nationalism to come together are alleviated by the disunity 
of the variants of Russian nationalism. Empirically, 
Ianov's position is apparently weakened by the evolution in 
the 1970s of Russian nationalist dissidents such as Osipov, 
Kapitanchuk and Khaibulin away from the regime and towards 
the human rights movement, 
A further obstacle to the reconciliation of dissident 
nationalists with the regime has been highlighted by 
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Pospielovsky. In the nineteenth century both the 
Slavophils and the regime claimed to support Orthodoxy and 
autocracy (although they differed in their understanding of 
these concepts). In the 1980s there has been no such 
ideological congruence between Russian nationalist 
dissidents and the regime. 83 Although the gLgsudarstvennik 
ideology and the ideology of the vozrozhdentsY have 
official supporters, they do not represent the official 
ideology of the regime. Andropov's attack on Russian 
nationalism represented the reassertion of Marxism- 
Leninism. His KGB experience must have made clear to him 
that Russian nationalism was a cause of much 
dissatisfaction amon- non-Russians, both inside and outside 
the Party. With the Russian and Slav share of the 
population declining, it would have been expedient to 
appeal to an internationalist ideology to maintain the 
integrity of the multinational State, as well as to appeal 
to the patriotism (without encouraging the nationalism) of 
the constituent nations. 
Dunlop and Pospieiovsky both see the strength of the 
nationalists in the tens of millions of Orthodox believers 
in the USSR. Pospielovsky argues that ideas which are 
rooted in the Russian past are more likely to be a 
successful alternative to the ruling ideology than Western 
liberal ideas which are not. For him, the question is not 
whether Russian nationalism will come to power, but which 
sort of nationalism it will be. 
84 
Dunlop wrote in his 1983 book that Russian nationalism 
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could become the State ideology after the Brezhnev 
succession was compieted. He suggests that if the 
gosudarstvenniki gained control, they might listen to the 
vozrozhdentS, y and then allow them into power. 
... if the National Bolsheviks [i. e. the 
Z, osudarstvennikil were to come to power, they would be 
much more vulnerable to the arguments of the 
intellectually more sophisticated vozrozhdentsy, with 
whom they have numerous ideational and emotional links, 
than are present-day Xarxist-Leninists.... A possible 
scenario, therefore, would be a brief National 
Bolshevik interregnum followed by a vozrozhdenets 
period of rule. 85 
This seems to me a serious misunderstanding of the 
relations between the &gsudarstvenniki and the 
vozrozhdentsy. If the former were to come to power, they 
would be likely to seek to tighten censorship and prevent 
publication of other views, be they of democratic-liberal 
or national-religious tendencies. 
It seems that Ianov, Pospielovsky and Dunlop all 
overestimated the importance of Russian nationalism, both 
as a force for dissent and as a potential direction for the 
regime to move in. Under Gorbachov, Russian national 
interests will not be neglected. A nationalist ideology, 
however, is unlikely to be viable for long in a State where 
the dominant nationality is a minority, as the Russians are 
becoming. Representatives of the non-Russians on the 
Central Committee and Politburo can be expected to oppose 
Russian nationalist tendencies. It must be remembered, 
though, that Russianss continue to dominate these bodies. 
It may seem to a Western observer that ideas about 
democratization and decentralization are much more relevant 
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'r-o the material and moral needs ol the Russian people than 
peasant nostalgia or the exploits of General Skobelev. But 
politicians do not always act in their own best interests. 
It cannot be ruled out that the Russian core of the 
. 00 
political elite will at some point in the future succumb to 
Russian nationalist ideas. 
If the shift of power from the Party structures to the 
Congress of People's Deputies and the new Supreme Soviet 
continues, public opinion will play an increasing role in 
policy formation. At present nationalist trends do not 
appear to have majority support among Russians, but there 
is a widespread feeling against what are seen as the 
privileges of the non-Russian republics. If non-Russian 
nationalism continues to grow, the danger of a Russian 
backlash will grow too. If the economy were to deteriorate 
further and if Gorbachov and his allies were to be 
discredited, it is likely that politicians who appealed to 
Russian traditions rather than Western methods would find a 
more sympathetic response from Russians than they have 
until now. 
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Note 
Primary sources for the study of Slavophilism are 
fairly rare. A particularly useful source for some of the 
main writings of classical Slavophilism is the volume 
compiled by Nikolai Brodsky, IýLanELie slavianofily. A copy 
is in the Main Library of the University of Birmingham. 
Editions of the collected works of the four leading 
Slavophils are available. The fourth edition of Aleksei 
Khomiakov's collected works is at the Taylor Institution, 
University of Oxford, and the first volume of the second 
edition is at the School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies, University of London (SSEES). The SSEES library 
has a complete pre-revolutionary edition of Ivan 
Kireevsky's works, and the Taylor Institution has the 
complete works of Konstantin Aksakov. The University of 
Glasgow has a volume of the works of Ivan Aksakov, while 
SSEES has a complete edition. With the growth of Soviet 
interest in Slavophilism in the 1970s, collections of 
articles by the Aksakov brothers and by Ivan Kireevsky have 
been published in Moscow, in the "Liubiteliam russkoi 
slovesnosti" series. It is likely that if alasnost' 
survives, more and fuller editions of the collected works 
of the Slavophils will appear. Already editions of the 
works of such influences on Slavophilism as Nikolai 
Karamzin and Pyotr Chaadaev are on the way. Turning to 
later pre-revolutionary writings, Vladimir Solovyov's 
Natsional'nyi vopros v Rossii is in the University of 
Glasgow. Whether this work, or the Vekhi collection 
(reprinted by Possev), will be republished in the USSR in 
623 
full remains to be seen. 
As far as secondary sources are concerned, the works of 
Nicholas Riasanovsky, Andrzej Walicki and Peter Christoff 
on Slavophilism deserve particular note. Riasanovsky's 
Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles 
remains valuable, and his volume on Nicholas I lays out the 
social, political and ideological environment which gave 
birth to Slavophil doctrine. Walicki's SlavopýLile 
Controyarsy is a thoroughgoing analysis of the influences 
on Slavophilism, of the ideas of its main exponents, and of 
the trends of thought which developed from it. On pan- 
Slavism, the volumes by Hans Kohn and Michael Petrovich are 
useful. Nikolai Tsimbaev's monograph on Ivan Aksakov 
benefits from access to Moscow archives. The series 
"Zhizn' zamechatel'nykh liudei" has brought out biographies 
of Tiutchev and Dostoevsky, and under glasnost' may perhaps 
publish biographies of other Russian nationalist thinkers. 
Nikolai Berdiaev's ideas on Russian messianism and its 
link with Russian communism are expressed in The Russian 
Idea and The Origin of Russian Communism. From a different 
perspective, Mikhail Agursky discusses the nationalist 
elements in Stalinism in Ideologiia_natsional-bol'shevizma. 
Agursky's volume The Third Rome, despite its title, is in fact 
an expanded translation of the previous volume, focussing on 
National Bolshevism. The best single source for the study 
of the rebirth of Russian national consciousness after 
Stalin is probably the journal Novyi mir, especially from 
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1952 to 1970. Dina Spechler's volume is the most detailed 
investigation of this. In the Brezhnev and post-Brezhnev 
periods, the journals Molodaia gvardiia, Moskva and 
particularly Rgsh sovremennik have been the main carriers 
of Russian nationalist thought. The works by Dimitry 
Pospielovsky and John Dunlop, and Aleksandr lanov's The 
Russian New Right, are the most important secondary sources 
on Russian nationalism under Brezhnev. I did not see two 
works which are due to be published in the near future: 
Darrell Hammer's Russian Nationalism and Soviet Politics 
(Westview) and Stephen Carter's Twentieth-Century Russian 
Nationalism (Frances Pinter). 
The leading primary source on dissent under Brezhnev 
was the samizdat bi-monthly Ehnonicle of Current Events. 
Despite the dangerous conditions in which it was produced, 
the editors managed to maintain a high level of accuracy. 
The most thorough analysis of trends of thought in samizdat 
was for a long time Ferdinand Feldbrugge's volume, although 
it was published relatively early in the development of the 
human rights movement. It has, perhaps, now been overtaken 
by Liudmila Alekseeva's longer book, Soviet Dissent, 
written by a former participant in the Moscow Helsinki 
Monitoring Group. The main sources for the development 
of Russian messianism in samizdat are the Russian 
nationalist journals, especially ytc4ft, ; ýtmlia and 
Moskovskii sbornik. Vladimir Osipov's Tri otnosheniia k 
Rodine is a convenient collection. Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn's programmatic writings -A Letter to the 
Soviet Leaders and the co-authored From Under the Rubble 
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are indispensable, as is his memoir of struggle against 
the aPparat, The Oak and the Calf. Other memoirs of 
particular relevance to the Russian nationalist movement 
are those by Levitin-Krasnov and Mikhail Kheifets (on 
Osipov). Among the various samizdat anthologies in 
English, the most useful for Russian messianism is The 
Political. Social and Religious Thought of Russian 
"Samizdat", edited by the emigres Mikhail Meerson- 
Aksyonov and Boris Shragin. 
The principal archives of samizdat material, both of 
which I visited, are the Radio Liberty Arkhiv samizdata in 
Munich and the archives at Keston College in Keston, Kent. 
Both archives are well organized. Keston College 
concentrates on religious samizdat. It regularly published 
a bibliography of new material, in Religion in Communist 
Lands, from 1972 to Autumn 1981 (although only a select 
bibliography after Autumn 1978). Since then it has 
periodically produced lists of new material. The Arkhiv 
samizdata is much more comprehensive, but it should not 
necessarily be considered to be a representative collection 
of all the samizdat in circulation in the Soviet Union. 
Writers or groups who have more contacts with foreigners 
and thus more opportunities to send their documents to the 
West are likely to be over-represented in comparison with 
those for whom Western links are not important. 
Furthermore, some writers may have expressed the desire 
that the Arkhiv not hold their material, because they do 
not want to be associated with Radio Liberty. The Arkhiv 
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samizdata initially published its holdings in the Sobranie 
dokumentov samizdata, and later in the weekly bulletin 
Materialv sam, izdata. 
/I -I Emigre journals which are particularly useful sources 
for Russian Orthodox samizdat are the Paris Vestnik 
RuggkgZo Sti1danchestgZo KhristianakgZo-Dy; Lzheniia (which 
since No. 111 has outgrown the Studenchesko--o in its 
title); the NTS Frankfurt publications, Posey, Grani and 
(to 1981) Vol_'noe slov0; and the newer Journals, Russkoe 
vozrozhdenie (Paris and New York) and Veche (Munich). 
These journals are also useful sources of information on 
current developments in the USSR. The most useful 
periodicals in English for the subjects covered here are 
the Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, renamed since the 
beginnimg of 1989 Report on the USSR (the Russian version 
sometimes includes material not in the English edition); 
Radio Liberty's Cul: rent Abstracts; the invaluable Current 
Digest of the Soviet Press; Keston College's Religion in 
Communist Lands; the publications of the Institute for 
Jewish Affairs (London), Soviet Jewish Affairs and Ins1Zh: L: 
Soviet Jews; the USSR News Brief (Munich); and Index on 
Censorship (London). 
In this bibliography, the traditional division between 
primary and secondary sources has not been followed; for my 
purposes, Soviet discussions of historical topics such as 
the battle of Kulikovo Field, which might be regarded as 
secondary sources, are treated as primary sources, since my 
interest in them is for what they tell us about the views 
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of Soviet writers today. No method of dividing this 
bibliography would be completely satisfactory. I have the 
following sections: bibliographies; works on messianism, 
nationalism and socialism outside Russia; writings on pre- 
revolutionary Russia, where I have included general works 
on Russia; writings on 1917 and the Soviet period, which 
includes Soviet publications on the Tsarist period whose 
chief relevance is what they convey about the Soviet 
period; and samizdat writings. I have excluded newspaper 
articles (other than those I think especially important) 
and Radio Liberty reports. I have listed English 
translations of Russian originals where I am aware of them; 
the version I cite first is normally the version I used. I 
have given American and Canadian publishers as well as 
British where possible. In order to keep the length of 
this bibliography down, I have limited it to those works 
which I have both cited in the notes and seen. 
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